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1980 DIGILAW 415 (MAD)

Jayakodi v. State Thro S. I. of Police, Sholavandan

1980-10-24

S.NAINAR SUNDARAM

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Judgment : The Petitioner in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is an approver. He is seeking grant of bail pending investigation in Crime No. 589 of 1978, Sholavandan Police Station. His attempt to obtain bail before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai, did not fructify because the learned Sessions Judge, in view of the provisions of section 306 (4) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, felt that an approver could not be released on bail unless he was already on bail. The same question is being once against agitated before me in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition. 2. Mr. T.S. Arunachalam, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, would rest his submissions on two grounds. One is that the general provisions found in section 437 of the Code will override section 306 (4) (b) of the Code and power to grant bail under the general provisions need not be circumscribed by section 306 (4) (b) of the Code. The second ground is that this Court, being of superior jurisdiction, has got inherent powers to grant bail de hors limitations, if any, prescribed elsewhere in the Code. These submissions of the learned Counsel are being sought to be repelled by Mr. M. Karpagavinayagam, representing the State, by pointing out that an approver is not an accused who could invoke the provisions relating to bail and even otherwise, the inherent powers of this Court cannot be exercised when there are express limitations prescribed in the Code. 3. For the proposition that an approver cannot be equated to an accused, Mr. M. Karpagavinayagam relies on the decision of Pan-chapakesa Ayyar, J., in Karuppa Served v. Kundaru1. The principle recognized in the learned Judge’s decision is that an approver cannot be put in the same position as an accused and the provisions of sections 497 and 498 of the Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) (now sections 437 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) cannot apply to him; an approver who was not on bail at the time he was tendered the pardon and accepted it cannot be released on bail in the course of the preliminary inquiry and before the inquiry has ended; and if commital ensues, before he has deposed in the Sessions Court and the trial has concluded. 4. 4. The question as to whether approvers can be enlarged on bail during the pendency of the trial before, the Sessions Court, came up for consideration before Paul, J., in Palaniswami v. Gundu Palani2, and the learned Judge, after discussing the earlier authorities, including the one in Karuppa Servai v. Kundaru1, opined that it is not within the competence of the Court to admit an approver to bail when the law declared in unambiguous language that an approver shall not be released on bail until the decision of the case and that the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) (Presently section 306 (4) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), must be read as an exception to the general provisions. In fact, Mr. T.S. Arunachalam, learned Counsel for the petitioner, places reliance on the two decisions referred to and considered by Paul, J., in the above decision, and I have no reason to take a different view from that expressed by Paul, J., in the said decision. 5. I am also clear in my mind that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court cannot be, resorted to and exercised if there is a specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which has dealt with the scope of powers of Court and from which it is possible to spell out a bar, express or implied, with reference to the exercise, of such inherent jurisdiction. This principle has found recognition in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra3. 6. Above all, there is a reason as to why an approver has to be detained in custody until the termination of the trial unless he is already on bail even at the time when pardon is tendered to him. There is every chance that both the prosecution and the accused would be anxious to get at him and make him resile from the statement which he has already given and the assurance that he will stick on to the statement and speak out the truth, to a very great extent, will become nebulous. There is every chance that both the prosecution and the accused would be anxious to get at him and make him resile from the statement which he has already given and the assurance that he will stick on to the statement and speak out the truth, to a very great extent, will become nebulous. That is the reason why the provisions of the Code contemplate that an approver cannot be equated to an accused and he cannot be let on bail until the termination of the trial, unless he is already on bail having been admitted to bail on or before the tendering of pardon to him. 7. If these principles are kept in mind, I am not able to persuade myself to countenance the case of the petitioner for the grant of the bail. It is pointed out that the investigation is yet to be completed even though the occurs rence is stated to have taken place on 15th December, 1978. Mr. M. Karapaga Vinayagam for the State assures that there will be expeditious completion of investigation by the officials concerned and this is recorded. In the result, this criminal miscellaneous petition is dismissed. Criminal miscellaneous petition dismissed.