JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - By means of this petition, two orders dated 1-9-1979 and 14-9-1979 passed by the learned Additional Munsif, Allahabad (Sri T. M. Khan) granting a temporary injunction restraining the petitioners from taking any decision suspending or terminating the services of Dr. A.P. Srivastava, respondent no. 2, the Principal of the College, petitioner No. 2, at the meeting of the Committee of Management of the College fixed for 2-9-1979, or thereafter, and an order passed by the learned District Judge dismissing the appeal of the petitioners against the said injunction, have been assailed. 2. These are the relevant facts. The petitioner no. 1 is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act It runs and manages Lala Lakshmi Narain Degree College, Sirsa, in district Allahabad, through a Committee of Management The said College is affiliated to Kanpur University. Its management and affairs are regulated by the provisions of the U P. State Universities Act and the First Statutes of the Kanpur University. The petitioners nos. 3 and 4 are respectively the Committee of Management and the Manager of the College. 3. Dr A P. Srivastava, respondent no. 2, was appointed as the Principal of the College on one year's probation with effect from 3-9-1977. Not having found the work of the Principal up to the mark, the Committee of Management, by a resolution dated 2-9-1978 extended the period of probation of Dr. A. P. Srivastava by one year. It appears that even by the end of the second year of probation, the Committee of Management remained dissatisfied with the work and conduct of the Principal. A meeting of the Committee of Management was, therefore, convened for 22-7-1979, the agenda of which is said to have been circulated on 13-7-79. Items nos. 2 and 4 of the agenda read as follows : - "2. To consider the complaint received against the Principal Dr. A. P. Srivastava. 4. To consider the probationary period of Dr. A. P. Srivastava, Principal of the College, expiring on 2-9-1979." 4. Items nos. 2 and 4 of the agenda read as follows : - "2. To consider the complaint received against the Principal Dr. A. P. Srivastava. 4. To consider the probationary period of Dr. A. P. Srivastava, Principal of the College, expiring on 2-9-1979." 4. Two days before the meeting was to take place, one Sri P. C. Srivastava, a Lecturer in the College instituted a suit No. 673 of 1979 in the court of the learned Munsif (East), Allahabad The same day, it was transferred to the court of Sri T. M. Khan, an Additional Munsif, who, upon an application made by the plaintiff in that behalf, issued an injunction on 21-7-79 restraining the Committee of Management from implementing any decision which might be taken on 22-7-1979 or thereafter. The petitioners immediately filed a writ petition No. 5357 of 1979 in this Court, in which an interim order was passed staying the operation of the. order passed by Sri T. M. Khan on 21-7-1979. The writ petition was, however, permitted to be withdrawn on 27-8-1979 on the ground that the petitioners had a clear remedy by way of an appeal to the learned District Judge against the order dated 21-7-1979. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, this Court had directed that while the management was free to take steps in regard to the termination of the services of Dr. A. P. Srivastava, during the pendency of the said writ petition, the management would not pass final orders terminating the services of the Principal. 5. After the dismissal of the writ petition, the petitioners filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Allahabad. Meanwhile, on 31-8-1979, the respondent no. 2 himself filed a suit No. 811 of 1979 in the court of the learned Munsif (East), Allahabad with a prayer inter a la that it be declared that the plaintiff was a confirmed Principal of the College, and that the management was not entitled to terminate his services. The plaintiff also filed an application for 8 temporary injunction along with the suit. The learned Munsif (East) issued notices on the injunction application and fixed 1-9-1979 for consideration. However, on 1-9-1979, at the instance of the plaintiff, this suit too was transferred to the Court of Sri T. M Khan. The plaintiff also filed an application for 8 temporary injunction along with the suit. The learned Munsif (East) issued notices on the injunction application and fixed 1-9-1979 for consideration. However, on 1-9-1979, at the instance of the plaintiff, this suit too was transferred to the Court of Sri T. M Khan. On 1-9-1979, Sri T. M. Khan, passed the following ad-interim injunction : - "Defendants are restrained from taking any decision regarding suspension, termination and dismissal of the plaintiff in the proposed meeting fixed for 2-9-1979, or thereafter, and from taking any decision and implimenting it which may effect the cause of the plaintiff till 3-7-1979." 6. On 3-9-1979, the petitioner filed what may be described as a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit itself and to the jurisdiction of the Court to grant any injunction therein (See Annexure "2" to the writ petition). On the 3rd and 4th September, 1979, arguments were advanced on behalf of both sides on the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the petitioners. Orders were n served on the application, and eventually by a detailed order dated 14-9-1979, the learned Additional Munsif overruled all the preliminary objections and held that the Court had jurisdiction to grant the injunction. Thereupon, the petitioners directly came to this Court and filed a writ petition No. 7617 of 1979 challenging the validity of the orders dated 1-9-1979 and 14-9-1979. The petition was directed to be listed for admission after ten days. On 17-10 1979, the writ petition was dismissed as having become infructuous on the ground that the petitioners had in the meantime filed another writ petition No. 8049 of 1979, in which the petitioners challenged not only the orders dated 1-9-1979 and 14-9-1979, but also another order dated 16-10-1979, by which the learned District Judge had vacated an ex parte interim order staying the operation of the order passed by the learned Munsif dated 1-9-1979. the ether writ petition filed by the petitioner' being writ petition No. 8049 of 1979 was directed to be listed for admission on 2-10-1979 as a date had been fixed for the final bearing of the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 1-9-1979 The learned District Judge by the order dated 17-11-1979 dismissed the petitioners appeal which was directed, according to the petitioners, against the orders dated 1-9-1979 and 14-9-1979. Writ petition No. 8049 of 1979 was consequently dismissed on 21-12-1979 as having become inturctuous. Thereafter, the petitioners filed the present writ petition challenging the aforesaid orders. 7. Counsel for the petitioner submitted the following points for my consideration : - (1) The provision of Section 13 of U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act. 1976, amending the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, completely barred the jurisdiction of the courts below to issue the injunction dated 1-9-79 or to issue any injunction which had the effect of affecting the internal management and affairs of the College or the Society running it. (2) The learned Munsif has issued the temporary injunction dated 1-9-1979 in utter disregard of the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. (3) Even if it be assumed that the learned Munsif had jurisdiction to issue injunction, he did not exercise his discretion judicially and in accordance with the taw in granting the injunction. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 on the other hand urged that the view taken by the learned Munsif as well as learned District Judge with regard to their jurisdiction to issue the injunction under challenge is perfectly sound and correct and calls for no interference. He further submitted that in any case, the petitioner still have an effective alternative remedy by contesting the matter of injunction before the learned Munsif, as the temporary injunction w as issued be the learned Munsif only until such time as was allowed to the petitioners to file objections. Learned counsel contended that in view of his latter submission, this Court ought net to interfere in any view of the matter. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I am clearly of the view that the petition is entitled to succeed on each one of the three points urged on behalf of the petitioners. 10. I shall take up the first point first. Elaborating on the first point, counsel submitted that under Section 13 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act No 57 of 1976), there was an absolute and express prohibition against the courts granting injunction in certain matters. 10. I shall take up the first point first. Elaborating on the first point, counsel submitted that under Section 13 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act No 57 of 1976), there was an absolute and express prohibition against the courts granting injunction in certain matters. So absolute was the interdiction intended to be that the Legislature has further provided that any order of injunction granted in contravention of this provision shall be void. Counsel placed reliance on clauses (a),(b),(d) and (h) of Section 13 of the aforesaid Act in support of his argument that the courts below did not have jurisdiction to issue a temporary Injunction in favour of respondent no. 2. 11. In order to appreciate the submission of counsel for the petitioners, it will be convenient to have the provisions of Section 13 extracted here, in so far as they are relevant: - "13. In the first Schedule, in Order XXXIX - (a) in Rule 2, in sub-rule (2), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely : - "Provided that no such injunction shall be granted - (a) where no perpetual injunction could be granted in view of the provisions of Section 38 and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1968; or (b) to stay the operation of an order for transfer, suspension, reduction in rank, compulsory retirement, dismissal, removal or otherwise termination of service of, or taking charge from, any employee including any employee of the Government, or (c) .. ... ... (d) to affect the internal management or affairs of any educational institution including a University, or a Society, or (e) .. .. .. (f) .. .. .. (g) .. .. .. (h) in any matter where a reference can be made to the Chancellor of a University under any enactment for the time being in force ; and any order for injunction granted in contravention of these provisions shall be void. 12. Arguments with regard to the applicability of clause (a) shall be dealt with under the second point argued by counsel for the petitioners. 13. I shall, therefore, first examine the effect of clause (b) of Section 13 aforesaid in relation to the facts of the present case. 12. Arguments with regard to the applicability of clause (a) shall be dealt with under the second point argued by counsel for the petitioners. 13. I shall, therefore, first examine the effect of clause (b) of Section 13 aforesaid in relation to the facts of the present case. In my view, the injunction issued by the learned Munsif quoted above on 1-9-1979 restraining the management from taking any decision and from implementing the same in regard to the suspension, termination and dismissal of the plaintiff from service, clearly runs counter to the prohibition embodied in clause (b), it virtually prevents the management from suspending, dismissing, or terminating the services of the Principal of the institution. The net effect of the injunction issued is the same. If the courts do not have the power to stay the operation of the order of suspension, dismissal Oi termination of services, in my judgment, they will have no jurisdiction to issue an injunction restraining the management from implementing its decisions regarding suspension, dismissal or termination of the services of the employee. For, what. cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly. Clause (b) of Section 13 is, therefore, clearly attracted to the facts of the present case. 14. I shall next consider the question whether clause (d) of Section 13 was also attracted. In may judgment, the injunction issued by the learned Munsif clearly has the effect of interfering with the internal management and affairs of the College and the Society, which runs it. The injunction restrains the management even from taking a decision regarding the services of respondent no. 2, and from implementing the decision "which may affect the cause of the plaintiff." 15. It can hardly be gainsaid that an order of injunction which prevents the management from considering the suitability of the person holding the post of the principal and which restrains the management even from considering the question whether that individual ought to continue as the Principal of the College is one which affects, in the most direct way, thy internal management of the College and the Society which runs it. In Shyamlal Yadav v. Shrimati Kusum Bhawan and others reported in 1979 A.L.J. 785, (S.C.), their Lordship of the Supreme Court were considering the desirability of issuing an injunction restraining the management of a college from taking any action suspending the Principal of the College for a certain length of time. Their Lordships observed as follows : - "Assuming that she was working as Principal, how is it right for a court to interfere with the action of the management against its employee by way of an ad-interim injunction unless there was a strong prima facie case that the action was illegal? How is it a valid ground to grant an injunction merely because the suspended Principal would suffer uncompensatable disadvantages if the operation of the order (of suspension) was not stayed? For by every suspension, the alleged delinquent will sustain some disadvantage. Does that justify a Court coming in the way of the internal management of a college club or other like enterprises. It will be strange jurisprudence which will paralyse autonomous bodies if courts can intervene on some ipso dixit to undo acts of internal management against employees especially when the power of the employer is made out." There is, therefore, no doubt that the injunction order does affect the internal management and affairs of the College and the Society. The words used in the Statutes "internal management" and "affairs" have not been defined in the statutes and being words of wide amplitude, clearly cover the present case. The order passed by the learned Munsif on 1-9-1979 is, therefore, clearly hit by clause (d) of Section 13. 16. Coming to clause (h) of Section 13, the argument was that under Section 68 of the State Universities Act, the respondent no. 2 undoubtedly has a right to take the matter in dispute by way of reference to the Chancellor. Counsel urged that a resolution, passed by the Committee of Management in regard to the services of the petitioners, cannot take effect unless it is reported to the Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor has approved it. If the management passed a resolution terminating the services of respondent no.2, he has the right to make a representation to the Vice Chancellor against the resolution and request him not to approve the representation under Statute No. 17.06(4). If the management passed a resolution terminating the services of respondent no.2, he has the right to make a representation to the Vice Chancellor against the resolution and request him not to approve the representation under Statute No. 17.06(4). If, however, the Vice-Chancellor passed an order approving the action of the management, the Principal would be clearly entitled to make a representation to the Chancellor under Section 68 as the Vice-Chancellor is an officer of the University within the meaning of Section 68. Counsel submitted that clause (h) of Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 barred the issue of jurisdiction in any matter, where a reference can be made to the Chancellor. 17. In my opinion, whether clause (h) of Section 13 applies or not would depend on whether the management acts under Statute No. 17.06 or under Section 31 (2) of the State Universities Act. An action under Statute 17.06 may, in the ultimate analysis attract the application oi Section 68 and, therefore, of clause (h) of Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976. But an action under the third proviso to Section 31 (2) would not attract those provisions as under Section 31 (2) the action contemplated is by the management against which there cannot be a reference under Section 68 of the State Universities Act as the committee of management is neither an authority nor even an officer of the University. It is, therefore, not possible to say that the injunction issued was also barred by clause (h) of Section 13. 18. Counsel for respondent no. 2, however, vehementaly urged that the aforesaid provisions of Section 13 could have no application where the plaintiff comes to the Court with the assertion that there is legally no committee of management in existence, or where allegations of fraud and mismanagement are made against the management by the plaintiff. Having given the matter my best consideration. 1 am of the view that on the facts of the present case, the above argument has no substance Assuming that in extreme cases where there is neither in fact, nor in law in existence a committee of management, the provisions of Section 13 would not apply, the present is certainly not a case of the category. From a reading of the plaint filed by respondent no. From a reading of the plaint filed by respondent no. 2 as well as the averments made in the counter affidavit filed in this court on behalf of respondent no. 2, it is indisputable that the committee of management, of which the petitioner no. 4 is the Manager, of the de facto committee of management Indeed, it has been asserted in the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners that respondent no. 2 was appointed by this very committee of management as Principal. It is not the case of respondent no. 2 that there is in existence son e other committee of management which is legally empowered to act on behalf of the college In the plaint what is alleged is that some present individual members are not qualified to be the members of the committee of management. In regard to two members, namely, Sri R.P. Dwivedi and Sri G.D. Dwivedi representing the Teachers, it is alleged in the plaint that they are not eligible to be the members as they are not the senior-most members of the staff. In regard to two other members, it is alleged that they are disqualified from being the members of the committee of management in view of Section 39 of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973. These are the specific defects which are pointed out in the plaint as regards the composition of the committee of management. As regards the non-teaching members of the committee what is alleged is that there was nothing to show that they had been properly elected as office bearers or members according to the Rules of the Society. It is not disputed that the non-teaching members of the committee of management were elected in the year 1976 or thereabout, and that they have been functioning as such ever since then. 19. In my judgment, the averments made in the plaint do not bring the case of the petitioner in the category of those extreme cases which may be said to be excepted from the operation of Section 13 of the aforesaid U.P. Act. 19. In my judgment, the averments made in the plaint do not bring the case of the petitioner in the category of those extreme cases which may be said to be excepted from the operation of Section 13 of the aforesaid U.P. Act. A mere allegation pointing out defects in the committee of management of the nature mentioned above, would not, in my view, bring the present case into the category of there being in existence no committee of management in the eye of law entitled to the protection mentioned in Section 13 (d) of the afore said Act. 20. It may be that clause (d) of Section 13 of the Act may not apply in some extreme cases where a body of persons claiming to be constituting the committee of management of the College are mere pretenders and rank usurpers, when neither in fact, nor in law it is so, or can be characterised as the committee of management. The present, however, is certainly Dot a case of that character. 21. In this connection, it would be pertinent to refer to Section 66 of the U.P. State Universities Act, which reads as follows : - "66. No act or proceeding of any authority, or body or committee of the University shall be invalid merely by reason of - (a) any vacancy or defect in the constitution thereof, or (b) some person having taken part in the proceedings who was not entitled to do so, or (c) any defect in the election, nomination or appointment of a person acting as members thereof, or (d) any irregularity in its procedure not affecting the merits of the case." The above provisions clearly support the view which I am inclined to take, namely, that a mere defect in the constitution of the committee of management or the fact that some of the persons participating in its proceedings are not qualified to be its members would not, in my opinion, have the consequence of reducing the committee of management to a complete non-entity, not entitled to the protection aforesaid by Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976. 22. As regards the argument that there are allegations of fraud in the plaint, against the present committee of management. 22. As regards the argument that there are allegations of fraud in the plaint, against the present committee of management. I am clearly of the view that the averments made in the plaint are not such which can properly take the case out of the purview of Section 13 of the Act. In the plaint, what has been alleged against the committee of management is that defendant No. 4 is not maintaining the accounts of the College properly, or that he is misappropriating the college funds, and that he is generally mismanaging the affairs of the college. In my view, even if it be assumed that the allegations of maladministration or n is appropriation of the College funds are taken to be correct on their face, that would not make any difference to the application of Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976. These allegations do not amount to a case where it can be said that there is legally no committee of management in existence such as may be held entitled to the protection of Section 13. These allegations do not take the present case out of the extreme exception which counsel for the respondent appeared to have had in his mind.' 23. As already stated, admittedly the present committee of management is the de facto committee managing the affairs of the College. It is this committee which appointed the respondent no. 2 as the Principal. It is, therefore, prima facie entitled to continue to manage the affairs of the College until it is held otherwise and consequently, the court would have no jurisdiction to pass any orders affecting the right of this committee to manage the internal affairs of the College. 24. In view of what has been stated above, I hold that the provisions of Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 clearly barred the jurisdiction of the Court to issue any injunction preventing the petitioners from taking decision in regard to the services of respondent no. 2 and from implementing the same. The first argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is, therefore, accepted. 25. I shall next take up the question whether the courts below had any jurisdiction to issue an injunction in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on clauses (e) and (h) of Section 41. The first argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is, therefore, accepted. 25. I shall next take up the question whether the courts below had any jurisdiction to issue an injunction in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on clauses (e) and (h) of Section 41. In regard to clause (e), the argument was that inasmuch as specific performance of the contract of personal service is normally not to be allowed, the court had no jurisdiction to issue any injunction. This argument was advanced before the learned Munsif but was not accepted by him. Numerous authorities were cited before the learned Munsif. Some were cited before me also. The legal position in regard to this controversy appears to have been set at rest by a services of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court. Two of these decisions need to be mentioned. These were cited by counsel for the petitioners. 26. The first was the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain and others reported in AIR 1976 S. C. 888. The majority view in this case was that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a court nor .ally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, according to the decision of the Supreme Court, is subject to three exceptions :- (1) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution of India ; (2) where a worker is sought to be a reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law ; and (3) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provision of the Statute. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the Executive Committee of the Vaish Degree College not having been created by any statute, was not a statutory body. Their Lordships further held that the relief of declaration and injunction under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act were discretionary reliefs, and they could not be granted as a matter of course, or as of right. 27. Their Lordships further held that the relief of declaration and injunction under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act were discretionary reliefs, and they could not be granted as a matter of course, or as of right. 27. The learned Munsif under his order dated 14-9-1979 held that the present case is covered by the third exception mentioned above. The view is obviously wrong. The (committee of management in the present case was admittedly not created by any statute, though it may be governed by certain statutes. The case of respondent no. 2 is admittedly not covered by the first and second exceptions. Under the circumstances, the present case was clearly covered by the dictum of the Supreme Court laid down in the case of Vaish Degree College (supra) which was wrongly applied by the learned Munsif. 28. The learned Munsif. however, observed that this decision only laid down that normally a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced. However, there are no special circumstances, at least none has been pointed out by the learned Munsif or the learned District Judge or even by counsel for the respondent, which may prima facie take the case of the plaintiff out of the normal rule. In the case of Vaish Degree College (supra), the Supreme Court had taken note of the fact that the plaintiff in that case had worked only for two years with his employer. In the present case also, admittedly, the respondent no. 2 has been in the employment of the College only from 2-9 1977. In any case, unless some special circumstances are established, prima facie, the plaintiffs suit was clearly barred by the provision of Section 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act. (The dictum of the Vaish Degree College has been followed by the Supreme Court as late as 1979 in the case of J. Tewari v. Shrimati Jwala Devi reported in 1979 (4) S.C.C. 160 . (The dictum of the Vaish Degree College has been followed by the Supreme Court as late as 1979 in the case of J. Tewari v. Shrimati Jwala Devi reported in 1979 (4) S.C.C. 160 . To the same effect is the view of our own Court expressed recently in the case of Union of India v. Kedar Rai and another reported in 1979 A W.C. 675, where this Court reiterated the view that the Court while considering an application for injunction must address itself to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, and that Courts ought not to issue injunction which has the effect of imposing an employee on the employer, or which has the effect of enforcing a contract of personal service unless there are some special circumstances. This Court applied the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases including the case of Vaish Degree College and set aside the order passed by the learned District Judge on the ground that he had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing a temporary injunction restraining the Union of India from removing the plaintiff from ss.vice.) 29. Following the aforesaid decisions, I hold that prima facie the plaintiff was not entitled to the reliefs (a) and (e) claimed in the suit as the grant of such reliefs was clearly barred by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. Consequently, the Court had no jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from terminating the services of the plaintiff or taking any decision in that behalf. 30. As for the argument of the petitioners counsel founded on clause (h) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, for the reasons I have given above for not applying clause (h) of Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976, I do not accept this argument as well. 31. Coming to the third and last submission. I am of opinion that the learned Munsif issued the injunction as a matter of course, and not in accordance with the settled principles regulating the grant of injunction by courts. The principle that a relief for injunction is discretionary and that the plaintiff cannot claim it as a matter of right is far too well established to require elaboration or reiteration. Relief of injunction is granted by the Courts according to sound legal principles debito Justitice. The principle that a relief for injunction is discretionary and that the plaintiff cannot claim it as a matter of right is far too well established to require elaboration or reiteration. Relief of injunction is granted by the Courts according to sound legal principles debito Justitice. Applying these principles, a Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Kedar Rai (supra) observed thus : - "A person seeking relief of temporary injunction must satisfy the court that he has a frima facie case, namely, the issue raised by him in the suit would in all probability be decided in his favour and he would be entitled to the relief claimed by him in the suit. He must further satisfy the court that its interference is necessary to protect him from irreparable injury and lastly he must show that the mischief or injury which is likely to be caused in the absence of the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise in granting it. Broadly speaking, the court before granting injunction must satisfy itself about the existence of three factors : - Firstly that there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff, secondly, that irreparable injury will accrue to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted and the injury which may be caused to him cannot be compensated in term of money, and, thirdly the balance of convenient is in favour of the plaintiff. Unless all these three conditions are satisfied, no temporary injunction should ordinarily be granted." I am in respectful agreement with the observations of the Bench. The courts below do not appear to have addressed themselves at all to this test before granting the temporary injunction. If they had considered this, they would have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff would not have suffered in the slightest degree by the mere passing of the resolution of the committee of management. There was, absolutely, no ground to think that if injunction was not immediately issued, the plaintiff would have suffered irreparable loss. The leaaned Munsif should have waited at least till he had given a reasonable opportunity to the defendants to file their detailed objections against the injunction application. There was, no apprehension or likelihood of any un-compensable loss, if injunction had not been granted then and there. 32. The leaaned Munsif should have waited at least till he had given a reasonable opportunity to the defendants to file their detailed objections against the injunction application. There was, no apprehension or likelihood of any un-compensable loss, if injunction had not been granted then and there. 32. I am also of the view that in view of the fact that the reliefs (a) and (e) claimed by the plaintiff in the suit are reliefs which if granted would amount to granting specific performance of a contract of personal service, prima facie the suit of the plaintiff was barred, and that consequently, the plaintiff did not have a prima facie case such as to entitle him to the grant of a temporary injunction. The view of the learned Munsif to the contrary as expressed by him in his order dated 14-9-1979 is unsustainable. 33. For these reasons, I am clearly of the view that the third point urged by the counsel for the petitioner has to be answered in favour of the petitioner. 34. Before ending, I must deal with an argument on which counsel for the respondents laid considerable stress. It was urged that the learned Munsif had merely issued at temporary injunction for the period during which the defendants were incited to file objections, It was, therefore, submitted that the petitioners still had their remedy by way of contest before the learned Munsif himself. I find no substance in this argument. On all major controversies relating to the jurisdiction of the Court, the learned Munsif had already expressed his opinion (see the order dated 14-9-1979), As rest of the controversies have already become closed for the petitioners, it would not be right to relegate them to the remedy of contesting the injunction application before the learned Munsif. 35. Counsel for the respondents also tried to make a great deal of the fact that the petitioners had filed a number of writ petitions earlier in this Court, and that they were all dismissed. However, as would appear from the facts mentioned above, none of the petitions filed by the petitioners was dismissed on merits. Each one of the earlier petitions filed by the petitioners was dismissed without going into the merits. Consequently, the dismissal of earlier petitions filed by the petitioner would have not have effect of operating as res judicata in this petition. 36. Each one of the earlier petitions filed by the petitioners was dismissed without going into the merits. Consequently, the dismissal of earlier petitions filed by the petitioner would have not have effect of operating as res judicata in this petition. 36. I may now deal with the two decisions cited by the counsel for the respondents. In C. M. P. Degree College v. Jamuna Prasad .Pandey, (1979 A.L.R. 275) the question was whether a suit filed by a Lecturer of a Degree College claiming an injunction against the committee of management was barred by Section 69 of the State Universities Act. The Court held that inasmuch as no relief was claimed against the University or any of its officers, the bar of Section 9 of the Act would not apply. The proposition is, with respect, entirely unexceptionable. However, I have not held that the present suit is barred by Section 69 of the aforesaid Act. I have reached my conclusions independently of Section 69 of the Act. This decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the respondents. 37. The next case cited, namely, Shridhar Misra and others v. Jaichandra Vidyalankar and others ( AIR 1959 All. 598 is again distinguishable and is of no help. In this case, it has been ruled that ordinarily a civil court would not interfere with the internal management of a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, but the rule is subject to certain exceptions which have been mentioned therein. This decision can afford no assistance to the contention of counsel for the respondent as the learned Judge deciding that case was not concerned with the effect of the provisions of Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976. Furthermore, the problems in the case of Shridhar Misra and others (supra) were fundamentally different from those with which I am concerned. 38. In view of what has been staled above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. This orders passed by the learned Munsif on 1-9-1979 and 14-9-1979, and that passed by the leaned District Judge on 17-11-1979 are quashed. The parties will bear their own costs of this petition.