JUDGMENT : R.R. RASTOGI, J. 1. This is tenant's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order dated 22-12-1978 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur Respondent No. 1. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that one Lok Nath Dixit was owner of house No. 22 situated in Mohalla Hazaripur in the town of Gorakhpur. This house was divided in five portions, one of which was in the possession of the owner himself, three others were in possession of tenants and the fifth portion facing the road towards south was let out to Laxmi Prasad Gupta, Petitioner No. 1 for the purpose of carrying on business therein, on 1-7-1967. On his death on 6-4-1972 Lok Nath Dixit left behind his three sons Ramesh Chandra, Harish Chandra and Mahesh Chandra, his widow Smt. Dulari Dixit, one unmarried daughter Suman Pandey and two married daughters Smt. Drmila Dubey and Smt. Mithilesh Dubey. An application for release of the aforesaid fifth portion was moved by the sons, widow and unmarried daughter u/s 21(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on 4-5-1977. The married daughters were made opposite parties of the second set. Opposite parties of the Ist set consisted of the tenant and one Anand Prasad Gupta, a relation of his. Two grounds were given in the application. Firstly that Mahesh Chand was out of employment and he wanted the disputed shop for setting up his own business and the second ground was that Laxmi Prasad Gupta was carrying on Kairana Business in a shop in Mohalla Khoonipur Saha-ganj and had sublet the shop in dispute to Anand Prasad Gupta. 3. The application was contested by both these opposite parties. The alleged need of Mahesh Chandra was denied and it was asserted that he was doing business in the small triangular areas which adjoins the disputed shop. It was also denied that Laxmi Prasad Gupta had sublet the disputed shop to Anand Prasad Gupta. 4. The application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority on the findings that Mahesh Chandra could carry on his business in the small shop adjoining the disputed shop and further that Laxmi Prasad Gupta had not sublet the disputed shop to Anand Prasad Gupta. 5. 4. The application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority on the findings that Mahesh Chandra could carry on his business in the small shop adjoining the disputed shop and further that Laxmi Prasad Gupta had not sublet the disputed shop to Anand Prasad Gupta. 5. On appeal the Additional District Judge took a contrary view and held that Mahesh Chandra Dixit had not joined any service with Tata S.K. Agency Sahibganj as alleged by the opposite parties and that he genuinely needed the shop in dispute for establishing his own business. The learned Additional District Judge also held that Laxmi Prasad Gupta was carrying on his business in another shop in Mohalla Khoonipur Sahibganj and had sub-let the shop in dispute to Anand Prasad Gupta and that being the position, the tenant would not suffer any hardship if the disputed shop was released in favour of Mahesh Chandra Dixit. Accordingly, the disputed shop was ordered to be released in his favour for establishing his own business. The order forms the subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition. 6. It has been asserted in paragraph 12 of the writ petition that Mahesh Chandra Dixit had closed the shop which was adjoining the shop in dispute and had taken employment with Tata S.K. Agency and he was not in need of the shop in dispute. Respondent No. 2, Ramesh Chandra Dixit in his counter affidavit, filed on 29-6-1979 denied this allegation and stated that Mahesh Chandra was not an employee as suggested and had only started selling the goods of S.K. Agency Sahibganj, Gorakhpur on daily wage basis and that provided only a small income to him which was hardly sufficient for his maintenance and he was in genuine and bona fide need of the disputed shop. On 29-1-1980 Mahesh Chandra filed an affidavit stating that at the time of the filing of the application u/s 21 of the Act he was of course unemployed, but now he has been employed in S.K. Tata Agency Sahibganj, and is no more in need of the disputed shop for doing any business. The Petitioners in their rejoinder-affidavit again reiterated the same averment and also filed a copy of an agreement alleged to have been executed between them and Mahesh Chandra Dixit on 29-1-1980. The Petitioners in their rejoinder-affidavit again reiterated the same averment and also filed a copy of an agreement alleged to have been executed between them and Mahesh Chandra Dixit on 29-1-1980. Ramesh Chandra Dixit thereafter filed supplementary counter affidavit in which it has been stated that in May 1979, as a result of a mutual family arrangement the family properties were divided and the disputed accommodation along with some other property was allotted in the share of the deponent Ramesh Chandra Dixit and Mahesh Chandra Dixit was allotted some other property and he had no concern with the disputed shop. Thus, Ramesh Chandra Dixit became the sole landlord of the disputed shop and he served a notice dated 12-12-1979 on the tenant u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 20 of the Act and it was thereafter that the tenant Petitioner won over Mahesh Chandra Dixit and got an affidavit filed by him in order to create complications and harass the deponent. 7. In view of the subsequent developments two questions fall for consideration--Firstly whether in deciding this writ petition notice should be taken of the subsequent events or not and secondly as to what is the nature of the affidavit given by Mahesh Chandra Dixit? I may first take up the second question. 8. As has been stated above it was claimed in the application for release that Mahesh Chandra Dixit being unemployed wanted the disputed shop to set up his own business. The other two brothers were and are admittedly in employment. Thus, the need for the shop in question was alleged to be of Mahesh Chandra Dixit. The Additional District Judge in appeal directed the release of the disputed shop in favour of Mahesh Chandra Dixit. After the filing of the writ petition Mahesh Chandra Dixit has come forward with an assertion that since he has got employment, he is no more in need of the shop in dispute for doing his own business. According to the learned Counsel for, the Petitioners as also of Mahesh Chandra Dixit, this affidavit of Mahesh Chandra Dixit amounts to his withdrawing from the proceedings while it has been contended on behalf of the other Respondents that is. Mahesh Chandra and others that the writ petition cannot be decided on the basis of a compromise and that being so the impugned order cannot be interfered with. Mahesh Chandra and others that the writ petition cannot be decided on the basis of a compromise and that being so the impugned order cannot be interfered with. I am not inclined to accept this submission, because in my opinion the affidavit of Mahesh Chandra Dixit is clearly in the nature of an intimation to the Court of his intention to withdraw from the proceedings. It is not in the nature of a compromise and has not been so treated by the Petitioners and Mahesh Chandra Dixit. Therefore, no such question arises in this case as to whether the writ can or not be decided on the basis of a compromise. 9. Now coming to the first question it was urged on behalf of the contesting Respondents that subsequent events cannot be taken notice of, that in the present writ petition all that has to be seen is as to whether the impugned order suffers from any such error of law which may justify an interference by this Court, that this Court cannot substitute its own order on the basis of the subsequent events, but has to remand it to the lower court for decision afresh in the light thereof. It was also contended that since the interest of a third party has intervened, this Court should take notice of the same. That interest is said to be of Remesh Chandra, who as a result of the family partition claimed to have received the disputed shop in his share. In my opinion when admittedly after the decision of the appeal by the Additional District Judge some change has taken place in the situation, how can the Court be asked not to take notice of this change. It is not necessary to take into consideration the existing position in order to make the right of remedy claimed just and meaningful. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 in an appeal by special leave against a decision given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a revision application, the Supreme Court had occasion to observe: It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies pending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice--subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of undated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. A caution was of course given and it was that; The court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of the events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. 10. In the instant case when admittedly as a result of Mahesh Chandra Dixit joining some service his need to carry on business in the shop in dispute having come to an end or as a result of family partition the disputed shop coming to the share of another member of the family who is admittedly in service and whose need was not pressed in service for claiming release of the disputed shop can it be said that the Court should ignore these events and enter into an academic discussion of the merits of the impugned order only and decide the writ petition? In my opinion the decision of the writ petition in the light of the subsequent events would factually be in the accord with the correct reality and it cannot be said that there will be any disregard of the interest of either party. Ramesh Chandra has already taken steps to determine the tenancy of Laxmi Prasad Gupta and in due course of time, if he wants to eject him, he will have to take proper steps therefor. So far as the present proceedings are concerned when the need of Mahesh Chandra Dixit has ceased to exist, the shop cannot be released in his favour. 11. So far as the present proceedings are concerned when the need of Mahesh Chandra Dixit has ceased to exist, the shop cannot be released in his favour. 11. I am also not inclined to agree with the learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents that the matter may be referred back to the Additional District Judge for passing a suitable order in the changed circumstances of the case, because, as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Ganesh Das Ram Gopal Vs. The Munsif, South Lucknow and Another, AIR 1976 All 111 : "While exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises the same power which was exercised by the learned Munsif u/s 7B(II) of the Act. What the learned Munsif could do u/s 7-B (II) the same can be done by the High Court in writ proceedings." (Para 16) 12. In Shambho Nath v. Radhey Shyam 1976 ALJ 669 a learned Single Judge of this Court of course held that the legality of the impugned order has to be judged with reference to the circumstances as they existed at the time the order was passed and this Court when exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot act like a court of appeal and take into consideration the subsequent events. I have already referred above the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Venkateshwarlu (Supra), on the basis of which it cannot be said as a matter of absolute proposition of law that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court cannot take into consideration the subsequent events. 13. The learned Counsel for the Respondents also relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Udai Bhan Singh v. Board of Revenues 1974 RD 107 FB where, while explaining the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution, it was observed that when a writ petition is filed challenging a decision in a suit or proceedings declaring of adjudicating rights or interest in any land this Court calls for record of the suit or proceeding and if it is found to be without jurisdiction or if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record the judgment or order is quashed. This Court after quashing the order cannot substitute its own order or decree for the order or decree impugned, but must send back to the court or authority concerned for deciding the case in accordance with the law declared by it. I do not think that this proposition is applicable to the present case because the impugned order is now not sought to be quashed on the basis of any error of law apparent on the face of the record, but the person for whose need the disputed shop was sought to be released wants to withdraw from the proceedings. In this situation this Court is not substituting its own order or decree for the order or decree impugned, but is only giving effect to the current reality. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, treating the affidavit filed by Mahesh Chandra Dixit as an application to withdraw from the proceedings, I find that the impugned order cannot be allowed to stand and is liable to be quashed. The writ petition hence succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. In the circumstances, parties will bear their own costs all through.