JUDGMENT : R.R. RASTOGI, J. 1. This is a landlord's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari, quashing the orders dated 3-9-1976 and 21-4-1978 passed by Respondents Nos. 2 and 1 respectively. The Petitioner is owner of a house property in the town of Chandpur, district Bijnor and since long it has been on lease with Vedic Kanya Pathshala, Chandpur, district Bijnor, Respondent No. 3. The Petitioner had been in service in Rajasthan and on his retirement he wanted this house for his personal residence and hence moved an application u/s 21 of the Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The application was resisted by the tenant. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the application on the ground that since the tenant is a recognised educational institution, it is not liable to ejectment u/s 21(8) of the Act. The same view has been taken on appeal by the Additional District Judge, Bijnor. 2. Sub-section (8) of Section 21 of the Act which reads as under was inserted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. (8). Nothing in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) shall apply to a building let out to State Government, or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation, or to a recognised educational institution, unless the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom Clause (ii) or Clause (iv) of the Explanation to Sub-section (1) is applicable; Provided that in the case of such a building the District Magistrate may, on the application of the landlord, enhance the monthly rent payable therefore to a sum equivalent to one twelfth of ten percent of the market value of the building under tenancy, and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from the commencement of the month of tenancy following the date of the application; Provided further that a similar application for further enhancement may be made after the expiration of a period of five years from the date of the last order of enhancement. Clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to Sub-section (1) were omitted by this very Amending Act and, therefore, the last portion of the sub-section does not carry any meaning. 3. Two submissions were made before me on behalf of the Petitioner. Clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to Sub-section (1) were omitted by this very Amending Act and, therefore, the last portion of the sub-section does not carry any meaning. 3. Two submissions were made before me on behalf of the Petitioner. Firstly that Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 being substantive in nature cannot be controlled by Sub-section (8) which has not been given retrospective effect and thus proceedings pending when this amendment was made would not be governed by it. The second submission made was that the provisions contained in Sub-section (8) aforesaid being discriminatory, is violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. 4. I do not find much substance in either of these submissions. I may first dispose of the second submission. The scope of Article 14 of the Constitution has come up for discussion before the Supreme Court and various High Courts in a number of cases and it is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis, namely, geographical or according to the objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration--See Budhan Choudhry and Others Vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 , Ram Krishna Dolmiya v. Justice Tandolkar AIR 1958 SC 548 and Pathumma and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Others, AIR 1978 SC 771 . In Pathumma's case it has further been observed: It is well settled that before a person can claim to be discriminated against another he must show that all other persons are similarly situated or equally circumstanced....In other words discrimination violative of Article 14 can only take effect if there is discrimination between equals and not where unequals are being differently treated. 5. 5. Sub-section (8) aforesaid has given protection from ejectment to buildings let out to the State Government, or to a local authority, or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution. The interest of the landlords of such buildings have been adequately taken care of by making suitable provisions in the provisos. They can claim enhancement of monthly rent payable to a sum equal to one twelfth of 10 percent of the market value of the building under tenancy and further make similar application for further enhancement after the expiry of a period of five years from the date of the last order of enhancement. It is therefore not possible to say that the provisions contained in Sub-section (8) is violative of Article 14 or even of Article 19 of the Constitution. 6. Coming to the first submission the principle embodied in Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act is that the pending cases although instituted under the provisions of law as in force at that time will in the matter of the procedure be governed by the amendments, if any, made in the procedural law. during the pendency of the suit, but whatever procedure was correctly adopted and concluded under the old law cannot be opened again for the purpose of applying the new procedure, vide Nani Gopal Mitra Vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1636 paras 5 and 6. So far as the provision contained in Sub-section (8) is concerned, it is as regards matter of procedure, but relates to substantive rights and" it is of course a question of real difficulty to say as to whether it has retrospective operation. An almost similar question had come up before the Supreme Court in Sree Bank Ltd. Vs. Sarkar Dutt Roy and Co., AIR 1966 SC 1953 . In that case by consent of parties a decree was passed in favour of the Appellant bank against the Respondent for payment of Rs. 31,000/- in the manner specified. The decree provided that if the Respondents fail to pay any of the instalments mentioned in it within four months of its becoming due, the Appellant bank shall deem all instalments in default and shall be entitled to realise all the said amount by execution. The amounts payable under the decree by May 30,1947 were all duly paid and that left a sum of Rs. The amounts payable under the decree by May 30,1947 were all duly paid and that left a sum of Rs. 21,000/- payable by six annual instalments each payable on the 30th of December, of a year, the first being payable in 1947 and the last in 1952. None of these 6 instalments was paid and an application for realising them by execution was made on August 26, 1957. In the meantime a petition for winding up the Appellant bank had been presented on May 11, 1948, and an order for winding up had been made on August 3 1948 and the application for execution was made by the Liquidator in the course of the winding up. Under Article 182(7) of the 1st Schedule to the Limitation Act an application for execution is barred if not made within three years from the date on which the amount sought to be realised was payale under decree. On December 30, 1953, Section 45O was introduced in the Banking Companies Act, 1949, Sub-section (1) of which provided that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or in any other law for the time being in force in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application by a banking company which is being wound up, the period commencing from the date of the presentation of the Petitioner for the winding up of the banking company shall be excluded. The Appellant bank claimed that this section saved its application for execution from the bar of limitation imposed by Article 182(7). It was urged on behalf of the Respondents that Section 45-O had no retrospective operation. That submission was repelled for the reason that where a statute is passed with the object of protecting the public against some evil or abuse it may be allowed to operate retrospectively, even if by such operation it will deprive some person or persons of vested right (paragraph 5). Raghubardayal, J. further observed; It is not necessary for the retrospective operation of the provisions of an Act that it must be stated that its provisions would be deemed to have always existed. That is one mode and may be an effective mode of providing that the provisions would have retrospective effect. Raghubardayal, J. further observed; It is not necessary for the retrospective operation of the provisions of an Act that it must be stated that its provisions would be deemed to have always existed. That is one mode and may be an effective mode of providing that the provisions would have retrospective effect. Retrospective effect of an enactment can also be gathered from its language and the object and intend of legislature in enacting it. (Para 38) 7. If this principle is applied to the present case, it would be a better view to hold that the provisions contained in Section 21(8) is retrospective in operation. As I have stated above the object was to provide protection in the matter of tenancy from the provisions of this Act in respect of buildings in the tenancy of the State Government, local authority, or recognised educational institutions. By the same amendment adequate safeguards were made for the interests of the landlords in respect of those buildings. Therefore, the provision should be given a retrospective effect and on the finding that the tenant of the disputed, building is a recognised educational institution, the application for release was rightly dismissed. 8. In view of the foregoing discussion, this writ petition fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.