ORDER M. P. Mehrotra, J. -This application has been moved seeking a review of my judgment dated 28-8-1979 whereby 1 dismissed the writ petition in limine. The said writ petition was moved by 12 petitioners. This review application has, however, been moved only by five of the said petitioners. The five applications before me .are respectively the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 in the writ petition. I am extracting certain passages from my judgment in the writ petition with a view to give the facts of the case: "The facts, in brief, are these. One Ramadhar was treated as the tenure-holder and notice was issued to him. It is alleged that the notices were issued to two sons also. The proceedings took place and ultimately 9.65 acres of land was declared surplus in the hands of Ramadhar by the Prescribed Authority. It seems that Ramadhar died during the proceedings. Thereafter, the proceedings were continued before the Prescribed Authority in the presence of the heirs. The Prescribed Authority in accordance with the directions given in the remand order by the appellate court declared certain land measuring 9.65 acres to be the surplus land. Thereafter, an application under Section 13-A of the Act was moved and a true copy of the same is annexure 8 to the petition. An objection was taken in this application that the second notice, which had been issued under the amended Act, was wrongly issued. It seems that in the second notice the sons holding was also said to be included in the holding of the father Ramadhar. The Prescribed Authority rejected this application holding that Section 13-A of the Act was not attracted. Thereafter, an appeal was filed and the same was also dismissed. Now the petitioners have come up in the instant writ petition and apart from the four applicants in the application under Section 13-A of the Act, many others have joined also in the instant petition. They were nowhere there in the proceedings under Section 13-A of the Act. Some of them claim to be the third parties and claim that their rights are being affected. It should be seen that so far as the impugned order of the Prescribed Authority is concerned, that was passed in accordance with the appellate courts remand order. No proceedings were taken against the appellate courts remand order and therefore, the said order became final. It should be seen that so far as the impugned order of the Prescribed Authority is concerned, that was passed in accordance with the appellate courts remand order. No proceedings were taken against the appellate courts remand order and therefore, the said order became final. If the contention of the petitioners were correct, that there was some obvious mistake, then the appellate court should have been approached and not the Prescribed Authority who merely carried out the directions given in the remand order. So far as the second notice is concerned, it is not necessary to go into the said question because the impugned order of the Prescribed Authority declaring 9.65 acres as surplus land in the hands of Ramadhar is really based on the first ceiling proceedings. In such a situation, the petitioners can have no grievance against the said order. It should be seen that under Section 13-A of the Act, the jurisdiction conferred by the Act is a discretionary one. There is no compulsiveness underlying this provision. In such a situation no question of jurisdiction arises. The learned counsel next contended that there was some arithmetical error which is undoubtedly a very minor on the said contention. Even if, some minor mistakes were there, it was not obligatory that the Prescribed Authority must have interfered. In .any case, as I have said above, so far as this court is concerned, there is no question of jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner when contended that so far as the petitioners Nos. 5 to 11 are concerned, the ; proceedings before the Ceiling Authorities were bad in law, because no notice under Rule 8 of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules was issued to them. So far as the petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 are concerned, from the allegations made in the petition itself, it seems that notices were issued to them and they had put in appearance also. This is clear from Paras. 4 and 5 of the petition. These two petitioners had not join in the application under S. 13-A of the Act. The objections, therefore, raised by these two petitioners cannot be entertained in view of the aforesaid background. So far as the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 are concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on recent Full Bench decision in Civil Misc. These two petitioners had not join in the application under S. 13-A of the Act. The objections, therefore, raised by these two petitioners cannot be entertained in view of the aforesaid background. So far as the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 are concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on recent Full Bench decision in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 257 of 1977, Shantanu Kumar v. State of U.P. and others. The Full Bench Tendered its decision on August 22, 1979. It should be seen that in the said Full Bench case, the appellate judgment in the appeal, which was filed by the tenure-holder, was decided on January 10, 1977 and the said Writ Petition No. 257 of 1977 was filed by Shantanu Kumar on January 31, 1977. The Full Bench granted relief to the petitioner. In the instant case, I am not interfering on the ground of delay on the part of the petitioners Nos. 5 to 11. The impugned order of the Prescribed Authority was passed on 6th May, 1978 and thereafter as stated above no appeal was filed by the tenure-holder against the said order of the Prescribed Authority. As stated above, the Prescribed Authority in passing the said order dated 6th May, 1978, had merely carried out the directions given by the appellate court in its judgment dated 17-5-1976, a true copy whereof is annexure 5 to the petition. The petitioners Nos. 5 to 11 cannot take any advantage of the subsequent proceedings under S. 13-A of the Act because they were no parties to the application under S. 13-A of the Act. These petitioners, therefore, had no justification for not coming to this Court much earlier. They have come to this Court after long delay and in my opinion the delay has not been satisfactorily explained. In Para. These petitioners, therefore, had no justification for not coming to this Court much earlier. They have come to this Court after long delay and in my opinion the delay has not been satisfactorily explained. In Para. 13 of the petition, a general statement has been made: "That in all the aforementioned proceedings Balendra Shekar and others (petitioners 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) were not given any notice, nor did they know of these proceedings under the Act against Ramadhar Singh or against petitioners 5 and 6 although their names had been recorded in the revenue records under the orders dated 5-2-1972 and existed in the revenue records on the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1972." In my view this allegation is wholly insufficient to explain the big delay involved in the petition. None of the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 has sworn the affidavit in support of their petition. The affidavit has been sworn by one Ram Chandra Tewari who has merely described himself as a pairokar of the petitioners. It has not been stated in the petition as to how and when the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 came to know of the ceiling proceedings. In such a situation I decline to entertain this petition on the ground of delay so far as the petitioners Nos. 5 to 11 are concerned. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to go into the allegations which have been made in the petition that names of the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 had been recorded in the revenue records and, therefore, they were entitled to get the notice under Rule 8 of the relevant Rules." 2. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that my aforesaid judgment suffers from a patent error which is apparent on the face of record inasmuch as I did not correctly follow the Full Bench decision of this Court in Shantanu Kumar v. State (1979 All WC 585): (1979 All LJ 1174). Learned counsel placed reliance on Jamna Kuer v. Lal Bahadur (AIR 1950 FC 131) to contend that the error in the present case was an error apparent on the face of record and that it was not material as to how tire error and by whom it was committed. 3. Learned counsel placed reliance on Jamna Kuer v. Lal Bahadur (AIR 1950 FC 131) to contend that the error in the present case was an error apparent on the face of record and that it was not material as to how tire error and by whom it was committed. 3. Next reliance was placed on the decision reported in Tribuvan Dutt v. Civil Judge, Bahraich (1979 Ali WC 26): (1979 All LJ 70). 4. I have considered the aforesaid contentions but in my view, I cannot interfere in the present application as no error is apparent on the face of record in my aforesaid judgment dismissing the said writ petition. This is not to suggest that the ground which I have given in my judgment must be held to be correct without any controversy I took a particular view in the said judgment and I felt that there was delay on the part of the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 in filing the writ petition and that the same had not been sufficiently explained. I did consider the aforementioned Full Bench decision in Shantanu Kumar v. State (supra) and pointed out that in the said case the petitioner Shantanu Kumar had filed the petition, without any delay. In the instant case the petition was filed 011 22-4-1979 and it sought the quashing, if necessary, of the two decisions of the Prescribed Authority respectively dated 24-9-1977 and 6-5-1978. In the petition, it is true, the petitioners also sought the quashing of the appellate order dated 1-6-1979 (Annexure 11) and the quashing of the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 2-3-1979 (Annexure 9). However, as I pointed out in my judgment, the live applicants before me, who were the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 in the writ petition, were no parties in the proceedings under Section 13-A where the said order dated 2-3-1979 was passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting the application under Section 13-A and wherefrom an appeal was taken and the same was dismissed by the appellate court by its judgment dated 1-6-1979 (Annexure 11). The said application under Section 13-A was moved by Km. Nirupma, Smt. Meera Devi Smt. Ram Piari Devi and Smt. Man Murti Devi but we are not concerned with them so far as the instant review application is concerned as it has not been moved by the said ladies. The said application under Section 13-A was moved by Km. Nirupma, Smt. Meera Devi Smt. Ram Piari Devi and Smt. Man Murti Devi but we are not concerned with them so far as the instant review application is concerned as it has not been moved by the said ladies. Therefore, it is clear that so far as the present applicants in the review petition are concerned, they do not come into the picture so far as the aforesaid order dated 2-3-1979 of the Prescribed Authority and the order dated 1-6-1979 of the appellate court are concern- ed. The applicants in the review petition ran get the necessary relief only if the earlier orders of the Prescribed Authority passed in the ceiling case against Ram Adhar Singh are quashed and such quashing was sought in the petition though it was added if necessary. I took the view that when the writ petition was moved on 22-8-1979 seeking the quashing of the order dated 6-5-1978 and the order dated 24-9-1975 then it was necessary that the petitioners Nos. 7 to 11 in the writ petition should have sufficiently explained the delay which was involved in the filing of the writ petition so far as they were concerned. I held that the said delay was not satisfactorily explained. I distinguished the Full Bench decision in Shantanu Kumar v. State (1979 All LJ 1174) (supra) on the ground that the petitioner in the same had approached the court without any delay. Learned counsel for the applicants has suggested that the Full Bench in the said decision had negatived the contention raised on behalf of the State that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay. In my opinion, the question of delay was not at all involved in the Full Bench decision and it was not laid down by the Full Bench that if there is non-compliance with Rule 8 of the Ceiling Rules, then the question of delay in filing the petition loses its value. The Full Bench only laid down: "The existence of any remedy under the Act cannot validate the proceedings which are void for lack of jurisdiction and which have resulted in the declaration as surplus land of an area which a person other than the tenure-holder, who has been heard, claims". The Full Bench only laid down: "The existence of any remedy under the Act cannot validate the proceedings which are void for lack of jurisdiction and which have resulted in the declaration as surplus land of an area which a person other than the tenure-holder, who has been heard, claims". It was further laid down: "The consent or waiver cannot be a ground for refusing to entertain such an objection". 5. It is well known that in this Court normally a petition has to be filed within 90 days of the relevant date and if there is a delay then the same has to be sufficiently explained. The rule of practice has been followed in this Court for a number of years. It is therefore, open to the court not to entertain a petition under Article 226 if it feels that the delay in filing the same has not been sufficiently explained. I thought when I dismissed the writ petition in limine that nothing contrary to the observance of the said rule of practice has been laid down in the Full Bench decision in Shantanu Kumar v. State (1979 All LJ 1174) (supra). I have not been persuaded in this review application that the view which I took was wrong. 6. In any case, even if my view was wrong, I do not think it can be said to be an error apparent on the face of record. So far as I am concerned, I took the aforesaid view and I still adhere to the same. It is a different matter that another Judge of this Court or some other Court may interpret the Full Bench decision in a interpretation of the Full Bench pronouncement, cannot be deemed to be a case of an error apparent on the face of record (sic). 7. I do not think that the aforesaid decision of the Federal Court (AIR 1950 FC 131) and the decision of the learned single Judge in Tribhuwan Dutta v. Civil Judge (1979 All LJ 70) (supra) have any relevance to the controversy involved in the instant review petition. 8. I may further point out that the office has reported that the review application is 12 days beyond time. I need not say anything about the same as I thought it fit to reject the application on merit. 9. Accordingly, this review application is rejected.