JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated October 4, 1975 of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Churu, whereby the appellant was sentenced and convicted as under:- 1. Mangilal u/s. 307 and 393/398, IPC. 10 years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine further 1 year's S.I. u/s. 393/398, I.P.C. 7 years R,I. and a fine of Rs. 500/-. in default of payment of fine further 1 year's R.I. All the substantive sentences were to run concurrently.Briefly stated the facts according to the prosecution were these : On 29-10-74, Mst. Chuki and her husband Mohan Lal (deceased) went to the temple of Hanumanji situated in Dungar Gopalpura for worship at about 6.30 p.m. When they were standing on Kachchi chabutari of the Dharmsala, they were attacked by the two persons. One of them fired a pistol, the other one stabbed Mohanlal with a knife. Thereafter, fobbing them the culprits ran away and an alarm was raised by Mst. Chuki and several persons gathered there. Mohanlal was taken to Sujangarh Hospital,where he succumbed to his injuries. However, before his death, his dying declaration was recorded. On this dying declaration a case was registered and usual investigation was started. The investigating officer inspected the site and also recovered one blood stained knife (Chhura) from there. Appellant Mangilal was arrested on 6-11-74 and the test identification parade was held on 30-12-74 before the Judicial Magistrate. In the test identification parade the appellant was identified by Mst. Chuki as one of the assailants, who had stabbed her husband. After completing the investigation, a challan was preferred, the case was committed and learned Additional Sessions Judge, Churu after holding a trial convicted the appellant in the manner stated above. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and Public Prosecutor for the State and perused the record of the case carefully. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant before arguing the case moved an application under section 391 Cr. P.C. to take further evidence on record. It was stated that after conviction of the appellant, the true culprits i.e. the assailants of Mohanlal have been arrested. One of the culprits even made a confession and completely exonerated the appellant. The Police after due investigation filed a challan against Shivprakash and Sitaram in respect of the same offence, for which the appellant stood convicted. It was stated that after conviction of the appellant, the true culprits i.e. the assailants of Mohanlal have been arrested. One of the culprits even made a confession and completely exonerated the appellant. The Police after due investigation filed a challan against Shivprakash and Sitaram in respect of the same offence, for which the appellant stood convicted. A further prayer was made in the challan that Mangilal appellant be suitably dealt with. The confessional statement of Sitaram appears to have been recorded on 13-4-76 and it appears that he has confessed to his crime implicating also is co-accused Shriprakash. The judgment dated July 7, 1978 of learned Sessions Judge, Churu is with regard to this crime accusing Shriprakash and Sitaram and whereby this judgment both of them were acquitted. Learned counsel for the appellant prays that copy of the challan against Sitaram and Shriprakash, the confessional statement of Sitaram dated April 13, 1976 and copy of the judgment dated July 4, 1978 of learned Sessions Judge, Churu in Sessions Case No. 27 of 1976 be taken on record as additional evidence. I have considered the argument carefully. In my opinion, it is difficult to say that these documents are relevant for disposal of this appeal. The fact of filing the challan in respect of the same offence against the two accused would hardly provide any defence to the appellant. The judgment of learned Sessions Judge, Churu can be no offence in this case except on the fact that in respect of the same offence other persons were tried and acquitted. The confessional statement of Sitaram could be of some assistance to the appellant but the fact is that he has retracted his confession. The fact that some other person made a confession with regard to this crime and by implication exonerated the appellant would be of little assistance. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept this application moved on behalf of the appellant under section 391, Cr. P.C. The facts as alleged by the prosecution except as to the identity of the appellant are not challenged before me. Obviously, the statement of Mst. Chuki and the dying declaration of Mohanlal coupled with the other supporting evidence could not be disbelieved to come a finding that a robbery was not committed. However, the question for determination is whether the appellant was one of the culprits. Obviously, the statement of Mst. Chuki and the dying declaration of Mohanlal coupled with the other supporting evidence could not be disbelieved to come a finding that a robbery was not committed. However, the question for determination is whether the appellant was one of the culprits. The sole evidence against the appellant is the statement of PW 8 Mst. Chuki supported by the test identification. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the statement of PW 8 Mst. Chuki was not reliable and suffered from various infirmities. The test identification parade was of little relevance as the appellant was arrested on 6-11-74 and was put up for test identification as late as on 30-12-74. The possibility can not be ruled out that Mst. Chuki had seen the appellant before the test identification. Learned counsel for the appellant made some reference to the relevant evidence in this connection, which shall be noticed at the proper stage. It is further contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the investigation was not fair. The appellant is accused that be had stabbed Mohanlal with a knife or a chhura. which was left at the scene of the incident. It was also smeared with blood. This knife (chhura) recovered. yet it was not sent to a finger prints expert to find out whether it had any finger marks on its handle and if so, whether it tallied with the finger prints of the appellant. This would have been clinching evidence against the appellant and adverse presumption should be taken against the prosecution for omission of investigation in this regard. I have considered the argument carefully. The law as to the value of the identification, evidence, was thus stated in the following authorities:- 1. The Delhi Administration v. Balkrishan, AIR 1972 SC 3 . Evidence-Appreciation of - It is not a proposition of law that after a lapse of a long period, witnesses would, in no case, be able to identify the dacoits they had seen in the course of a dacoity committed during the night. However, the Courts mast be extremely cautious when such evidence is before them." 2. Evidence-Appreciation of - It is not a proposition of law that after a lapse of a long period, witnesses would, in no case, be able to identify the dacoits they had seen in the course of a dacoity committed during the night. However, the Courts mast be extremely cautious when such evidence is before them." 2. Yeshwant and others v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 337 - "The result is that the evidence of the identity of Brahmaned as the assailant who had actually used the axe on Sukal remains involved in doubt which is not removed by any reliable corroborative evidence. It is well known that evidence as to identity particularly of previously unknown persons is a deceptive kind of evidence which has led to miscarriages of justice sometimes. We, therefore think that Brahmanand Tiwari appellant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt emerging from the unsatisfactory nature of evidence as his identity." 3. Pritam Singh and another v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1971 Raj. 184 - "Test identification held in long after the event is of little value. The value of identification depends on two most important factors viz., that the person who identifies an accused had no opportunity of seeing him after the commission of the crime ands secondly that no mistake had been made by the witness. No importance can be attached to identification if the test identification is conducted long after the arrest of the accused. When the accused were put in the identification parade 11 days after there arrest and no convincing explanation came forth as to why so much time was allowed to pass between the arrest of the accused and the identification proceedings identification cannot be said to be proper." 4. Ganga Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1977 RLW 178 - "After their arrests the two appellants were put up for identification in a test parade on 15-6-71, i.e. after more than 25 days. No explanation is forthcoming from the side of the prosecution why the test-identification parade was not held within a reasonable time after the arrest of the two appellants. No explanation is forthcoming from the side of the prosecution why the test-identification parade was not held within a reasonable time after the arrest of the two appellants. I am of the view that in determining the value of test-identification parades one of the vital factors that has to be considered is whether the identification parade was held within a reasonable time after the arrest of the accused and, if not so, whether there is convincing explanation from the side of the investigating agency for delay in conducting the test-parade." 5. Pirthi and another v. State, AIR 1966 All. 607 - "The evidence that results of test identification parades separated by too long intervals of time should not be considered together ought to apply only to exclude later test identification parades and not earlier ones when the memory is fresher. The evidence of identification based on personal impressions certainly requires careful scrutiny because it is apt to be deceptive and leads to miscarriage of justice. 6. Chandra Pal and other v. State, AIR 1954 All. 684 - "It is not safe to rely on the testimony or one good witness for convicting a person of the offence of dacoity especially when there is not other circumstantial evidence to connect him with the crime." 5. At the out set, I may observe that apart from the evidence of identification by Mst. Chuki PW 8, there is no evidence worth the name on record of the case to connect the appellant with the crime. The case hinges solely on the impression of identification of Mat. Chuki. Since, she is the only witness against the appellant, her statement has to pass through the test of a rigid scrutiny. Another infirmity, which may be noticed in the prosecution case is that the investigating agency failed to investigate with regard to the knife, which was alleged to be the weapon of the offence and was found lying on the scene of the incident. It was probable that the handle of the knife or the blade had come finger prints of the appellant. If care would have been taken to find out that the knife bore had any finger prints impressions than the matter could have been clinched by comparing of finger prints of the appellant with those available on the knife. It was probable that the handle of the knife or the blade had come finger prints of the appellant. If care would have been taken to find out that the knife bore had any finger prints impressions than the matter could have been clinched by comparing of finger prints of the appellant with those available on the knife. The investigation therefore, failed in his duty to property investigate the case and in this manner withheld a vital piece of evidence against the appellant. Another admitted position in the case is that the appellant was arrested on 6-11-74 yet test-identification parade was held on 30-12-74. The prosecution has failed to give out any explanation for this long delay in holding the test-identification parade. This by itself casts serious doubt on the statement of PW 8 Mst. Chuki as regards her identification of the appellant and its corroboration by the test-identification. It ;s also well settled that a convocation can be based on the sole testimony of a single witness of sterling worth, but the courts had been always hesitant and reluctant to act upon such a evidence unless completely satisfied about its truth. It is hardly necessary to state that the evidence of identification by itself is a weak type of evidence as was observed in the case of Shri Ram v. The State of U.P., AIR 1975 SC 175 - "No rule of law requites that the oral testimony of a witness should be corroborated by evidence of identification. In fact, evidence of identification itself a weak type of evidence. But when at the earliest stage the accused himself had asked that an identification parade be held and the demand was opposed by the prosecution and the parade was therefore not held, it is an important point to be considered in his favour." Keeping these infirmities in view, now I proceed to scrutinise the statement of PW 8 Mst. Chuki. In the trial, she stated that they were going in a cart to the temple of Hanumanji, when they reached near the temple of Ramdeoji, she saw two persons sitting there. The cartman asked who they were. It is further stated by her that those two persons subsequently attacked them. She also gave description of the appellant and said that it was he,who stabbed her husband. She also stated that after the incident, she identified the appellant in Churu jail. The cartman asked who they were. It is further stated by her that those two persons subsequently attacked them. She also gave description of the appellant and said that it was he,who stabbed her husband. She also stated that after the incident, she identified the appellant in Churu jail. In the cross-examination, she stated that she was not sure whether she could identify the cartman, or 3 or 4 persons who came on the scene of the incident and who were sent for bringing a jeep. The witness admitted that she could not now identify them. She even could not say whether any of those four bore small pox marks. She denied the suggestion that she identified or saw the appellant in the hospital. She denied her statement Ex.13/1 A to B given by her before the Magistrate, who conducted the identification parade, with regard to some other identification of some persons who were suspected of the crime. It is stated in Ex.D/ 1 by the Magistrate that the witness expressed that she saw the real culprit in Sujangarh Hospital and he was not amongst them. Ex.D/1 is proved by the statement of DW 1 Shyamnarain Vyas, who conducted the test identification parade of the other suspects. My attention was also drawn to the statement of PW 3 S.C. Goel, who stated that he asked Mst. Chuki that whom to identify she had come. Mst. Chuki replied that she had come to identify that person, who had stabbed her husband by a knife. It is, therefore, argued by learned for the appellant that the statement of Mst. Chuki was not reliable, I am inclined to agree with this submission. In the first instance, the test identification parade was not held promptly and this has considerable detracted from the merit of the testimony of Mst. Chuki also does not appear to be of sharp intellect and her power of observation and her identification can not be said to be up to the standard inasmuch as, she expressed her inability to identify the cartman and also various other persons including those four, who were sent to fetch a jeep. This fact, therefore, raises a doubt that this could well be a case of mistaken identity. Another infirmity, which can be noticed in the statement of PW 8 Mut. This fact, therefore, raises a doubt that this could well be a case of mistaken identity. Another infirmity, which can be noticed in the statement of PW 8 Mut. Chuki is her statement Ex.D/ 1, wherein she had admitted to have seen the appellant in Churu hospital while he was sitting on the bench. 6. I have already observed that the investigation was not fair and investigation was not proper. It appears that Mst, Chuki was under some sort of instruction from the investigating agency, otherwise she could not have said that she had come to identify that culprit,who had stabbed her husband. There were two participants in the crime and Mst. Chuki could not be aware that who of them had been arrested. 7. That apart, there is no evidence against the appellant except the sole statement of Mst. Chuki, as regards to the identity of the appellant as one of the culprits. This type of evidence by itself is of a weak type and in this case, it consists of only one witness,which is not corroborated by any fact or circumstance of the case. I have gone through the statement of Mst. Chuki but it does not inspire confidence in view of the infirmities noticed above. For all these reasons, I am of the view that it is not safe to convict the appellant for this offence and the prosecution has failed to establish its charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 8. I, therefore, accept this appeal, set aside the judgment of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Churu and acquit appellant Mangilal son of Ram Rikh of all the charges for which he stood convicted and sentenced. The appellant is on bail and need not surrender to his bail-bonds, which are hereby discharged.Appeal accepted. *******