JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a revision directed against order dated 19th July, 1980, passed by the District Judge, Gwalior, confirming order passed by the First civil Judge, Class I, Gwalior dated 15-5-1980 whereby application for issuance of temporary injunction restraining the implementation of order of transfer of the applicant, transferring and posting him from Gwalior to Durg, was rejected. ( 2. ) FACTS material for decision of this revision are as under: (a) Shortly put, the plaintiff-applicant has instituted the suit giving rise to this revision on 15-4-1980 for declaration to the effect that the order of his transfer dated 19th March, 1980, vide order No. Admn/3/e/ 80/473 is arbitrary, mala fide, inoperative, illegal and ineffective; and that he is entitled to work as librarian in Government Fine Arts College, gwalior on the allegations that: the petitioner was appointed as Librarian in the year 1967. It was in January, 1978 that he was transferred from khandwa to Gwalior on his own request without giving T. A. , D. A. and joining time. Thereafter, applications were invited vide advertisement no. 2/79 for posts of Librarian. Out of the candidates, who had applied for the post, Ku. Tej Rani Mishra and Shri Gopal Prasad Sahu were selected and appointed as Librarian on the posts in Government Fine Arts College and Government Engineering College, Jabalpur, respectively by order dated 19-3-1980. In this order, it has been stated that Ku. Tej Rani Mishra and shri Gopal Prasad Sahu have been appointed temporarily until further orders with effect from the date of their taking over. These appointments are stated to have been made on vacant posts. As the plaintiff was working on the said post on that date, the post cannot be regarded to be vacant. Accordingly, the order of appointment of Ku. Tej Rani Mishra is based on a non-existing fact. Moreover, the order of transfer of the plaintiff from Gwalior to Durg, bears despatch No. as Admn /3/e /80/473, Bhopal, dated 19-3-1980, whereas the despatch number on the order of posting is Admn/3/e/80/471, bhopal dated 19-3-1980. This also shows that the orders are not bona fide. The plaintiff was served with an order No. Estt. 0-4/79-80 dated 1st April, 1980, in which it has been stated that Ku. This also shows that the orders are not bona fide. The plaintiff was served with an order No. Estt. 0-4/79-80 dated 1st April, 1980, in which it has been stated that Ku. Tej Rani Mishra has joined on the post of Librarian in the Government Fine Arts College, Gwalior, on 1st April, 1980, before noon, and the plaintiff was directed to give immediately charge of the post to her. This shows that the day, on which Ku. Tej rani Mishra joined her duties, as librarian, the petitioner was working on the said post. As such, the post was not vacant. It is further contended that the impugned order of transfer is invalid not only on account of the aforesaid facts, but also because the plaintiff has been transferred before expiry of normal period of three years of his posting at Gwalior. As such, the transfer order is against instructions contained in G. A. D. Memo no. 3020 CR-10710 dated 7-3-1958. Accordingly, the impugned order discloses abuse of power and is mala fide, having been passed to accommodate ku. Tej Rani Mishra. In the suit, the plaintiff-applicant has submitted an application for issuance of temporary injunction substantially on the aforesaid facts and grounds, wherein it has been prayed that the defendants (a) be restrained from implementing the orders of transfer of the plaintiff and (b) be directed not to relieve the petitioner from the post of Librarian in the Government fine Arts College, Gwalior and that he should be allowed to work on the said post. (b) The claim of the plaintiff is resisted by the defendant-non-applicants on the grounds that the order of appointment of Ku. Tej Rani Mishra as well as the order of transfer of the plaintiff are neither outcome of mala fides nor disclose abuse of power and that the impugned orders have been passed administratively. The application for issuance of temporary injunction has been opposed substantially on these grounds. ( 3. ) THE trial Court rejected the application for issuance of temporary injunction. Aggrieved by this order, the applicant-herein preferred an appeal, which has been dismissed by the learned District Judge, Gwalior. Hence this revision. ( 4. The application for issuance of temporary injunction has been opposed substantially on these grounds. ( 3. ) THE trial Court rejected the application for issuance of temporary injunction. Aggrieved by this order, the applicant-herein preferred an appeal, which has been dismissed by the learned District Judge, Gwalior. Hence this revision. ( 4. ) IN this revision, it has been contended by Shri A. G. Velankar, learned counsel for the applicant that (i) the impugned order has been passed in an illegal manner; (ii) the order of transfer of the applicant, having been passed before expiry of three years from the date of his posting on the post, is violative of instructions contained in the GAD memo referred to above, which has force of law and is binding on the State Government; (iii) that the order of posting of Ku. Mishra as well as the order of transfer of the plaintiff are vitiated by mala fides and abuse of power; (iv) prima facie case, balance of convenience and concept of irreparable injury are in favour of the plaintiff-applicant; more so because the suit itself would be rendered infructuous if the interim injunction is not granted; (v) that the order of posting of Ku. Mishra, as Librarian in Government Fine Arts College, Gwalior, is based on a non-existing fact, inasmuch as though the post is stated to be vacant, it was not vacant on that day. ( 5. ) MR. P. D. Agarwal, panel lawyer, appearing for the non-applicants argued in support of the impugned order. ( 6. ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the revision deserves to be dismissed. ( 7. ) NO statute and or rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are shown to regulate power regarding transfer of Government servants. As such, transfer is a matter within administrative discretion. The administration is obviously the best judge, being in know of all circumstances relevant to determine the desirability or the propriety of any particular posting and or transfer. Postings and or transfers have to be made by the State government and/or appropriate authorities keeping in view larger interest of the administration. For the purpose, the Government and/or appropriate authorities have to make their best possible choice. Postings and or transfers have to be made by the State government and/or appropriate authorities keeping in view larger interest of the administration. For the purpose, the Government and/or appropriate authorities have to make their best possible choice. Whenever a transfer is made, the government employee so transferred from one place to other may feel unhappy for one or the other reason. However, so long as the transfer is made by competent authority, on account of exigencies of administration, it would be valid and would not be open to challenge in the Courts of law, as held in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu ( (sc) 1974 (1) SLR 497= AIR 1974 SC 555 ). However it is not to be taken that the State Government and/or the appropriate authority has absolute power in the matter. ( 8. ) IN case order of transfer has been passed arbitrarily or constitutes an abuse of power, or is an out come of mala fides or has been passed in order to give discriminatory preference to a junior, such an order of transfer will be amenable to a challenge in the Courts of law. I am fortified in this view by the following observations made in Smt. Pushpika v. State of W. Bengal (1972 SLR 910 ). "it is no doubt true that orders of transfer of Government servants like any other Government administrative or executive order are passed invariably for administrative purposes or in public interest. Such orders normally are outside the purview of examination by Courts of law. It is also the law, as observed by this Court in Mihir Kumar Sarkar v. State of west Bengal (75 c w N 831 (46)), that an executive decision or action or an administrative decision is liable to be struck down if it is used mala fide or for a collateral purpose. " ( 9. It is also the law, as observed by this Court in Mihir Kumar Sarkar v. State of west Bengal (75 c w N 831 (46)), that an executive decision or action or an administrative decision is liable to be struck down if it is used mala fide or for a collateral purpose. " ( 9. ) IN N. N. Sinha v. General Manager (1973 (1)SLR 1153), law on the point has been laid down thus: "unless there is in the impugned orders any violation of the provision of the Constitution or statute or rules founded on them having the force of law or such orders are in excess of powers of the issuing authority under the law, the Court cannot probe into the orders to enquire their propriety or necessity and question the order to substitute its judgments in place and stead of decision taken by the said authorities who are the best judges of the situation and legally competent to pass such orders. At the same time it may be obvious or apparent on the facts evident, admitted or established, that the orders of the authorities though otherwise legal and valid have not been issued for the professed purposes as in public or administrative or in the exigencies of service but they are only passed for other purposes in the garb of ostensible purposes. The Court of law in such cases has thought it fit and competent for itself to probe in and scrutinize such orders to see if they have been passed for other purposes under colourable exercise of powers or if such orders are accordingly mala fide. " So also, if an administrative order is based on reasons of fact, which do not exist must be held to be infected with an abuse of power, as held in Smt. S. R. Vankataraman v. Union of India ( (sc)1979 1 SLR 130 ). ( 10. ) NOW, I turn to examine the present case in the light of the aforesaid principles. The challenge to the posting order of Ku. Mishra is two fold : first, it is contended that it is based on a non-existing fact, inasmuch as at the time when it was passed, post of librarian in the Government Fine arts College, Gwalior, was not vacant, but it contains a recital to that effect. Secondly, despatch number allotted to the order of posting of Ku. Mishra is two fold : first, it is contended that it is based on a non-existing fact, inasmuch as at the time when it was passed, post of librarian in the Government Fine arts College, Gwalior, was not vacant, but it contains a recital to that effect. Secondly, despatch number allotted to the order of posting of Ku. Mishra is earlier in sequence to that given to the order of transfer of the petitioner. After passing of the order of transfer, the post on which the plaintiff was working will be taken to have become vacant. As such, it cannot be regarded that the order of posting of Ku. Mishra is based on a non-existent fact. Mere irregularity of sequence in allotment of despatch numbers is of no consequence, because it is ex-facie the order of transfer of the petitioner which has to take effect first. The applicant has on his own showing started on 1-4-1980 the process of preparing papers for handing over charge. ( 11. ) SO far as challenge to the impugned orders on the ground that they constitute abuse of power and are violated by mala fides is concerned, a bare allegation on the point, without making clear and specific allegations, is not enough. Moreover, the burden to establish mala fides is very heavy on the person, who alleges it. Allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved and the very seriousness of such allegations demand proof of a higher order of credibility. This is what has been held in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu. ( 12. ) IN this case, both the Courts below have held that no ex facie case has been made out on the basis of which inula fides or abuse of power of authority may be inferred. The proper approach in such matters should be as laid down in by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Rajindra Sareen ( (s c) 1972 SLR ll2 ). "the proper approach should have been to consider all the allegations together and find out whether those allegations have been made out and whether those allegations when established, are sufficient to prove malice or ill-will on the part of the official concerned and whether the impugned order is the result of such malice or ill will. "the proper approach should have been to consider all the allegations together and find out whether those allegations have been made out and whether those allegations when established, are sufficient to prove malice or ill-will on the part of the official concerned and whether the impugned order is the result of such malice or ill will. We are emphasising this aspect because in certain cases even a single allegation, if established, will be so serious to lead to an inference of mala fides. But, in certain cases each individual allegation, treated separately, may not lead to an inference of mala fides; but when all the allegations are taken together and found to be established, then the inference to be drawn from those established facts may lead to the conclusion that an order has been passed mala fide, out of personal ill will or malice. " ( 13. ) IN this case, after taking into consideration the cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances alleged, both the Courts below have held that the plaintiff has not succeeded in showing that the impugned orders are ex facie out come of mala fides or are tainted by abuse of power. As such, their approach in the matter is wholly proper. ( 14. ) FACED with situation, Mr. Velankar, advanced a contention to the effect that in absence of law and/or statutory rules, the administrative instructions contained in GAD memo. 3020/cr/10710 dated 7-3-1958 are binding on the State Government and the authorities concerned. Since the transfer of the applicant having been made prior to the normal period of three years from the date of posting of the applicant-plaintiff, at Gwalior, it cannot be regarded to be a normal transfer. The relevant portion of the GAD Memo, reads as under : - "2. Transfer of Government servants can be broadly divided into two categories, namely : -A. Normal transfers. B. Transfers other than normal. 3. Transfers of category A are those made, when it is considered desirable to shift a Government servant after he has completed his normal term of service at one place. Note:- The term "normal" here means the minimum of three years and the maximum of five years, subject always to the exigencies of public service. Ordinarily, there should be no transfer before three years, unless absolutely necessary. Note:- The term "normal" here means the minimum of three years and the maximum of five years, subject always to the exigencies of public service. Ordinarily, there should be no transfer before three years, unless absolutely necessary. In case of any specific assignment or special scheme or projects, there should normally be not transfer until the completion of the assignment, scheme or project, or at least until the expiry of five years. 4. In category B would fall the following: (i) transfers for administrative reasons or in the public interest other than those governing transfer of category A; (it) transfers necessitated by the possession of qualifications and experience required for a post in another station, whether in the same capacity or on promotion; and (iii) transfers becoming necessary for filling in (a) posts falling vacant, owing to promotion or deputatian or long leave of another government servant and also (b) posts newly created. " ( 15. ) NEW, Mr. Velankar contends that instructions contained in the gad memo. extracted above have force of law. For the purpose reliance is placed on the following observations in M. P. Pandey v. Union of India (1979 (3) SLR 72)wherein H. L. Anand, J. , has after referring to instructions contained in government of India Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum No. F-44/1 /59-Ests/a, dated 15th April, 1959, held as under: "these instructions no doubt are incapable of superseding any statute or statutory rule or even a term in the contract of service but in the absence of any of these to the contrary "fill in the gap" and are of a binding nature and have force of law and it was so ruled by the Supreme court in the case of Sant Rum Sharma (air 1967 stc 1910 ). " ( 16. ) I am afraid, the principles laid down in the case of Santram Sharma (supra) do not go to the extent of holding that administrative instructions have the force of law. What has been held in Sant Ram Sharma (supra) is as under: "we proceed to consider the next contention of Mr. N. G. Chatterjee that in the absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts the Government cannot issue administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions not found in the Rules already framed. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. N. G. Chatterjee that in the absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts the Government cannot issue administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions not found in the Rules already framed. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection grade posts. But that does not mean that till statutory rules are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue administrative instructions regarding the principle to be followed in promotions of the officers concerned to selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed. " Accordingly, with due deference to the learned Judge deciding the case of m. P. Pandey (supra) I do not find myself in agreement with him, when he lends for support on Sant Ram Sharmas case (supra) for holding that the-executive instructions have force of law. ( 17. ) SO far as binding efficacy of executive instructions is concerned, the law on the point has been laid down thus in State of U. P. v. Chandra Mohan nigam (1977 s c c (l andand) 535): "the instructions which are issued by the Government to fill up gaps in the provisions must be deemed to be part of the conditions of service and would be binding on the Government and cannot be violated to the prejudice of the Government servant. " However, it is not shown by the applicant that the instructions in the fore-squoted memo have been ex facie violated. That apart, the very use of the word ordinarily radicates that power to transfer prior to expiry of the normal period of minimum three years is reserved and conceded to the authorities concerned. Moreover, administrative instructions if not earned into effect, for good reasons, cannot confer a right: 18, Shri Velankar,. learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicant was. emphatic in relying on the ratio of Prakashchandra v. State of M. P. ( 1980 MPLJ 251 = 1980 JLJ 370 ), in support of his contentions -. What has bees held in. Moreover, administrative instructions if not earned into effect, for good reasons, cannot confer a right: 18, Shri Velankar,. learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicant was. emphatic in relying on the ratio of Prakashchandra v. State of M. P. ( 1980 MPLJ 251 = 1980 JLJ 370 ), in support of his contentions -. What has bees held in. Prakashchandras- s case (supra) is as under: "in any service when the relationship is that of a master and servant, transfer, promotion, retirement etc. are the incidence of service. Usually, the Master has full power to transfer his servant wherever he wanted, because transfer is made, looking to the character and the quality of the work, the servant does. Therefore, if a Master wants that at particular-place, a particular servant is required, then certainly, he has a right to transfer bis servant from one place to another. This is the general idea behind the powers which are given to a Master to transfer his servants at his will. That, however, does not mean that this power is absolute and a Master has a right to- transfer his-servants capriciously. Where the master transfers a servant merely to accommodate another servant the transfer is mala fide, Smt. Pushpika v. State of W. Bengal relied on. " Where an authority is not acting honestly and when it has a suspicion that there is something wrong and it fails to make further enquiry, then its action cannot be regarded to be bona fide. AIR 1973 s C 529 and A I R 1966 S C 1283, relied on. * * * "if an order of a transfer is to accommodate some other officer and not for any public or administrative purpose, then such an order is certainly mala fide and to see whether the order is of this nature or not, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to go into the merits even though no evil or civil consequences are followed from such an order. Merely saying in the reply that the transfer of the plaintiff was for an administrative purpose is not sufficient. (1973) I S L R 1153, relied on. " "civil Court certainty has power to see whether the transfer order is passed mala fide or with ulterior motive. " ( 18. ) I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by Brother Navkar J. , in the case of Prakash Chandra {supra ). (1973) I S L R 1153, relied on. " "civil Court certainty has power to see whether the transfer order is passed mala fide or with ulterior motive. " ( 18. ) I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by Brother Navkar J. , in the case of Prakash Chandra {supra ). However, the whole question is about applicability of the principles enunciated therein. The facts and circumstances of the present case are different from those available in the case of Prakash Chandra (supra ). It was a case of a chain of transfers within a short span of time obviously made in order to accommodate another government employee. In that case, Shri P. D. Shrivastava, the government employee, who was transferred in place of Prakashchandra, was before the Court. Here, Ku. Mishra has not been impleaded as a party. Even if factum of absence of Ku. Mishra be ignored, in the circumstances stated above, it cannot be held to be a case where the impugned order may be regarded to be either mala fide or an out-come of abuse of power. In the instant case, the facts stated are not ex facie sufficient to generate judicial certitude for concluding that there is prima facie case for exercise of the extra ordinary power vesting in the Courts of law to give interim relief in the matter of transfer of Government servants, which is essentially an administrative function. Moreover, the ratio of Prakashchandras case (supra) is not intended to arm the government servants with a weapon to approach the courts of law with any sort of challenge to the order of transfer and succeed in setting an interim injunction for staying operation thereof. Mere likelihood of a suit being rendered infructuous cannot be regarded as legally enough for issuance of temporary injunction, as in that eventuality a party may institute a frivolous suit and succeed in getting interim relief even without showing that a prima facie case exists in his favour. ( 19. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order is not shown to be vitiated by any jurisdictional error warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court. As such, the revision fails and is hereby dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred. Revision dismissed.