ORDER M. Mehrotra, J. -This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The petitioner had been proceeded against in the earlier ceiling proceedings and the Appellate Court by its judgment dated 3rd July, 1976 set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority and discharged the Notice which had been issued to the petitioner under S. 10 (2) of the Act in the said proceedings. This is clear from a true copy of the said judgment of the Appellate Court which is Annexure 1 to the petition. Thereafter, a fresh notice was issued to the petitioner. The Prescribed Authority has stated in its order dated 6-2-1978 (Annexure 2) that the said fresh notice was issued under S. 29 of the Act. The Appellate Court, however, has stated in its judgment dated 29-4-1978 (Annexure 3) that the notice was issued under S. 13-A of the Act. It is, therefore, obvious that the second notice issued to the petitioner was sought to be justified either under S. 29 of the Act or under S. 13-A of the Act. 3. Sri S. C. Khare, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, contended before me that such notice could not be issued in the facts and circumstances of the case. He has placed reliance on Mahendrapal Singh v. State of U. P. (1977 All WC 460) : (AIR 1978 NOC 6). On the other hand, the learned standing counsel has contended that it was a case of sheer omission inasmuch as the own documents of the petitioner, namely, the gift-deed stated the age of the third son Upendra Singh to be 13 years at the time when the said document was executed i.e. on 15th Dec., 1969. Accordingly, on 8-6-1973 Upendra Singh was still a minor and, therefore, his l/3rd share in the gift-deed was liable to be clubbed with the holding of the petitioner. The learned counsel contended that such an error could be corrected by a proceeding under S. 13-A of the Act. 4. It should be seen that so far as S. 29 of the Act is concerned, obviously the same was not applicable to the facts of the case. The learned counsel contended that such an error could be corrected by a proceeding under S. 13-A of the Act. 4. It should be seen that so far as S. 29 of the Act is concerned, obviously the same was not applicable to the facts of the case. The said provision could be invoked only if the States case was that the petitioner, as the tenure-holder, had come to hold some land either under a decree or an order of a Court, or as a result of succession or the transfer or by prescription in consequence of adverse possession, after 8-6-1973. This obviously is not the contention of the State in the instant case. Therefore, S. 29 of the Act can certainly be held to be not applicable to the facts of the instant case. 5. So far as S. 13-A of the Act is concerned, it should be seen that its provision could only be invoked if it could be held that there was any mistake apparent on the face of the re- cord. This expression has been considered in various judicial pronouncements and it is settled law that no mistake can be said to be apparent on the face of the record which requires evidence to be tendered for establishing the same. The learned standing counsel contended that the recital in the gift-deed amounted to an admission of the petitioner. Even if that be so, it is well settled that admissions can be explained, and in the facts of the instant case, it was open to the petitioner to lead evidence to establish that the recital in the gift-deed was by way of approximation and, in fact, no actual date of birth had been given in the said document and the age was approximately mentioned. It was possible for the petitioner to establish that on the basis of more direct evidence, Upendra Singh was really a major and not minor on 8-6-1973. It is not necessary to say as to in what manner such evidence would have been treated by the authorities below if it really came to a situation where such an exercise had to be done by the authorities concerned. But the vital point is that such an exercise is not contemplated to be done under S. 13-A of the Act. But the vital point is that such an exercise is not contemplated to be done under S. 13-A of the Act. Therefore, I accept the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner that merely on the ground that there was a certain recital in the gift-deed, it was not open to the authorities below to contend that there was an error apparent on the face of the record and that the third son of the tenure-holder should have been treated as minor on the relevant date i.e. 8-6-1973. In my view, S. 13-A of the Act was not applicable to the facts of the instant case. 6. This petition accordingly, succeeds and is allowed and the judgment of the Appellate Court dated 29-4-1978 and the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 6-2-1978 are hereby quashed. In me circumstances, there will be no order/as to costs.