ORDER Hari Swarup, J. -This petition has been filed against the judgment of the District Judge, by which he refused to entertain the petitioners appeal under Section 21 of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Compensation Officer had passed an order under Section 21 (1) of the Act determining compensation. The order was passed on 2-1-1972. An appeal against that order could have been filed within ninety days of the order. The appeal was, however, filed on 19-9-1972. The appeal was rejected as barred by limitation. The U. P. State has filed this petition through the Deputy Commissioner challenging the correctness of the order of the District Judge dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation. 2. Certain facts are relevant. The order was sent to the Commissioner on 25-1-1972 and the matter was reported to the Assistant Commissioner on 9-2-1972. The Assistant Commissioner summoned the file from the Deputy Commissioner on 21-2-1972 which was received on 21-3-1972. The Assistant Commissioner thought it necessary to make spot inspection for determining whether the compensation awarded by the Compensation Officer was justified and whether an appeal be filed. He made the spot inspection on 3-5-1972. He then became busy with some other work and sent the report to the Secretary of the Board of Revenue. The matter remained pending with the Secretary Board of Revenue and was ultimately sent to the State Government for orders regarding filing of the appeal on 30-6-1972. The State Government sent back the papers for filing the appeal on 29-8-1972 and the appeal was filed on 19-9-1972. 3. On the facts mentioned above the learned District Judge took the view that sufficient cause had not been shown for condoning the delay; according to him there was no explanation by the Assistant Commissioner for not conducting the spot inspection within the period of limitation for filing the appeal. According to him there was also not sufficient explanation about the sending of the matter to the Board of Revenue and for subsequent delay. 4. According to him there was also not sufficient explanation about the sending of the matter to the Board of Revenue and for subsequent delay. 4. Learned counsel for the State has contended that the view taken by learned District Judge is erroneous and the facts are such on the basis of which it could, rather should, have been held that the State had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation and the delay in filing the appeal was due to sufficient cause. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents. According to him the cause shown was not sufficient and in any case, it is urged, that because the view taken by the learned District Judge was a plausible view it cannot be deemed to suffer from a manifest error of law, so as to enable this Court to take a different view and hold that the delay had been sufficiently explained. 5. I am in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that it is not open in the writ jurisdiction to take a different view in matters where the District Judge has been given the jurisdiction to exercise discretion and he has exercised the jurisdiction legally. May be, if I had considered the matter as the court of first instance I might have taken a different view, but unless it can be held that the view taken by the learned District Judge was not a plausible view that cannot be reversed in exercise of the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The court had the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence produced before it and to arrive at the inference that the cause shown was not sufficient. The inference drawn by the court below cannot be held to be not a plausible inference. 6. It seems that the delay was due to the fact that the matter had to pass through various hands and this took time. It is really a case of delay being caused by the process of red tapism; and it has resulted in a serious loss to State revenue. The learned Standing counsel has contended that the District Judge had applied erroneous principle of law in judging whether there was sufficient cause for filing appeal beyond limitation. It is really a case of delay being caused by the process of red tapism; and it has resulted in a serious loss to State revenue. The learned Standing counsel has contended that the District Judge had applied erroneous principle of law in judging whether there was sufficient cause for filing appeal beyond limitation. According to him it is the date of the knowledge of the authority who has to direct the filing of the appeal that is relevant and in this case, according to him, it was the State Government which could take the decision about the filing of the appeal. No doubt, it is true that the knowledge has to be of the authority who has taken the decision to file the appeal, but the acceptance of the principle enunciated by the learned Standing Counsel will make the provision about limitation almost ineffective. The Government does not act except through the agency of its different officials and the action of each official has to be seen in determining whether the Government has acted with due diligence or not. Knowledge of the final authority cannot, therefore, be the basis for calculating limitation for the appeal. The period spent in processing the matter has, therefore, to be explained by the State Government. 7. The Act prescribed different periods of limitation for the citizen and the State Government. Under Section 21 (2) the period of limitation is thirty days while under Section 32 (2) of the Act the period of limitation for the State Government is ninety days. The Legislature has accordingly taken into consideration the longer period necessary for making decision to file the appeal by the State Government. This also shows that the intention of law was that even when the appeal is preferred by the State Government it must explain the delay caused by its officials in presenting the memorandum of appeal. 8. The other ground raised before the learned District Judge was that because the formal order had been prepared in the case much after the date of the order viz. 25th Jan. 1972, the appeal should be deemed to have been filed within time because it was filed within ninety days of the making of the formal order. The learned District Judge did not accept the contention. 25th Jan. 1972, the appeal should be deemed to have been filed within time because it was filed within ninety days of the making of the formal order. The learned District Judge did not accept the contention. He has committed no error in taking this view because under Section 21 the time begins to run not from the date of the formal order, but from the date of the order of the Compensation Officer passed under Section 21 of the Act. The time cannot accordingly begin to run from the date of the formal order. In view of the explanation appended to Section 12 of the Limitation Act the time spent before the filing of the application for copy of the formal order can also not be available to the State Government. 9. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs.