JUDGMENT - R.S. BHONSALE, J.:---The petitioner one Abedabi d/o Daud Shaikh has filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on behalf of herself and on behalf of her minor son Samir challenging the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur, in Criminal Revision Application No. 12 of 1978 as well as in Criminal Revision Application No. 13 of 1978 filed by her husband Sikandar Akabar Mujawar. Abedabi had filed Criminal Revision Application No. 12 of 1978 in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Solapur, against the judgment and order dated 24th January, 1978 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Solapur, dismissing her application for maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. In this petition the following facts are not disputed : (1) that the present petitioner Abedabi was married to respondent Sikandar Akabar Mujawar on 20th May, 1971, (2) that a son who was named Samir was born on 10th of June, 1972 out of this wedlock and (3) that as the petitioner and the respondent did not get along in their marital relationship, respondent Sikandar issued a public notice giving talaq on 6th January, 1973 and divorced her. It is also not disputed that thereafter Sikandar married one Mumtaj Begum on 29th May, 1973 and from the second wedlock two issues are born. 3. In consequence of the talaq pronounced by the respondent husband, petitioner Abedabi filed Regular Civil Suit No. 968 of 1974 on 26th September, 1974 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Solapur, for maintenance and for recovery of an amount of Rs. 5, 779.05. This amount consisted of four items, namely, :--- 1. Rs. 751.00 as Mehr 2. Rs. 1,0000.00 as maintenance for 10 months from march to December 1972. 3. Rs. 300.00 as Maintenance for Iddat period of three months from January to March 1973. 4. Rs. 3,728.00 as price of the articles which had been given to the respondent at the time of the marriage as Dahej. 4. The decree in that suit came to be passed on 23rd July, 1973. However, respondent husband Sikandar filed an appeal against the said decree and partial stay was granted in respect of the payment of decretal amount in Regular Darkhast No. 351 of 1976 filed by the present petitioner. Abedabi after the amount of Rs. 4. The decree in that suit came to be passed on 23rd July, 1973. However, respondent husband Sikandar filed an appeal against the said decree and partial stay was granted in respect of the payment of decretal amount in Regular Darkhast No. 351 of 1976 filed by the present petitioner. Abedabi after the amount of Rs. 2,833.06 was credited in the trial Court. Since the stay was in respect of the remaining amount, the Darkhast came to be disposed of on 25th July 1977 as fully satisfied. 5. Petitioner Abedabi filed Miscellaneous Application No. 26 of 1977 on 27th October, 1976 claiming an amount of Rs. 200/- per month by way of maintenance under the provisions of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The only contention raised by the respondent husband in those proceedings was that he having lawfully divorced Abedabi, her claim was not sustainable in the eyes of law. He also disputed the quantum of the amount claimed by Abedabi. By an amendment application moved to the said miscellaneous application of 6th December 1977, Abedab added petitioner No. 2 Samir in that application and contended that respondent husband had neglected and refused to maintain Samir, their son, who was born out of lawful wedlock. The respondent husband resisted Samir being added as application No. 2 and contended that Samir was not admitted to any school and the petitioner Abedabi was hardly a competent person to look after and take care of Samir, inasmuch as he was wandering like a vagabond. He denied the allegation of Abedabi that he had neglected or refused to maintain Samir, present respondent No. 2. 6. The only evidence that was led in the trial Court was of petitioner Abedabi and that of respondent Sikandar on behalf of the respective parties. No other witness was examined either in support or in rebuttal of the allegations made by the petitioner. 7. Having scrutinised the evidence of both the petitioner and the respondent, the learned judicial Magistrate, First Class, Solapur, Came to the conclusion that as Abedabi was fully paid the amount of Mehr and Iddat as per the customary and personal law to which the parties belonged, petitioner Abedabi was not entitled to any claim for maintenance in view of the provisions of contained in section 127(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He, however, allowed the application in respect of son Samir and awarded him an amount of maintenance of Rs. 45/- per month. 8. Both the parties were dissatisfied with the said order passed by the learned trial Magistrate on 24th January, 1978. Petitioner Abedabi and son Samir preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 12 of 1978 in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Solapur, being aggrieved by the refusal by the learned Magistrate to award an amount of maintenance whatsoever to her and being aggrieved by the quantum of partly amount awarded to son Samir by the learned trial Magistrate. Respondent husband Sikandar was also dissatisfied with the said order and he too preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 13 of 1978 and his grievance seems to be that the amount of Rs. 45/- month ought not to have been awarded to son Samir. 9. The learned Additional Sessions Judge heard both the application together and since both the revision applications arose out of the same proceedings, i.e. from Miscellaneous Application No. 26 of 1977, he disposed of them by common judgment dated 28th September, 1978. He partly allowed Revision Application No. 12 of 1978 filed by Abedabi and Samir, inasmuch he ordered that respondent husband Sikandar should pay Rs. 100/- per month as maintenance amount from the date of the application, i.e., 27th October, 1976 to 25th April, 1977, that is the date when the amount of Mehr and Iddat was paid by respondent husband in the trial Court. He did not enhance the quantum of maintenance of the son Samir. The learned Additional Sessions judge also held that the husband was not liable to pay any maintenance subsequent to April 25, 1977 to petitioner Abedabi. He, therefore, dismissed the husbands criminal revision application, as, in his opinion, there was no substance in it. 10. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur, petitioner Abedabi and son Samir have filed the above criminal application with twofold grievances. Firstly, it is contended by Mr. He, therefore, dismissed the husbands criminal revision application, as, in his opinion, there was no substance in it. 10. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur, petitioner Abedabi and son Samir have filed the above criminal application with twofold grievances. Firstly, it is contended by Mr. Mandlik, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, that it was an error on the part of the learned Additional Sessions Judge for not having considered the price of the articles which had been given to the husband at the time of the marriage as Dahej as part of "the whole of the sum which under any customary or personal law as applicable to the parties was payable on such divorce..."In other Words, what was contended by Mr. Mandlik was that the liability of the husband to pay maintenance does not come to an end only after the payment of the amount of Mehr and the amount of Iddat, according to the personal law of the parties to which they belong, but also the price of the articles which had been given to the husband as Dahej at the time of the marriage becomes payable under the customary or personal law of the parties to which they belong. 11. Secondly, Mr. Mandlik contended that in any case the learned Additional Sessions Judge was in error in holding that the liability of the husband for maintenance came to an end after April 25, 1977, i.e. after the amount of Iddat and Mehr was paid in the Court on that day by the respondent husband. Thirdly Mr. Mandlik contended that the quantum of Rs. 45/- per month awarded by the learned Magistrate in favour of son Samir was too paltry and ought to be enhanced. 12. Mr. Mandlik has fairly stated that in view of the civil proceedings between the parties and in view of the fact the part of the decretal amount credited by the husband in the trial Court, he does not wish to press his first contention as to whether the price of the articles which had been given to the respondent husband at the time of the marriage can be said to be included in "the whole of the sum which under any customary or personal law was payable on such divorce." 13. As far as the next contentions are concerned, Mr. As far as the next contentions are concerned, Mr. Mandlik is on the sounder footing and in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in (Bal Tahira v. All Hussain Fissali Chottia)1, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 362. It is clear that every divorced wife otherwise eligible is entitled to the benefit of maintenance allowance and the dissolution of the marriage makes no difference to this right under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Explanation (b) to section 125 of the Code reads as follows: " wife includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried." It is not disputed in this case that Abedabi after she was divorced by respondent husband Sikandar on January 6, 1973 has not remarried. In other words, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahiras case, she is otherwise eligible for the benefit of maintenance allowance under section 125 the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Bai Tahiras case the Supreme Court has emphasised the social object behind the purpose of new provisions in section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the maintenance of a wife who has been divorced by her husband and who was not yet remarried. The Parliament in conformity with Article 15(3) and deliberate by design made a special provision to help women in distress cast away by divorce. Protection against moral and material abandonment manifest in Article 39 is part of social and economic justice; specialised in Article 38, fulfilment of which is fundamental to the governance of the country. It is too well-known to emphasise that remedy under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a summary for a destitute woman and her destitution does not come to end by the fact that the amount of Mehr and Iddat is paid by her husband. Again, the Supreme Court has further observed in Bai Tahiras case : The purpose of he payment under any customary or personal law must be to obviate destitution of the divorce and to provide her with wherewithal to maintain herself. The whole scheme of section 127(3)(b) is manifestly to recognise the substitute maintenance arrangement by lump sum payment organised by the custom of the community or the personal law of the parties. The whole scheme of section 127(3)(b) is manifestly to recognise the substitute maintenance arrangement by lump sum payment organised by the custom of the community or the personal law of the parties. There must be a rational relation between the sum so paid and its potential as provision for maintenance; to interpret otherwise is to stultify the project. Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot be pedantic but purposeful. The proposition; therefore, is that no husband can claim under section 127(3)(b) absolution from his obligation under section 125 towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance." The facts of the present case will show that the amount of Mehr was only Rs. 751/- and maintenance amount of Iddat for the period from January to March 1973 was Rs. 300/-. In our view, this amount of Mehr is not sufficient for maintenance of Abedabi. The Supreme Court had further observed in Bai Tahiras case: "The legal sanctity of the payment is certified by the fulfilment of the social obligation, not by a ritual exercise rooted in custom. No construction which leads to frustration of the statutory project can secure validation if the Court is to pay true homage to the Constitution." In our view, the amount of Mehr and Iddat in this case appears to have no reasonable relationship with the object and is wholly illusory. This Court had an occasion to follow and explain the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahiras case in more than one case. In (Criminal Application No. 2075 of 1976 decided on 15/16th of January, 1980)2. We have considered the same question in extenso and in view of that judgment it is unnecessary for us to make any further observations, except to say that it now well settled that in view of the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the Supreme Court is binding upon this Court. We, therefore, respectfully follow the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahiras case cited supra. 13. We, therefore, respectfully follow the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahiras case cited supra. 13. In this view of the matter, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not right to confine the operation of the maintenance under only up to 25th April, 1977, i.e. on the date on which the amount of Mehr and Iddat was deposited by the respondent husband in the trial Court in Civil proceedings. In our opinion, petitioner Abedabi is entitled to continue maintenance allowance even after that date and, therefore, we direct that petitioner Abedabi will be entitled to maintenance allowance of Rs. 100/- per month from the date of the application, i.e. October 27, 1976. We set aside that part of the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge which confines the payment of maintenance only up to April 25, 1977. Petitioner Abedabi will be entitled to the amount of maintenance even thereafter at the same rate of Rs. 100/- per month. The order of maintenance in favour of son Samir is confirmed. However, it is made clear that this order in favour of Samir will continue until he attains the age of majority as per the provisions of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. In the result, petition is partly allowed and the rule is made partly absolute.