JUDGMENT S. Roy, J. The petitioner in this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has prayed for quashing the order dated 18.12.1978 passed by Respondent No. 2 in Election case No. 2 of 1978. This is annexure 4 to the writ application. 2. The petitioner. Respondent Nos. 7 & 8 contested the election to the office of the mukhiya of Kanderbera Gram Panchayat in the district of Singhbhum. The petitioner was declared duly elected mukhiya or the said Gram Panchayat on 7.6.1978. Respondent no. 7 filed an election petition before Respondent No. 2 for setting aside the election of the petitioner and for declaring him as duly elected to the office of the mukhiya. The grounds on which he challenged the election are inter alia that corrupt practice was adopted in the election and that rejection of 93 ballot papers was illegal. Respondent Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, who are respondents in the election petition filed joint written statement. The petitioner and Respondent No. 8 filed separate written statements. In the written statement filed by the petitioner, be, inter alia, contended that the election petition filed by Respondent No. 7 being not in accordance with role 75 (1) of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules. 1959 (hereinafter called "the Rules"), in as much al the election petition was not verified in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, 1903 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), It ought to have been summarily dismissed under rule 77 of the Rules. He also contended that the box containing the rejected ballot papers cannot be re-opened for the purpose of fresh scrutiny. By the impugned order, Respondent No. 2 has rejected both the contentions of the petitioner. 3. The learned Standing Counsel took a preliminary objection that in view of the proviso to rule 70 of the Rules which has provided a forum for appeal against the judgment or the Election Tribunal, the writ application was not maintainable. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in this case no appeal lay and in view of the fact that the application has been admitted for hearing the same cannot be dismissed as not maintainable. 4. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in this case no appeal lay and in view of the fact that the application has been admitted for hearing the same cannot be dismissed as not maintainable. 4. Rule 70 of the rules is as follows : “No election held under these rules shall be called in question in any other manner on any ground whatsoever other than by a petition before the Election Tribunal appointed under these Rules. Provided that any candidate or voter aggrieved by the judgment of the Election Tribunal may within thirty days of the said judgment appeal to the District Judge who shall deliver his judgment within six months. Explanation :- District Judge means the judge “appointed by the State Government as such and it includes such Additional District Judie to whom the appeal is transferred by the District Judge for disposal.” According to the proviso, appeal may be filed to the District Judge, if any candidate or voter is aggrieved by the judgment of Election Tribunal. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel is that the impugned order is a judgment and, therefore, an appeal shall lie. 5. The word "judgment" has not been defined in the Rules. The question for determination is whether the impugned order which has not finally disposed of the election petition filed by Respondent No. 7 can be said to be judgment so as to attract the proviso to rule 70 of the Rules. There is no dispute that no appeal can be filed if it is not provided in the statutes. It is also not in dispute that every order can't be said to be a judgment. Therefore, appeal will lie under rule 70 of the Rules only if an order can be said to be a judgment. What is meant by judgment came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the Case of Asrumati Devi Vrs. Kumar Bupendra Deb Raikot and ors. The Supreme Court was deciding whether an order made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent transferring a suit from a District Court to the Extra-Ordinary Original Civil Side of the High Court is a judgment for the purpose of appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It is, of course true that in that case the Supreme Court did not frame exhaustive definition of the word “judgment". It is, of course true that in that case the Supreme Court did not frame exhaustive definition of the word “judgment". But the Principles laid down by the Supreme Court for deciding whether an order paid under clause 18 of the Letters Patent can be said to be a judgment for the purpose of appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent can be aptly applied for deciding whether each and ever, order passed by the Election Tribunal can be said to be a judgment. The Supreme Court referred to a large number of decisions of different High Courts including the pronouncement of Sir Richard Couch. C. J. in the often referred case of Justices of the peace for Calcutta Vs. Oriental Gaxe Company and observed as follows :- “It cannot be said, therefore, that according to Sir Richard Couch every judicial pronouncement on a right or liability between the parties is to be regarded as a ‘judgment’ for in that case there would be any number of judgment in the course of a suit or proceeding, each one of which could be challenged by way of appeal. The judgment must be the final pronouncement which puts an end to the proceeding so far as the Court dealing with it is concerned. It certainly involve the determination or some right or liability, though it may not be necessary that there must be a decision on the merits. This view which is implied in the observation or Sir Richard Couch C. J., quoted above, has been really made the balls of the definition of judgment by Sir Arnold While C. J. in the Full Bench decision or the Madras High Court to which reference has been made vide 35 Mad (F.B.). Generally speaking, the final order by which a proceeding is put an end by determining some right or liability may well be termed as judgment. 6. Respondent No. 2 has not finally disposed of the election petition by the order contained in annexure 4. Annexure 4 does not affect the merit of the controversy between the parties in the election petition. Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court to this case it must be held that the order contained in annexure 4 is not a judgment and, therefore, not appeal-able to the District Judge under the proviso to rule 70 of the Rules. Applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court to this case it must be held that the order contained in annexure 4 is not a judgment and, therefore, not appeal-able to the District Judge under the proviso to rule 70 of the Rules. If respondent No. 2 had summarily dismissed the ejection petition under rule 77 of the Rules, as pleaded by the petitioner in his written statement, then appeal was maintainable before the District Judge because by that order the election petition would have been finally disposed or so far Respondent No. 2 wall concerned. The preliminary objection of the learned Standing Counsel, therefore falls. 7. Mr. Prasad contended that on 26.6.1978 when Respondent No. 7 filed the election petition, it was not verified in the manner laid down in the Code for verification of the pleadings. Respondent No. 2, therefore, ought to have summarily dismissed the election petition filed by Respondent No. 7 in terms of rule 77 of the Rules. 8. Rule 75 of the Rules Inter alia, provides that the election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code for verification of the pleading Rule 77 of the Rules, inter alia, provided that if there is any failure to comply with the provisions of Sub-rule 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules, the Election Tribunal shall summarily dismiss the election petition, provided that the petition shall not be dismissed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. 9. According to Order VI, Rule 15 (1) of the Code (as amended by the Patna High Court) facts in every pleading shall be verified by solemn affirmation or on oath of the party or one of the parties pleading or some other person proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case before any officer empowered to administer oath under Section 139 of the Code. 10. What will be the consequence if an election petition is filed without the verification on solemn affirmation or on oath came up for consideration before a Full Bench as provided under rule 75 (1) read with rule 77 of the Rules in the case of Saratchandra Mandal Vs. Phani Bhushan Singh and others. 10. What will be the consequence if an election petition is filed without the verification on solemn affirmation or on oath came up for consideration before a Full Bench as provided under rule 75 (1) read with rule 77 of the Rules in the case of Saratchandra Mandal Vs. Phani Bhushan Singh and others. It was held in that case that the Election Tribunal has got power to allow the amendment of the verification of an election petition if it is not verified in accordance with the requirements of the Code only if the defects or the cumulative effect of the defects is of minor nature so as not to take the matter out of the realm of the rule of sufficient compliance. If there is sufficient compliance, literal compliance is not necessary. But if there is no sufficient compliance, then it is imperative for the Tribunal to dismiss the election petition. It cannot afford to give an opportunity to the election petitioner for amending the election petition for removal of major and fatal defects. 11. Admittedly the election petition which was filed on 26.6.1978 was not verified according to Order VI, rule 15 (1) of the Code. On that date, Respondent No. 7 was granted time to file affidavit. On 14.7.1978 an affidavit was filed by Respondent No.7 in support of the facts stated in his election petition on 9.12.1978 another affidavit was filed on behalf of Respondent No. 7 in support of the facts stated in his election petition. Election petition, therefore, when presented was not in terms of Rule 75 of the Rules. In this case, the election petition was filed without verification on solemn affirmation or on oath. It is a case of total non-compliance of the provision of rule 75 of the Rules. Applying the law laid down in the case of Mandal, it must be held that in this case there was a major defect in the election petition and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to allow the petitioner opportunity to remove the same. The order of the Court below as contained in annexure 4 by which respondent No. 2 has rejected the prayer of she petitioner to summarily dismiss the election petition for non-compliance of rule 75 (1) of the Rules cannot be sustained. 12. The order of the Court below as contained in annexure 4 by which respondent No. 2 has rejected the prayer of she petitioner to summarily dismiss the election petition for non-compliance of rule 75 (1) of the Rules cannot be sustained. 12. In the result the application is allowed, the order as contained in annexure 4 is set aside and the election petition filed by respondent No. 7 is summarily dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.