ORDER A. N. Varma, J. - This petition by a landlady is directed against an order dated 17-8-1978 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr allowing an appeal of respondent nos. 2, 3 and 4, and rejecting the application of the petitioner filed under section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 thereinafter referred to as U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972). 2. These are the relevant facts. The petitioner is the owner and landlady of two shops situate on K. Prasad Road, Bulandshahr. Shrimati Laxmi Devi Gangal, respondent no. 2 is the tenant of one shop, while the respondent nos. 3 and 4, of the other. 3. The landlady filed an application under section 21(1) of the aforesaid U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on the ground that her husband Dr. B. S. Rathore had retired as Chief Medical Officer Bulandshahr in May 1972. After his retirement, the landlady and her husband had settled down in Bulandshahr. Dr. Rathore has since his retirement been doing private practise in an annexe contiguous to their residential house and was commanding a substantial practise as a surgeon. In the annexe, Dr. Rathore was running, what has been described as a mini-hospital, in which there was an operation theatre, sterilisation room, store room, male and female wards for the indoor-patients etc, for want of accommodation, the operation theatre was being used as consultation chamber, while the operations were being performed in a verandah under adverse conditions. There was no accommodation available for being used as consultation chambers and dispensary for Dr. Rathore. Nor was there any accommodation for the staff attached to the hospital consisting of compounders and nurses etc. 4. The two shops under the tenancy of aforesaid respondent nos. 2 to 4 opened on the main road, namely, K. Prasad Road. The shops were so situate that they could be easily connected from the back doors with the said mini-hospital of Dr. Rathore. The landlady, therefore, bona fide required the two shops for her husband and his hospital. The tenants on the other hand did not require the shops in dispute. So far as respondent nos. 3 and 4 were concerned, they were not using the shop for any purpose except as a godown close to the shop in dispute. As for respondent no. The tenants on the other hand did not require the shops in dispute. So far as respondent nos. 3 and 4 were concerned, they were not using the shop for any purpose except as a godown close to the shop in dispute. As for respondent no. 2, she too could shift the Government Fair Price Shop without much difficulty to one of the many shops constructed by the Municipality of the town, just across the road, those shops being available. 5. The application was contested by respondent no. 2. She denied that the landlady bona fide required the shops. She asserted that Dr. Rathore did not halve any such practice as to entitle him to additional accommodation. She also raised some technical pleas such as that a single application against two sets of tenants was not maintainable. As regards her own need, she asserted that she held a Fair Price Shop Licence issued by the Government, and that she could not shit the shop to any other place without the concurrence of the Government. Out of respondent nos. 3 and 4, only Channan Singh contested the case. Pitam Singh did not do so. The case of Channan Singh was that he was not the tenant of the shop in dispute. Firm Messrs Haveli Ram Shiv Dayal was the tenant of the shop, and that consequently, the application was bad for mis-joinder of parties. On merits, it was asserted that Dr. Rathore already had sufficient accommodation available with him for his private practice. It was asserted that Dr. Rathore had only consultancy practice which too he was doing only as a pastime. Further, according to Channan Singh, Dr. Rathore did not enjoy good health and that it was, therefore, unlikely that he would require any additional accommodation for expanding his practice. 6. In support of her case, the landlady filed the affidavit of her husband, Dr. Rathore, and of Ram Gopal Garg and Dr. G. N. Srivastava. Besides the affidavits, the landlady also filed some documents consisting of a sketch map on scale indicating the true position in regard to the entire accommodation which was in occupation of the landlady as also of the disputed shops, the tenants on the other hand filed their own affidavits besides those of Ram Saran Dass and Devendra Kumar. Besides the affidavits, the landlady also filed some documents consisting of a sketch map on scale indicating the true position in regard to the entire accommodation which was in occupation of the landlady as also of the disputed shops, the tenants on the other hand filed their own affidavits besides those of Ram Saran Dass and Devendra Kumar. Besides, the Prescribed Authority itself visited the shop in dispute as well as the building belonging to the landlady where she is residing and her husband is running the aforesaid private hospital. An inspection note was prepared by the Prescribed Authority and a true copy of the same has been filed with the petition as Annexure "8". 7. The Prescribed Authority accepted the version of facts as given by the landlady and came to the conclusion that Dr. Rathore did bona fide require the shops in dispute for running his private hospital in a proper and effective way. The Prescribed Authority then compared the hardship likely to be caused to the two parties and held that as between the landlady and the tenants it is the former who would suffer more than the latter. With those findings, the application of the landlady was allowed and the tenants were directed to be evicted. 8. Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority, the tenants appealed. The learned V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr has allowed the appeal of the tenants, reversed the findings of the Prescribed Authority and rejected the application of the landlady. Hence this petition by the landlady. 9. Counsel for the petitioner vehemently assailed the finding of the learned District Judge on both the issues, namely, whether the landlady bona fide required the shops and whether the tenants would suffer greater hardship than the landlady. Learned counsel submitted that the findings of the learned District Judge are perverse on the face of then, and are besides wholly unsustainable in law. Counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 4 on the other hand submitted that the findings recorded by the learned District Judge are findings of facts which are not amenable to review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the order passed by the learned District Judge cannot be sustained. 11. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the order passed by the learned District Judge cannot be sustained. 11. The Prescribed Authority had recorded a categorical finding on the basis of the evidence on record as well as impressions gathered by him from local inspection that Dr. Rathore was in Act running a private hospital in the annexe of his residence, and that having regard to the act that Dr. Rathore had worked as Chief Medical Officer for 22 years out of his total service of 32 years, and was, therefore, fully equipped professionally and otherwise to run a private hospital on the scale asserted by him, the landlady did seem to require the shops in dispute for enabling her husband to have a place for consultation as well as a dispensary for catering to the needs of the hospital and the public at large. This finding has been set aside by the learned District Judge principally on two grounds. The first is that according to the learned District Judge, the landlady already has two motor garages situate on either sides of the two shops as well as some servant quarters which could be utilised by Dr. Rathore for meeting his additional professional needs. The second is that in the view of the learned District Judge, the landlady was not able to prove satisfactorily that her husband had the requisite professional qualifications for specialisation, for that he even had the necessary equipment for running a surgical hospital. As a result of these findings, the learned District Judge has held that the landlady does not bona fide require the shops in dispute. 12. Having given the matter my anxious consideration, I have not the slightest doubt that neither of the aforesaid two grounds given by the learned District Judge is sustainable. On the question whether the landlady had the two garages mentioned above available, the landlady had filed the affidavits of her husband and Dr. G. N. Srivastava. In regard to one of the two garages, the clear evidence of the landlady was that it was being used by her husband as motor garage for his Ambassador car. Indeed, the Act that Dr. Rathore owns a car which he keeps in one of the two garages was not seriously disputed. G. N. Srivastava. In regard to one of the two garages, the clear evidence of the landlady was that it was being used by her husband as motor garage for his Ambassador car. Indeed, the Act that Dr. Rathore owns a car which he keeps in one of the two garages was not seriously disputed. In regard to the other garage, the landlady had filed the affidavit of Dr. G. N. Srivastava before the Prescribed Authority in which it was categorically stated that the said garage was part of the tenancy of Dr. G. N. Srivastava, a tenant of the landlady on the flat which is just above the shops in dispute. Dr. G. N. Srivastava stated in this affidavit that he owned an Ambassador car bearing No. USL-8903 which is parked in the said garage. It was said that at the time of inspection of the Prescribed Authority, Dr. Srivastava was away on tour while his car had been sent for repairs. The learned District Judge, however, relying on the inspection note of the Prescribed Authority held that garage which was claimed to have been in the tenancy of Dr. Srivastava was vacant on the sole ground that no car was to be found at the time of inspection of the Prescribed Authority. The learned District Judge has obviously omitted to consider a vital place of evidence, namely the affidavit of Dr. Srivastava. Even the inspection note of the Prescribed Authority does not support the conclusion of the learned District Judge. The Prescribed Authority has clearly stated in his inspection note that the key of the garage was in possession of Mrs. Srivastava (wife of Dr. G. N. Srivastava). The Prescribed Authority has noted in his inspection note that Mrs. Srivastava had told him that Dr. Srivastava was out of station, and that his car had gone for repairs. The finding of the learned District Judge, therefore, that the said garage was vacant and available just because the car of Dr. Srivastava was not there at the time of inspection of Prescribed Authority is manifestly perverse and unsustainable being supported neither by the inspection note on which he placed reliance nor by any evidence on record. In view of concrete evidence existing on the record, which the learned District Judge did not consider, his finding that the garage in the tenancy of Dr. In view of concrete evidence existing on the record, which the learned District Judge did not consider, his finding that the garage in the tenancy of Dr. G. N. Srivastava was vacant and available to the landlady has to be set aside. The learned District Judge has fallen into a manifest error of law in assuming that the garages were available to the landlady without considering the Act that both these garages were being used as such by the cars belonging to Dr. Rathore and Dr. Srivastava. 13. Coming to the question whether the servant quarters belonging to the landlady could be used as consultation chamber and dispensary by Dr. Rathore, the learned District Judge has again fallen into a manifest error. The Prescribed Authority who had the added advantage of having a first hand knowledge of the size and nature of various accommodations available with thin landlady observed as follows in regard to servants quarter : "It is a useless argument of the opposite-party that he should establish his consulting room in the servants quarters. They are just like cells and were under the occupation of the servants. Naturally the doctor has a status by him, he will have to engage sweeper, ward boy, nurse, compounders and others, so that they may help him at any time of need and emergency. Out of the two motor- garages, one is under the occupation of Dr. Rathore and the other, that of Dr. G. N. Srivastava. Both the doctors have stated on oath that they have their own cars, and naturally they will require garages. Under such a circumstance, there is no accommodation in the garage. The building is just above the two shops and has been allotted to Dr. G. N. Srivastava, who is occupying the same. Definitely there is no place for Dr. Rathore to establish his consultation and dispensing room." 14. The prescribed Authority had considered the evidence objectively and gave a categorical finding that the accommodation which the learned District Judge wrongly assumed as vacant and available with the landlady, was neither vacant nor suitable for the requirement of Dr. Rathore. The learned District Judge made no effort whatsoever to examine the evidence on record and to find out whether the garages and the servant quarters were vacant and fit for the work of consultancy and dispensary. The suggestion of the learned District Judge, therefore, that Dr. Rathore. The learned District Judge made no effort whatsoever to examine the evidence on record and to find out whether the garages and the servant quarters were vacant and fit for the work of consultancy and dispensary. The suggestion of the learned District Judge, therefore, that Dr. Rathore could manage with the servants quarters and the garages for his additional need was entirely erroneous and unworkable. Thus the finding of the learned District Judge that the landlady already had sufficient accommodation available with her for meeting the requirements of her husband is manifestly unsustainable. The finding of the Prescribed Authority on this point was perfectly correct and called for no interference. The learned District Judge was not justified in setting it aside on assumptions, conjectures and surmises, which had no basis and were wholly unwarranted. The finding of the learned District Judge on the question of bona fide requirements of the landlady is, therefore, liable to be set aside on the above ground alone, namely, that he had wrongly assumed that the landlady has sufficient accommodation already available with her in the shops of servants quarters and garages. 15. The second ground upon which the learned District Judge has dismissed the need of the landlady as not bona fide is that in the opinion of the learned District Judge, Dr. Rathore has not been proved to have the necessary professional experience and qualifications as well as the requisite equipment for the proposed expansion of the hospital. This conclusion is again perverse, Dr. Rathore indisputably was in the State Medical Health Service for 32 years, out of which for 22 years, he had worked as Chief Medical Officer in various districts. The learned District Judge has, however, observed that he was not aware of the real qualifications of Dr. Rathore, and whether Dr. Rathore was a surgeon of some repute. The fact that Dr. Rathore was the Chief Medical Officer for 22 years itself was sufficient proof of his professional abilities and experience. It is not possible to speculate on what degree of expertise or' specialisation did the learned District Judge expect Dr. Rathore to possess before holding that Dr. Rathore would be entitled to have a place for consultancy work and dispensary. 16. Rathore was the Chief Medical Officer for 22 years itself was sufficient proof of his professional abilities and experience. It is not possible to speculate on what degree of expertise or' specialisation did the learned District Judge expect Dr. Rathore to possess before holding that Dr. Rathore would be entitled to have a place for consultancy work and dispensary. 16. The notions of the learned District Judge as regards the degree of specialisation which a landlord engaged in medicine and running a private hospital must possess before being allowed to have a consultation chamber and dispensary for his private hospital are clearly wrong, having no basis in law. In my opinion, the finding of the Prescribed Authority on the professional equipment of Dr. Rathore was perfectly correct and sound and that of the learned District Judge to the contrary, is entirely unsustainable and unacceptable. 17. The learned District Judge has next observed as follows :- "Fourthly, the learned Prescribed Authority should have looked into this aspect of matter in order to find out the bona fide need of the landlady whether her husband Dr. Rathore is possessed of sufficient paraphernalia regarding the establishment of his proposed mini-hospital." These observations clearly betray that the learned District Judge overlooked the evidence on record. Apart from the affidavits filed on behalf of the landlady pointing to the fact that Dr. Rathore has all the necessary equipment for per forming operations and everything that goes with surgery, there was the inspection note of the Prescribed Authority itself in which it is clearly recorded that the Prescribed Authority found that Dr. Rathore had the necessary surgical setup consisting inter alia of an operation table, surgical instruments, equipment for sterilisation of the instruments and store-room etc. The learned District Judge, therefore, committed a patent error of law in assuming without any justification for basis that Dr. Rathore was not possessed of sufficient "paraphernalia regarding the establishment of the proposed mini-hospital." Equally unacceptable is the finding of the learned District Judge that Dr. Rathore was not likely to have retained his mental and physical capabilities after his retirement. In the affidavit which has been filed in support of this petition, Dr. Rathore has disclosed his age as 63 years. The application under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 was moved in the year 1976 when Dr. In the affidavit which has been filed in support of this petition, Dr. Rathore has disclosed his age as 63 years. The application under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 was moved in the year 1976 when Dr. Rathore must have been even younger. In any case, the broad and sweeping generalisation in which the learned District Judge has indulged, namely, that it is a matter of common knowledge that after a public servant attains the age of superannuation, his mental and physical capabilities were bound to suffer, is entirely unjustified. The Prescribed Authority has observed that it had occasion to see Dr. Rathore in court in connection with the present case, and that it was satisfied that Dr. Rathore was fully possessed of sound health as well as his mental and physical faculties. The finding of the learned District Judge to the contrary is entirely conjectural, whimsical, and unsustainable, not being based on any data for material. 18. The other grounds mentioned by the learned District Judge are equally extra-ordinary. The learned District Judge has observed that the landlady has not stated that her husband was possessed of same specialisation which no one also possessed in the town. Another observation of the learned District Judge is that the fact that the mini-hospital being run by Dr. Rathore not having been proved to have been run for any religious for charitable purposes, could not be regarded as something from which the public at large was likely to be benefited. These observations are all entirely unjustified and clearly show that the learned District Judge was influenced by considerations which were totally irrelevant and irrational. 19. The learned District Judge has also dismissed the petitioner's application on the ground that what the landlady was asking for was luxury and not necessity. I find it difficult to accept this proposition. A claim to have the shops released to enable the husband of the landlady to have an additional accommodation for consultation and dispensary for his private hospital cannot be equated with luxury. It is a professional requirement of a person who has even a modest practice as a surgeon. The requirement of the petitioner was, therefore, not a demand for luxury. The learned District Judge has erred in holding otherwise. 20. It is a professional requirement of a person who has even a modest practice as a surgeon. The requirement of the petitioner was, therefore, not a demand for luxury. The learned District Judge has erred in holding otherwise. 20. In view of what has been stated above, I am firmly of the view that the finding of the Prescribed Authority that the petitioner bona fide required the accommodation in dispute for the purposes of setting up a mini-hospital was perfectly correct and sound, and the finding of the learned District Judge to the contrary is wholly unsustainable, perverse and is based upon irrelevant and irrational considerations, conjectures, and surmises, and also upon disregard of material pieces of evidence on record. 21. On the question of relative hardship also, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the finding of the learned District Judge is equally perverse and suffers from the same sort of errors from which the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlady suffers. On this question, the trial court had considered various relevant facts and circumstances and came to the conclusion that the tenants, for the reasons mentioned by the Prescribed Authority in its judgment, were not likely to suffer any great hardship. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the petitioner's husband had filed an affidavit (see Annexure "3" to the writ petition) in which it had been categorically stated that the tenant Shrimati Lakshmi Devi Gangal had produced a letter or (a certified copy of it) said to have been issued by one Shyam Babu, District Supply Officer Bulandshahr, in which it was stated that the said tenant had been prohibited from shifting her shop to any other place, whereas in fact there was no such officer posted at Bulandshahr bearing the name of Shyam Baboo. It was asserted in this affidavit that the said document was entirely unreliable. The learned District Judge, it was urged, fell into a manifest error of law in relying on this document. It was further urged that the learned District Judge fell into a manifest error of law in taking the view that inasmuch as the disputed shops were let out for non-residential purposes, the offer of an alternative accommodation to the tenants was of no relevance. 22. It was further urged that the learned District Judge fell into a manifest error of law in taking the view that inasmuch as the disputed shops were let out for non-residential purposes, the offer of an alternative accommodation to the tenants was of no relevance. 22. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that inasmuch as the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of relative hardship has been inevitably affected by his decision on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlady, the same has to be set aside for a reconsideration. I am also of opinion that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the view of the learned District Judge as to the effect of the offer of alternative accommodation suggested by the petitioner for the tenants is clearly unsustainable. It is incorrect to say that such a suggestion for offer has no relevance at all in the case of a non-residential building. Such an offer for suggestion, in my view, will have a direct bearing on the question of relative hardship. Learned counsel for the petitioner also seems to be right in his submission that the learned District Judge did not consider the affidavit of the petitioner's husband as regards the letter of the District Supply Officer Bulandshahr dated 11-8-77 (paper no. 32-A filed by respondent no. 2). 23. In view of what has been stated above, the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of comparative hardship also has to be set aside for a reconsideration. The finding of the Prescribed Authority as regards the bona fide requirement of the landlady for the two shops in question is, however, affirmed and it shall not be open to question upon remand of the case to the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge will consider only the question of comparative hardship and will give a finding thereon after considering the entire evidence on record and in the light of the observations made above. 24. For the reasons stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 17-8-78 passed by respondent no. 1 in Appeal Nos. 8 and 10 of 1978 are quashed. The case is remanded to respondent no. 1 for being disposed of afresh according to law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The respondent no. For the reasons stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 17-8-78 passed by respondent no. 1 in Appeal Nos. 8 and 10 of 1978 are quashed. The case is remanded to respondent no. 1 for being disposed of afresh according to law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The respondent no. 1 will try and dispose of the two appeals expeditiously. The parties are let to bear their own costs of this petition.