JUDGMENT Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. Sushil Chandra Deb Roy, who was an employee of Eastern Railway Administration had brought a suit in the City Civil Court at Calcutta against the General Manager, Eastern Railway and four other officers (the appellants abovenamed) of the said Railway, inter alia, for a decree declaring his right to continue in his post as a Senior A.G.C. Burdwan under the Divisional Superintendent Eastern Railway, Howrah, after rectifying the date of his birth in the service book and for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from giving effect to the order of his superannuation with effect from 1st February, 1971. The defendants had contented the said suit. The trial court did not grant any ad interim order of injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff respondent. On 20th August, 1974 the learned Judge, 2nd Bench, City Civil Court decreed the said suit in favour of the plaintiff and declared that he ought to have retired on superannuation on 1st June, 1973 and his superannuation on 10th March, 1972 was illegal. The learned Judge of the court below accepted the plaintiff's case that he was born Ist June, 1923 and that he could not have been made to retire on a date prior to 1st of June, 1973. But, presumably because the court had delivered its judgment on a date subsequent to 1st June, 1973 which the plaintiff claimed was the date of his superannuation, the trial court did not grant the plaintiff's prayer for permanent injunction. The defendant-appellants being aggrieved by the said decision, preferred this appeal. 2. Having heard the parties and considered the pleadings and the evidence we are satisfied that the decree as passed by the trial court cannot be sustained. At the outset, we may point out that the trial court's attention was not drawn to the fact that the Union of India, which owns the Eastern Railway Administration was not impleaded as a defendant and only the five officers of the said Railway Administration including the General Manager by their designations were made defendants. But it is unnecessary to consider this question of joinder/non-joinder of parties because the plaintiff's case ought to be dismissed on merits. 3. On 4th August, 1934, the then Division Superintendent, Howrah, East Indian Railway had issued an advertisement inviting applications for appointment on probation to the posts of Assistant Station Masters and Signalers. But it is unnecessary to consider this question of joinder/non-joinder of parties because the plaintiff's case ought to be dismissed on merits. 3. On 4th August, 1934, the then Division Superintendent, Howrah, East Indian Railway had issued an advertisement inviting applications for appointment on probation to the posts of Assistant Station Masters and Signalers. The qualifications for the said posts were that the candidates must have passed the matriculation or equivalent examination, hold a diploma in telegraphy and be of an age between 18 and 21 on 9th of October, 1934 (vide Ext. 1). In response to the said advertisement the plaintiff-respondent submitted an application dated 13th August, 1934. According to the copy of the said application produced by the plaintiff (Ext. 4), he had stated therein that he had passed the matriculation from the Calcutta University in the year 1929 and he held a diploma in telegraphy from the Indian Telegraph and Commercial School, Chittagong. His age would be 14 years 5 months on 9th of October, 1934. The original application submitted by the plaintiff, however, was not produced by the Railway Administration. The plaintiff was given an appointment as a probationary Assistant Station Master with effect from February 11, 1935. 4. The Railway Administration produced the plaintiff's service-book which was opened on 7th February, 1935. It is admitted that the plaintiff had personally filled up the initial entries in the said service book including the one relating to the date of his birth. He had mentioned 1st February, 1913 as the date of his birth. We refuse to believe the statement of the P.W.1, that he had written the said date of his birth according to dictation of an officer of Railways. There is no evidence to corroborate his said claim and it is utterly improbable that the plaintiff would give a wrong date of his birth on the dictation of somebody else. The plaintiff himself produced his matriculation certificate which stated that he was aged 16 years 1 month on 1st of March, 1929. Thus, the date as given in the service-book of the plaintiff exactly tallied with the age of the plaintiff as given in his matriculation certificate. 5. The plaintiff-respondent's case was that his age as recorded in his matriculation certificate and also as entered in his service book was erroneous and that in fact he was born on 1st of June, 1915. 5. The plaintiff-respondent's case was that his age as recorded in his matriculation certificate and also as entered in his service book was erroneous and that in fact he was born on 1st of June, 1915. In support of this claim, he relied upon an affidavit dated 9th August, 1934 affirmed by his father, Satish Chandra Roy, before a Magistrate, Ist Class, Habigunj, stating that his son, Sushil Chandra Deb Roy's age had been recorded wrongly in his matriculation certificate and actually his date of birth was 1st of June, 1915. The copy of the plaintiff's application for appointment as a probationary Assistant Station Master did not mention about the said affidavit. The original of the said affidavit by the plaintiff's father came from his custody and in case the plaintiff had submitted the said affidavit along with this application in all probability the same would have been kept with the Railway records. It further appears that in spite of the plaintiffs claim that his age would be 19 years 5 months on 9th October, 1934, he himself had filled up his service book according to his age as given in his matriculation certificate. Therefore, we are unable to believe that the plaintiff did not correctly enter his date of birth in his service book (Ext 9b). 6. The plaintiff cannot derive any assistance from the fact that in his memo (Ext. 3) dated 25th January, 1935 while forwarding the plaintiff to the District Medical Officer, Lilua, for medical examination the Divisional Superintendent had stated that the age of the plaintiff was 19 years 7 months. In the first place the plaintiff's age as given in the said memo was presumably on the basis of the date given in his own application for appointment dated 13th August, 1934. The plaintiff was appointed to the post of Assistant Station Master with effect 11th February, 1935 and we have already stated that on 7th February, 1935 in his own hands he had entered in his service book 1st February, 1913 as the date of his birth. Further, the said forwarding memo (Ext. 3) authorising the plaintiff for medical examination was not a statutory document as regards his age. The medical examination was not held to determine his actual age and the same was only for deciding his physical fitness for the post to which he was subsequently appointed. Further, the said forwarding memo (Ext. 3) authorising the plaintiff for medical examination was not a statutory document as regards his age. The medical examination was not held to determine his actual age and the same was only for deciding his physical fitness for the post to which he was subsequently appointed. Therefore, we are of the view that the age of the plaintiff as mentioned in the forwarding Memo (Ext. 3) dated 25th January, 1935 cannot outweigh the evidentiary value of the plaintiff’s matriculation certificate and the entries made by himself in his service book on 7th February, 1935 (vide Exts. 9b and 10). For the same reason, we do not attach much importance to the certificate of the District Medical Officer, Eastern Railway, Lilua which stated that the plaintiff aged 19-9, had been examined and considered fit (Ext. 9a). The said opinion of the District Medical Officer about the plaintiff's age was of no importance because the medial examination was not held for determination of his age but for deciding his fitness or otherwise. 7. The court below was of the view that the prescribed age in the advertisement for the post (Ext. 1) was between the 18 to 21 years on 9th October, 1934, whereas if the plaintiff was born in February, 1913, he would be more than 21 years on 9th October, 1934. It is true that there was no evidence that any express order was made for relaxation of the age requirements in case of the plaintiff. But, the fact that in spite of recording his age more than 21 years in his service book, he was given an appointment indicated that the age requirement in his case was impliedly relaxed. The plaintiff cannot take any advantage of the fact that without any express order of relaxation, he was given an appointment although he was over age. In case without fulfilling the age requirement, he was appointed as a probationer Assistant Station Master, his appointment would be irregular and it would be questionable whether he had any right to continue to a post to which he was irregularly appointed. 8. In this connection, the learned Judge of the trial court had referred to the Rules for Recruitment and Training of Non-gazetted Staff on State Managed Railways contained in Appendix XXII of the State Railway Establishment Code as corrected up to 10th June, 1937. 8. In this connection, the learned Judge of the trial court had referred to the Rules for Recruitment and Training of Non-gazetted Staff on State Managed Railways contained in Appendix XXII of the State Railway Establishment Code as corrected up to 10th June, 1937. The Agent of the Railways under the said rules was conferred power to relax or modify the provisions relating to prescribed age for appointment. Even if, in case of the plaintiff, the then Agent of the East Indian Railways did not order for relaxation, the same did not invariably mean that the Railway Administration had accepted that the age of the plaintiff recorded in his matriculation certificate was incorrect and that he was really born on 1st June, 1915 as claimed in the plaintiff's application. The said contention ought to be rejected in view of the entry made by the plaintiff himself in his service book to the effect that he was born on 1st February, 1913. When apart from the parole evidence of the plaintiff there is no other reliable evidence, we are unable to agree with the trial court that the Railway Administration had accepted and acted upon the affidavit affirmed by the plaintiff's father (Ext. 2) stating that the date of the plaintiff's birth was 1st day of June, 1915. Neither in the plaintiff's application for the post nor in his service book any reference was made to the said affidavit (Ext. 2). Even if, the Railway Administration was aware of the plaintiff's claim that he was born on 1st June, 1915, same did not imply that the Railway Administration had accepted the said date as the correct date of birth of the plaintiff. 9. The learned Judge of the court below had failed to consider the provisions of Rule 726 of the State Railway Establishment Code (as corrected up to 10th June, 1937) and of Rule 145 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I. According to Rule 726(1) of the said previous Establishment Code, a declaration of age for public purpose express or implied by a railway servant of any class either before or on entering railway service shall be held to be binding and no revision of such declaration would be permitted at a later date. In case of non-gazetted staff, the then Agent of the Railway could permit.... In case of non-gazetted staff, the then Agent of the Railway could permit.... "the alteration of the recorded date of birth in any case in which it is proved to the satisfaction of such authority on the strength of documentary evidence that the date as furnished is incorrect. The evidence produced should be such as would furnish an incontrovertible proof that the date of birth of an employee is not what is recorded in the service register". The sub-rule (3) of the Rule 145 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol. I prescribes that the recorded date of birth shall be binding and no alteration of the same shall be accordingly permitted. 10. Thus, the date of birth as recorded by the plaintiff in his own hands in his service-book was binding. The Rules conferred power respectively upon the then Agent and the General Manager to alter the said date of birth of non-gazetted staff in the circumstances specified in the respective rules. It is stated before us that the General Manager, South Eastern Railway by Serial Circular No. 4549 dated 26th November, 1963 had delegated his said power under Rule 145(3) of the Code to the Chief Personnel Officer of the said Railways. 11. The learned Judge of the court below has referred to the fact that the plaintiff had submitted representation against his age recorded in the service book long before his retirement (vide plaintiff's letter dated 3rd October, 1941. Ext. 11). In fact, the said circumstances was against the petitioner. There was no basis for his supposed belief that his age had been already recorded in pursuance of his aforesaid representation. Therefore, in the year 1941, the plaintiff had admittedly come to know that the entry of his age in the records was allegedly erroneous. The Railway Administration did not pass any order for alteration of his age and therefore, in the year 1941 the plaintiff's cause of action had accrued but he took no further steps till the year 1970 when it was notified that the plaintiff would attain 55 years of age on 1st of February, 1971. 12. The Railway Administration did not pass any order for alteration of his age and therefore, in the year 1941 the plaintiff's cause of action had accrued but he took no further steps till the year 1970 when it was notified that the plaintiff would attain 55 years of age on 1st of February, 1971. 12. The learned Judge has inter alia held that although the determination of age of an employee is an administrative act and the court cannot question the said act but when the employee disputes the correctness of the age, he must be informed of the case and he must have a fair opportunity to meet the case before a decision adverse to him is taken. The reported decisions noted in the judgment of the learned trial Judge do not support the proposition that in every case a Government servant disputes his recorded age, he cannot be retired unless he is first given an opportunity to prove the correct date of his birth. The supreme court in State of Assam & anr. v. Daksha Prasad Deca & ors. AIR 1971 SC 173 had explained their earlier decision in State of Orissa v. Dr, Miss Binapani Dei AIR 1967 SC 1269 , which has been referred to by the trial court. The respondent in Daksha Prasad Deca's case (supra), had made a representation that the date of his birth as recorded in service record was incorrect. The same had been once rejected. In 1963 he had again applied for correction of his date of birth. The application was again rejected by an order dated June 26, 1965. The Assam High Court had held that if the true date of birth of the respondent was August 1, 1911, the order compulsorily retiring him without giving him an opportunity to prove his true age infringed the guarantee of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court over-ruled the said view, Shah, J. who delivered the judgment of the court held that according to the recorded date of birth of the respondent he was liable to be compulsorily retired on the date on which he attained the age of 55 years. The Supreme Court over-ruled the said view, Shah, J. who delivered the judgment of the court held that according to the recorded date of birth of the respondent he was liable to be compulsorily retired on the date on which he attained the age of 55 years. The said date of compulsory retirement must be determined on the basis of the service record and not on what the respondent claimed to be as his date of birth unless the service book is first corrected consistent with the appropriate procedure. The learned Judge further observed that a public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and may apply for correction of the record. But when the record is correct he cannot claim that he has been deprived of the guarantee under Article 311(2) of the Constitution by being compulsorily relied on attaining the age of superannuation on the footing of the date of birth entered in the service record (vide paragraph 4). The decision in Miss Binapani Dei's case (supra), was distinguishable. In the former case, the recorded age of the government servant was altered to her detriment and not consistently with the rules of natural justice and by depriving her of an opportunity to meet the case of the State. But in a case where the State did not seek to modify the service record and it was the government servant who sought modification of the service record the principles laid down in Miss Binapani Dei's case (supra), may not apply. The court in Daksha Prasad Deca's case (supra), however, recognised that ordinarily when an application is made for rectification of age by a public servant concerned, the State should give the applicant proper opportunity to prove his case and should give due consideration to the evidence brought before it. 13. The above observations in Daksha Prasad Deca's case (supra), would also apply in the present case. The Railway Administration did not seek to alter the age of the plaintiff as recorded in his service book. But it was the plaintiff who had claimed that his said recorded age was incorrect. Therefore it was for the plaintiff to apply under the relevant rules of the Railway Establishment Code for rectification of his age. The Railway Administration did not seek to alter the age of the plaintiff as recorded in his service book. But it was the plaintiff who had claimed that his said recorded age was incorrect. Therefore it was for the plaintiff to apply under the relevant rules of the Railway Establishment Code for rectification of his age. There was no material to indicate that in accordance with the said rules in due time he had made any application either to the General Manager of the Railway or to his delegated authority. He filed a belated application to the C.P.O., Eastern Railway and the said application was still undisposed of when he first moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution and thereafter filed the civil suit. Secondly, even in case an application had been made, it would be for the prescribed authority to consider in accordance with law the said prayer of the plaintiff for alteration of his age in the railway records. Ordinarily, the civil court cannot itself rectify the age of an employee recorded in his service record. In the event, without exhausting the remedy provided in the service rules/regulations relating to correction/alteration of recorded age, an employee straightway moves the civil court, the Court may direct him to first proceed in accordance with the rules/regulations. When however in respect of an application for alteration of his age made by an employee the prescribed authority either fails to exercise its jurisdiction or commits any other jurisdictional error or acts mala fide, the Civil Court would prohibit the said authority from giving effect to the said order and also by a mandatory order may direct the prescribed authority to decide in accordance with law, the said application of the said employee for correction/alteration of his age. Normally, the civil court would not substitute its own views for those of the prescribed authority as to whether the age of an employee had been correctly recorded in the official records. 14. We have already observed that in case a railway servant is superannuated, according to the date of his birth recorded in his service book, the same would not amount to removal and the principles laid down in Pursuhottam Dhingra's case AIR 1958 SC 36 and Motiram Deca's case AIR 1964 SC 600 , would be entirely inapplicable. 15. 14. We have already observed that in case a railway servant is superannuated, according to the date of his birth recorded in his service book, the same would not amount to removal and the principles laid down in Pursuhottam Dhingra's case AIR 1958 SC 36 and Motiram Deca's case AIR 1964 SC 600 , would be entirely inapplicable. 15. Our attention has been drawn to the recent decision of Krishna Iyer and Desai, JJ. in Jiwan Kishore v. Delhi Transport Corporation AIR 1980 SC 1251 . The said case is distinguishable on facts. Krishna Iyer, J. who delivered the said judgment found that there was a discrepancy about the date of birth of the respondent between the two official records of the Delhi Transport Corporation. The employer, Delhi Transport Corporation, itself had appointed its Medical Board to fix the age of the employee and according to the assessment of the age by the Medical Board he was 51 years of age on 13th of June, 1975. In Jeewan Krishna's case (supra), both sides had agreed that if the court fixed the age as per the Medical Board's determination, they would accept and abide by it. On this footing the Supreme Court had disposed of the appeal in partial allowance. In the instant case, the Medical Board which had examined the plaintiff before he entered railway service was never called upon to scientifically determine his age. The panics neither in the trial court nor in the High Court agreed that the court itself may fix the age of the plaintiff. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the court ought not to assume the powers of the prescribed authority under the Railway Establishment Code and itself fix the plaintiff's date of birth. In the instant case, we have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is bound by the date of his birth which was entered by him in his service book and we have disbelieved his evidence relating to the circumstance under which he had entered 1st February, 1915 as the date of his birth. Therefore, in the instant case, it would be wholly unnecessary to again direct the prescribed authority under the Rule 145 of Railway Establishment Code Volume I to consider in accordance with law the plaintiff's application for correction/rectification of his age. Therefore, in the instant case, it would be wholly unnecessary to again direct the prescribed authority under the Rule 145 of Railway Establishment Code Volume I to consider in accordance with law the plaintiff's application for correction/rectification of his age. It may be also noted that nearly 9 years have passed since the date on which the appellant was due to be superannuated according to the railway records. 16. According to the age recorded in his service-book, the plaintiff was due to retire with effect from 1st February, 1971. He had moved this court under Article 226 of the Constitution and had obtained Civil Rule No. 125(W) of 1971 wherein an interim order was made in his favour. On 7th May, 1971 a learned Judge of this Court disposed of the said Rule obtained by the plaintiff extended the said interim order for a period of 90 days and granted him liberty to file a suit for appropriate reliefs. Thereafter, on 30th July, 1971 the plaintiff had instituted the present suit in the City Civil Court at Calcutta for declaration and permanent injunction. We have already stated that the trial court had declined to grant the plaintiff's prayer for interim injunction. Therefore, he was made to retire from the railway service before the disposal of the said suit. The trial court has granted a decree in his favour declaring that he ought to have been retired on superannuation on 1st June, 1973 and his superannuation dated 10th March, 1973 was illegal, but has not given any consequential reliefs. 17. The trial court's observation that the court may take into consideration the altered circumstances to do complete justice between the parties is no doubt unexceptionable. The Rule 7 of Order 7 of the Civil Procedure Code enjoins that every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claim, either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the court may think just to the same extent, as if it had been asked for and the same rule applies to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement. The ordinary rule is that the rights of the parties ought to be determined as on the date of the institution of the suit and not on the basis of the lights which might have accrued to them after the institution of the suit (see in this connection the observations in Rai Charan Mandal & anr. v Biswa Nath Mandal & ors 20 CLJ 107; Doorga Prosad Chamaria v. Secretary of State AIR 1945 PC 62; Posupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders AIR 1975 SC 1409 ; Rameshwar & ors v. Jot Ram & ors AIR 1976 SC 49 etc). At the same time, it is also settled law that when the original relief claimed as by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate or that it is necessary to have decision of the court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten the course of litigation or to do complete justice between the parties, the courts may depart from the general rule and mould the relief on the basis of the altered circumstance. Therefore, in the instant case, when the plaintiff had been compulsorily retired during the pendency of the suit, the trial court had undoubtedly a jurisdiction to take notice of the said subsequent event and to mould the relief. But the trial court overlooked that normally such subsequent events are brought to the notice of the court by a party by amendment of its pleadings including the prayer. In the instant case, the said subsequent event of plaintiff's compulsory retirement transpired in course of evidence adduced by the parties, But at no stage the plaintiff had prayed for amendment of his plaint by incorporating therein consequential prayers by way of mandatory injunction or for pecuniary relief by way of damages and/or for recovery of his arrear pay and allowances upto the month of June 1973. Although the trial court was of the view that in the interest of justice and to shorten the course of litigation, the subsequent event of plaintiff's retirement ought to be taken into consideration, it did not in fact mould the relief which would have been appropriate in the said changed circumstances. In other words, neither the plaintiff prayed before the trial court nor did the said court mould the consequential relief on the basis of the said altered circumstances. In other words, neither the plaintiff prayed before the trial court nor did the said court mould the consequential relief on the basis of the said altered circumstances. After the plaintiff had already retired from service the mere declaratory decree by the trial court in his favour could be of no effect. The trial court has merely declared that the plaintiff ought to have been retired on superannuation on 1st January, 1973 and his superannuation on 10th March, 1972 was illegal. But the trial court did not grant any consequential relief either for rectification of the railway records which showed that the plaintiff was to attain age of superannuation on 1st February, 1971 or even in deciding afresh in accordance with law whether or not the said records ought to be altered as claimed by the plaintiff. Even if we had dismissed the appeal at the instance of the Railway Administration, the above bare declaration obtained by the plaintiff-respondent would have been futile and not of such legal consequence. 18. The plaintiff has neither filed any appeal or cross-objection, inter alia, contending that the trial court ought to have granted a decree for consequential reliefs by way of recovery of arrears salary etc. It is not necessary to consider whether or not in exercise of our powers under Order 43 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made by the trial court. We have already held that the plaintiff's suit is liable to fail on the ground that he is not entitled to obtain a declaration that he ought to have been retired on superannuation on 1st June, 1973. 19. For the forgoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree appealed against and dismiss the plaintiff's suit. 20. There will be no order as to costs. Sharma J : I agree. Appeal allowed.