JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a revision against judgment dated 18-7-1979, passed by Additional District Judge, Sheopur, whereby he has affirmed the judgment and decree dated 2-1-1979 passed by the trial Court, decreeing the suit for recovery of rent brought against her by the plaintiff-non-applicant. ( 2. ) FACTS essential for decision of this revision are as under : the plaintiff-non-applicant brought the suit giving rise to the present revision on 27-10-1976, on the allegations that the defendant-applicant herein had mortgaged with possession the suit house situated in Bains Pada, Kila, road, Sheopur by executing a mortgage deed dated 28-4-1970 for Rs. 4,500 in respect of the transaction; that on the same day, the defendant took back the said house on lease by executing a rent note whereby she agreed to pay rent Rs. 90 per month: that the rent is due with effect from 28-8-1975. Accordingly, the plaintiff claimed a decree for arrears of rent Rs. 1,170 for the period between 28-8-1975 to 27-9-1976. ( 3. ) THE defendant-applicant herein admitted the factum of mortgage and execution of rent-note and resisted the claim of the plaintiff, inter alia, on the grounds that she is a marginal farmer within the contemplation of section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Gramin Rin Vimukti Tatha Rin Sthagan adhiniyam, 1975 (Act No. 32 of 1975-for short the Act): that as a consequence ensuing from commencement of the Act, the mortgage stood redeemed and the right of the plaintiff to recover rent has disappeared and that the plaintiff is merely entitled to a decree for Rs. 144 for rent due prior to commencement of the Act. ( 4. ) THE trial Court decreed the suit on the findings that (1) that the transaction of mortgage and lease-back is not covered by the Act; (2) that the defendant-applicant resides in urban area of Sheopur; (3) that the applicant does not hold land and does not cultivate personally the land claimed to be held by her; (4) that the said land has been declared in Monga v. Nathya1 to be belonging to one Nogna, vide Ex. P-7; and that his name has also been mutated vide order dated 5-11-1977 (Ex. P-8); that the suit property is situated within the municipal limits of Sheopur and therefore, the benefit of the Act cannot be claimed by the defendant-applicant. ( 5. P-7; and that his name has also been mutated vide order dated 5-11-1977 (Ex. P-8); that the suit property is situated within the municipal limits of Sheopur and therefore, the benefit of the Act cannot be claimed by the defendant-applicant. ( 5. ) AGGRIEVED by this judgment and decree, the defendant-applicant preferred appeal, which has been dismissed by the learned Additional District judge on the additional findings that the money due by virtue of mortgage and rent are beyond the pale of the Act; and that the rent cannot be treated to be interest. The second appeal being barred by section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendant has preferred this revision. ( 6. ) IN this revision, it is contended by Shri V. K. Sapre, learned counsel for the defendant-applicant that the impugned judgment and decree are without jurisdiction; that the transaction of mortgage and/or lease back are squarely governed by the provisions of the Act; that the applicant is a marginal farmer within the contemplation of section 3 (g) (ii) of the Act; that the factum of being in actual possession and/or personal residence in village is not essential for one being treated as a marginal farmer, if one happens to hold agricultural land not exceeding half hectare of irrigated or one hectare of unirrigated; that as in the Civil Suit (C. S. No. 215/76), in which Ex. P-7 judgment was given, the applicant herein was not a party, both the Courts below have erred in treating it to be binding on the applicant; that the Court below erred in relying on mutation order (Ex. P-8), as that too has been passed behind her back; and that, in any event, by virtue of section 6 (a) of the Act, a decree for rent due up to the date of enforcement of the Act (i. e. 16-10-1975) can certainly be passed. ( 7. ) SHRI R. D. Jain, learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-applicant argued in support of the Act contended that a farmer, in order that he may be regarded as marginal farmer, should be a resident of rural area and that the impugned judgment and decree are within the saving carved out by section 6 (a) of the Act. ( 8. ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the revision deserves to be partly allowed. ( 9. ( 8. ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the revision deserves to be partly allowed. ( 9. ) THE Act is a social piece of legislation. It has been enacted to provide relief from indebtedness to members of the Scheduled Castes and scheduled Tribes, small and marginal farmers, landless agricultural labourers and rural artisans in rural areas "the Act has been declared by section 2 of the Act to be an Act for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing principles specified in Article 46 of the Constitution of India. " ( 10. ) NOW, section 4 of the Act enumerates the consequences to ensue on commencement of the Act. The Act commenced on 16-10-1975. " ( 10. ) NOW, section 4 of the Act enumerates the consequences to ensue on commencement of the Act. The Act commenced on 16-10-1975. By virtue of section 4, "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract or other instrument having a force of jaw and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the following consequences shall, on the commencement of this Act, ensue, namely :- (a) Every debt advanced before the commencement of this Act including the amount of interest, if any, and which is payable by- (i) a marginal farmer; (ii) a landless agricultural labourer; (iii) a rural artisan; to a creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged, (b) no civil Court having jurisdiction shall entertain any suit or proceeding against a debtor specified in clause (a) for the recovery of his debt; (c) all proceedings in execution of any decree for money or proceeding for making final any preliminary decree for foreclosure or sale or proceedings in execution of any final decree for sale against a debtor specified in clause (a) for recovery of his debt shall stand withdrawn and all property of the said debtor under attachment in any such proceeding shall forthwith be released; (d) Every debtor specified in clause (a) in detention in a civil prison in execution of any decree for money passed against him by a civil Court in respect of a debt shall forthwith be released; (e) all suits and proceedings pending against a debtor specified in clause (a) for the recovery of debt shall abate; (f) every property pledged by a debtor specified in clause (a) shall stand released in favour of such debtor and a creditor shall be bound to return the same to the debtor forthwith; (g) every mortgage executed by a debtor specified in clause (a) in favour of a creditor shall stand redeemed and the mortgaged property shall be released in favour of such debtor: provided that where a suit or proceedings is instituted jointly against the said debtor and any other person, nothing in this section shall apply to the maintainability of a suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to such other person. Explanation.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle the said debtor to refund of any part of a debt already repaid by him or recovered from him before the commencement of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.) ( 11. ) NOW, section 6 enacts bar of application of Act, Its clause (a), which is relevant for the present purpose runs as under : "6. Bar of application of Act.-Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to liabilities falling under the following heads, namely :- (a) any rent due in respect of any property let out to a debtor. " Now, in order to entitle a debtor to claim benefit of section 4, it is necessary that (1) there must be a debt advanced to him before commencement of the Act; and (2) the debtor must be either a marginal farmer, a landless agricultural labourer or a rural artisan. If the aforesaid conditions are shown to co exist, debts so owed by such a person to a creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged. No Civil Court shall entertain any suit against a debtor specified in clause (a) above for recovery of such debt. The terms debt and marginal farmer, have been defined by section 3 (d) and (g)respectively as under:- "in this Act unless the context otherwise requires,- (d) "debt" includes all liabilities owing to a creditor in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, payable under a decree or order of a civil Court or otherwise and subsisting on the date of commencement of this Act whether due or not due; (g) "marginal farmer" means an agriculturist who :- (i) in case of a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled tribe, holds not exceeding one hectare of irrigated or two hectares of unirrigated agricultural land and who cultivates personally such land; (ii) in case of a person other than a member of Scheduled caste or Scheduled Tribe, holds an agricultural land not exceeding half hectare of irrigated or one hectare of unirrigated land and who cultivates personally such land. " (Emphasis supplied.) ( 12. ) IN the instant case, the suit property is admittedly situated in village Birampura, Pargana Sheopur. It has also been held by both the courts below that the applicant herein resides in the suit house situate in bains Pada, Kila Road, Sheopur. " (Emphasis supplied.) ( 12. ) IN the instant case, the suit property is admittedly situated in village Birampura, Pargana Sheopur. It has also been held by both the courts below that the applicant herein resides in the suit house situate in bains Pada, Kila Road, Sheopur. The question of residence having been concluded by properly arrived at finding of fact, is not open to challenge in this revision. Accordingly, the question of applicability of the Act to the applicant herein is being considered on the hypothesis that she does not reside in rural area, but resides in urban area of Sheopur. ( 13. ) NOW, in the definition of marginal farmer reproduced above, it is not made a postulate of law that in order that one may be regarded a marginal farmer, he should reside in rural area. The applicant claims to be a marginal farmer within section 3 (g) (ii) of the Act by virtue of holding an agricultural land, not exceeding the specified limit and also on the ground that she cultivates the land held by her personally. The residence has not been made a relevant consideration for the purpose. Now, the connotation of the word, holds and that of the expression cultivates personally has to be gathered from the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959), by virtue of section 3 (m) of the Act which provides that: "(m) Words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959)shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in that Code. " The term "holding" has been defined in section 2 (i) of the Code as under: "(i) "holding" means- (i) a parcel of land separately assessed to land revenue and held under one tenure; and (ii) in reference to land held by a tenant a parcel of land held from a Bhumiswami under one lease or set of conditions. " The term "holding" has been defined in section 2 (i) of the Code as under: "(i) "holding" means- (i) a parcel of land separately assessed to land revenue and held under one tenure; and (ii) in reference to land held by a tenant a parcel of land held from a Bhumiswami under one lease or set of conditions. " The term "to cultivate personally" has been defined in section 2 (Z-2)of the Code thus: "(Z-2) "to cultivate personally" means to cultivate on ones own account- (i) by ones own labour; or (ii) by the labour of any member of ones family; or (iii) by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share; or (iv) by hired labour under ones personal supervision or the personal supervision of any member of ones family. " The applicant herein claims to hold the land as occupancy tenant from one Nathya Bhumiswami in village Birampura in Paragana Sheopur. Now, on the strength of judgment (Ex. P-7) and mutation order (Ex. P-8) it has been concluded that the applicant herein does not hold the land in question, beeause Nanga has been declared to be a Bhumiswami in possession vide judgment in Civil Suit No. 215-A of 1976 (Ex. P-7) and his name has been mutated in the village papers by mutation order (Ex. P-8 ). Neither in the suit nor in the mutation proceedings, the applicant herein was a party. Accordingly, the judgment and the order passed behind her back have no binding efficacy qua her. In the Khasras (Ex. P-5 and P-6), which are on record, Pitam Singh, husband of the applicant herein, has been recorded as occupancy tenant, the duration of his possession being shown for more than 12 years. This position is reflected in Khasras upto Samvat 2032. The name of Pitam Singh disappeared only when the Tahsildar has behind the back of the applicant ordered mutation of the name of Nanga as Bhumiswami of the suit land. The entry of possession in the name of her husband enures for the benefit of the applicant. By no process known to law, the non-applicant has been able to show that the possession of the land, which was with Pitamsingh, and after his death with the applicant herein, was removed and was obtained by Nanga. On this point, there is not even an iota of evidence on record. By no process known to law, the non-applicant has been able to show that the possession of the land, which was with Pitamsingh, and after his death with the applicant herein, was removed and was obtained by Nanga. On this point, there is not even an iota of evidence on record. By virtue of section 117 of the M. P. Land Revenue code, 1959, a statutory presumption arises to the effect that Pitamsingh was and no person other than the applicant herein was in possession of the suit land up to Samvat 2032. Accordingly, it has to be held that the applicant herein is in possession of the aforesaid land on the strength of which she claims to be a marginal farmer. ( 14. ) NOW even assuming that the appiicant herein is not in actual possession of the suit land, legal consequence will not be different. In order that one may hold land it is not necessary that one should be in its actual possession. The connotation of term holding" fell for consideration in dattu Ramji v. Woman Raghunath, (AIR 1940 Nag. 247.), wherein this Court was concerned with the concept of "surrender of a holding" as envisaged by section 89 of the c. P. Tenancy Act (1 of 1890 ). By section 2 (4) of that Act, the definition of the term holding as made is as under :- "in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant. . . . . . . . . in the subject or context,- (4) "holding" means a parcel of land by a tenant of landlord under one lease or one set of conditions. " Niyogi J. in Dattu Ramjis case (supra) ruled as under: "the land may be in possession of a trespasser but the "holding" remains with the rightful tenant". The definition of the word "holding" in that Act and in the M. P. Land revenue Code, 1959 are substantially similar. Accordingly, I see no reason to interpret the term holding in a different way. As such, the factum of being in actual possession of the suit land is not a sine qua non for regarding that a farmer holds that land. Accordingly, it is being held that the applicant holds the aforesaid land in village Birempur. ( 15. Accordingly, I see no reason to interpret the term holding in a different way. As such, the factum of being in actual possession of the suit land is not a sine qua non for regarding that a farmer holds that land. Accordingly, it is being held that the applicant holds the aforesaid land in village Birempur. ( 15. ) NOW, in order that a person who holds agricultural land may be regarded as a marginal farmer it has also to be shown by him/her that he/she cultivates personally such land. The connotation of the term "personal cultivation" as occurring in section 54 or the M. P. Abolition of proprietary Rights Act, 1951 has been explained by Division Bench of this court in Harishchandra Bohra v. Garbhoo Singh, (196l R N 23.) thus : "the expression "personal cultivation" in section 54 of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951 indicates not merely bodily possession of the land but constructive possession and also the right to possess against a trespasser. If a wrongdoer takes possession, steps to exclude him can certainly be taken, and the cultivation of the trespasser in these circumstances cannot clothe him with any right. His cultivation has to be deemed to be on behalf of the rightful owner. The fact therefore, that the lands have been in cultivation of a trespasser who has taken forcible possession from the recorded tenant cannot prevent the rightful owner from claiming the right as Raiyat under section 5 of the m. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951 and claim possession of the lands on the basis of that title. " (Emphasis supplied.)Now the definition of the expression "personal cultivation" as given in section 54 of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951, is substantially similar to that given by section 2 (Z-2) of the M. P. Land Revenue code, 1959. Accordingly, the ratio of Harishchandra Bohras case (supra)can be usefully extended and applied for construing the expression cultivates personally occurring in section 3 (g) (ii) of the Act. 15. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, it is to be concluded that the approach of the Courts below on the point is just contrary to the law. They appear to have imported a new concept of residence into the definition of marginal farmer. Construction put on the expressions holds and cultivates personally is also contrary to law. 15. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, it is to be concluded that the approach of the Courts below on the point is just contrary to the law. They appear to have imported a new concept of residence into the definition of marginal farmer. Construction put on the expressions holds and cultivates personally is also contrary to law. Accordingly, both the Courts below acted in an illegal manner in concluding that the applicant is not a marginal farmer and as such is not entitled to claim benefit of section of the Act. ( 16. ) FACED with this situation, Mr. R. D. Jain, placing reliance on the preamble of the Act, contended that a marginal farmer within the contemplation of section 4 (a) of the Act should be shown to be resident of rural area. I am afraid reliance on the Preamble for the purpose, cannot be available to the plaintiff non applicant, especially when the definition of marginal farmer as contained in section 3 (a) of the Act is unambiguous and clear in terms. No doubt, Preamble is a key to open the mind of the Legislature, but it cannot be used to control or qualify precise and unambiguous language of the enactment. It is only when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a provision that recourse may be had to the preamble to ascertain the reasons of the enactment and hence the intention of the Parliament. If the language of the enactment is capable of more than one meaning then that one is to be preferred which comes nearest to the purpose and scope of the preamble. In other words, Preamble may assist in ascertaining the meaning but it does not affect clear words in a statute. The Courts are thus not expected to start with the Preamble for construing a statutory provision nor does the mere fact that a clear and unambiguous statutory provision goes beyond the Preamble give rise itself to a doubt on its meaning, as held in tribhuban Parkash v. Union of India, (AIR 1970 S C 540 ). ( 17. ) AS stated above, the language employed in section 4 (a) read with section 3 (g) (ii), reproduced above, is clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, with the aid of the Preamble, the concept of residence of a marginal farmer in rural areas cannot be imported into the provisions in question. ( 17. ) AS stated above, the language employed in section 4 (a) read with section 3 (g) (ii), reproduced above, is clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, with the aid of the Preamble, the concept of residence of a marginal farmer in rural areas cannot be imported into the provisions in question. Mr. Jain was unable to show that it is open for the Courts to read in a provision something which is foreign to it. Accordingly, the plaintiff non applicants cannot be permitted to invoke the aid of the Preamble for the purpose. Moreover, the words "in rural areas" relate to "rural artisans" and not to the other persons specified in the preamble. ( 18. ) THIS brings me to the further question as to whether the Act is applicable to the present suit or not ? The plaintiff-non-applicant seeks to recover rent amounting to Rs. 1170 for period between 28-8-1975 to 27-9-1976. Now, the plaintiff non applicant claims status of a creditor by virtue of the mortgage-deed executed on 28-4-1970 and the rent note dated 28-4-1970 executed by the applicant herein in his favour. It is a case of secured debt. As such, it has to be held that the plaintiff is a creditor and the defendant applicant is a debtor and the amount sought to be recovered is a debt within the meaning of section 3 (d) of the Act, reproduced above. The definition of the word, debt includes all liabilities. Liability to pay rent claimed is a liability within its postulate. . ( 19. ) NOW, in order that the benefit of section 4 may be claimed by the applicant and given by the Court, it is necessary that the debt in question should be subsisting on the date of commencement of the Act, i. e. 16-10-1975. It is in respect of such a debt that section 4 operates. It is only such debt which alone will be deemed to be discharged wholly by virtue of clause (a)of the section 4. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit in respect of recovery of a debt specified in clause (a) of section 4, as discussed above, is specifically barred by clause (b) of the section 4. It is only such debt which alone will be deemed to be discharged wholly by virtue of clause (a)of the section 4. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit in respect of recovery of a debt specified in clause (a) of section 4, as discussed above, is specifically barred by clause (b) of the section 4. By virtue of clause (g) of section 4, every mortgage executed by a debtor specified in clause (a) above, in favour of a creditor shall stand redeemed and the mortgage executed by the applicant herein in favour of the non-applicant stood redeemed on 16-10-1975 and the mortgaged property shall be regarded to be liable to be released in her favour. This consequence accrued only in respect of debt which was subsisting on the date of commencement of the Act, as stated above. Rent amounting to Rs. 144 was only due on that day. Preamble of section 4 carves out a saving in favour of express provision contained in the Act. This is clear by virtue of the expression save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act. Now, section 6 (a) creates a bar of of application of the Act to any rent due in respect of any property let out to a debtor. Since the amount of Rs. 144 was due on the date of commencement of the Act, it is within the pale of section 6 (a) of the Act, more so, because it was upto the date of commencement of this Act that the relationship of debtor and creditor inter se parties continued, and the aforesaid amount of rent was due from the applicant debtor in respect of the property let out to her by the plaintiff-creditor-non-applicant. Accordingly, the claim of the plaintiff in respect of rent due up to 16-10-1975 remained unaffected by provisions of section 4, and could be enforced through court of law. Jurisdiction of the civil Court was not taken away in respect of that part of the claim. Further, the amount said to have been due after 16-10-1975 is within the mischief of section 4, as discussed above. Accordingly, the plaintiff non-applicant has no right to claim the amount of rent which on his own showing became due after the aforesaid date. ( 20. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, the revision is allowed partly. Further, the amount said to have been due after 16-10-1975 is within the mischief of section 4, as discussed above. Accordingly, the plaintiff non-applicant has no right to claim the amount of rent which on his own showing became due after the aforesaid date. ( 20. ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, the revision is allowed partly. The judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below are set aside. The claim of the plaintiff non-applicant for a decree for an amount of Rs. 144 by way of rent due between the period 28-8-1975 to 16-10-1975 is only liable to be decreed and is hereby decreed. Accordingly, the suit shall stand decreed in respect of that amount. Rest of the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below are hereby set aside, and the suit of the plaintiff in respect of the other claim is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs all throughout. Revision partly allowed.