ORDER K.C. Agarwal, J. -This is a tenants writ petition preferred against a judgment of the Third Additional District Judge, Bareilly, dated May 13, 1978. 2. Smt. Jaswant Kaur, Respondent 2, and Manjeet Singh, respondent 3, filed an application under Section 21 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 for release of the disputed shop on the ground that Smt. Jaswant Kaur had two sons, Jagmohan Singh and Manjeet Singh. It was alleged that Manjeet Singh, the second son, was previously employed as Surveyor in the Survey Department of the Government of India, but had left the service in the year 1973 and was since then unemployed. She claimed that the shop was required by her for enabling Manjeet Singh to start his own business. She alleged that in the absence of any accommodation available to him for starting a business, Manjeet Singh was loitering about without any business and work. 3. The application was resisted by the petitioner. Apart from other grounds, two of them were that Smt. Jaswant Kaur and Manjeet Singh were not entitled to file the application under Section 21. The petitioner claimed that respondents 2 and 3 were not the sole owners of the disputed shop, and that they were only co-owners along with Jagmohan Singh alias Jogender Singh, and since Jagmohan Singh had not been impleaded as a party, the application was liable to be rejected. The second ground taken was that Manjeet Singh was already employed and was doing business as a partner in the firm M/s. Pindi Auto Traders, and, as such, the premises was not required by respondent 3. 4. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties led evidence. One of the questions which arose before the. Prescribed Authority was as to whether respondents 2 and 3 were entitled to file the application. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of respondents 2 and 3 was not bona fide. It also found that Jagmohan Singh alias Jogender Singh was also one of the landlords of the property and since he had not been joined in moving the application, the same was not maintainable. The question of comparative hardship had also been decided by the Prescribed Authority in favour of the petitioner. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, Respondents 2 and 3 filed an appeal under Section 22 of 11. P. Act XIIT of 1972. The question of comparative hardship had also been decided by the Prescribed Authority in favour of the petitioner. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, Respondents 2 and 3 filed an appeal under Section 22 of 11. P. Act XIIT of 1972. In the appeal, the contesting respondents filed the original rent deed executed by the petitioner, to demonstrate that as the said rent deed had been executed by the petitioner in favour of Smt. Jaswant Kaur alone, she was competent to file the application under Section 21 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. The appeal was allowed on 13-5-1978 and all the findings given by the Prescribed Authority against the contesting respondents were reversed. The appellate authority held that since Smt. Jaswant Kaur was the landlord of the premises in dispute. and she having let out the same to the petitioner, she was competent to file the application. The appellate authority also found that Manjeet Singh was not a partner of the firm M/s. Pindi Auto Traders, and that he was unemployed, and for the purposes of settlement of Manjeet Singh, the shop was genuinely required. The last question examined by the appellate authority was that of comparative hardship. In its opinion, the landlords since were likely to suffer greater hardship from the rejection of the application, the application was liable to succeed. 6. Being dissatisfied, the tenant has filed the present writ petition. 7. The first question that arises for decision is about the power of admitting additional evidence in appeal filed under Section 22 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 by the appellate authority. In the instant case, the tenant-petitioner had challenged the right of the contesting respondents to file the application under Section 21 of the Act on the ground that as they were not the exclusive owners of the property, they could not file the application all alone, without impleading Jagmohan Singh. This objection prevailed with the Prescribed Authority. In appeal, respondent 2 filed the original rent deed executed by the petitioner. The rent note clearly showed that the shop was let out to the petitioner by Smt. Jaswant Kaur alone. Section 22 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 provides that to an appeal filed under this section, the provisions of Section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply. Section 10 in its turn provides for the power of an appellate authority. The rent note clearly showed that the shop was let out to the petitioner by Smt. Jaswant Kaur alone. Section 22 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 provides that to an appeal filed under this section, the provisions of Section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply. Section 10 in its turn provides for the power of an appellate authority. Subsection (2) of Section 10 lays down: "The appellate authority may confirm, vary or rescind the order, or remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing, and may also take any additional evidence, and pending its decision stay the operation of the order under appeal on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit." 8. Section 10 (2) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 is on the same lines as Section 107 (1) (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section also provides that an appellate court shall have power to take additional evidence. The power to take additional evidence conferred by Section 107 (1) (d) C. P. C. is subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. C. was made to carry out the purpose of the aforesaid section. It enumerates the grounds on which oral or documentary evidence could be produced by a party in the appellate court. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 has three clauses. Sub-rule (2), however, provides that wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. Reading of the two provisions would show that O. 41, Rule 27 C. P. C. circumscribes the grounds on which additional evidence has to be taken. It confers discretion on the appellate court to receive and admit additional evidence. This discretion, however, is. not an arbitrary one. 9. Reading of the two provisions would show that O. 41, Rule 27 C. P. C. circumscribes the grounds on which additional evidence has to be taken. It confers discretion on the appellate court to receive and admit additional evidence. This discretion, however, is. not an arbitrary one. 9. Reverting to the provisions of Act XIII of 1972, reference may be made to Section 34, S. 34 (1) reads as under.- "The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Civil P. C., 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely.- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits; (c) to (f) ............................ (g) any other matter which may be prescribed." 10. Rule 22 of the Rules has been framed by the State Government under Section 34 (1) (g). The relevant clause to be noted is clause (f) of this Rule, which provides that for the purposes of holding any enquiry or hearing any appeal, the authority shall have the power referred to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Civil P. C. and to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the authority concerned. 11. The argument was that Section 22 read with Section 10 conferred unfettered power on the appellate authority to take additional evidence, and that it could not be circumscribed by the conditions laid down in sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 27 of Order 41 of the Civil P. C. I am unable to accept this submission. Section 34 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 provides that the appellate authority shall have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Civil P. C. This is followed by clauses (a) and (b) which read together deal with the taking of additional evidence. Section 34 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 provides that the appellate authority shall have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Civil P. C. This is followed by clauses (a) and (b) which read together deal with the taking of additional evidence. If all these provisions are taken into consideration, one is led to conclude that the power to take additional evidence in appeal is to be exercised in the same fashion as by a civil court under Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. C. If such an interpretation is not made to sub-section (1) of Section 34 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972, the very object of enactment of this section would be defeated. To concede un-hedged power in a court of appeal to admit additional evidence would mean that it would neither be required to give reasons for admitting additional evidence nor an opportunity of giving evidence in rebuttal to the other side. The legislature clearly intended that the power to take additional evidence has to be exercised in the same manner and in the same fashion as by a civil court. Putting up the said interpretation has the effect of not only advancing the object of enactment, but also checking the vagaries of the courts below. 12. In Smt. K. Khare v. R. N. Pande (1979 All LR 547): (1979 All LJ 1263), a learned single Judge of this Court was called upon to consider the power of admitting additional evidence in a revision filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The learned Judge held that there is no such power under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Pause Courts Act. He, however, carved out an exception with regard to one situation. That situation is where the lower court has refused to allow a party to file any evidence, and that order is found contrary to law. In that connection, the decision given in Kishan Kumar Agrawal v. First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, (1978 All Rent Cas 294), was cited by him. That situation is where the lower court has refused to allow a party to file any evidence, and that order is found contrary to law. In that connection, the decision given in Kishan Kumar Agrawal v. First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, (1978 All Rent Cas 294), was cited by him. In that case it was held that the appellate authority had power to admit additional evidence in accordance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. C. The learned single Judge observed that he did not agree with that view because Section 34 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 did not confer any such power. He also observed that Section 34 made certain powers of the civil court specifically mentioned therein to be applicable, and since Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. C. is not one of the orders made applicable, the same could not apply. However, ps this point did not arise directly before him, the learned single Judge did not refer the case to a larger Bench. In my view, although Section 34 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 does not specifically make any mention of Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. C.. but reading sub-section (1) of Section 34, where it lays down that the power of a court of appeal would be the same as that of the civil court, one is led to the irresistible conclusion that Order 41 Rule 27 C. P. C. applies. This is more so when it is read along with cls. (a) and (b). Clauses (a) and (b) in terms although apply to original proceedings, but they have not to be read literally. The context also could be taken into account. Devoid of context, it would be incapable of serving the purpose. 13. At this place, it may further be pointed out that the general principle is that appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a superior court to review, reverse, correct or affirm decisions of inferior courts. The general principle applicable is that facts and evidence not included or brought on record, cannot be considered by an appellate authority. The evidence which is not part of the record has to be ignored. It is for this purpose that the power of an appellate court has to be regulated in the matter of taking of additional evidence. The general principle applicable is that facts and evidence not included or brought on record, cannot be considered by an appellate authority. The evidence which is not part of the record has to be ignored. It is for this purpose that the power of an appellate court has to be regulated in the matter of taking of additional evidence. Therefore, if the general principles are taken hold of in interpreting Section 34, there would be no difficulty in holding that Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. C. applies to proceedings of an appeal. 14. That apart, clause (g) of Section 34 (1) provides that the power of a court of appeal as also that of the original authority could be prescribed by Rules. Rule 22 applies Section 151 of the Civil P. C., Section 151, C. P. C. is meant for advancing the cause of justice. Therefore, to me it appears that with the aid of Section 151, C.P.C. as well, the principles behind Order 41. Rule 27. C. P. C. could be applied. In aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court has authority to control all its incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise thereof, for which purpose it may when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act. Hence, Section 151, C P. C. as well, the principles behind Order 41. Rule 27. C. P. C. could be applied. To leave it uncontrolled would be to permit a court of appeal to take additional evidence and neither to give reason for doing so nor to give opportunity to the other side to file evidence in rebuttal. 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case, two points were urged. The first was that the application was filed by the contesting respondents for the need of Manjeet Singh who was already engaged in the business of the firm M/s. Pindi Auto Traders, hence the application ought to have been rejected. On the evidence, the appellate authority found that Manjeet Singh was not a partner of the said firm and was unemployed. 16. The second submission was that the need of the tenant-petitioner had not been properly considered and compared with that of the landlords. This submission is also not correct. On the evidence, the appellate authority found that Manjeet Singh was not a partner of the said firm and was unemployed. 16. The second submission was that the need of the tenant-petitioner had not been properly considered and compared with that of the landlords. This submission is also not correct. The appellate authority found that the father of the petitioner had a shop in his possession which had been sold by him to the elder brother of the petitioner. This sale deed was fictitious and it was executed in order to defeat the right of the landlords so that the landlords could be deprived of the plea that the petitioner could carry on the business with his father. On the findings, it is clear that the shop still belongs to the father of the petitioner. He could also share the shop with his father. As compared to this, Manjeet Singh did not own any other shop in which he could carry on his business. Even the business which was being carried on by his brother was run in a rented shop. Manjeet Singh was found to be without job since February 1973. He did not own any other shop where he could start his business. In such circumstances, the finding of the appellate authority that the petitioner was likely to suffer greater hardship could not be said to be erroneous. 17. For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs payable by the petitioner to respondents 2 and 3. The stay order is discharged.