S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) WE now turn to fourth and fifth contentions. The fourth contention relates to the apportionment of contribution between the petitioner on one hand and its lessees on the other hand. Respondents Nos. 5 to 45 are the lessees of the petitioner. The question of paying contribution under the town planning scheme arises in respect of Final Plots Nos. 58 46 45 52 54 50 47 56 53 44 51 57 60 61 79 74 76 96 86 87 88 89 72 158 162 164 165 and 166. The Town Planning Officer has ordered the lessees to bear 2/5th of the contribution payable in respect of the aforesaid lands and the lessor the petitioner to bear 3/5th of the contribution. Now this contention was raised before the Board of Appeal. The Board of Appeal has held that it has no jurisdiction to examine this part of the order of the Town Planning Officer. The jurisdiction of the Board is governed by sec. 34 of the Act (Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 In 1971 when the appeals were filed before the Board of Appeal sec. 34 provided as follows: By decision of the Town Planning Officer under clauses (v ). (vi) (viii) (ix) (x) and (xiii) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32 shall be forthwith communicated to the party concerned and any party aggrieved by any such decision may within one month from the date of the communication of the decision present an appeal to the District judge for decision of the appeal by a Board of Appeal constituted under sec. 35; and on receipt of an appeal as aforesaid the Board of Appeal shall as soon as may be be constituted as hereinafter provided and shall hear and decide the appeal. This section renders certain decisions of the Town Planning Officer appealable to the Board of Appeal. They are decisions which fall under clauses (v) (vi) (viii) (ix) (x) and (xiii) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32. ( 2 ) LET us now turn to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32. Mrs. Mehta has argued that the question of apportionment falls under clause (ix) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32. It reads as follows:in accordance with the prescribed procedure the Town Planning Officer shall. . . . . . (1) of sec. 32. ( 2 ) LET us now turn to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32. Mrs. Mehta has argued that the question of apportionment falls under clause (ix) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32. It reads as follows:in accordance with the prescribed procedure the Town Planning Officer shall. . . . . . calculate the proportion in which the increment of the plots included in the final scheme shall he liable to contribution to the costs of the scheme in accordance with the provisions contained in sec. 66. bit has been argued by Mrs. Mehta that the expressions proportion and contribution read in light of the fact that clause (ix) refers to entire sec. 66 necessarily embrace within their sweep the question of apportionment or contribution between a lessor and his lessee because according to her sec. 66 to which reference has been made in its entirety specifically provides for such apportionment. On the other hand the learned Government Pleader has argued that clause (ix) does not provide for determination of apportionment of contribution between a lessor and a lessee of a particular plot but it provides for determination of contribution payable in uniform or different proportions by different plot holders. In support of his argument he has stressed the expression in which the increment of the plots included in the final scheme used in clause (ix) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32. If emphasis is laid on the expression increment of the plots it is likely to lead to an inference that the expressions proportion and contribution used in clause (ix) have a reference to contributions payable in respect of different plots and not contribution payable in respect of a particular plot by its lessor and lessee and by its mortgagor and mortgagee. ( 3 ) NOW in order to examine the rival arguments which have been raised in this behalf it is necessary to turn to sec. 66. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 66 provides as follows:the costs of the scheme shall be met wholly or in part by a contribution to be levied by the local authority on each plot included in the final scheme calculated in proportion to the increment which is estimated to accrue in respect of such plat by the Town Planning Officer. 66. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 66 provides as follows:the costs of the scheme shall be met wholly or in part by a contribution to be levied by the local authority on each plot included in the final scheme calculated in proportion to the increment which is estimated to accrue in respect of such plat by the Town Planning Officer. THIS provision indeed has reference to contribution payable in respect of each plot included in the final scheme which the Town planning Officer is required to determine. However there is a proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 66 and it contains four clauses. Clause (ii) in the proviso to sub- sec. (1) read as follows;provided that where a plot is subject to a mortgage with possession or to a lease the Town Planning Officer shall determine in what proportion the mortgagee or lessee on the one hand and the mortgagor or lessor on the other hand shall pay such contribution. IT is clear therefore that under sec. 66 the Town Planning Officer is under an obligation to decide not only what contribution is payable in respect of each plot included in the town planning scheme but is also under an obligation to decide in what proportion contribution shall be payable in respect of a particular plot by its lessor and lessee or by its mortgagor or mortgagee. We have no doubt in our minds that sec. 66 casts upon the Town Planning Officer both these obligations. If we now turn to clause (ix) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32 again and examine it in this light we must necessarily hold that clause (ix) contemplates determination of contribution payable in respect of each plot and also payable in respect of a particular plot by its lessor and lessee or by its mortgagor and mortgagee. The comprehensive reference to sec. 66 made in clause (ix) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32 emboldens us to take this view. If the argument raised by the learned Government Pleader was well founded the Legislature would have referred in sec 32 (1) (ix) to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32 excluding its proviso. The Legislature has not done it. We may in this behalf refer to clause (iii) in proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32 in which reference has been made only to clause (f) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 64. (1) of sec. 32 excluding its proviso. The Legislature has not done it. We may in this behalf refer to clause (iii) in proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32 in which reference has been made only to clause (f) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 64. Therefore when we read clause (ix) and clause (iii) in proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32 in juxtaposition it is clear that the Legislature has referred to a specific provision where it wanted to do so and made a general reference where it wanted to provide otherwise. Therefore it is clear that when it is read in this context we find that comprehensive reference to sec. 66 does not mean reference only to the principle part of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 66 but it means reference to the whole of it including its proviso Therefore to read the expression the increment of the plots included in the final scheme as referring only to plots and not to the lessor and lessee or mortgagor and mortgagee of a particular plot is to take a lop sided vies v of the matter. Indeed the learned Government Pleader tried to support his contention by having resort to clause (xiv) of sub-sec (1) of. sec. 32. Clause (xiv) can never support the contention raised by him. He himself realized it in course of his arguments and did not press the question further. In order to be fair to his argument we reproduce below clause (xiv) of sub-sec. (1) of sec 32:in accordance with the prescribed procedure the Town Planning Officer shall. . . . . draw in the prescribed form the final scheme in accordance with the drafts scheme. THIS clause has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of apportionment of contribution between a lessor and his lessee. In our opinion therefore the Board of Appeal was in error in holding that the question of apportionment of contribution between a lessor and his lessee did not fall under clause (ix) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 32. and that therefore it had no jurisdiction under sec. 34 to bear appeal against it. ( 4 ) IN our opinion the Board of Appeal has jurisdiction to examine this question. (1) of sec. 32. and that therefore it had no jurisdiction under sec. 34 to bear appeal against it. ( 4 ) IN our opinion the Board of Appeal has jurisdiction to examine this question. Therefore the impugned order of the Board of Appeal in so far as it relates to this aspect in respect of several final plots to which we have referred must be set aside and quashed. The fourth contention raised by Mr. Mehta therefore is upheld. ( 5 ) IN the result the petition is partly allowed. The decision of the Board of Appeal that it has no jurisdiction to decide the question of apportionment of contributions between the petitioner on one hand and its several lessees on the other hand in respect of several final plots to which we have hereinabove referred is quashed and set aside and all appeals with which those Final Plots are concerned are sent back to the Board of appeal with a direction that the Board of Appeal shall on merits after giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and its lessees of being heard decide in what proportion contribution is payable by the petitioner on the one hand and by its lessees on the other hand in respect thereof Further the Town Planning Officer is directed to decide after giving the petitioner reasonable opportunity of being heard its application for exemption in respect of Final Plot No. 76 made by it under sec. 32 (1) (vii) of the Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 It is needless for us to state that except in respect of these two matters the order made by the Town Planning Officer or the order recorded by the Board of Appeal as the case may be stands Rule is made absolute partly with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. .