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1980 DIGILAW 45 (KER)

RADHAKRISHNAN v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR

1980-02-07

T.KOCHU THOMMEN

body1980
Judgment :- 1. The only question which arises for consideration in this case is whether an application for reference under S.20 (2) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 ('the Act') is barred when the award was made pursuant to an agreement between the parties as regards the value of the land and other material particulars. 2. By agreement dated 21-6-1974 it was agreed between the petitioners and the Collector that the land belonging to the petitioners would be acquired under the Act at a value of Rs.80/-per cent inclusive of solatium and value of improvements. Subsequent to that agreement steps were taken for acquisition. Notices under S.3 (1) and 6 were issued on 3-9-1974 and 9-12-1975 respectively. The award was made on 30-12-1976 strictly in compliance with the value mentioned under the agreement. The award was sought to be challenged by the petitioners by means of an application (Ext. P2) which was admittedly filed within the time stipulated under S.20. 3. The application was rejected by the 2nd respondent by Ext. P3 order dated 30-8-1977 solely on the ground that in view of the agreement dated 21-6-1974 an application under S.20 was not maintainable. That is precisely the question which is now agitated before me. 4. Various contentions have been urged in support of the petitioner's attack on Ext. P3. The main contentions are: (1) the agreement dated 21-6-1974 is void by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of Art.299 (1) of the Constitution; and, (2) it was not open to the Collector to refuse an application solely on the ground of a prior agreement as regards the value. 5. The Government Pleader is justified in pointing out that, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dattatraya Shankerbhat Ambalai v. The Collector of Sholapur (AIR. 1970 SC. 850), an agreement entered into between the parties, though not in proper compliance with the requirements of Art.299(1)and therefore not enforceable, nevertheless supplies the best evidence as to the market value of the land at the relevant time. This is in fact what is stated under S.16 of our Act. Such a provision has not been incorporated into the Central Act (Land Acquisition Act, 1894). Nevertheless a reference has to be made strictly in accordance with the provisions of S.20 of the Act which reads as follows: '20. This is in fact what is stated under S.16 of our Act. Such a provision has not been incorporated into the Central Act (Land Acquisition Act, 1894). Nevertheless a reference has to be made strictly in accordance with the provisions of S.20 of the Act which reads as follows: '20. Reference to Court'.- (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made; (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under sub-section (2) of S.12 or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire." (emphasis supplied) The only fetter placed upon the right of a person to make an application for reference, provided such application is made within the time stipulated, is that the applicant should not have accepted the award. Any person who has accepted the award is estopped from questioning the validity of the award. That is all what the section says. The section does not make any specific reference to the conclusive evidence mentioned under S.16, which reads as follows: "15. Award in case of agreement as to the amount of compensation:- (1) If the Collector and all the persons interested agree as to the amount of the compensation to be allowed, the Collector shall make an award under his hand for the same. (2) Such award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall be conclusive evidence as between the Government and all persons interested, of the value of the land and the amount of compensation allowed for the same." (emphasis supplied) What S.16 says is that the parties to the agreement are bound by the value of the land and the amount of compensation as accepted under the agreement. The owner of the land cannot claim a compensation in excess of what has been agreed upon. Nor can the Collector refuse to award compensation in accordance with such agreement The agreement as to the value and compensation is conclusive evidence and it cannot therefore be questioned subsequently. That question cannot be raised either in proceedings under the Act or subsequently in a court. That is all what S.16 says. It does not say that because of the conclusive evidence an application for reference is barred. 6. It may be open to the parties or valid grounds to question the very existence of the agreement or the validity thereof This can be investigated only in a court of law. Apart from the fact that it is not open to the parties to go behind the agreement as regards the stipulations therein, the right of a party to question the very existence of the agreement or the validity thereof is not barred by any provision of the Act. Consequently it is not open to the Collector to refuse to make a reference solely by reason of a prior agreement. Such power cannot be read into either S.16 or S 20. 7. I do not express any view as regards the merits of the various contentions raised by the petitioners challenging the validity of the award. That is for the civil court to consider. For the reasons stated by me Ext. P3 is unsustainable It is quashed. The 2nd respondent is directed to consider Ext. P2 on merits in the light of what is stated above. The OP. is allowed in the above terms. No costs.