JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan and B. D. Agarwala, JJ. - By means of this petition Dharamvir Singh Tyagi who was admittedly a lecturer employed at J. P. Janta Intermediate College. Bulandshahr, prays for a writ of certiorari, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the records of the case and quashing the order of (he Deputy Director of Education, respondent no 1, dated October 31, 1979. 2. Shown of all the unnecessary details, the relevant facts on which the petitioner base his claim are that since he was out of favour with the Manager, he was suspended by means of a resolution of the Committee of Management dated August 11,1975 On September 3, 1975, charges were framed and an explanation was called for from him with a view to take disciplinary proceedings against him. On November .13, 1975, the petitioner consequently filed civil suit No. 281 of 1975 in the court of the learned Civil Judge, Bulandshahr fora declaration that the suspension order dated August 11, 1975, is null and void. He also prayed for an ad-interim injunction It is alleged that when the Manager found that the order of suspension was indefensible, he persuaded the petitioner to withdraw the suit promising to permit him to resume duties. The petitioner was not awarded of the designs of the Manager, respondent no. 3 and when the order suspending him from the service urns revoked, he withdrew auk no. 281 of 1975. It is alleged that on April 3,1976, consequent upon revocation of order of suspension the petitioner was re-instated to his service at the College. On April 4, 1976, the petitioner was called to the residence of the Manager at about 8 O'clock in the morning. According to the petitioner's case at that time Sri Acharya Vachaspati, who was the Manager of the College, was General Secretary of the District Congress Committee and the declaration of emergency subsisted. The petitioner states that be was threatened with detention under Maintenance of Internal Security Act unless he submitted a resignation from, his services at the College. Thus, under threat of arrest and detention, the petitioner was compelled to sign a letter of resignation and deliver it to the Principal of he College. The petitioner states that be was threatened with detention under Maintenance of Internal Security Act unless he submitted a resignation from, his services at the College. Thus, under threat of arrest and detention, the petitioner was compelled to sign a letter of resignation and deliver it to the Principal of he College. The petitioner's letter of resignation, it is alleged, was accepted by the Manager on the same day and its acceptance was communicated to him by the Principal of the College. 3. After the declaration of Emergency was revoked, on July 11,1977, the petitioner made a representation to the District Inspector of Schools voicing his grievance that the alleged resignation letter was a forced one and was not the outcome of the voluntary act of the petitioner. According to the petitioner after hearing the petitioner as well as the Manager and Principal of the College, the District Inspector of Schools respondent no 2 by means of the order dated April 10, 1978 allowed the petitioner's representation holding that the action of the Manager in accepting the resignation letter which had resulted in bis removal from service was illegal and against the provisions of law and the petitioner was directed to be restored to his post. The petitioner asserts that after the order of the District Inspector of Schools, dated April 10 1978, he joined the service of the College the same day and gave an intimation in writing of his having done so immediately. Order April 11, 1987, however, when the petitioner went to the College to join his duties, he was informed that the District Inspector of Schools had suspended the operation of his earlier order dated April 10, 1978 passed on the petitioner's representation and that he consequently could not be permitted to join the college. A copy of the order dated April 10, 1978 by which the District Inspector of Schools suspended bis earlier order of the same dated was served on the petitioner on April 12, 1978. The petitioner. consequently by means of suit No. 198 of 1978, filed in the court of the learned Munsif Bulandshahr, challenged the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated April 10, 1987, suspending the operation of the order passed by him on the petitioners representation. The petitioner. consequently by means of suit No. 198 of 1978, filed in the court of the learned Munsif Bulandshahr, challenged the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated April 10, 1987, suspending the operation of the order passed by him on the petitioners representation. The learned Munsif initially granted an exparte injunction in favour of the petitioner but subsequently vacated it on May 31, 1978 The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of the learned Munsif vacating the order of injunction failed. It is alleged that since the State was not impleaded in the suit a&M the State Government was liable to pay the salary of teachers, it was apprehended that the suit instituted 5y him in the court of the learned Munsif was liable to be dismissed Consequently, on August 9, 1978 he applied for permission to withdraw the suit. The learned Munsif by means of his order dated September 26, 1978, however, dismissed the suit as having been withdrawn. 4. The petitioner thereafter filed Miscellaneous Writ No. 2354 of 1979 in this Court challenging the validity of the order of the District Inspector of Schools by means of which he suspended the operation of the order passed by him on his representation. The writ petition was admitted to hearing and while it was pending decision in this Court, the Manager and the Principal of he College filed an appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated April 10, 1978 allowing the petitioner's representation. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was ultimately allowed by the judgment of a Division Bench of this court on July 25, 1979. The order dated April 10, 1978 by which the District Inspector of Schools had suspended the operation of his order of the same date allowing the representation of the petitioner was quashed. The Bench noticed the fact that an appeal had been preferred against the order of the District Inspector of Schools before the Deputy Director of Education which was pending decision and it was observed that the Deputy Director of Education will proceed to decide the appeal filed by the Management in accordance with law. The Bench noticed the fact that an appeal had been preferred against the order of the District Inspector of Schools before the Deputy Director of Education which was pending decision and it was observed that the Deputy Director of Education will proceed to decide the appeal filed by the Management in accordance with law. After the writ petition was decided by this Court, the appeal preferred against the order dated April 10, 1978 by the Committee of Management cam e up for decision before the Deputy Director of Education A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the petitioner to the jurisdiction of Deputy Director of Education to entertain the appeal. The Deputy Director of Education took the view that there was a direction contained in the judgment of this Court in Miscellaneous Writ Petition no. 2354 of 1979 that he should decide the appeal and consequently it was no longer open to him not to decide the appeal on merits. Having held that there was no option left to him not to decide appeal the Deputy Director of Education proceeded to heal it on merits and by means of the impugned order dated October 31, 1979 allowed it and set aside the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. As a result of the decision of the Deputy Director of Education dated October 31, 1979, the order passed by the District prospector of Schools dated April 10, 1978 was nullified. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated October 31, 1979, the petitioner has invoked the powers of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 3, the Committee of Management of U.P. Janta Intermediate College, Boland-shahr, wherein it has been asserted that the letter of resignation submitted by the petitioner was a voluntary act of his and it has been denied that it was obtained by and act of coercion on the part of the Manager or the Principal of the College. It has been asserted in the counter-affidavit that the resignation letter dated April 4, 1976 was submitted by the petitioner out of his own sweet will to spare himself facing an inquiry which would have inevitably resulted in his dismissal from service. It has been asserted in the counter-affidavit that the resignation letter dated April 4, 1976 was submitted by the petitioner out of his own sweet will to spare himself facing an inquiry which would have inevitably resulted in his dismissal from service. There averments in the counter-affidavit that the proceedings before the District Inspector of Schools were exparte and without notice to respondent no. 3. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner, the averments made in the petition have been reiterated. 7. In these proceedings we are not called upon to decide the question as to whether the alleged letter of resignation of the petitioner dated April 4, 1976. Was the outcome of a voluntary act on the part of the petitioner or it was obtained from him by coercion. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has merely contended that against the order of the Deputy Inspector of Schools dated April 10, 1978 no appeal lay under any provision of law and consequently the order of the respondent no. 1 dated October 35, 1979, is without jurisdiction. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3 on the other hand contended that the order of the District Inspector of Schools itself indicated that it was an order passed under Section 16-G (3) (c) U.P. Intermediate Education Act and an appeal lay against it under Section Jo-G (3) (c) thereof. In the alternative it was contended that assuming that the order of the Deputy Director of Education is without jurisdiction the District Inspector of Schools bad also no power UDder any provision of law to pass the order dated April 10, 1978 and consequently this Court should not in exercise of the direction under Article 226 of the Constitution interfere, since it would result merely in an illegal order being quashed to revive and perpetuate another which is equally illegal. 8. We shall first of all examine the question as to whether the District Inspector of Schools had any power to pass the order dated April 10, 1978 which has been set aside by the Deputy Director of Education by means of the impugned order. 9. 8. We shall first of all examine the question as to whether the District Inspector of Schools had any power to pass the order dated April 10, 1978 which has been set aside by the Deputy Director of Education by means of the impugned order. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the basic grievance of the petitioner was that in spite of the fact that he had not voluntarily submitted his resignation and the purported letter of resignation had been obtained from him under threat and coercion, respondent no. 3 treated the petitioner as having ceased to be in service or employment of the College. If the allegation was true the act of respondent no 3 directly affected the petitioner s light to obtain his salary from respondent no. 2 who is a statutory authority made responsible for payment of salary of teachers of recognised institution under the provisions of the U. P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was urged that though the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools was not one specifically and directly contemplated by any provision of the Act there existed in the; District Inspector of Schools by necessary implication a power to decide a dispute of the character raised before him by the petitioner. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents we are of the opinion that fere is substance in the contention and the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated April 10, 1978, which was interfered with by the Deputy Director of Education cannot be characterised as one without jurisdiction. Under sub section (3) of Section 3 of the Act, District Inspector of Schools have been saddled with the statutory duty of ensuring payment of salaries of employees of recognised institutions within the time specified in that provision. Under Section 4 of the Act, the District Inspector of Schools has been vested with the power to inspect or cause to be inspected for the purposes of the Act any institution or call for such information and record etc. from the management with regard to the payment of salaries to its employees as be may think fit. Under Section 4 of the Act, the District Inspector of Schools has been vested with the power to inspect or cause to be inspected for the purposes of the Act any institution or call for such information and record etc. from the management with regard to the payment of salaries to its employees as be may think fit. Section 5 of the Act further empowers the District Inspector of Schools, in the event of any default under the Act to direct single operation of the accounts of the institution subject to its provisions. Under Section 6 of the Act the District Inspector of Schools has power, on being satisfied on the basis of the inspection of an institution that its management had committed difficult in complying with any directions given under Section 4 or breach of the provisions of Section 3 to recommend to the Deputy Director of Education that action be taken against it under subsection (2) thereof. 11. An analysis of the above mentioned provisions make it clear that the statute easts a duty on the District Inspector of Schools to ensure that teachers and other employees of a recognised institution are paid their salaries in due time and without any unlawful deductions. It is well settled law that where an Act confers powers on a statutory authority to do an act, there exists in it by necessary implication all such powers as might be essential for its effective exercise. In Sutberlands-Statutory Construction, the law on the subject has been stated in the following terms : "Where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, ail powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication. Thus it has been stated, an express statutory grant of power or the imposition of a definite duty carries with it by implication, in the absence of a limitation authority to employ all the means that are usually employed and, that are necessary to the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty That which is clearly implied is as much a part of law as that which is expressed. The rule whereby a statute is, by necessary implication, extended had been most frequently, applied in the construction of law delegating powers to (sic) officers and administrative agencies." The Supreme Court in Assistant Collect or O. E. v. N.T. Company of India Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563 , observed that: "It is a well established rule of construction that a power to do something essential for the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation may be implied." 12. A Division Bench of this Court In Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12725 of 1975 connected with Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 639 of 1976 was called upon to decide as to whether in the event of two rival bodies claiming to be the Committee of Management of a recognised institution it was open to the District inspector of Schools in the absence of a statutory provision to recognise one of them as the Committee of Management. The view was taken that since the District Inspector of Schools has to perform various administrative functions of a statutory character in collaboration with the Management of High .schools and Intermediate Colleges and such duties could not be discharged by an officer unless he is in a position to find out on an administrative level as to who are the real office bearers there were ample powers by implication available to the District Inspector of Schools to recognise one of the two rival committees as the duly constituted committee of management. It was held that if any party feels dissatisfied with the administrative decision taken by the District Inspector of Schools, he is at liberty to file a suit against a rival claimant for adjudication of their rights either as office bearers or as members of the Managing Committee, and in the event of a decree being obtained by such party there can be little doubt that the District Inspector of Schools, in case he has taken a wrong decision, will alter his decision and will recognise that party in whose favour a decision has been given judicially. This decision was followed with approval by another Division Bench of this Court in Committee of Management v. The District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, 1978 AWC 124 . This decision was followed with approval by another Division Bench of this Court in Committee of Management v. The District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, 1978 AWC 124 . The rule of construction adverted to above was given effect to by another Division Bench of this Court in Rameshwar Das Mittal v. State of U.P., 1972 ALJ 990. The material facts giving rise to that case were that a motion of no confidence was brought against Rameshwar Das Mittal, the petitioner before this Court. Before a meeting to consider the motion of no confidence was held, the District Magistrate received letters of resignation on behalf of nine members of the Board. The Distt. Magistrate forwarded those letters to the State Government as required by the relevant provisions of U. P. Municipalities Act. In the meanwhile the persons who had purported to resign by means of those letters made applications before the District Magistrate denying their signatures on the resignation letters. They asserted that they had never sent any resignation letter to the District Magistrate and somebody interested in defeating the motion of no-confidence had committed forgery. They made a prayer for being allowed to take part in the meeting convened for considering the motion of no confidence against Rameshwar Das Mittal. Each of the aforesaid persons filed affidavits before the District Magistrate affirming that they had not sent their resignations to the District Magistrate from the membership of the Board and that they desired to continue as members of the Board. The District Magistrate forwarded the affidavits of the aforesaid nine persons to the State Government. By a letter the State Government informed the District Magistrate that the members whose purported letters of resignation had been received and who had denied having sent them were entitled to continue as members of the Board and the affidavits filed by them prima facie indicated that their contention was correct. The State Government, therefore, directed that there was, in fact, no vacancy in the membership on account (sic) Magistrate issued notices to those members. In pursuance of the letter of the State Government, the District Magistrate issued notices to those members also requesting them to attend the meeting for considering the no confidence motion. They participated in the said meeting and the motion of r.o confidence was carried against Rameshwar Das Mittal. In pursuance of the letter of the State Government, the District Magistrate issued notices to those members also requesting them to attend the meeting for considering the no confidence motion. They participated in the said meeting and the motion of r.o confidence was carried against Rameshwar Das Mittal. He filed a writ petition in this Court claiming relief by a writ in the nature of quo-warranto calling upon the members, whose purported letters of resignations had been received by the District Magistrate, to show under what authority they were holding the office of members of the Board. A writ of mandmus was also prayed for by the petitioner directing the State Government and the District Magistrate Dot to consider such members as members of the Board and further not to give effect to the motion of no confidence alleged to have been passed against the petitioner If the petitioner's contention had been accepted that the members who had purported to send letters of resignation had ceased to be members of the Board and consequently were dis-entitled to participate in the meeting for considering the motion of no-confidence, the writ petition would have succeeded because the requisite number of members would not have been found to have supported the motion of no confidence. It was urged before this Court that once a letter of resignation purporting to have been signed by a member was received, it was not open either to the State Government or the District Magistrate to investigate the question and to decide whether the resignation was a genuine ODe or not. The contention was repelled by this Court and it was held that though Section 39 of the U.P. Municipalities Act does not specifically empower either the District Magistrate or the State Government to decide as to whether a letter of resignation was genuine or Dot, there existed an implied power in the State Government to do so. 13. In view of the discussion above, we are consequently of the opinion that the District Inspector of Schools had implied powers to decide as to whether the letter of resignation purporting to have been sent by a member of the staff of a recognised institution was genuine or not and legally accepted or not to enable him to meaningfully exercise the statutory powers vested in him under the Act. 14. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, however, contended that neither in the representation made by the petitioner to the District Inspector of Schools nor in the order passed by the officer is there a prayer for a direction with regard to payment of salary to the petitioner under the aforesaid Act and consequently, the order cannot be held to have been passed by implication to give effect to any provision of the Act. The contention, in our view, in hyper technical to be acceptable. The only interest which the petitioner had in challenging the genuineness and legality of the purported letter of resignation was to obtain a decision that he continued to remain a member of the staff of the College and consequently was entitled to receive his salary, the representation consequently was clearly relatable to his out it low cut to draw his salary from his employer. It is true that the District Inspector of School has neither made any mention of the Act in his detailed order nor has he given any specific direction to the respondent to pay any salary either for the past or for future to the petitioner by means of his order dated 10th April, 1938. It is, however, evident that the order recognises the petitioner as continuing to be a teacher in the College and the obvious conclusion is that be would be entitled to salary from the respondents under the Act. We, consequently, conclude that the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools cannot be characterised as one which was without jurisdiction. 15. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents next contended that the order of the District Inspector of Schools was passed in disregard of the principles of natural justice since the respondent no. 3 had not been impleaded as a party to the representation made by the petitioner and the Committee of Management had not been given any opportunity of being heard in support of its case. The relevant assertions on the basis of which this contention has been raised are contained in paragraphs nos. 19 and 20 of the counter affidavit, filed by Satya Deo Sharma on behalf of respondent no. 3. Both these paragraphs are verified on the basis of perusal of record. The relevant assertions on the basis of which this contention has been raised are contained in paragraphs nos. 19 and 20 of the counter affidavit, filed by Satya Deo Sharma on behalf of respondent no. 3. Both these paragraphs are verified on the basis of perusal of record. In paragraph 19 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated that the answering respondent was not in the know of the actual contents of the representation submitted by the petitioner before the District inspector of Schools and was not given any information or intimation. In paragraph 20 of the counter-affidavit similarly it has been stated that the District Inspector of School passed the order dated 10th April, 1978 which was obtained ex parte by misrepresenting the facts. In the rejoinder-affidavit filed in response to the counter-affidavit, it has been categorically asserted on the basis of personal knowledge that it is incorrect to say that respondent no. 3 did not know the contents of the alleged representation. In fact, respondent no. 3 participated in the inquiry before the Assistant District inspector of Schools as well as the District Inspect of Schools. The allegation that the respondent no. 3 had no information or intimation is totally false and incorrect. The question of impleadment of respondent no. 3 did not arise as he was called upon by the District Inspector of Schools and Assistant District Inspector of Schools. From the appellate order of the Deputy Director of Education also, it does not appear that the order of the District Inspector of Schools was challenged on the ground that it had been passed in the absence of respondent no. 3 ana without its knowledge. We consequently find no force in this contention also. 16. The next question which survives for consideration is as to whether the Deputy Director of Education had any power to entertain an appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools and could interfere with it. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the order of the District Inspector of Schools was appealable under Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Act. This provision entitled any party to prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education against an order of the Inspector under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 16 G of the Act. This provision entitled any party to prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education against an order of the Inspector under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 16 G of the Act. The relevant portion of clause (b) is as follows : - "The Inspector may approve or dis-approve or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management ;....................." The notice of termination mentioned in clause (b) quoted above refers to notice of termination contemplated by clause (a) of sub section (3) of Section 16-G which is in the following terms : - "No Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank oi subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector................" 17. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, committee of management, urged that whenever an employee resigns and the resignation is accepted by the Committee of Management, the only consequence is the termination of services of the employee and as such the act amounts to termination of services within the meaning of Section 16 G (3) (a) of the Act and the order of the District Inspector of Schools amounted to an order of disapproval of the termination of the petitioner's services under clause (b) of sub section (3) of Section 16-G of the Act and hence becomes appealable under clause (c) thereof. In our opinion, there is no merit in this contention. A mere reading of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 16-G discloses that the notice of termination of service envisaged by that provision is one which is a result of initiative taken by the Committee of Management itself. It is true that even a resignation by the employee does result in shapping the relationship of master and servant between the Committee of Management and the Teacher concerned, none the less, it is not termination of services of the nature envisaged by sub-section 3 (a) of Section 16 G of the Act. Section 16-G (3) (b) envisages an order of approval or disapproval by the District Inspector of Schools of a notice of termination of the teacher's service which is brought about at the initiative of the Management just as an order of dismissal or removal is. Section 16-G (3) (b) envisages an order of approval or disapproval by the District Inspector of Schools of a notice of termination of the teacher's service which is brought about at the initiative of the Management just as an order of dismissal or removal is. It is only in such cases that an appeal lies against an order of District Inspector of Schools under Section 16-G (3) (c). The order of the District Inspector of Schools, as already held above, was passed under the implied powers possessed by him and as such was not appealable under any provision of U. P. Intermediate Education Act As held by the Supreme Court in Soorajmall Nagarmall v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1963 SC 393 an appeal is a creature of the statute. Against an order passed by a statutory authority in exercise either of express or implied powers, an appeal does not lie unless provided for by statute. In the instant case, we have already held that no statutory provision exists justifying the Deputy Director of deduction entertaining an appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools. 18. An attempt was made before us to contend that since the High Court while allowing writ petition no. 2354 of 1979 had directed the Deputy Director of Education to decide the appeal which at that time was pending are him, it was no longer open to the petitioner to contend that the order of the Deputy Director of Education was without jurisdiction and that he had no power to certain the appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools. This contention, in our opinion, is without any substance. A perusal of the judgment recorded by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2354 of 79 discloses that when it was brought to the notice of the Bench hearing the writ petition that an appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools had already been filed by the Committee of Management before the Deputy Director of Education, the learned judges merely observed that `the Deputy Director of Education will decide the appeal in accordance with law. The direction of this Court that the Deputy Director will decide the appeal In accordance with law necessarily meant that he would also decide the question as to whether the appeal lav against the order impugned before him at all. The direction of this Court that the Deputy Director will decide the appeal In accordance with law necessarily meant that he would also decide the question as to whether the appeal lav against the order impugned before him at all. There was no mandate contained in the judgment of this Court which disentitled the Deputy Director of Education to take a view that the appeal was not maintainable and that he was required to decide the appeal on merits even if no appeal was maintainable. 19. Before concluding this judgment, we wish to make it clear that the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools does not amount to adjudication of the nights of the parties. It will be open to respondent no. 3, in case it feels dissatisfied with the decision of the District Inspector of Schools to institute a suit against the petitioner for declaration that he ceased to be a members of the teaching staff of the College since he had genuine y resigned from this post. In the event of a decree being passed by the Civil Court in favour of respondent no. 3, there can be little doubt that the District Inspector of Schools even if he is not a party, will give effect to the judicial decision. It was faintly urged before us that Section 12 of the Act bars any suit being filed in the Civil Court. That provision on which reliance has been placed runs as under : - "No order made or direction given by the State Government, the Director, the Regional Deputy Director, Education, or the Inspector or other officer in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any court." This section merely bars the institution of suits challenging orders passed under express provisions of the Act, such as are contemplated by Sections 4, 5 and 6 thereof. In the instant case, the order that was passed by the District Inspector of Schools and was taken before the Deputy Director of Education in appeal, as held by us, was not an order passed under any specific provision of the Act and, consequently, does not fall within the scope of Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent respondent no. 3 taking appropriate proceedings before the Civil Court. 20. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent respondent no. 3 taking appropriate proceedings before the Civil Court. 20. For the reasons given above, we allow this petition and quash the order of the Deputy Director of Education, respondent no. 1, dated 31-10-1979. The respondent no. 3 is directed to give effect to the order of District Inspector of Schools dated 10th April, 1978. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs from respondent no, 3.