Judgment :- 1. The first application is for impleading supplemental respondents 2 to 9 as the legal representatives of the sole respondent when the appeal was filed. The 2nd petition is for excusing the delay in impleading them. 2. The judgment under appeal is dated 27-6-1974. The Second Appeal was filed on 11-6-1976. The respondent died in December 1975. The impleading petition is dated 6-10-1976. The application was opposed by the respondent's counsel on the ground that it was filed six months after the death of the respondent in an appeal which was still born It was also contended that an application to implead the legal representatives of a dead respondent in the Second Appeal was not maintainable. This submission does not appear to be well-founded. Occasions may arise where a party, in spite of his best efforts is kept in the dark about the death of one or the other respondents in the appeal. Such party may bona fide file an appeal with the deceased respondent as a party. It cannot be said that the Court is helpless to come to the rescue of such parties on being satisfied with his or her bona fides. Under S.153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has power to amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit, on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit. The question for consideration is whether the enabling provision contained in S.153 could be used in an appeal since the section deals with "in any proceeding in a suit" and secondly whether the defect in filing the Second Appeal with the deceased respondent is "an error in any proceeding in a suit". In my view, a very liberal construction has to be given to the phraseology used in the section, for, it enables the Court to do justice where it is satisfied that an error has crept in for no fault of the party. I hold that an error in the institution of an appeal can be brought within the ambit of the expression "error in any proceeding in a suit", with the aid of S.141 CPC. and since an appeal is a continuation of the suit. 3. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in Goplakrishnayya v. Lakshmana Rao (AIR. 1925 Madras 1210). and since an appeal is a continuation of the suit. 3. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in Goplakrishnayya v. Lakshmana Rao (AIR. 1925 Madras 1210). The Full Bench held that an appeal was a proceeding in a suit and that if an appeal was presented against a person who was dead on the date of the presentation of the appeal, the cause title could be permitted to be amended under S.153 CPC. Though the appeal as filed was incompetent, S.153 CPC. could be called in aid to direct the amendment prayed for. The principle enunciated in the Full Bench decision squarely applied to the case on hand and I am in respectful agreement with the same. 4. However, the petitioner has another hurdle to overcome, and that is to get the delay excused. The delay is sought to be executed with the following averments in the affidavit. The person who has sworn to the affidavit states that though he knew about the death of the respondent he was under the mistaken notion that the legal representatives of the respondent could be brought on record in the 1st appellate court and therefore he did not bring it to the notice of the counsel with whom the papers were entrusted for filing the Second Appeal. This explanation is on the face of it unacceptable. It is further stated that it was only when the counsel's clerk found that notice issued to the respondent was returned unserved that he realised that the appeal without notice to the respondent's legal representatives was incompetent. This is the only explanation advanced. It is trite law that in an application to excuse delay there should be sufficient grounds made out explaining each day's delay (vide: Mahant Bikram Dass Chela v. Financial Commissioner (1977 (4) SCC. 69). Since the delay has not been satisfactorily explained and sufficient grounds to condone the delay are not made out, I dismiss CMP. No. 18915 of 1976 and consequently, CMP. No. 18916. of 1976 also. Dismissed.