JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. -One Nathu Ram was the tenant of a shop and on coming to know that he was intending to vacate the same the petitioner on 22-7-74 made an application for allotment of the same m his favour. An order of allotment was also passed in his favour on 6-8-74 and the petitioner was given possession. The landlord respondent No. 3 was not aware of these proceedings as he had not been given any notice as required by Rule 9 (3) of the Rules made under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. He accordingly filed an appeal under Section 18 of the Act (as it then stood) against the allotment order. That appeal was allowed and the allotment was held to be invalid for want of notice to the landlord before the passing of the order. The learned District Judge on 9-10-74, vide his appellate order annexure 2 to the petition, remanded the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who exercised the powers of the District Magistrate under the Act. When the matter went back to the RCEO the landlord moved an application for release of the accommodation in Ins favour. The petitioner filed objections against the release application. Only the landlord was allowed to adduce evidence. The petitioner was not allowed to give evidence. The release application was rejected by the RCEO on 26-2-75, vide annexure 6. The landlord respondent thereupon filed an appeal without impleading the petitioner. Only the District Magistrate was impleaded as respondent in the appeal. The learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal on 29-9-75 and ordered the release of the accommodation in favour of the respondent. It was also mentioned that the application of the petitioner for allotment consequently became in-fructuous. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner has come to this court. 2. The petition was cognizable by a single Judge according to the Rules of the Court. A learned single Judge on 25-7-77 directed that the question of validity of Rule 13 (4) be referred to a Division Bench. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner has come to this court. 2. The petition was cognizable by a single Judge according to the Rules of the Court. A learned single Judge on 25-7-77 directed that the question of validity of Rule 13 (4) be referred to a Division Bench. In fact another Writ Petition No. 1611 of 1974, Ram Dayal v. District Judge had already been referred to the Division Bench on this question, but we are informed by the parties counsel that the said writ petition has been decided on other grounds and the question of validity of Rule 13 (4) remained undecided. It is thus that this petition has been placed before a Division Bench by order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. 3. Rule 13 (4) referred to above ran as follows :- "(4) Every application under Section 16 (I) (b) shall be a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord, and the out-going tenant or the prospective allottee, if any, shall have no right to file any objection against it." This sub-rule was deleted on 25-5-77 on which date an altogether different R. 13 was substituted. The rule as now substituted does not make any specific provision as to whether in an application for release made by the landlord a prospective allottee has a right to be heard or not. The new rule is thus silent on this question. However, Rule 13 (4) quoted above was in force at the time of the impugned decision by the Additional District Judge. 4. It may be noted here that the entire writ petition has been referred to this Division Bench and not merely the question of validity of the said sub-rule. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the said sub-rule was void on account of unreasonableness and in the alternative he has contended that even if the Rule be followed the petitioner having already been let into possession was entitled to be heard before-the landlords application for release was allowed. 6. Both the contentions are contested by learned counsel for the respondent. 7. The validity of Rule 13 (4) was upheld by a learned single Judge (S.D. Agarwal, J.) in Raghunandan Lal v. District Judge (1978 All Rent Cas 347): (AIR 1978 NOC 197). 6. Both the contentions are contested by learned counsel for the respondent. 7. The validity of Rule 13 (4) was upheld by a learned single Judge (S.D. Agarwal, J.) in Raghunandan Lal v. District Judge (1978 All Rent Cas 347): (AIR 1978 NOC 197). He observed as follows in para 6 of the report: "Rule 13, sub-clause (4) does not lay down anything contrary to Section 16 of the Act. Once the tenant vacates the property then the property reverts to the landlord and thereafter the question as to whether the property should be released or not is a question between the District Magistrate and the landlord. Even if this clause was not there, then too, in my opinion, the out-going tenant or the prospective allottee cannot have a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord." 8. In view expressed by Agarwal, J. appears to us to be reasonable, and no serious argument was advanced before us to contest its correctness. Indeed the said view appears to be consistent with the Full Bench authority of Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer ( AIR 1965 All 49 ): (1964 All LJ 412) wherein Desai, C. J., observed as follows in para 6 of the report:- "1 see nothing anomalous or improper in the State Governments directing that whenever a landlord bona fide needs an accommodation for his own occupation the District Magistrate regardless of all circumstances should not order him to let it to any one. After all he is the owner of the accommodation and when he genuinely needs it for own occupation there is no reason why anothers needs, however pressing they may be, should have a prior claim. However, pressing the others needs may be, he has no claim against this accommodation or against the landlord and the State Government -could very wisely refuse to consider them as against the landlords needs. However, pressing the others needs may be, he has no claim against this accommodation or against the landlord and the State Government -could very wisely refuse to consider them as against the landlords needs. No landlord is under an obligation to meet needs of others however pressing they may be: his right as the owner of the accommodation is not subject to the pressing needs of another and it makes no difference whether the pressing needs are of an individual or of a public authority or institution." This view was expressed in the context of the provisions of Rule 6 of the Rules made under the old Act (U. P. Act 3 of 1947) but the ratio is equally applicable to the instant case. Of course the ruling does not strictly tally with the question as to whether a prospective allottee should be heard or not. But it does imply that he should have no right of hearing because his needs are irrelevant so far as the application of the "landlord for release is concerned. Another learned single Judge (Hon'ble K.S. Varrna, J.) has also taken the same view in A. K. Sharma v. Smt. Shyam Rani (1979 Luck LJ 199). We agree with Hon'ble S.D. Agarwal, J. and Hon'ble K.S. Varma, J. in their view that the deletion of Rule 13 (4) does not improve the position of a prospective allottee and does not give him a locus standi to challenge the landlords application for release. 9. The mere fact that the said rule was deleted does not necessarily imply, that the rule-making authority intended to confer a locus standi on the prospective allottee. The deletion may have been made on the ground that the sub-rule was considered redundant. No provision was, however, made to provide a standi to prospective allottee's to contest a landlords application for release. 10. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the fact that the petitioner had been put in possession gave him a locus standi to contest the release application. He has invited our attention to the observations of the learned District Judge in his order dated 9-10-74. He had observed as follows :- "Another peculiar circumstance in this ease is that the tenant has without any fault on his part come in occupation of the shop allotted in his name. He has invited our attention to the observations of the learned District Judge in his order dated 9-10-74. He had observed as follows :- "Another peculiar circumstance in this ease is that the tenant has without any fault on his part come in occupation of the shop allotted in his name. He could not be thrown out simply on the ground that the allotment order suffers from some legal defects, for which the authorities were responsible. I am confident that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer will keep in his mind this circumstance and proceed to decide the case afresh after intimating the date on which the allotment application would be considered by him." 11. It appears that these observations were made by the learned District Judge in ignorance of Section 18 (3) which provides that: "Where an order under Section 16 or Section 19 is rescinded District Magistrate shall, on an application being made to him on that behalf, place the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been rescinded, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary." However that may be, it seems that because of these observations of the learned District Judge, which did not form part of the operative order, the landlord himself did not make any application under Section 18 (3). The allotment order being void the fact that the petitioner was put into possession in pursuance thereof cannot confer on him a higher right than he would have had otherwise. He has already enjoyed the benefit of this observation of the learned District Judge but he cannot claim any special rights on the basis of the same. 12. In the result, we find no force in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. The learned counsel for the petitioner has in the end requested for some time to vacate the accommodation and has given an undertaking that the petitioner shall vacate the premises on the expiry of the time allowed. 12. In the result, we find no force in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. The learned counsel for the petitioner has in the end requested for some time to vacate the accommodation and has given an undertaking that the petitioner shall vacate the premises on the expiry of the time allowed. In view of this undertaking we grant him three months further time to vacate the premises on condition that he pays as damages tor use and occupation for the entire period of his occupation so far and hereafter an amount calculated on the basis of the rate of rent payable by the previous tenant.