JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is occupying the upper story of a house situate in mohalla Mahabir Bazar, Saharanpur as a tenant, the ground floor of which is in the occupation of the landlord. An application was made for release of the accommodation in the tenancy of the petitioner under section 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") by respondents 1 to 9 asserting that even though at one stage respondents 1 to 9 were the co-owners of the accommodation aforesaid, there was a partition in pursuance whereof the said house was allotted to the share of respondent No. 1 alone. It was further asserted by them that the accommodation under the tenancy of the petitioner was required for the personal use and occupation of respondent No. 1. The application was contested by the petitioner and was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority. On an appeal having been filed by respondents 1 to 9, the order of the Prescribed Authority was set aside by the V Additional District Judge, Saharanpur respondent No. 10, and the release application was allowed. Respondent No. 10 has held that the need of the landlord was bona fide. On the question of comparative hardship, respondent No. 10 had held that in view of the offer made by respondents 1 to 9 that the petitioner may occupy the ground floor hitherto occupied by respondent No. 1 as an alternative accommodation, the application for release has to be considered more liberally. Respondent No. 10 has also held that the landlord would suffer greater hardship in case the application for release was rejected than that which is likely to be suffered by the tenant on account of his eviction from the disputed premises. It is this order of respondent No. 10 which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It is this order of respondent No. 10 which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that the application for release was based on two grounds (1) that the landlord being a Mohammadan pardah was observed in his family and it was difficult to observe pardah for the landlord while residing in the ground floor of the house aforesaid and (2) that the extent of the accommodation at the disposal of the landlord was inadequate keeping in view that two of his sons have attained majority and are of marriageable age but for want of accommodation it has not been possible to marry them. 3. It has been asserted by counsel for the petitioner that even the ground floor of the aforesaid house was earlier occupied by a tenant and the landlord had got it released in his favour on the ground of his personal requirement and in those proceedings he had taken a definite stand that if be were allowed to occupy the ground floor there will be no infringement of pardah. According to counsel for the petitioner, the stand taken by the landlord in the instant case was contradictory to the stand taken by him in the aforesaid proceedings and the release application should not have been allowed on this ground. 4. So far as this submission is concerned, it would be seen that, as is apparent from the case of the landlord, this was not the main ground on which the release application had been made. It is true that it was one of the grounds stated therein but the main ground seems to be that in view of the fact that two of his sons had attained majority and were of marriageable age, and the accommodation at his disposal was inadequate. In regard to the extent of the accommodation at his disposal, the case of the landlord was that he was in occupation of one room of a house situate in mohalla Topia Sarai and one room and a verandah along with a court-yard on the ground floor of the house in question. Respondent No. 10 has, on appraisal of evidence produced by the parties, accepted the case of the landlord in regard to his need being bona fide for additional accommodation. 5. In India Pipe Fitting Co. Respondent No. 10 has, on appraisal of evidence produced by the parties, accepted the case of the landlord in regard to his need being bona fide for additional accommodation. 5. In India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 45, it has been held that the finding that the landlord's requirement was bona fide and reasonable arrived at by appreciating the evidence on record is a finding which cannot be disturbed in a writ petition unless it could be brought within the purview of a perverse finding. In Mattu Lal v. Radhe Lal, 1975 R.C.J. 86. it was held that the finding reached by the Additional District Judge on an appreciation of evidence about the bona fide requirement of the landlord is a finding of fact and not a finding of mixed law and fact. It is not the case of the petitioner that the finding of respondent No. 10 that the need of the landlord was bona fide was based on no evidence so that it could be termed as a perverse finding. In this view of the matter, it would not be possible to reverse that finding under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this connection, it would further be seen that respondent No. 10 in arriving at the conclusion that the accommodation at the disposal of the landlord was inadequate has not taken into consideration the question of pardah. The inconsistent stand which the landlord had taken on the question of pardah, according to the petitioner therefore, cannot be a ground to hold that the finding of the Additional District Judge on this point is vitiated in any manner. A perusal of the impugned order passed by respondent No. 10 will indicate that the fact that pardah was observed in the family of the landlord has been taken into consideration only as an additional ground for allowing the release application. In regard to the landlord's plea about pardah the Additional District Judge has held : "In the matter of privacy it cannot be accepted that the occupants of the ground floor and of the first floor are in the same position and that if the privacy of the occupants of the ground floor is affected that of the first floor too is affected since, the persons of the ground floor can look up at the occupants of the first floor. The occupants of the first floor are obviously in an advantageous position and they can, if they so desire, observe their privacy against the occupants of the ground floor. The same cannot be true regarding the occupants of the ground floor. They have to come out into the Sahan for various purposes including for using the latrine, the kitchen or the bath-room. During summer they have to sleep in the open Sahan. The change over of the premises would, thus, go along way to solve this problem also of the landlord." 6. Coming to the question of comparative hardship it would be relevant to notice sub-rule (f) of rule 16 of the rules framed under the Act which reads : "(f) where the landlord offers to the tenant alternative accommodation reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family the landlord's claim for release of the building under tenancy shall be construed liberally." 7. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that in considering the comparative hardship respondent No. 10 has committed an error in holding that in the family of the petitioner there are only two members, namely, the petitioner and her husband. It has been asserted that, as is apparent from the order of the Prescribed Authority the parents of the husband were also residing with him so also was residing with her one of the sons of the petitioner. It has been urged that in view of this circumstance the finding of the respondent No. 10 on the question of comparative hardship is vitiated in law. It is true that the fact that old relations were living with the tenant is not to be ignored completely but in view of the definition of the term 'family' contained in section 3(g) of the Act, it cannot be said that the parents of the husband of the petitioner were members of the petitioner's family. As regards the plea that respondent No. 10 has ignored the fact that one of the sons was residing with him, it may be pointed out that the petitioner has two sons. One of them is admittedly in service and living outside Saharanpur. The other son was a student of M.B.B.S. and in that connection was residing at Agra and not at Saharanpur at the time when the application for release was made. One of them is admittedly in service and living outside Saharanpur. The other son was a student of M.B.B.S. and in that connection was residing at Agra and not at Saharanpur at the time when the application for release was made. I am informed that now that son has passed his M.B.B.S. and has come back to reside with the petitioner at Saharanpur. What appears is that since at the relevant time even the second son was residing at Agra and not at Saharanpur, the respondent No. 10 has made the observation in the impugned order that there are two members in the family of the petitioner. That apart on that ground alone the impugned order, in my opinion, does not deserve to be quashed particularly when the accommodation on the ground floor has been offered by the landlord to the petitioner. Indeed while disputing the genuineness of the need of the landlord, the petitioner had in paragraph 5 of the written statement, inter alia, stated that "the ground floor accommodation at present contained two rooms (one room which forms entrance and the other inside room) and one big verandah (which can be easily converted into two rooms) than kitchen, latrine, bath room, one kothari and a big sehan." When the said accommodation on the ground floor has been offered by the landlord to the petitioner, it is not open to her turn round say that the accommodation on the ground floor could not be treated as "an alternative accommodation reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family" within the meaning of rule 16(1)(h) of the rules framed under the Act. 8. So far as the legal position is concerned, neither the Act nor the Rules framed thereunder provide that even it the need of the landlord is found to be bona fide, no release application is to be allowed unless the tenant has already an alternative accommodation at his disposal or one is offered to him in the proceedings for release. Even if the landlord had not made the offer aforesaid, the application for release could yet have been allowed on the finding that the need of the landlord was bona fide, of course, after considering the question of comparative hardship. Even if the landlord had not made the offer aforesaid, the application for release could yet have been allowed on the finding that the need of the landlord was bona fide, of course, after considering the question of comparative hardship. On the facts of the instant case, therefore, it cannot be said that respondent No. 10 has committed any such error even on the point of comparative hardship of the parties which may justify interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. As seen above, respondent No. 10 has also recorded a finding that in the event of the release application being dismissed the landlord would be put to greater hardship than the hardship which is likely to be caused to the petitioner in the event of the said application being allowed. That finding again is a finding of fact and cannot be interfered with in a writ petition. See Muni Lal v. Prescribed Authority, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 29. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in this writ petition and it is liable to be dismissed. 10. Before parting with the case, I may point out that in the impugned order the respondent No. 10 has stated that the petitioner is given an option to occupy the ground floor premises No. 13/ 1216/7 and that she shall signify her consent in this behalf in writing within a period of 15 days failing which this offer of alternative accommodation shall lapse. The time of fifteen days granted by the impugned order has apparently expired. Sri R.K. Jain, counsel for the landlord, has, however, made a statement that the landlord has no objection if one month's time from today's date is granted to the petitioner to signify her consent in regard to the acceptance of the offer of the alternative accommodation. The time of fifteen days granted by the impugned order has apparently expired. Sri R.K. Jain, counsel for the landlord, has, however, made a statement that the landlord has no objection if one month's time from today's date is granted to the petitioner to signify her consent in regard to the acceptance of the offer of the alternative accommodation. He has further stated that if the petitioner accepts the offer of the alternative accommodation and makes alterations in the said accommodation in the manner stated by her in paragraph 5 of her written statement the landlord will not institute a suit for ejectment of the petitioner on the ground contemplated by section 20(2)(c) of the Act, namely, that the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction or structural alteration in the building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it. He has further stated that the rent of the ground floor, if the offer is accepted by the petitioner to occupy the same, would be such as may be agreed upon between the parties or if there is no such agreement as may be determined under section 8 of the Act. In my opinion, the statement made by counsel for the petitioner is fair and just. 11. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The conditions in regard to the acceptance of the offer made by the landlord to the petitioner for occupation of the ground floor of the house aforesaid shall be the same as are contained in the statement of the counsel for the landlord referred to above. In case the petitioner accepts the offer, there will be no difficulty but in case the finds it difficult to accept the same, she is granted three months' time from today's date to vacate the accommodation in question. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 12. A copy of this order may be supplied to counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within a week.