JUDGMENT-The present case is a shining illustration of the stupefying manner in which a dishonest defendant, who now admits himself to be a rank trespasser on the premises initially allowed to be occupied by him as a matter of charity has persuaded the Courts to get enmeshed in procedural wrangles and to defeat just right of the plaintiffs. 2. The petitioners before me are the trustees of the Seth Khattau Morarji and others trust. This trust is the owner of building Narayan Niwas situate at Dadyseth Agiary Lane, Bombay. Two rooms on the 3rd floor of the said building are in the occupation of the present respondent. The said premises were given for occupation to the respondent by the 6 trustees of the trust in the year 1957. It is common ground before me that initially a rent of 50 p. per room was charged by the trustees to the respondent for occupation of the rooms but the trustees stopped charging even this negligible, nominal rent from the year 1960. Mr. Soochak appearing for the respondent has informed me that till the year 1960 the respondent was in the part time employment of the trust and that his grievance is that he was receiving only Rs. 15 as salary. However, he himself admitted on behalf of his client that he left the employment in the year 1960 in which year he also stopped paying the negligible amount of rent of Re. 1 in connection with the two rooms. For the sake of convenience the premises occupied by the respondent shall be referred to hereinafter as 'the suit premises. 3. It may be mentioned here that under the Trust Deed executed by the original settlor Shri Purshottam Shamji the four sons of the settlor were the original trustees of the said trust. Under the Trust Deed, it is provided that the Trust should have minimum three trustees. There is another provision in the trust Deed for the appointment of the trustees after the death, retirement or refusal to function by the trustees in question. It is not in dispute that in the year 1966 two of the original trustees ceased to be trustees because of the death of one and because of the retirement of the other. The number of continuing trustees was thus reduced to two. Petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 were the continuing trustees. It is not in dispute that in the year 1966 two of the original trustees ceased to be trustees because of the death of one and because of the retirement of the other. The number of continuing trustees was thus reduced to two. Petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 were the continuing trustees. Under the Trust Deed the power of appointment of trustees is given to the trust and in the exercise of that power, the trustees appointed petitioners Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 as additional trustees. The Deed of Appointment in that behalf was executed on 15th February 1966 and it was lodged for registration with the Registrar of' Assurances in the year 1967. For some reason or the other the registration was not complete till the year 1979. All the six trustees, however, managed the trust property. It is to be noted that this Trust is registered under the Public Trusts Act. Really speaking, the change in the constitution of the board of trustees should have been intimated to the Charity Commissioner by the Trustees immediately and the requisite approval of the Charity Commissioner should have been obtained. This legal requirement was presumably not complied with by the petitioners for some time although they were acting as trustees from the date of their appointment. 4. In the year 1972 petitioners trustees got information that the respondent who was occupying the suit premises without payment of a single farthing had already acquired alternate accommodation at Kandivli and that having regard to the object of the Trust, be had no justification to continue in the suit premises. Hence a notice dated 8-2-1972 was given by the trustees through their advocate revoking the respondent's license to continue with the occupation of the premises. No reply was given by the respondent to this notice. In the notice it was specifically stated that the respondent had acquired alternate accommodation at Kandivli and he was, in fact, living there. This fact was nowhere denied by the respondent. In these circumstances, the petitioners trustees filed an ejectment application against the respondent on 18-9-1972 under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act. It may be stated here that in those proceedings the fact that the respondent had acquired alternate accommodation at Kandivli and that he, in fact, has been residing there has been admitted by the respondent in so many words. It may be stated here that in those proceedings the fact that the respondent had acquired alternate accommodation at Kandivli and that he, in fact, has been residing there has been admitted by the respondent in so many words. As a matter of fact, Mr. Soochak, the learned counsel for the respondent appearing before me has made a clean breast of two facts on behalf of his client: Firstly, that the respondent has already acquired accommodation elsewhere and that he has been, in fact, residing there with his family and secondly, that the respondent does not belong to that category of persons who can be said to be needy or indigent so as to be required to occupy the suit premises with the aid of charity. 5. Respondent filed his points of defences by which he stated that he was not aware as to whether the present petitioners were the present trustees of the trust duly appointed according to law as per the Deed of Trust. He contended that the applicants should be required to prove their right, title and interests in the property in order to be able to file and for maintain the application. He also contended that he was a tenant in respect of the suit premises. He even went to the length of contending that, "he has been paying the rent for the premises and is ready and willing to pay the same and otherwise perform the terms and conditions of tenancy, if any. He also pleaded protection under the Rent Act and claimed that he was not liable to be ejected from the suit premises." 6. In view of these pleadings, the trial Court had to raise an issue under section 42-A of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act as to whether the respondent was the tenant in respect of the suit premises. The trial Court called upon the parties to lead evidence on this question. In the evidence, respondent had to admit that he was not paying a single farthing as rent for the suit premises even though he had contended in the written statement falsely that he has been paying rent for the suit premises. In view of this fact and in view of the other circumstances the trial Court came to the conclusion that the respondent was not a tenant in respect of the suit premises. In view of this fact and in view of the other circumstances the trial Court came to the conclusion that the respondent was not a tenant in respect of the suit premises. The respondent had the cheek to file not only an appeal to the Bench of two Judges of the Small Cause Court which was dismissed, but even to file a Writ Petition in this Court which was summarily rejected. He bad, therefore, to gO to trial on the basis that he was not a tenant of the suit premises. 7. It may be stated here that during the pendency of this appeal which was dismissed on 5th October] 978. the respondent filed additional points of defences in the trial Court. However, no notice in respect of the said additional points of defences was given to the petitioners or to their learned advocate nor a copy of the additional points of defences was furnished to them. By the said additional points of defences, it was contended that at the time when the present ejectment application was filed applicants Nos. 1 and 5 (petitioners] and 4 before me) were the only trustees on record of the Trust. The contention was that the minimum number of trustees required for filing an application was 3. It was, therefore, contended that applicants Nos. 1 and 5 (petitioners 1 and 4 before me) who were the only trustees on record had no power to file an application for ejectment. Nextly, it was contended that the Deputy Charity Commissioner who passed an order dated 27-3-1973 had ordered that the name of applicants Nos. 2, 3,4, and 6 (petitioners Nos. 2, 3, 5. and 6 before me) be deleted. The contention was that the said four trustees were illegally appointed as trustees and, hence, the application filed by them was liable to be dismissed in limine. Nextly, it was contended that though the Charity Commissioner had appointed two more of the remaining petitioners as trustees by his order dated 4th July 1974, the appointment dated 4th July 1974 could not relate back to the date of the Ejectment Application which was filed on 18-9-1972. It was, therefore, contended that the original application was defective and was, hence, liable to be dismissed with costs. 8. It was, therefore, contended that the original application was defective and was, hence, liable to be dismissed with costs. 8. In view of these additional pleadings, the learned trial Judge raised a preliminary issue whether the application filed by the petitioners was maintainable and whether the petitioners proved that they were duly and legally appointed trustees as per the Deed of Trust. At this stage, certain proceedings that were taken before the Deputy Charity Commissioner and the Charity Commissioner under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and the orders passed by them may be referred to. It may be recalled that out of the four trustees originally appointed by the settlor, two had already ceased to be trustees by virtue of death or retirement in the year 1966 and only the present petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 continued as trustees thereafter. The remaining petitioners were appointed as trustees by the Deed of Appointment referred to hereinabove but no approval in that behalf was taken from the Charity Commissioner. An application for the said approval was made by the trustees of the trust to the Deputy Charity Commissioner in or about the year 1972. However, the Deputy Charity Commissioner rejected {he said application by an order dated 6th July 1972. This order was passed by him because, according to him, the remaining four trustees, that is to say, the present petitioners 2, 3, 5 and 6 could not be appointed as trustees as per the provisions of the Deed of Trust. 9. When this application was rejected, the petitioners approached the Charity Commissioner and the Charity Commissioner prepared a scheme for the purpose of the administration of the Trust and as per the said scheme, he appointed all the petitioners including petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 who were also the original trustees as the six trustees of the trust in question. The scheme was prepared by the order dated 21-10-1974. It may be also mentioned here that he had also passed another order on 4-7-1974 appointing ,two more trustees (present petitioners Nos. 2 and 6) in addition to petitioner Nos. 1 and 4 who were already acting as trustees as the four trustees of the trust for the time being. This order was only got superseded by the scheme which was framed by the order dated 21-10-1974 mentioned above. 2 and 6) in addition to petitioner Nos. 1 and 4 who were already acting as trustees as the four trustees of the trust for the time being. This order was only got superseded by the scheme which was framed by the order dated 21-10-1974 mentioned above. Under the said scheme it was also provided that the property of the Trust vested in all the six trustees. It may be mentioned here further that the scheme prepared by the Charity Commissioner dated 21-10-1974 was tiled and exhibited by the petitioners in the proceedings before the trial Court and the scheme has been even duly exhibited. It is not at all disputed that petitioners would be fully within their right to tile an application for ejectment on the strength of the scheme, if not, otherwise. In fact it is not disputed at least before me that the objection was a purely technical objection; but the contention was that the technicality affected the rest of the trial Court's. jurisdiction. It was this aspect of the objection that went home to the trial Judge. The learned trial Judge was persuaded by the respondent to take the view that although the respondent had not a title of right to remain in possession of the suit premises and even though the fact that the Trust was, being managed by all the six trustees as de-facto trustees and managers was never disputed before the trial Court and even though the right of two of the trustees (namely petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 before me) as trustees of the trust was never called in question before the trial Court, the ejectment application was not maintainable, because the petitioners were not duly and legally appointed as trustees of the Trust as per the Deed of Trust. The application for ejectment tiled by the petitioners was, therefore, dismissed by the trial Court. But in the circumstances of the case, in view of the patently dishonest character of the respondent's nature. the trial Court passed no order as to costs. 10. The present writ petition is directed against the said order of dismissal passed by the trial Court. 11. Initially, the present Writ petition came up for hearing before my brother Kurdukar J. and remained pending hearing before him for a number of days. Mr. the trial Court passed no order as to costs. 10. The present writ petition is directed against the said order of dismissal passed by the trial Court. 11. Initially, the present Writ petition came up for hearing before my brother Kurdukar J. and remained pending hearing before him for a number of days. Mr. Soochak appearing for the respondent did not choose to file his Vakalatnama all that time and he did not even find it necessary to mention to the Court that he was instructed to appear on behalf of the respondent. The result was that by his order dated 7-12-1979 my brother Kurdukar J. had to hear the petition ex-parte. He held following the judgment of the Supreme Court in A I R 1956 S C 382, that the petitioners who are at least defacto trustees or are at least in de-facto management of the Trust were perfectly entitled to file and prosecute the application for ejectment and that the Court was bound to pass a decree even at the instance of the de-facto trustees. The rule in that Writ petition was therefore, made absolute by him. Thereafter. Mr. Soochak appeared before me and made a grievance that he had failed to file a Vakalatnama on account of the wrong advise received by him pertaining to the practice of this Court. He contended that for several days he was unable to mention to the Court that he was instructed to appear on behalf of the respondent. He made an application to the Court which contained several personal allegations against the learned advocate Mr. Vora appearing for the petitioners. Mr. Vora appearing for the petitioners on the other hand stated that he had no objection if the petition was heard once again on merits so as to avoid an unedifying spectacle in the Court of mutual mud-slinging. Mr. Vora appearing for the petitioners was fair enough to concede to the ex parte order being ~et aside. Hence. I set aside the ex parte order by consent and the petition was heard before me once again. 12. The hearing of the petition went on for four days. Mr. Soochak was heard at length on 30-1-1979 and. thereafter it was adjourned for settlement to 1-2-1980. It was adjourned for settlement because Mr. Hence. I set aside the ex parte order by consent and the petition was heard before me once again. 12. The hearing of the petition went on for four days. Mr. Soochak was heard at length on 30-1-1979 and. thereafter it was adjourned for settlement to 1-2-1980. It was adjourned for settlement because Mr. Soochak appearing for the respondent had made a clean breast before me that so far as the right of the respondent to remain in occupation was concerned, his client had no leg to stand upon. He conceded that from 8-2-1972 which was the date of the revocation of the licence, the respondent was in occupation of the suit premises without a title of title and his position was no less than that of a rank trespasser. He conceded that he bad no defence whatsoever on merits to the claim for possession in valid proceedings. In view of this frank admission. I inquired from him whether his client would not· be prepared to hand over peaceful possession of the suit premises if some reasonable time was given to him to vacate. It was in these circumstances that this petition was allowed to be adjourned for settlement till 1st February 1980. On the first of this month, however, Mr. Soochak informed me apologetically that his client was not prepared to settle the matter or to hand over possession in spite of the clear legal position that right to remain in possession he had none. He. therefore, wanted to raise his legal contentions in support of the order passed by the trial Court. The petition had, therefore, to be re-heard for three more days. 13. Mr. Vora, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, has contended before me that the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding that the application was not maintainable at the instance of the petitioners. He contended that in any event the petitioners were the de-facto trustees or were in de-facto management of the Trust, and as such de-facto trustees, they had full right to file the application. He contended that in any event the petitioners were the de-facto trustees or were in de-facto management of the Trust, and as such de-facto trustees, they had full right to file the application. He invited my attention to the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1956 SC 382 , which reads as follows:- "A person who has been in de-facto possession and management of the Asthana and its properties for a long time claiming to be its trustee under the decree of a Court, valid or invalid, has sufficient interest to maintain proceedings for the warding off of a cloud cast by the defendant's action against the interests of the Asthana." The learned advocate has also invited my attention to the decisions of this Court reported in 69 B L R 469 as also to other authorities namely A I R 1949 Madras P. 721 (at page 724), A I R 1956 Andhra Pradesh P. 19 (at para II), A I R 1953 Allahabad, P. 449 (para 17) and A I R 1971 Madras P.253 (at Page 259, Para 17). All these authorities do go to hold that even a de-facto trustee or a person in de-facto management of the Trust has got sufficient locus to file the suit or to institute proceedings against a trespasser or against the person claiming interest adverse to the Trust for the purpose of claiming relief which will enure to the benefit of the Trust. I may mention here that even my brother Kurdukar, J. in his judgment dated 7th December 1979 had taken this very view and had arrived at the conclusion that the petitioners had sufficient locus to take proceedings against a person such as the respondent for the purpose of furthering the interests of the trust and for the purpose of getting relief for the purpose of the trust. In this view of things, therefore, it is really difficult to see any justification for the learned trial Judge to dismiss the petitioner's ejectment application on the grounds relied upon by him. 14. Mr. Vora for the petitioners pointed out to me that all these authorities were cited before the learned trial Judge but that the learned trial Judge had just failed to take them into account. Mr. 14. Mr. Vora for the petitioners pointed out to me that all these authorities were cited before the learned trial Judge but that the learned trial Judge had just failed to take them into account. Mr. Vora stated that this was the result of the fact that the judgment was delivered long after his arguments were heard by the learned trial Judge. He, therefore, contended that this is a clear case of non-application of mind by the learned trial Judge to the points urged before him. 15. Mr. Soochak appearing for the respondent was fair enough to state that he did not appear for the respondent in the trial Court and that, hence, it was not possible for him to deny the statement made by Mr. Vora. The said statement was not made for the first time before me. As a matter of fact, I find that the petitioners have made submissions in this behalf in their writ petition itself. I, therefore, find no reason to disbelieve Me. Vora that the points urged and the authorities cited by Mr. Vora before the trial Court have been overlooked by the learned trial Judge because of the lapse of time between the date of the arguments and the delivery of the final judgment. 16. On merits, however, Mr. Soochak contended that there was no basis for the petitioners to rely upon the said ruling of the Supreme Court reported in A I R 1956 S C page 382 and the other authorities referred to by me above. His contention is that there was no evidence that the petitioners were the de-facto trustees or were in de-facto management of the Trust. To my mind, it is too late in the day to raise this contention. A mere glance to the additional points of defences shows that, according to the respondent himself, at least petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 had been acting as trustees on the date of the application and reading both the defences together it can be clearly found that even according to the respondent himself all the petitioners were in the management of the Trust. The defacto management of the petitioners was not in dispute. Their real demurrer was that the petitioners' management of the trust property was not that of trustees because they were not validly appointed as trustees till the year 1974. The defacto management of the petitioners was not in dispute. Their real demurrer was that the petitioners' management of the trust property was not that of trustees because they were not validly appointed as trustees till the year 1974. The effective management of the trust by the petitioners or at least two of the petitioners is not called in question by him at all. Even the learned trial Judge has not found that the petitioners were not de-facto trustees or were not in de facto management of the trust. This being the position, the contention of Mr. Soochak is devoid of any merit. This petition is, therefore, really speaking capable of being decided on this point alone. 17. At the fag end of his arguments, Mr. Soochak tried to rely upon another circumstance in support of his contention in this Court that the petitioners were not in the actual management of the Trust property. He contended that on the petitioners' own showing they were not managing the trust property on the date of the application. In this connection, Mr. Soochak has invited my attention to Para 8 of his affidavit filed by the respondent in reply to the petition. In the said Para 8 reference is made by the respondent to statements made by the petitioners in the application to the Charity Commissioner under section 47 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The following averment in the said application is culled out by the respondent. It reads as follows:- "The Trust has become defunct and the legal proceedings adopted by the Trust against the occupants has remained dormant." From this averment Mr. Soochak wants me to infer that there was an admission given by the present petitioners, before the Charity Commissioner that they were not managing the trust property on the date of the ejectment application. The initial argument of Mr. Soochak was that the petitioners had led no evidence to prove that they were the de-facto trustees. Relying upon the abovementioned extracted statement Mr. Soochak contends that evidence was in fact to the contrary. 18. I am wholly unable to accept this argument. In the first place, I do not know whether the application referred to in the respondent's affidavit was a part of record before the lower Court. The respondent cannot be all owed to furnish fresh evidence in this Court. Soochak contends that evidence was in fact to the contrary. 18. I am wholly unable to accept this argument. In the first place, I do not know whether the application referred to in the respondent's affidavit was a part of record before the lower Court. The respondent cannot be all owed to furnish fresh evidence in this Court. But assuming that the said application was on record in the trial Court, I do not see anything in the said averment to justify an inference that the petitioners were not in de facto management of the trust property. What was meant by the said averment, obviously, was that since the number of trustees has been reduced below the minimum, the trust had become defunct in the eyes of law. They therefore, prayed that additional trustees may be appointed so that the trust can function according to the provisions of law. This cannot be considered to be an admission that the petitioners were not managing the trust at all. Moreover, it is dangerous to rely upon such stray sentences in order to arrive at a conclusive finding. 19. It is significant that this plea is being raised by the respondent for the first time in this Court. In the trial Court it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that as de facto trustees, the petitioners were entitled to claim relief against the respondent under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act. A number of authorities were cited in support of the proposition. Affidavit filed by the petitioners in that behalf has gone unchallenged. This aspect of the matter is already referred to by me above. The respondent, however, has nowhere stated in his affidavit that his present plea was urged by him in the trial Court. The contention is, thus, devoid of any merit for more reasons than one. This being the position, it is possible to allow this petition and to decree the petitioners' original application on this ground itself. 20. But there is another aspect of the matter which, to my -mind, the trial Court was in grave error in completely shutting its eyes too. At one stage, the respondent refuted that the scheme prepared by the Charity Commissioner passing the order dated 21-10-1974 was not a part of the record in the trial Court. 20. But there is another aspect of the matter which, to my -mind, the trial Court was in grave error in completely shutting its eyes too. At one stage, the respondent refuted that the scheme prepared by the Charity Commissioner passing the order dated 21-10-1974 was not a part of the record in the trial Court. I, therefore, deliberately called for the record at his instance and the hearing of this petition had to be adjourned for that purpose. When the record was received here it was found that the scheme was very much a part of the record and this fact had to be conceded by Mr. Soochak when this position was brought to his notice. Now, if the scheme was just glanced over by the learned trial Judge, be could have seen that at least- from 21-10-1974 when the entire proceeding was very much pending in the trial Court, all the petitioners got unimpeachable right and title in the suit property in strict accordance with law. It is to be noted that the very petitioners who had filed the application for ejectment were the persons who were appointed by the Charity Commissioner as the trustees under the scheme and they were the very persons in whom the property was ordered to be vested as per the scheme. If, therefore, there were any defects in the application for ejectment initially, it was clearly cured by virtue of the said scheme which came in force from 21-10-1974. The learned trial Judge should have seen that he had inherent jurisdiction under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, nay, it was his duty under the Code and under the General law to see to it that just and legitimate, claims of parties were not defeated on such technical grounds. The learned trial Judge should have seen that it would have been perfectly open for the self same applicants to withdraw the application and to file the same on 22-10-1974 and in that case the respondent would have had no basis for setting up these defences. There is no reason why the learned trial Judge should not have exercised his jurisdiction under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to see that this technical defect, if defect it was, was sufficiently cured by virtue of the said scheme dated 21-10-1974. There is no reason why the learned trial Judge should not have exercised his jurisdiction under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to see that this technical defect, if defect it was, was sufficiently cured by virtue of the said scheme dated 21-10-1974. Moreover, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code must also extend to taking cognisance of the subsequent events, which have a direct bearing upon matters which are in litigation. In this connection, it is useful referring to the authoritative pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti's case1. There it was stated as follows:- "It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the, the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the is has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into section 10 (3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact." It will be seen from the above that this is not only the power of the Court but it is the duty of the Court to see to it that considerations of justice are not made subsurvient to considerations of technical rigmarole and procedural wranglings. Moreover, .it must be borne in mind that the power that is given to the Court to do justice is evidently and manifestly the power coupled with duty and the Court cannot shirk from exercise of the power when it is clearly brought to the notice of the Court or when the Court has every reason to be aware that occasion to exercise the inherent power has clearly arisen. 21. Mr. Soochak, however, contended that no contention or argument was advanced before the trial Court that the scheme that came into effect from 21-10-1974 should serve as one which cures the initial defect in the filing of the application. I am not impressed by this argument. The Court had before it the scheme. Moreover, it was the case of the defendant himself that four trustees were in fact appointed by the Charity Commissioner by his order dated 4-7-1974. The appointment of these four trustees even was perfectly sufficient for the purpose of filing the ejectment application. These four trustees who, incidentally, were four of the six applicants in the lower Court, were perfectly entitled to get a decree against a rank trespasser such as the present respondent and the fact 'that the remaining two applicants were not appointed trustees till 21-10-1974 did not, in any way, affect the right of the said four trustees to get a decree in favour of the Trust. This contention of Mr. Soochak must be, therefore, rejected. 22. After the arguments of Mr. Vora were over and after the petition was heard for not less than three days, Mr. Soochak tried to raise certain contentions as preliminary objection to this writ petition. This contention of Mr. Soochak must be, therefore, rejected. 22. After the arguments of Mr. Vora were over and after the petition was heard for not less than three days, Mr. Soochak tried to raise certain contentions as preliminary objection to this writ petition. His first contention was that under section 42 (1) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 an appeal was provided against the order made by the Court of Small Cause exercising its jurisdiction under section 41 of the Act, to a Bench of two Judges of the said Court. He contended that there was, therefore, a clear alternate remedy available to the petitioners and, hence, he contended that this Court had no jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to entertain this writ petition. To my mind, raising of such an objection at a stage such as this is very much unjustified. It is raised at such a late stage that the object it8elf becomes objectionable. I have stated above that the hearing of this petition has gone on for nearly four days and Mr. Soochak raised this objection for the first time on the third day. Two days valuable time of this Court was allowed to be wasted by him. A number of points were raised by him during these proceedings before he actually raised this objection. In view of the fact that I have heard the pros and cons of the case fully and in view of the fact that this objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent at a very late stage and in view also of the fact that on Mr. Soochak's own concession the respondent bas really speaking no case whatsoever on merits, I was disinclined to entertain this objection of Mr. Soochak. 23. But even on merits, it may not be possible to sustain the objection. Mr. Vora appearing for the petitioners has invited my attention to the fact that what was filed by the petitioners was an application under section 41 as it stood before the amendment effected under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act in the year 1976 by the Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976. Mr. Vora pointed out that under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, only an application for ejectment could have been made. Mr. Vora pointed out that under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, only an application for ejectment could have been made. He pointed out that under section 46 (2) of the Act, all applications which were filed under the said section 41 and which were pending in the Court on the date of the amendment in the year 1976 were to be disposed of as if the new section 41 was not brought in the Statute Book at all. Thus, the impugned order was passed by the Court under the old section 41 and not under the new section 41. Mr. Vora pointed out that under section 42A of the new Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, appeal is provided but no appeal against the order such as the impugned order was provided at all. Under the present Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, an appeal contemplated under section 42 lies from a decree or order made by the Court exercising its jurisdiction under section 41. Mr. Vora contends that the appeal contemplated by the said section 42 can be only against an order passed under the amended section 41 and not under the unamended section 41. 24. There does appear to be substance in what Mr. Vora has argued. However, I do not want to express a final opinion on this point in view of the fact that the relevant objection has been raised by Mr. Soochak at a very late stage of the hearing of this petition and in view of the fact that respondent had, admittedly, no defence whatsoever on merits. I do not see any reason to drive the petitioners to file an appeal at this late stage and to furnish another modality to the respondent to delay and protract this litigation. The objection raised by Mr. Soochak is, therefore, rejected. 25. Mr. Soochak nextly contended that the ejectment application was not maintainable without the payment of the requisite court-fees as provided by section 71 of the unamended Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. I find no reason to hold that the court-fee paid by the petitioners was not properly computed by the lower Court. Mr. Soochak contends that this objection was taken by the respondent in his defence. But I find that this objection has not been pressed into service later on. Moreover, the nature of Mr. I find no reason to hold that the court-fee paid by the petitioners was not properly computed by the lower Court. Mr. Soochak contends that this objection was taken by the respondent in his defence. But I find that this objection has not been pressed into service later on. Moreover, the nature of Mr. Soochak's objection appears to be that under the said section 71, the provisions of clause (b) are applicable. I am afraid this contention is misleading. Mr. Soochak has probably lost sight of the fact that section 71 as it then stood started by saying that these provisions were subject to the provisions of section 44 of the unamended Act and under said section 44 of the Act, the court-fee payable in respect of proceedings under Chapter VII is the same as that chargeable under Chapter III of the Bombay Court Fees Act. Turning to the Bombay Court Fees Act, we find that section 6 (xii) (d) of the said Act is relevant for this purpose. The said clause refers to a suit between landlord and tenant. If this clause applies, the court-fee paid by the petitioner cannot be said to be less. However, this question need not detain us any further. Under section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court has got power to allow the applicant to pay the requisite court-fee at any stage of the proceedings if such fee has not been paid and upon such payment the application shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. If the objection raised by Mr. Soochak was raised by him before the trial Court, the Court would have applied its mind to the question by itself instead of being guided by the registry's, decision on that point. In all these circumstances, I do not find it necessary to allow Mr. Soochak to raise this point at this stage at all. Consequently, this contention must be rejected. 26. Mr. Soochak nextly relied upon the analogy of the explanation of the unamended section 42 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and upon the provisions of the unamended section 43 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act with particular reference to the explanation to the same. The said section 43 and the explanation to the same runs as follows :- "S. 43. The said section 43 and the explanation to the same runs as follows :- "S. 43. Order for possession :-If the occupant does not appear at the time appointed and show cause to the contrary, the applicant shall, if the Small Cause Court is satisfied that he is entitled to apply under section 41, be entitled to an order addressed to a bailiff of the Court directing him to give possession of the property to the applicant on such day as the Court thinks it fit to name in such order. Explanation :-If the occupant proves that the tenancy was created or permission granted by virtue of a title which determined previous to the date of the application, he shall be deemed to have shown cause within the meaning of this section." Mr. Soochak contends that since the respondent has shown that on the date of the ejectment application, the trustees had no title to the said premises because they were not legally appointed as trustees, the respondent must be deemed to have shown cause within the meaning of the said section 43. I must confess my total inability even to understand this point. What the explanation provides is ver;}' simple. It provides that the defendant can show that the applicant has no subsisting right to make the application for ejectment and that is enough for dismissing the application. In the instant case, that is not the position at all. I have already held that on the date of the ejectment application, at least two trustees had a subsisting right to file tho ejectment application. Secondly, all the petitioners/applicants were de-facto trustees or were in de-facto management of the trust property. As such they had subsisting right to file the application. Moreover, I have also held that if there was any defect in their title, it was sufficiently cured by virtue of the appointment of all the petitioners as trustees with effect from 21-10-1974. I, therefore, fail to see as to what application of the provisions of section 43 can have to the facts of the present case. This contention of Mr. Soochak must also, therefore, fail. 27. Lastly, Mr. Soochak contended that this Court's power under Artic]e 227 of the Constitution could not be invoked by the petitioner for the purpose of getting the mistake, if any, corrected such as the one committed by the lower Court. This contention of Mr. Soochak must also, therefore, fail. 27. Lastly, Mr. Soochak contended that this Court's power under Artic]e 227 of the Constitution could not be invoked by the petitioner for the purpose of getting the mistake, if any, corrected such as the one committed by the lower Court. In this connection he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in The Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. Ramtahel Ramanand and others2, with reference to the following observations of the Supreme Court therein:_ "Power of Superintendence-the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and, not for correcting mere errors." Mr. Soochak contended that the errors, if any, committed by the lower Court were nothing but 'mere errors' within the contemplation of the judgment of the Supreme Court. His contention is that if ans errors can be imputed to the lower Court they were one or both of the following two : (a) not realising that the petitioners were de-facto trustees or were in de-facto management of the trust: (b) not taking into account the effect of the order which was passed by the Charity Commissioner on 4th July 1974 and the Scheme which was prepared by the Charity Commissioner by order dated 21st October 1974. 28. Mr. Soochak's contention is that so far as the first error is concerned, no evidence was led before the trial Court that the trustees were de-facto trustees on the date of the ejectment suit. He, therefore, contends that this cannot be considered to be an error at all. To my mind this is a vain attempt on the part of Mr. Soochak to reagitate the same point which is already dealt with by me above. I have already found that both the parties had gone to trial on the basis that the petitioners were in the management of the trust. It is on this basis alone that I have held that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A I R 1956 S C 382 becomes relevant for the purpose of this petition. The attempt of Mr. Soochak to show that there was no error in this connection at all is therefore futile. 29. Mr. It is on this basis alone that I have held that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A I R 1956 S C 382 becomes relevant for the purpose of this petition. The attempt of Mr. Soochak to show that there was no error in this connection at all is therefore futile. 29. Mr. Soochak's contention regarding the second error is that no arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioners urging the trial Court to take into account the effect of the scheme prepared by the Charity Commissioner on 21-10-1974. I am not impressed by this argument at all. Mr. Soochak had gone to the length of stating, at one stage, that the said scheme was not on record at all. I have stated above that it was very much part of the record. As a matter of fact, even before this scheme, there was an order dated 4th July 1974 by virtue of which two additional trustees were appointed by the Charity Commissioner. Thus there were four trustees of the trust as from 4-7-1974 and from the very inception of the suit all these four trustees were there on record as plaintiffs. Moreover, the respondent has himself referred to the order dated 4-7-1974 in his additional written statement. All these facts were there before the Court. The scheme was there before the Court. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Court to raise the necessary inference from the totality of all these facts. Assuming, therefore, that no such argument as mentioned above was advanced on behalf of the petitioner trustees there is no reason why the Court itself did not apply its mind to this aspect of the case. The Court had inherent power to see to it that just claims are not delayed or defeated and litigations are not protracted or multiplied on account of the habit of the defendants to take resort to mere technicalities. To my mind, it was the duty of the Court itself to apply its mind to the aspect of this case. The Court had inherent power to see to it that just claims are not delayed or defeated and litigations are not protracted or multiplied on account of the habit of the defendants to take resort to mere technicalities. To my mind, it was the duty of the Court itself to apply its mind to the aspect of this case. The failure on the part of the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction is to my mind the result only of the non-application of its mind to the nature of its duty in the context of the facts of the case and to the nature of its power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 30. Mr. Soochak lastly made a grievance about the petitioners' conduct. He contended that there were certain mis-statements made in Para 10 of the petition and that those mis-statements disentitled the petitioners from getting relief at the hands of this Court. I have gone through the submissions made in the said para 10 of the said petition. I find that the statements made therein can at the most be said to be somewhat inaccurate statements. By no stretch of imagination they could be described as misstatements. This is so for the very simple reason that no particular advantage could be taken by the petitioners on the strength of these statements assuming that they were somewhat erroneous. Moreover, a rank trespasser, conceding that out of law, justice, equity, nothing was on his side, accusing the petitioners of mis-statements and calling upon this Court not to exercise its power under Article 227 is something suggestive of Satan quoting the Bible. The contention is totally devoid of any substance and hence, merits no consideration. 31. In all these circumstances, I am of the opinion that each of the arguments advanced by Mr. Soochak must fail. 32. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the trial Court was in grave error in holding that the application filed by the present petitioners was not maintainable. In the light of the above mentioned discussion, I hold that the application was perfectly maintainable. I find that there is no other point raised on behalf of the respondent in defence to the petitioners' ejectment application. It therefore. follows that along with this Writ petition, the original ejectment application will have to be allowed. 33. In the light of the above mentioned discussion, I hold that the application was perfectly maintainable. I find that there is no other point raised on behalf of the respondent in defence to the petitioners' ejectment application. It therefore. follows that along with this Writ petition, the original ejectment application will have to be allowed. 33. I, therefore, set aside the order passed by the lower Court and order ejectment application No. 588 IE of 1972 filed by the petitioners in the lower Court be allowed as prayed for. The respondent is ordered and. directed to hand over possession of the suit premises to the petitioner forth-with failing which petitioners to be at liberty to recover the decree through Court. 34. The rule earlier issued is made absolute. Having regard to the time taken by the respondent in the hearing of this petition by getting the petition unnecessarily adjourned and particularly by raising the various technical pleas for the purpose of defeating the rights of the charitable trust, I direct that the respondent should pay the special costs of this petition to the petitioners which are quantified at Rs. 500. Petition allowed.