JUDGMENT:— This appeal has been filed by the first defendant in O. S No. No. 8221 of 1472 in the City Civil Court, Madras. The suit was for recovery of Rs. 767.17 and for posesssion of certain machineries or in the alternative of their value of Rs. 12,143.48 with interest. The National Small Industries Corporation Bombay Private Limited supplied to the first defendant two machines viz., (1) one complete unit Log Bandsaw Mills and (2) Log Band Mill with 52 H. P motor and starter, under two agreements dated 11th March, 1959 and 7th December, 1959 marked respectively as Exhibits A-1 and A-2. The first defendant took delivery of the machines. As a result of an amalgamation and conversion into a Public Company, the plaintiff, the National Small Industries Corporation Limited became the successor of the original contracting party viz., the National Small Industries Corporation Bombay Private Limited. The total value of the two machines came to Rs. 1,46,529.67. The agreement was in the form of a hire-purchase agreement and it allowed the payment of the price in monthly instalments over a peried of 2 months. The first defendant paid a major portion of the amount due under the two agreements leaving a balance of Rs. 173.54 in respect of the Log Bandsaw Mills and Rs. 1,197.90 in respect of the Log Band Mill. Contrary to the agreement the first defendant is said to have sold the machineries to the second defendant, who in turn sold them to the third defendant without reference to, or obtaining the consent of, the plaintiff. Alleging that the first defendant had no right to alienate the machinery and that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the two items of machinery or their value, the claim as mentioned above was made in the suit. 2. The first defendant in his written statement contended that the machines were purchased for Jaya Saw Mills and Mysore Timber Mills respectively, that Mysore Timber Mills was a partnership concern. While Jaya Saw Mills was a Hindu undivided family concern, that the payment was made by the respective mills separately, that there has been wrong appropriation of the payments and that Mysore Timber Mills had paid the entire amount. It was alto the plea that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. While Jaya Saw Mills was a Hindu undivided family concern, that the payment was made by the respective mills separately, that there has been wrong appropriation of the payments and that Mysore Timber Mills had paid the entire amount. It was alto the plea that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. The second defendant contested the claim on the ground that there was no contract between him and the plaintiff and that he was not responsible for any amount that may be due from the first defendant. 4. The third defendant did not file any written statement. However, he appeared through counsel. The trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether all the amounts paid by the first defendant were not properly credited as alleged in paras. 4 and 5 of the written statement? 2. Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation? 3. To what relief? 5. The trial Judge viz., III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, came to the conclusion that all the amounts paid by the first defendant were properly given credit to and that the salt wag in time. He, therefore, decreed the suit for possession or in the alternative for Rs 12,149.48. He, however, held that the claim in so far as it related to Rs, 766.17 was not supported by any evidence and had to be rejected. The first defendant has come forward with the present appeal contesting the decree that was passed by the Court below. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant took up before me two points viz., that the payments had not been properly given credit to and that the suit was barred by limitation. As far as the plea of the amounts paid not having been properly given credit to is concerned, the learned counsel was not in a position to place before me any material on the basis of which it can be held that the amounts paid had not been properly adjusted in the accounts. It has been found by the Court below that it was the first defendant, who entered into the contract. In Exhibit A-1 be described himself as the proprietor of Mysore Timber Mills and in Exhibit A-2 he gave the address as ‘care of Mysore Timber Mills’. It has been found by the Court below that it was the first defendant, who entered into the contract. In Exhibit A-1 be described himself as the proprietor of Mysore Timber Mills and in Exhibit A-2 he gave the address as ‘care of Mysore Timber Mills’. In neither of these agreements did he state that he was entering into the agreements on behalf of any partnership, which carried on the business in the name of Mysore Timber Mills He himself admitted in the witness box that the agreements had been entered into by him. He had not described the capacity in which he entered into the contract as if it was on behalf of any partnership. The plain-tiff was, therefore, entitled to appropriate the amounts paid on the basis that the first defendant was the only person who was making the payments and not any partnership. It is not in dispute that if the payments were to be taken as having been made by the first defendant in respect of the two contracts, then there is nothing wrong in the decree. Therefore, I do not find that there is any scope for interference in so far as it has been found that the first defendant had not paid all the instalments and that there was a default. 7. In so far as the sum of Rs. 766. 17 is concerned, it has not been decreed. There is no appeal by the plaintiff. Thus, the suit in effect was only for possession of the machinery or in the alternative for their value. It has already been found that the amounts paid had been properly credited by the plaintiff and that a balance was due under the two agreements. The question that survives for consideration is whether the suit for recovery of the machinery or its value is within time. 8. It is in this connection that my attention was drawn to the following Articles of the Limitation Act, 1963, viz., Articles 68, 69, 91, and 113 theft, or dishonest misappropriation or conversion possession it is 91 (b) for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining any other specific movable property. Three years. When the property it wrongfully taken or injured, or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful. 113. Any suit for which so period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years. When the right to sue accrues.” 9. Three years. When the property it wrongfully taken or injured, or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful. 113. Any suit for which so period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years. When the right to sue accrues.” 9. As far as Article 91 is concerned, it cannot be held to apply to the facts here, because the suit is not for compensation, but for possession of the machinery, which was the subject-matter of the Hire Purchase Agreement. Article 113 would have to be applied only if it is found that no period of limitation has been provided elsewhere in the Schedule. We are thus left with Articles 68 and 69 and only in case they did not apply, it would be necessary to seek support from Article 113. 10. Before considering the Articles, the question as to the rights of the parties under a Hire Purchase Agreement may be examined. As pointed out in a recent unreported Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bell Alloy Steel Private Limited v. The National Small Industries Corporation Limited1, rendered by Ramanujam and Venugopal, JJ., there is a distinction between a contract of purchase and a contract of hire purchase. The contract of hire purchase is one of the variations of the contract of the bailment, but it is a modern development of commercial life, and the rules with regard to bailments, which were laid down before any contract of hire purchase was contemplated, cannot be applied simpliciter, because such a contract has in it not only the element of bailment but also the element of sale. At common law the term “hire purchase” properly applies only to contracts of hire conferring an option to purchase, but it is often used to describe contracts which are in reality agreements to purchase chattels by instalments, subject to a condition that the property in them is not to pass until all instalments have been paid-See Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition at page 510, paragraph 823. 11. In G.J. Subbarayalu and another v. A. RM. A. N. Annamalai Chettiar2this Court was concerned with a contract under which there was a delivery of a cinema projector with accessories, subject to the payment of an agreed price in instalments. 11. In G.J. Subbarayalu and another v. A. RM. A. N. Annamalai Chettiar2this Court was concerned with a contract under which there was a delivery of a cinema projector with accessories, subject to the payment of an agreed price in instalments. It was expressly provided in the contract, as is commonly found in the case of hire purchase agreements, that the ownership of the machine should not pass until the price was paid in full. As there was failure to pay the instalments, there was a termination of the contract, and the owner filed a suit, which was in substance one for delivery of the cinema projector and its accessories and, in case the delivery could not be obtained, for recovery of their value. There was a decree for delivery within a period of 14 days of the projector or in the alternative for the payment of Rs. 2,250 being the value of such a projector and its accessories. The defendants in the suit construed the decree as giving them an option to retain the projector on payment of Rs. 2,250 and, therefore, deposited the amount into Court. The plaintiff decree holder refused to accept it, and applied in execution for an order directing delivery of the projector. It was held that the defendant held the projector and its accessories in a fiduciary capacity and were trustees within the meaning of section 11(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. It was held also chat the defendants were under a duty to deliver the article to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was entitled to such order for delivery in his favour. That was a case where there was a termination of the contract within the period during which the price was payable in instalments. In the present case the price had not been fully paid there was a small balance representing the last instalment due. In such a case, under the agreement between the parties, the property in the machinery did not pass until the last instalment was paid and. therefore, the plaintiff continued to be the owner of the property. 12. The present case is an action in trover. In such a case, under the agreement between the parties, the property in the machinery did not pass until the last instalment was paid and. therefore, the plaintiff continued to be the owner of the property. 12. The present case is an action in trover. To maintain an action in trover, the plaintiff must establish that he had title to the goods in question and hat he was entitled to possession thereof when he called upon the defendants to deliver possession See L.J. Leach and Company Ltd v, Jardine Skinner and Co1, It is not in dispute that in this case the property in the goods did not pass to the defendants on account of the non-payment of all the instalments as provided by the agreements. 13. The Privy Council in L. P. S. Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen and others2, has construed the scope and content of the word “conversion” occurring in Article 68 In that case there was an agreement granting a mining lease in favour of the appellant over an area called “Pathar-garda”. The lease contemplated an additional area in Gaurigram being also granted. However, there was no actual agreement in respect of Gaurigram. The lessee granted a sub lease and the sub-lessee continued the working even in Gaurigram. Another party, who had obtained a lease of Gaurigram, filed a suit against the sublessee, the appellant before the Privy Council, for damages for conversion of coal raised by him from Gaurigram. The fact that the sublessee carried on mining in Gaurigram bona fide was not in dispute. The question was whether Article 48 or Article 49 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, corresponding Articles 68 and 69 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would apply. The contention was that Article 48 did not apply, because, the conversion was not dishonest. At page 101 of the judgment the Privy Council held that, whether the conversion was innocent or dishonest, it was nevertheless a conversion falling within the scope of Article 48 in that case or Article 68 of the present Act. This decision was followed in Adjal Coal Company, Limited v. panna Lal Ghose and Others1. 14. Article 69 applies only to suit in respect of “other specific moveable property”. This decision was followed in Adjal Coal Company, Limited v. panna Lal Ghose and Others1. 14. Article 69 applies only to suit in respect of “other specific moveable property”. Reading Articles 68 and 69 together, it is clear that Article 69 would apply to a suit for recovery of specific movable property, which is other than the specific movable property described in Article 68. Specific movable property described in Article ‘9 must be the property, which is not lost to the owner as a result of theft, dishonest misappropriation, or conversion. See K. R. Talyrokhan. Gangadas Dwarkadas and others2. This decision has been approved by the Supreme Court in K.S. Nanji and Company v. Jatashanker Dossa and others3. Thus, this is a case where it cannot fall within Article 69, because it is a case of conversion falling within Article 68. 15. Construing the corresponding Article under the Indian Limitation Act . 1908, viz., Article 48, the Bombay High Court in K.M. Talyarkhan v. Gangadas Dwarkadas and others4, has held that in cases where there has been successive conversions of the same property by different persons, each of these conversions gives rise to an independent cause of action, and that the barring of one of them by the statute of limitation has no effect on the others and that this is so because of the fact that the effect of the law of limitation in respect of injuries to movable property is merely to destroy the plaintiff's right of action but not to divest him of his ownership in the property. The last column of the entry relating to the Article 68 in the Limitation Act describes the starting point of limitation as “when the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is.” 16. In the present case, there is evidence to show that the plaintiff became aware of the sale of the machinery contrary to the terms of the agreements, as early as 21st February, 1968. In the light of the decision of the Bombay High Court in K.M. Talyarkhan v. Gangadas Dwarkadas and others1, it would have been open to the plaintiff to describe as to when the successive transfers took place and if the last of the transfers was within the period of limitation, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recovery of the machineries under Article 68. Unfortunately the plaint does not contain any allegation about the dates on which the successive transfers have taken place. The suit itself came to be filed in September, 1972. When the plaintiff became aware of the transfer of the machinery even in February, 1968, the period of three years would expire by 20th February, 1971. The suit has been filed along after that date and it is clearly barred. 17. It is indeed unfortunate that the plea of limitation taken up in this case has to be upheld. But there is no answer to this plea. It is deplorable that the hire-purchaser of the machinery is in a possion to walk away the good without paying one of the instalments. If only the plaintiff-Corporation had been a little more vigilant, it would not have had to suffer from the effect of the plea of limitation. Even in February, 1968, it threatened to take criminal proceedings. Unfortunately it stopped with the threat and did not take appropriate action within the time allowed under the law. 18. The result in that the suit has to fail and the decree passed by the Court below has to be set aside. In view of the fact that the defendants are guilty of conversion of the machineries, I can only direct that they should bear the costs both in this Court as well as in the Court below. The result is the suit will stand dismissed with no order as to costs throughout. The appeal is allowed accordingly. R.S. ----- Appeal allowed.