ORDER A.N. Varma, J. -This is a tenant's petition directed against two orders dated 3-5-1979 and 4-4-1978 passed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 decreeing the suit for the eviction of the petitioner from an accommodation of a godown. 2. These are the relevant facts. The respondent No. 3 as the landlord of the petitioner filed a suit for the ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of default. In the summons issued to the petitioner on 28-2-75, "16-4-75" was fixed for the final disposal of the suit. In response to the summons, the petitioner put in appearance and deposited certain sums of money in court along with an application (paper No. 7-C) purporting to be under S. 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972). It was prayed in the application that the petitioner having deposited the entire damages and costs etc. as contemplated under S. 20 (4). the suit of the respondent No. 3 be dismissed. 3. "14-5-75" was fixed for the disposal of the above application. The application was dismissed on 15-5-76 with the finding that the deposit made by the petitioner was insufficient, that is, it did not cover the entire amount which was required to be deposited under S. 20 (4) of the aforesaid Act. Thereafter, a few dates were fixed for the disposal of the suit on merits-On 31-5-76, the petitioner made another application (paper No. 14/C) to the effect that he bad deposited the remaining amount and that, therefore, the benefit of Section 20 (4) be given to him. Yet another application to the same effect was moved on 1-6-1976. These applications too were dismissed by the court by an order dated 14-7-76 on the ground that the entire amounts envisaged by sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, had not been deposited by the petitioner on the date of the first hearing of the suit. The petitioner filed a Revision against this order before the learned District Judge, who passed an order dated 15-6-76 (sic) upholding the order passed by the court of first instance, namely, the Judge Small Causes. The petitioner filed a Revision against this order before the learned District Judge, who passed an order dated 15-6-76 (sic) upholding the order passed by the court of first instance, namely, the Judge Small Causes. The attempt of the petitioner to have the suit dismissed under Section 20 (4) of the Act having failed, the suit proceeded on merits and was decreed by the learned Judge Small Causes on 7-7-1977. 4. The petitioner went up in revision against this order. The Revisional Court by the order dated 26-8-1977 allowed the Revision and remanded the case to the court of first instance on the ground that proper issues had not been framed. The suit was again decreed on 1-12-1977. The petitioner yet again took the matter in revision and again by the order 4-3-1978, the Revision was allowed and the case decreed still again by a judgment and decree dated 4-4-78 by the learned Judge Small Causes. The petitioner challenged the decree by a Revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. The Revision has been dismissed by the learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Allahabad by a judgment and decree dated 3-5-1979. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decrees dated 4-4-1978 and 3-5-1979, the petitioner has filed this petition. He has prayed that those orders be quashed. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that there are no merits in this writ petition, and that the view taken by the courts below on the various issues involved is correct. 7. He has prayed that those orders be quashed. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that there are no merits in this writ petition, and that the view taken by the courts below on the various issues involved is correct. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted the following points for my consideration:- (1) The petitioner having deposited the entire amount required to be deposited under S. 20 (4) on 10-10-1977, which was the first date fixed for the hearing of the suit after the remand of the suit, the petitioner ought to be held to have complied with the provision of S. 20 (4) of the Act and the courts below have erred in law in taking the view that the date fixed for the hearing of the suit after the remand order dated 26-8-1977 could not be regarded as the date of the first hearing of the suit within the meaning of S. 20 (4) of the Act; (2) The notice served upon the petitioner by respondent No. 3 was invalid and it could not be held to have determined the tenancy of the petitioner under S. 106 of the T. P. Act; and (3) The order passed by the trial court dated 14-7-76 as affirmed in revision on 15-6-76, could not legally operate as res judicata against the petitioner as a bar to the plea of the petitioner that as a result of the deposit made by him on 10-10-1977, the petitioner must be deemed to have complied with the provisions of Section 20 (4) of the Act. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I have no doubt that there is no substance in the first two points urged by the counsel for the petitioner. It is obvious that if the first two points are answered against the petitioner, the third point would become a matter of academic importance having no bearing on the ultimate result of the case. 9. I shall take up the first point first. It is obvious that if the first two points are answered against the petitioner, the third point would become a matter of academic importance having no bearing on the ultimate result of the case. 9. I shall take up the first point first. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the first instance, the date of the first hearing was "16-4-75"; nor was it disputed by counsel for the petitioner that if his contention that "10-7-76" was the date of first hearing in the suit was not accepted, the question whether the petitioner had made the deposit as contemplated by S. 20 (4) of the Act on or before the date of hearing, that is, "15-4-75" stands concluded by the decision of the trial court dated 14-7-76 as affirmed in Revision by the aforesaid order dated 15-9-76. 10. The contention of the petitioner's counsel, however, was that when petitioners Revision was allowed, the decree passed' by the trial court dated 7-7-1977 was set aside, and the case was remanded to the court of the first instance, the entire proceedings in the suit which had taken place up to the passing of the decree dated 7-7-1977 must be deemed to have been wiped out, and consequently, it must follow as a corollary that 16-4-75 ceased to be the date of first hearing. Elucidating the argument, learned counsel contended that the previous proceedings having been wiped out, the first date fixed for the hearing of the suit after the remand, namely, 10-10-1977 must be deemed to be the date of the first hearing of the suit within the meaning of S. 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 11. Having given the matter my best consideration, I find it difficult to accept the above proposition. On the contrary, 1 find myself in complete agreement with the view expressed by the learned District Judge that the date of the first hearing of the suit was "16-4-75", and that the fact that the decree of the trial court was set aside in Revision, and the suit was remanded to the court of first instance, did not detract from that fact. 12. 12. In support of his contention, counsel placed reliance on two decisions of this Court, namely, Krishan Lal v. Lala Narendra Kumar (1978 All LR 798): (1978 All LJ 1102) and Gobardhan Ram v. Banarsi Ram ( AIR 1957 All 805 ). In my opinion, neither of these two cases lends any support to the broad proposition canvassed by counsel for the petitioner. In the case of Krishan Lal (supra), a learned Judge of this Court held that where an ex parte decree obtained by the landlord was set aside on the ground that the defendants had had no notice of the suit, the first date of hearing of the suit was not the date mentioned in summons, but it would be the first date of hearing fixed after setting aside the ex parte decree. The statement of the law in this case is, with respect, entirely unexceptionable, but it has no application to the facts of the present case. 13. There can be little doubt that where the finding is that the defendant was not served with the summons of the suit, the date mentioned in the summons as the first date of hearing, cannot possibly be regarded as the date of first hearing of the suit, and that in such an eventuality, the first hearing of the suit would be the date fixed for the hearing of the suit after the setting aside of the ex parte decree. The non-service of the summons must necessarily lead to the above inference. For, in a case where the defendant is not served with summons of the suit, it must follow as a legal fiction that no date was fixed in the summons as the first bearing of the suit. The decision cited by the learned counsel is thus clearly distinguishable. 14. The case reported in AIR 1957 All 805 is equally distinguishable. In that case, a learned Judge of this Court was construing the provisions of Art. 164 of the old Limitation Act. The learned Judge held that where there was no interruption in the hearing of the suit, the word "summons" in Art. 164 of the old Limitation Act must be deemed to refer to the summons issued in the first instance. The learned Judge held that where there was no interruption in the hearing of the suit, the word "summons" in Art. 164 of the old Limitation Act must be deemed to refer to the summons issued in the first instance. However, if there was an interruption in the hearing of the suit, on account of an order of stay passed by a superior court, the first hearing in the case would the first date on which the hearing of the case was resumed after the cessation of the stay order. Counsel for the petitioner laid considerable emphasis on the following observations'" appearing on page 809 of the Report:- "But in case there is any interruption by a stay order, the court in my opinion, has again to give notice of the date of hearing after the case is again restarted and that would also be in one sense the first date of hearing." This decision affords no assistance in resolving the controversy. The learned Judge was called upon to construe a provision which was entirely different in content and scope from those with which am concerned. The contextual setting is also completely different. S. 20 (4) of the Act confers a special benefit. It affords a privilege or an opportunity to a tenant of saving himself from the liability to be evicted on the ground of default under S. 20 (2) (a) of the Act. It provides that the tenant who has committed a default may avoid the consequences of evidence by depositing in the court on the very first date of hearing of the suit the various amounts mentioned in S. 20 (4) of the Act. In short, it gives the tenant one last chance to save himself from the liability to be evicted. That being so, I find no ground, for holding that the first date for hearing after remand of the case shall be the first date of hearing. 15. It is settled law that though the words employed in two statutes may be die same or identical, their construction need not necessarily be the same. For the words used derive their true meaning and concept from the context in which those words appear in a particular statute. 15. It is settled law that though the words employed in two statutes may be die same or identical, their construction need not necessarily be the same. For the words used derive their true meaning and concept from the context in which those words appear in a particular statute. In Metalware and Company v. Bansilal Sarma ( (1979) 3 SCC 398 ): ( AIR 1979 SC 1559 ), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus at page 406 of the Report:- "That particular observation on which strong reliance was placed by counsel for the respondent will have to be read in the context of scheme of Mysore Rent Control Act. Counsel for the respondent attempted to argue that purely on question of construction the identical words occurring in the two Acts should receive the same construction and it must be held that under S. 14 (1) (b) of the Act, it is not necessary for the landlord to establish that the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. It is not possible to accept this contention for the simple reason that though the words employed in two enactments may be the same or identical their construction may not be the same and would vary depending upon other cognate provision and the scheme of each enactment." 16. The context in which the words "at file first hearing of the suit" occurring in S. 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is entirely different from the context of similar words used in Article 164 of the old Limitation Act. This Court would, therefore, not be justified in applying the observations made in the case of Gobardhan Ram v. Banarsi Ram ( AIR 1957 All 805 ) (supra) in construing the provisions of S- 20 (4) of the Act. 17. In my judgment, the words "at the first hearing of the suit" have a definite and fixed meaning and concept. They must be held to refer to only one date which is fixed for the hearing of the suit, the date being one on which the Court applies its mind for the first time to the facts of the case as held by this Court in the case of Krishan Lal v. Lala Narendra Kumar (1978 All LJ 1102) (supra). They must be held to refer to only one date which is fixed for the hearing of the suit, the date being one on which the Court applies its mind for the first time to the facts of the case as held by this Court in the case of Krishan Lal v. Lala Narendra Kumar (1978 All LJ 1102) (supra). I find absolutely no warrant either on the plain language of the statute or even in the scheme underlying it for holding that the date of the first hearing of the suit is the date which is fixed for the hearing of the suit after the remand. In my opinion, it would be highly confusing, rendering compliance with S. 20 (4) of the Act difficult ' and impracticable if it were held that the date of the first hearing of the suit is capable of varying with the fluctuating course and fortunes of the litigation, I agree with the learned District Judge that the first date fixed for hearing in a case after remand may be the date of first hearing in a technical sense for the purpose of adjudication of rights which are the subject matter of suit, but it cannot be the first date of hearing within the meaning of S. 20 (4) of U. P. No. XIII of 1972. I, therefore, find no substance in the first point urged on behalf of the petitioner. 18. Coming to the next point, the contention of counsel for the petitioner was that the notice dated 16-9-1974 (vide Annexure "8" to the writ petition) merely asked the petitioner to vacate the accommodation and was, therefore, neither a proper notice under S. 106 of the T. P. Act, nor even a notice to quit as contemplated by S. Ill (h). Counsel placed reliance on three decisions of this Court in support of his submission. Having given the matter my anxious consideration, I have no doubt that there is no substance in this point either reading the notice as a whole, I have no doubt that the notice in question does determine the tenancy of the petitioner under cl. (h) of S. Ill of the Act. In my judgment, it is a notice which unequivocally determines the lease. If is clearly a notice to quit as envisaged under cl. (h) of S. 111. (h) of S. Ill of the Act. In my judgment, it is a notice which unequivocally determines the lease. If is clearly a notice to quit as envisaged under cl. (h) of S. 111. In the notice, it has been stated that the tenant had not paid the rent for the period beginning from 1-12-1965 till 31-8-1974. The lessor then asked the tenant to deposit the said arrears within a month of the receipt of the notice, and thereafter to vacate the accommodation and deliver up possession to the lessor .by 1st of Sept., 1974. The notice then goes on to state that if the petitioner did not deliver up possession to the landlord within the period of one month mentioned in the notice, the landlord would file a suit for recovery of arrears of rent as well as ejectment along with costs of the notice and of the suit. The notice further recited that the accommodation is also needed by the landlord for the growing needs of the landlord and the members of his family, in the end, it has been reiterated that the petitioner should vacate the accommodation and deliver up possession to the lessor, failing which the lessor would be constrained to institute appropriate proceedings for the eviction of the petitioner 19. Reading the notice as a whole, I am clearly of the view that it is a notice which validly determines the tenancy of the petitioner under cl. (h) of S. Ill of the T. P. Act. It is a plain and simple notice to quit within the meaning of S. Ill (h) of the Act. 20. In Abdul Jalil v. Hajt Abdul Talil ( AIR 1974 All 402 ): (1974 All LJ 381) a decision on which learned counsel for the petitioner himself laid considerable emphasis a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the validity of a notice purporting to determine the tenancy of a tenant. In that connection, the Division Bench after a very elaborate discussion of the subject of what constitutes a valid notice to determine a tenancy within the meaning of Sections 106 and 111 (h) of the T. P. Act laid down a large number of illustrations of various kinds of notices (see para. 10 of the Report). In the notice mentioned against cl. 10 of the Report). In the notice mentioned against cl. (F) of this para-, the words used are:- "You are given this notice to quit of vacate the premises on the expiry of 30 days from the date of service of this notice failing which suit for ejectment shall be filed against you." The Division Bench held such notice to be a valid one. It observed thus in para. 19 of the Reports:- "F. This is a simple notice to quit and as it satisfies the requirements of Section 106 as regards the time, it will validly determine the tenancy on the expiry of the period of notice under S. 111 (h)." The notice under consideration having been expressed in terms similar to those of Illustration F, is a valid notice under S. 111 (h), according to the above Division Bench decision of this Court. 21. Counsel, however, submitted that this Court has repeatedly held that a mere demand for possession cannot be treated as a valid notice. He placed reliance on the above Division Bench decision and urged that the present case is covered by Illustration G (See para. 10 of the Report) in the case of Abdul Jalil v. Haji Abdul Jalil (supra). Counsel also relied on the observations of this Court in the case reported in AIR 1963 All 581 : (1963 All LJ 567) and AIR 1972 All 155 : (1971 All LJ 799), both of which stress the same point, namely, that a mere demand of possession simpliciter cannot result in the determination of the tenancy. 22. In my opinion, these decisions too are of no assistance. For, the notice under consideration does not contain a mere demand for possession without more. As 1 have mentioned above, the notice under consideration clearly requires the tenant to vacate and deliver up possession to the lessor within thirty days of the notice, failing which, it states, the lessor would be constrained to file a suit for the ejectment of the petitioner. Such a notice is similar to the notice contemplated under Illustration F mentioned in the case of Abdul Jalil (1974 All LJ 381) (supra). It accords with requirements of S. 106 of the T. F. Act as regards the period. It will hence validly determine the tenancy on the expiry of the period of the notice under S. 1ll (h). 23. It accords with requirements of S. 106 of the T. F. Act as regards the period. It will hence validly determine the tenancy on the expiry of the period of the notice under S. 1ll (h). 23. Counsel for the respondents relying on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC 1745 urged that no notice either under S. 106 or S. Ill (h) was at all needed for determining the tenancy of the petitioner. He submitted that a notice of determination of the tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act was entirely unnecessary as the petitioner was liable to be evicted under the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, which obviates the necessity of determining the tenancy under the T. P. Act. This argument is founded upon the dictum of the Supreme Court in the decision cited above. The Supreme Court was considering the effect of the Rent Control Acts of the various other States vis-a-vis the provisions of the T. P. Act. As the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was not directly under consideration, I refrain from expressing any opinion on this argument. Indeed, in the view that I am taking as regards the validity of the notice, it is not necessary to consider the validity of that argument. 24. Coining to the third and last point, in view of my finding that the first date of hearing within the meaning of S. 20 (4) in the present case was "16-4-75" and not the first date fixed for the hearing of the suit after remand, that is, 10-10-1977 the question whether the decision of the trial court dated 14-7-1976 or of the Revisional Court dated 15-9-1976 (sic) operated as res judicata or not loses significance. I am, therefore, not expressing any opinion on this third and last point. The writ petition is liable to fail on my findings on the first two points alone. 25. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order fists. The petitioner is, however, three months time to vacate the accommodation in dispute.