JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - The Committee of Management and the Principal of the Janta Inter College, Fatehabad district Agra have filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In substance, the petitioners have challenged the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Agra directing single operation of the account in exercise of the power under the U.P. High School and Intermediate College (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act,'1971. The petitioners case, as set out in this petition, briefly is that Sri Virendra Kumar Tiwari, respondent No. 2 of the petition was a Laboratory Assistant (Peon), a Class IV employee of the college and he stopped coming to the College with effect from 15th July, 1976 and had gone to Delhi where he had taken up another job. Subsequently, Sri Tiwari, In all probability, due to some uncertainty of his continuation in employment at Delhi, started sending applications to the College praying for grant of casual leave, the last such application being for the period ending September 30, 1976, The Principal of the College informed Sri Tiwari that the leave was sanctioned but it would be leave without pay and he was further informed that in case he fails to report himself and join his duties in the College, it would be taken that he has no desire to serve the College any longer. Sri Tiwari not having reported for duty, the Principal of the College terminated his service by an order dated November 27, 1976 and a copy of this was also forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools. Thereupon in the vacancy caused due to termination of the services of Sri Tiwari, one Sri Shyam Murari Gupta was appointed as a Laboratory Assistant and that this appointment was duly approved by the District Inspector of Schools. It is further asserted by the petitioners that Sri Tiwari thereupon pressed for payment of his arrears of salary etc. and his entire dues were paid by a cheque dated 10th January, 1977, 2. Upon a representation then made by respondent No. 2 of the District Inspector of Schools, it appears that the District Inspector of Schools discussed the matter with the Principal of the College and ultimately by a letter dated September 17, 1977, he directed the Principal to permit Sri Tiwari to join his duties. Upon a representation then made by respondent No. 2 of the District Inspector of Schools, it appears that the District Inspector of Schools discussed the matter with the Principal of the College and ultimately by a letter dated September 17, 1977, he directed the Principal to permit Sri Tiwari to join his duties. In this letter, the District Inspector of Schools stated that the proceedings for determining Sri Ttwari's services were unconstitutional and contrary to rules. The Principal of the College re-asserted that Sri Tiwari h id abandoned his service and was not interested to join the college and it was in these circumstances that in his place Sri Shyam Murari Gupta had been appointed. The District inspector of School thereupon by letter dated October 11, 1977 informed the respondent No. 2 of the stand taken by the College and he was further informed by this letter that in accordance with Regulation 31 as applicable to Class IV employees, framed under Section 19-G of the Intermediate Education Act, he as entitled to file an appeal to the Manager against the decision of the Principal and in case he was aggrieved against the decision of the Manager, he could appeal against his decision to the District Inspector of Schools Thereupon the respondent No. 2 who was a member of U.P. Non-teaching Employees Parishad, got his matter represented through the Parishad. A notice was sent by the Parishad to the Manager of the College a also to the District inspector of Schools that in case respondent No. 2 was not permitted to join his duties then hunger strike would be resorted to in front of the office of the District Inspector of School, it is" alleged that a though the Principal and Manager of the College went to meet the District Inspector of Schools on their being so asked to do so but he .was reported to be not available and apparently, was subjected to some Gherao. A press statement dated November 4, 1977 was also Issued by the Principal of the College to the effect that Sri Tiwari was on illegal hunger strike without any reason. In this statement, It was stated that Sri Tiwari had been repeatedly asked by the Principal to come and join and it was only when he failed to do so that Sri Shyam Murari Gupta had been. appointed in his place. 3. In this statement, It was stated that Sri Tiwari had been repeatedly asked by the Principal to come and join and it was only when he failed to do so that Sri Shyam Murari Gupta had been. appointed in his place. 3. Ultimately the District Inspector of Schools by his letter dated November 7, 1977 wrote to the Principal of the College that by his earlier letter dated September 17, 1977, he had already held that the College in not permitting the respondent No. 2 to join his duties had acted unconstitutionally and contrary to rules and it was accordingly being directed that a bill in regard to the salary due to respondent No. 2 be prepared and sent to his office. It was further stated that in case, it v,as not done within 15 days then it would be treated as a default of the management and then orders would be passed for single operation of the account as provided for in Section 5 of the U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. in reply to this on behalf of the Committee of Management a letter dated November 18, 1977 was written to the District Inspector of Schools. It was asserted in this reply that there were no arrears of salary due to the respondent No. 2 and that he had already been paid the dues in January 1977, a printed reference was made in this reply to the earlier letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated October 11, 1977 whereby it was pointed that the remedy of respondent No. 2 lay in tiling an appeal against the order of the Principal. Thereafter the District Inspector of Schools on 2-12-1977 passed an order directing single operation of the account. It was further directed in this order that the account would be operated under the signatures of Shri Ram Sukh Tripathi, an Associate District Inspectors of Schools who has been arrayed as respondent No. 3 to this petition. Thereupon the petitioner filed the present petition in this Court. 4. A counter-affidavit as also supplementary counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent No. 2 and another counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools, Agra. 5. Thereupon the petitioner filed the present petition in this Court. 4. A counter-affidavit as also supplementary counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent No. 2 and another counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools, Agra. 5. It has first been contended that the order of the District Inspector of Schools contained in his letter dated October 18, 1977 having been passed after considering the case of the Management as well as of the respondent No. 2, and no new circumstance having come into existence since then, except the notice of hunger strike, the District Inspector of Schools manifestly erred" in law In then passing another contrary order dated November 7, 1977, taking the view that the action of the Management in not permitting the respondent No. 2 to join his duties was unconstitutional and in violation of the rules. In other words, what has been submitted is that the District Inspector of Schools though earlier by his order dated 18-10-77 had apprised the respondent No. 2 that his remedy lay by way of an appeal to the Manager and thereafter if necessary an appeal to the District Inspector of Schools, there was no good ground taking different view in his letter dated 7-11-77 holding the action of the Management as being illegal. It has next been contended that before passing the order dated November 7, 1977,-the petitioner were entitled to an opportunity which they were not afforded. The order dated December 2, 1977 directing single operation of the account has been challenged firstly on the ground that it fails to record any reasons and, consequently, the order stands vitiated. Next it has been contended that the petitioners reply contained in the letter dated 18-11-77 to the District Inspector of Schools in reply to his letter dated 7th November, 1977, was not considered by him, before passing the order of single operation dated December 2, 1977 and this being so, the order directing single operation stood vitiated in law. 6. The primary question which requires decision is as to, whether the Management was in default, which could enable the District Inspector of Schools to pass an order directing single operation of the account. 6. The primary question which requires decision is as to, whether the Management was in default, which could enable the District Inspector of Schools to pass an order directing single operation of the account. This question in its turn depends upon the other question as to whether the Management could legally treat the respondent No. 2 as having ceased be an employee of the institution and as to whether his services stood legally terminated. 7. On behalf of the management, it has been asserted that the services of the respondent No. 2 had been terminated by an order of the Principal dated 27th November, 1976. The respondent No. 2 in his counter affidavit as denied the receipt of any order of termination and his case further is that this order as well as any entry made in relation thereto in the college registers etc. are all forged and fictitious. In his supplementary counter-affidavit, he has categorically stated that no notice terminating his services was ever issued and served upon him and that order of termination contained it the letter dated 27th November, 1976, Annexure IT to the the writ petition, nothing but a forgery and mere fabrication. Receipt of the copy of this order is also denied in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the District-Inspector of Schools. "' In this counter affidavit, various circumstances have been pointed out casting doubt as to whether t: is letter dated 27th November, 1976 was ever sent. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 has emphasised the fact that it war. inconceivable that the order terminating the services of the respondent No. 2. would have been sent under certificate of posting when other letters of less significance and even of no significance were considered necessary to send by registered post. He has further pointed out to us that a mention of this order of termination is significantly absent. In the press statement dated 4-11-1977 made by the Principal. Further, it finds no mention in the reply of the management dated 18-11-1977 sent to the notice of the District Inspector of Schools dated 7-11-1977. It has been asserted by the learned counsel that the only explanation to this omission can be that, in fact, order dated 27-11-1976 was never issued. Further, it finds no mention in the reply of the management dated 18-11-1977 sent to the notice of the District Inspector of Schools dated 7-11-1977. It has been asserted by the learned counsel that the only explanation to this omission can be that, in fact, order dated 27-11-1976 was never issued. During the course of the hearing, we became inclined to peruse the records of the College, namely, the despatch register etc., in order to satisfy ourselves as to whether such an order was, in fact, sent. Having perused the same and having heard learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that in the circumstances of the case, if would not be expedient for us in these proceedings to record any definite finding on this issue. We, therefore, decided to proceed on the assumption as if the order of termination dated 27-11-1976 was, in fact, sent out by the Principal under certificate of posting. 8. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether this termination order became effective against the respondent No. 2., In State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, ( AIR 1966 SC 1313 ) it was held that an order of dismissal could , not take unless it was communicated to the employee concerned or was otherwise published. This principle was again reiterated the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, ( AIR 1969 SC 180 ) and it Was observed thus: "The termination of employment by an order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is intimated to the employee." After applying the above-noted test as laid down in the earlier case, the Supreme Court again in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, ( AIR 1977 SC 629 ) took the same view, namely, in the case of dismissal or the like the order becomes elective only after it is received by the officer concerned. 9. Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, we find (hat the order of termination dated 27-11-1976 even if assumed to have been sent under certificate of posting, as is the case of the management, then too, it has not been shown or proved that the respondent No. 2 ever received the same. No presumption, in law can be attached to the receipt by the addressee of the letter sent under certificate of posting. No presumption, in law can be attached to the receipt by the addressee of the letter sent under certificate of posting. On the contrary, as we have noticed above, the respondent No. 2 has categorically denied the receipt of any such order. Even the District Inspector of Schools has denied the receipt of the copy of this order alleged to have been sent to . him. Hence in our opinion, the alleged order, of termination dated 27-11-1976 never became effective and as such it cannot be said that the services of the respondent No. 2 stood determined. The respondent No. 2 accordingly continued to be an employee of the college In the absence of any valid termination of his services. 10. In regard 10 the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 that the services of respondent No. 2 could not have been terminated except with the approval of the District Inspector of Schools, it appears unnecessary to us to go into this question upon the view taken by us above that the order of termination never became effective against the respondent No. 2 and he continued in service of the College. 11. We are, hence, unable to find any manifest error of law in the view taken by the District Inspector of Schools in his communication dated September 17, 1977, I hat the action of the management, in not permitting the respondent No. 2 to join his duties and treating respondent No, 2 as having ceased to be in the service of the College, was illegal. 12. As regards the question as to whether the management was entitled to any further opportunity before -the order dated 7-11-1977 was passed, we find that the material facts were available before the District Inspector of Schools. What is noteworthy is that management at no stage whispered about the order of termination dated 27-11-1976, the other facts regarding the alleged abandonment or service by respondent No. 2 were already before him. In these circumstances, thereof no other opportunity appears to have been called for. What is noteworthy is that management at no stage whispered about the order of termination dated 27-11-1976, the other facts regarding the alleged abandonment or service by respondent No. 2 were already before him. In these circumstances, thereof no other opportunity appears to have been called for. Further, the order dated 7-11-1977 was a direction directing the Management to prepare the bill of arrears of salary due to respondent No. 2 and to forward the same to the District Inspector of Schools and it was in this communication that a reference was made to the already recorded earlier view about the illegality of the Managements action, in the order of District Inspector of Schools dated 17-9-1977. We are unable to find any lack of jurisdiction or infirmity in procedure, in sending of the communication order dated 7-11-1977 by the District Inspector of Schools. 13. The order dated December 2, 1977 passed by the District Inspector of Schools directing single operation was passed, after reply of the Management to the communication order dated November 7, 1977 had been sent by the Management on November 18, 1977. It is noteworthy that the Management in this reply mainly based their case on the earlier order dated October 11, 1977. No reference was made in this reply to the order of termination dated 27-11-1976. It cannot thus be said that opportunity was given to the Management before passing the impugned order dated 2-12-1977. 14. We are also unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order dated December 2, 1977 stands vitiated for want of reasons given in the order. Firstly, in the nature of proceedings contemplated by Section 5 of U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 the order which may be passed directing single operation is not an order which, in our view, may require detailed reasons as such. What is required is that the order passed after due application of mind and after giving opportunity to the management to have its say in the matter. What is required is that the order passed after due application of mind and after giving opportunity to the management to have its say in the matter. The order dated December 2, 1977 when read with the communication order, dated November 7, 1977 which in its turn refers to the earlier view taken by the District Inspector of Schools on September 17, 1977, clearly indicated the default of the Management, which is the reason for the order directing single operation. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the order dated December 2, 1977 was passed without application of mind;- We arc, hence unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel. No other infirmity was pointed out by the learned counsel in this order. 15. The writ petition, hence, fails and is dismissed with costs to the contesting respondents.