( 1 ) IN this petition under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the validity of the resolution dated 2-11-1974' passed by the Regional Transport Authority, shimoga, in subject No. 41/74-75 and also the order passed by the, Karna- taka State Transport Appellate Tribunal, bangalore, in appeal No. 241/75, dated 17-4-1976. ( 2 ) ONE Sri II. V. Rajgopal filed an application for grant of a stage carriage permit on the route from Coonda- pur to Shimoga via. Basur, Kondlur, siddapura, Hosanagadi, Kunchakal, abbipower Project area, Yedur, thirthahalli and Mandagadde; the application was signed by the said H, v. Rajagopal only. However, the name of the petitioner was also mentioned in the body of the application as one of the applicants. But, it is not in dispute that the petitioner has not signed the application. This defect was not noticed and the application was published and the objections were received. After receiving the objections and complying with all the procedural requirements, the R. T. A. heard the matter and resolved to reject the application in view of the rejection of another application filed by the petitioner alone on the identical route. ( 3 ) AFTER the rejection of the application and before the filing of the appeal, the aforesaid H. V. , Rajagopal expired and his legal representatives were not interested in the permit; therefore, they did not join the petitioner in preferring the appeal. The appellate authority has held that though the application was not signed by the petitioner, but this defect was not noticed by the R. T. A. and no objection was also raised by any of the objectors and the petitioner himself had produced, a solvency certificate, thus the entire proceeding haying been proceeded with on the basis that the application was filed by the petitioner and H. V. Rajagopal, the petitioner must be deemed to have filed, the application. Accordingly, the k. S. T. A. T. has rejected the contention of the respondents in this regard, Further, on the merits of the case, the appellate authority on consideration of the material on record and also on taking into consideration of the finding recorded by the Tribunal in respect of the same route in, appeal No. 340 (72 and also in, view of the rejection of the similar application filed by the United Roadways, few days prior to the filing of the application in question, came to the conclusion that there was no need for granting the permit on the route in question. Accordingly, the appellate authority has rejected the appeal. ( 4 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the appellate authority was not right in holding that there was no 'need in as much as there was no direct service from coondapur to Shimoga and the application of the petitioner which was rejected long prior to the filing of the present application and subsequent to the rejection of that application, the traffic has increased in the route; hence, it was contended that the authorities below ought not to. have made that as a ground for rejecting the present application. ( 5 ) SRI M. Rangaswamy, the learned counsel appearing for the 6th respondent, contended that the petitioner cannot be considered to be an applicant as he has not signed the application as sucn he cannot maintain the writ petition; that the finding recorded by the appellate authority that there is no need being a finding of fact, the same is not liable to be interferred with. ( 6 ) HAVING regard to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents, the questions that arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the petitioner can be said to be an applicant for grant of a stage carriage permit in respect of the route in question; (ii) Whether the order passed by the appellate authority is liable to. be interfered with. ( 7 ) THE, application for grant of a stage carriage permit is required to be made under Sec. 46 of the Motor Vehicles act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). be interfered with. ( 7 ) THE, application for grant of a stage carriage permit is required to be made under Sec. 46 of the Motor Vehicles act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The said section provides that an application for a permit in respect of a service of stage carriage shall, as far as may be, contain the particulars mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) thereof and also such other particulars as may be prescribed. As per Sec. 2 (21) of the Act, ''prescribea means prescribed by Rules made under the Act. Rule 103 of the Karnataka motor Vehicles Rules 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) provides that every application for the grant of renewal or counter-signature oi a transport vehicle permit shall be made in one of the prescrioed 'forms. Form No. 49 is the form prescribed for making an application for grant of a stage carriage permit. Rule 102 of the Rules provides that every application for the grant of a stage carriage shall be in the prescribed form and shall be accompanied by a solvency certificate issued by an officer of the revenue Department. Form No. 49 required the applicant to set out several particulars and it should be under the signature or thumb impression of the applicant. Para 18 in Form no. 49 further provides for the declaration tc be made by the applicant which is as follows:"i hereby declare that the above statements are true and further agree that they and all such provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and of all such rules made thereunder, in relation to permits shall be the conditions of the permit issued to me. "thus, the application for grant of a stage carriage permit is required to be made in the prescribed form under the signature or thumb impression of the applicant containing the declaration that the statements made in the application are true and further agreeing that the statements made in the application and all such provisions or the Act and the Rules made thereunder, in relation to the permit sought for shall be conditions of the permit issued to him. That being so, the application made in the name of the petitioner and another person (late H. V. Rajagopal) without the signature of the petitioner cannot be said to be an application made by the petitioner. That being so, the application made in the name of the petitioner and another person (late H. V. Rajagopal) without the signature of the petitioner cannot be said to be an application made by the petitioner. It is not the cate of the petitioner that there was a patnership between him and the late h. V. Rajagopal for running the stage carriage service in question; therefore, signing of the application, by late H. V. Rajagopal was also for and on behalf of the petitioner. In the absence of any such partnership, the application made in the name of late h. V. Rajagopal and the petitioner was required to be signed by both the persons. It was necessary for the petitioner to sign the application along with late H. V. Rajagopal. As the petitioner has not signed the applicarion made for grant of a, stage carriage permit in question, such an application cannot be said to have been made by the petitioner even though his name is found in the column meant for mentioning the name of the applicant. Thus, the petitioner cannot be considered to be the applicant for grant of a permit in question. Therefore, the mere fact that there was no obection raised by the objectors in this regard and the R. T. A. also did not notice the defect which goes to the very root of the matter and the fact that a solvency certificate was furnished in the case by the petitioner, do not in any way, cure the defect that was found in the application. The application itself was not filed by the petitioner. A mere filing of a solvency certificate cannot cure the defect in the application. Therefore, the finding recorded by the appellate authority that even though the petitioner had not signed the application along with the late, H. V. Rajagopal, nevertheless, he should, be treated as one of the applicants having made the application along with the late H. V. Rajagopal cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid conclusion of mine is sufficient to dismiss this writ. petition. However, the learned Counsel has argued on the merits of the case also; therefore, I will deal with the second question raised in the case. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid conclusion of mine is sufficient to dismiss this writ. petition. However, the learned Counsel has argued on the merits of the case also; therefore, I will deal with the second question raised in the case. It is true; that the original authority has not referred to the material placed before it and has simply rejected the application, filed by the late H. V. Rajar gopal on the ground that the previous- application filed by the petitioner in respect of the same route was rejected by the R. T. A; whereas the appellate) authority has taken into considers tion all the material placed before it and it has come to the conclusion that there were about 10 services operating on the route with a slight deviation in the route. Further, 5 months prior to the filing of the application in question, another application filed by the petitioner for the identical route was rejected. Not only this, another application of the United Roadways filed in respect of the same route was also rejected. Taking into consideration all these facts and also the material on record, a finding has been recorded by the appellate authority stating that the need for introducing the service in question has not been established. This finding is essentially a finding of fact. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the fact that there are 10 services will not be of much consequence inasmuch as all those ten services are not on the identical route in question as there is a slight deviation. The fact that the application filed by the petitioner in respect of the same route about a few mouths earlier to the proceeding in question, and also that of the United roadways in respect of the same route, were rejected is sufficient to sustain the finding recorded by the appellate authority that at the time when the application in question was decided, there was no need for introducing the set vices in question. When the statutory authority has taken into consideration all the material placed before it and has arrived at a con- clusion and that conclusion is not shown to be either palpably erroneous or arbitrary or unreasonable, this court will not in exercise of its jurisction under Arts. When the statutory authority has taken into consideration all the material placed before it and has arrived at a con- clusion and that conclusion is not shown to be either palpably erroneous or arbitrary or unreasonable, this court will not in exercise of its jurisction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the constitution, embark upon the re- appreciation of the evidence on record and arrive at a different conclusion. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I do not see any ground to interfere with the order of the appellate authority. Accordingly, this writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. --- *** --- .