Judgment :- 1. A kudikidappukaran is the appellant in both the second appeals. O.S. No 145 of 1968 was filed against him and another by the landlord for a permanent injunction restraining them from trespassing into the plaint 'A' schedule property and from putting up any new structures therein. O.S. No. 56 of 1969 was filed by him for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff in the earlier suit from trespassing into the property where his kudikidappu stood and from putting up any new structures therein In this judgment, the parties will hereafter be referred to according to their rank in O.S. No. 145 of 1968. 2. During the trial, it was noted that a pit latrine in the property was converted by the defendant into an E.S.P. type. Therefore, in O S. No. 145 of 1968 no injunction was granted to restrain him from converting the pit latrine into E.S.P. type, but he was restrained from putting up any new structures in the property. In OS. No. 56 of 1969 an injunction decree was given restraining the plaintiff from interfering with the amenities enjoyed by the defendant in item (2) in the plaint schedule therein. The plaintiff was however allowed to construct structures in the vacant space without interfering with the defendants' use and enjoyment of the structures described in item (2). 3. The plaintiff appealed. The appellate Court granted an injunction to him restraining the defendants from entering into the plaint schedule property or otherwise interfering with the right of possession of the plaintiff, subject to the rights of the defendants to possess and enjoy the extent adjoining the kudikidappu which they were entitled to purchase under the Act. O.S. No. 56 of 1979 was virtually dismissed. The appeals were therefor disposed of in effect in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant has come up in appeal. 4. The appeals were disposed of by the appellate Court by a common judgment. Since practically the same question is involved in these second appeals, I am disposing of the second appeals by a common judgment. 5. The property in dispute is a land over which there is admittedly the kudikidappu of the defendant. It is within a Municipality. A kudikidappukaran in a Municipality will be entitled only to 3 cents of land if an application is made under S.80A of the Land Reforms Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 5. The property in dispute is a land over which there is admittedly the kudikidappu of the defendant. It is within a Municipality. A kudikidappukaran in a Municipality will be entitled only to 3 cents of land if an application is made under S.80A of the Land Reforms Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. No such application has been made so far. Injunction is sought in respect of land, more than 10 cents in extent, (though shown as 7 cents in the plaint). The defendant has constructed a 'madappura' (bath room) and has put up a washing stone. What he now wants is an exclusive right to use the additional land; There is no dispute about title. His claim appears to be rested on S.79 A of the Act. For a proper consideration of the dispute involved, it will be useful to understand the scheme of the Act vis-a-vis the rights of the kudikidappukaran. S.75 to 80-0 deal with the rights and liabilities of kudikidappukaran. The Act confers rights on them which they do not have under the general law. They are given protection from eviction from their kudikidappu. They are given right to purchase the rights of the owner of the land (10 cents and 3 cents depending upon the locality where the building is situated). S.79A confers certain other rights on them. This case deals with the rights conferred under S.79-A. 6. From the pleadings it has to be assumed that the right claimed is rested on S.79A (1) read with the Explanation, which reads: 79A. Customary and other rights of Kudikidappukaran (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, or in any contract, or in any judgment, decree or order of Court, the kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to all rights accrued to him by custom, usage or agreement and which he was enjoying immediately before the commencement of this Act. Explanation. Customary and other rights of Kudikidappukaran (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, or in any contract, or in any judgment, decree or order of Court, the kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to all rights accrued to him by custom, usage or agreement and which he was enjoying immediately before the commencement of this Act. Explanation. For the purpose of this section, enjoyment of any benefit or concession for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to be enjoyment of a right accrued to the kudikidappukaran by custom, usage or agreement." On a combined reading of the section with the Explanation it is clear that a kudikidappukaran can claim any benefit or concession which he had been enjoying for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the commencement of the Act as though the rights have accrued to him by custom, usage or agreement. S 79 A(2) confers on him in addition to what is contained in S.79A(1) the rights of a dominant owner to claim the right of easement. In other words, if the kudikidappukaran had been enjoying a right of easement over the adjoining land either of the landlord or of the adjacent owner, he will be entitled to that right, provided he establishes it. I may at once say that in this case there is neither any plea nor any proof of a right which the defendant had acquired by easement. S.79A (3) and (4) confer on him the right to draw electric supply line and water supply line for domestic consumption and use. Disturbance of right conferred under S.79A(I) and (2) is made punishable under S.117A of the Act. The claim now put forward appears to be that the defendant is entitled to use the "Madappura" and 'washing stone'. If the suit had been so laid, there would not have been any difficulty. Whether the use of the 'Madappura' and the 'washing stone' is an amenity or not has not been considered by the Courts below for the obvious reason that such a case was not specifically raised. There is no allegation that the plaintiff is interfering with the right to use these. The difficulty arises when the right to use these structures and the additional property to the exclusion of the plaintiff is claimed under S.79A (1). There is no allegation that the plaintiff is interfering with the right to use these. The difficulty arises when the right to use these structures and the additional property to the exclusion of the plaintiff is claimed under S.79A (1). S 79A(1) deals with accrual of rights by custom, usage or agreement. No agreement is pleaded; nor is any custom pleaded much less proved. The plea therefore has to be understood in the context of the accrual of right by usage. It is true that there is evidence in the case to show that the appellant had been in possession of the property for more than 20 years. But such evidence will not be sufficient to bring the use within the expression 'accrual of right by usage'. Usage cannot be equated with user. Both are distinct. Their legal concepts are also different. Usage is something akin to custom and has to be understood ejusdem generis with custom. In the Black's Law Dictionary, usage is defined thus: "Usage. A reasonable and lawful public custom in a locality concerning a particular transaction which is either known to the parties, or so well established, general, and uniform that they must be presumed to have acted with reference thereto. Uniform practice or course of conduct followed in certain lines of business or professions or some procedure or phase thereof. "Usage" cannot be proved by isolated instances, but must be certain, uniform and" notorious. x x x x It is distinguished from 'custom' in that 'usage' derives its efficacy from assent of parties to transaction, and hence is important only if consensual agreements, while 'custom' derives its efficacy from its adoption into the law, is binding irrespective of any manifestation of assent by parties concerned, and may be of importance in any department of law. "Usage" in its most extensive meaning, including both custom and prescription; but, in its narrower signification, the term refers to a general habit, made, or course of procedure. A usage differs from a custom, in that it does not require that the usage should be immemorial to establish it; but the usage must be known, certain, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to law." The above definition clearly sets out the ambit of the expression 'usage'. It partakes of the same nature and character of a custom. A usage differs from a custom, in that it does not require that the usage should be immemorial to establish it; but the usage must be known, certain, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to law." The above definition clearly sets out the ambit of the expression 'usage'. It partakes of the same nature and character of a custom. Since there is neither an averment nor proof about a usage, the defendant is not entitled to the relief claimed. The evidence in this case falls far short of what is contained in the section. All that can be said in support of the defendant is that there exists in the property some construction put up by him. No permission can be inferred. Strictly these constructions amount to unauthorised constructions. What S.79A contemplates is not a benefit of such unauthorised construction. If a kudikidappukaran is permitted to encroach upon the adjacent property and put up unauthorised constructions or structures and use them for three years before the commencement of the Act and then claim benefit of S.79A, it would result in disastrous consequences The section contemplates only a very restricted right for the benefit of the group known as 'kudikidappukars'. A claim by way of right over unauthorised structures will not come within the ambit of S.79A. A kindred question fell for consideration before this Court in the decision reported in Paulalias Varkey v. Narayanan & another (1974 KLT 29), which arose from the refusal to grant temporary injunction by the appellate Court. In a civil revision petition, Eradi J, as he then was, held as follows: "The last ground mentioned by the Subordinate Judge for holding that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case is that the kudikidappukaran has claimed a right to use a urinal and latrine situated outside the area of ten cents surrounding the kudikidappu. The resultant position is that they were merely unauthorised constructions put by the defendants on the plaintiff's land and in respect thereof, no right can be said to have accrued to the defendants by custom, usage or agreement. The resultant position is that they were merely unauthorised constructions put by the defendants on the plaintiff's land and in respect thereof, no right can be said to have accrued to the defendants by custom, usage or agreement. S.79 A of Act 1 of 1964 referred to and relied on by the Subordinate Judge, can, therefore, has absolutely no application to the case." Though the Explanation to S.79A did not fall for consideration before the learned judge, which in that case was not necessary, I am in respectful agreement with the principle enunciated therein. 7. In my view the wording of S.79A creates difficulties for a kudikidappukaran. The explanation makes the intent of the section clear and easy of application. Custom and usage are difficult terms Proof of custom or usage is also difficult. What the Legislature intended was to confer on the kudikidappukaran the benefit of enjoyment of amenities and an accrual of that benefit if he had been enjoying it for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the commencement of the Act. If the explanation alone were on the statute book, a kudikidappukaran could easily establish that he had been enjoying the benefit or concession for the requisite period. The words "rights accrued by custom, usage or agreement" create difficulties. In order to claim this benefit proof of custom, usage or agreement is necessary. In other words, while the explanation does not in terms entail the necessity to prove custom, usage or agreement, the section does. It is for the Legislature to make suitable amendments by making it clear that what is intended is the protection of the amenities enjoyed by a kudikidappukaran for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the commencement of the Act. 8. Now reverting to the present case, since no benefit or concession for a continuous period of three years is claimed, set out or proved, it is not necessary to grant or refuse a decree on that core. The defendant wants exclusive use of the property in excess of what be is legally entitled to. This claim cannot be brought within the four corners of S.79A of the Act. He has been given the right to use the bathroom (Madappura). The plaintiff's right to enter the property is a right on the strength of his title, which is not disputed. This claim cannot be brought within the four corners of S.79A of the Act. He has been given the right to use the bathroom (Madappura). The plaintiff's right to enter the property is a right on the strength of his title, which is not disputed. Therefore, the decree passed by the appellate Court in modification of the decree given by the trial court has to stand. In the result, I dismiss the second appeal; but direct the parties to bear their costs. Dismissed.