ORDER H.N. Seth, J. - Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 are landlords of house No. 550 of Ward No. 5 situated within the Municipal limits of Basti. The said accommodation consists of some residential accommodation on the first floor as also a shop together with a verandah in front of it in the ground floor. The petitioner is a tenant in the shop in the ground floor of the said house. The landlords moved an application under section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for the release of the said shop in their favour and for eviction of the petitioner therefrom. In their application for release the respondents set out in detail as to how they needed the accommodation in possession of the petitioner for starting their business. They also, indicated the reason why they wanted to shift to this house for residence in the upper portion. 2. The petitioner contested the application contending, inter alia that the need set out by the landlords for occupation of the said house or for the matter any portion of the building was not bona fide and genuine. Further, if he is evicted from the shop in question, his business would be ruined and he would suffer irreparable injury. 3. The prescribed Authority, after going through the material produced in the case, came to the conclusion that the need of the respondents for occupation of the shop was bona fide, genuine and pressing. It also concluded that comparatively speaking the hardship in this case which the landlords were suffering was much greater than that which the petitioner was likely to suffer in case he was evicted from the shop in question. It accordingly allowed the application filed by the landlords. 4. Aggrieved, the petitioner went up in appeal before the District Judge and questioned the finding of the prescribed Authority both on the question of bona fide need of the landlords as also that with regard to the comparative hardship that was likely to be suffered by the parties by the grant for refusal of the prayer made in the application under section 21 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. 5. 5. The appellate authority affirmed the finding recorded by the prescribed Authority that the need of the landlords for occupation of the shop who real, bona fide and genuine and dismissed the appeal by the making the following observations : "There is no dispute over the act that the house in question belongs to the petitioners. The appellant occupied the lower portion of the house for carrying on a tailoring shop. He has his residential house in purani barsati. Admittedly the petitioners do not possess any other house either for their residence or for carrying on their business. It was also disclosed by the petitioners that they are living in a room which is much too insufficient for their purpose. I think when they own a house they must be allowed to get it for the purpose of their residence and for the purpose of carrying on business." 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the learned District Judge did not apply his mind to the crucial question, namely to the comparison of the hardship of both the parties. He upheld the order of the prescribed Authority merely because he was of opinion that the need of the landlords for occupation of the accommodation in question was genuine, without taking into consideration the effect which petitioner's eviction would have on the tailoring business carried on by him. He contended that the observation made in the order to the effect that the landlords did not possess any other house either for residence or for carrying on business, was not correct. He pointed out that on landlords' own showing they were living as also carrying on business in two rooms which were in their occupation and which according to therein were wholly insufficient for their use. According to him, it is now not disputed that the upper portion of the said building has not become available to the landlords for their residence. Accordingly, the said two kotharies are now available to the landlords for carrying on their business comfortably. 7. I find merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned District Judge did not record any finding on the question of comparative hardship of both the parties and the order passed by him cannot be sustained. 8. 7. I find merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned District Judge did not record any finding on the question of comparative hardship of both the parties and the order passed by him cannot be sustained. 8. Counsel for both the parties made an effort to satisfy me that in case an adverse order is made against their respective client, he would suffer hardship which, comparatively speaking, would be for greater than that which may be suffered by the other side. But then it is not the function of this Court to in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, record its own findings on this question. All such submissions should be made before the learned District Judge when the case goes back to him. It will be for him to assess the comparative hardship of the parties and to pass an appropriate order. 9. During the course of hearing it was suggested by learned counsel for the respondents that as the respondents are new admittedly in occupation of the first floor of the building it would be more convenient if they should be allowed to carry on the business in the shop situated in the ground floor of their own house and that the interest of the petitioner can be adequately secured if one of the rooms where the respondents are at present residing is allotted to him for carrying on tailoring business This would be one of the aspects which the appellate will have to keep in mind while assessing the comparative hardship of the parties and in case it comes to the conclusion that the hardship caused to the petitioner can be minimised by adopting the procedure suggested by the respondents. It may choose to pass suitable orders for achieving that object. 10. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the District Judge dated 22nd March, 1979 is quashed. The case is sent back to him with a direction that he would restore the appeal to its original number and dispose it of in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. It will be open to the District Judge to either dispose of the appeal itself for to transfer it to some other Additional District Judge. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. It will be open to the District Judge to either dispose of the appeal itself for to transfer it to some other Additional District Judge. As the case is an old one, I expect that the appeal would be disposed of by the appellate court within two months of the receipt of a certified copy of this order by him which may be produced before him by either of the two parties.