JUDGMENT: — The tenant is the petitioner. The respondents herein along with their mother deceased K. Kuppa Bai, figuring as petitioners filed an application under section 10 (3) (a) (in) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960 ) as amended by Act XXIII of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for an order of eviction against the petitioner. The premises bearing door No. 26/2, Pycrofts Road, Triplicane, Madras-5, belongs to the respondents, having been purchased by the respondents herein and their mother on 11th February, 1974 from one Indira and the petitioner is a tenant under the respondents in respect of the eastern shop in the ground floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 60. Claiming that the respondents purchased the premises bearing door No. 26/2, Pycrofts Road, Triplicane, Madras-5, for their use and occupation for their tailoring business which is carried on by them under the name and style of “Koneri Mani — Tailors and Suppliers of University convocation Academic Dresses” at the neighbouring rented premises, the respondents stated that they bona fide required the shop in the occupation of the petitioner for their business, as they are not in occupation of any premises of their own in the City of Madras. Since the petitioner did not vacate the premises in question in spite of a notice to that effect by the respondents, the application for eviction was filed by the respondents and their mother under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. During the pendency of the petition for eviction, the mother of the respondents died and the respondents herein were also recorded as the legal representatives of the deceased Kuppa Bai. 2. The petitioner resisted that application contending that the respondents are not carrying on any business and that the requirement on the ground of their own use and occupation for the purpose of their business is not bona fide. The petitioner also stated that the respondents were attempting to get enhanced rent for the premises and since the petitioner refused to pay the same, the application for eviction had been filed. A further objection was also raised by the petitioner to the effect that the respondents had sold away the business, and, therefore, the requirement of the respondents for the purpose of their business cannot be true. A further objection was also raised by the petitioner to the effect that the respondents had sold away the business, and, therefore, the requirement of the respondents for the purpose of their business cannot be true. On these grounds, the petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the application for eviction filed by the respondents. 3. Before the Rent Controller, on behalf of the respondents, P.W.1 was examined and Exhibits P-1 to P-10 were marked, while on behalf of the petitioner R. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined and Exhibits R-1 to R-7 were relied upon. The learned Rent Controller (VI Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras, on a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence upheld the claim of the respondents that ‘they are carrying on business in tailoring in a rented premises and that they require the premises in the occupation of the petitioner bona fide for the purpose of running such business’ there The stand taken by the petitioner that there was a demand for enhanced rent and that the tailoring business had been transferred to a third party, was held to be not established. On the aforesaid conclusions, the Rent Controller passed an order for eviction granting the petitioner three months’ time to vacate the premises in question. Aggrieved by this’ the petitioner herein preferred an appeal in H. R. A. No. 675 of 1978, before the Appellate Authority (IV Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras. The Appellate Authority, on a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, concluded that the respondents have established that they are carrying on business in a rented building, that they have no other non-residential building of their own and, therefore, they bona fide require the premises in the occupation of the petitioner for the carrying on of such business. In this view, the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was upheld and the appeal was dismissed. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this civil revision petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it has not been established that the respondents are carrying on a tailoring business. In this view, the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was upheld and the appeal was dismissed. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this civil revision petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that it has not been established that the respondents are carrying on a tailoring business. Elaborating this, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that no documents have been placed by the respondents to establish the carrying on of such business by the respondents, and, therefore, the respondents arc not entitled to secure an order for eviction against the petitioner on the ground that they are carrying on business. In addition, it is also pointed out that having regard to the nature of the business, namely, the supply of convocation gowns and hoods, for a day or two in the course of a year, the activity cannot really be called carrying on of a business as such which would entitle the respondents to secure an order for eviction. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the evidence of P. W. 1 which had been accepted by the authorities below is to the effect that the respondents are carrying on tailoring business and also the business is supplying convocation gowns and hoods in No. 1, Ayya Pillai Street, Triplicane, Madras-5, in a rented premises and that would be sufficient to establish the carrying on of the business by the respondents who are themselves qualified tailors. It is also further pointed out that the business is not confined only to the supply of convocation dresses, but extends to general tailoring as well, in a tenanted premises at No. 1, Ayya Pillai Street, Madras-5, where 8 persons are also employed and, therefore, the respondents are carrying on a business in tailoring and the supply of convocation garments and that would suffice to enable them to secure their own premises for such business. 5. 5. The requisites which must be established before an order for eviction under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act can be secured are: (1) the landlord or the landlady or any member of his or her family should be carrying on the business; and (2) the landlord or the landlady or any member of his or her family should not be in occupation, for purposes of a business which is carried on of a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which is his or her own. It remains to consider whether in the present case, these requirements have been fulfilled. P.W.1 is none other than the brother of the respondents and he has spoken to the carrying on of the tailoring business in a tenanted premises bearing door No. 1, Ayya Pillai Street, Madras, after the death of his father Koneri Mani. His evidence is to the effect that the business takes in the tailoring of all kinds of clothes and that convocation dress is also tailored. Though in the course of his cross-examination P. W. 1 would state that there are account books and that they have not been produced and that the respondents are not in the habit of appearing before Courts, that would not in any manner detract from the truth of the evidence given by P. W. 1. The learned counsel for the petitioner criticised that none of the respondents had been examined in support of the carrying on of the business. But that is really not necessary as their brother has come forward to depose with reference to the carrying on of the tailoring business by his sisters. His evidence further discloses that the respondents are carrying on tailoring business in a tenanted premises and that 8 persons are also working under the respondents. The documentary evidence also reveals that the first respondent is a qualified tailoring teacher as well and, therefore, there is nothing improbable in her running the tailoring business as spoken to by P. W. 1. The documentary evidence also reveals that the first respondent is a qualified tailoring teacher as well and, therefore, there is nothing improbable in her running the tailoring business as spoken to by P. W. 1. Therefore, from the evidence of P. W. 1, which has not in any manner been assailed by the petitioner and which has been accepted by the authorities below, it is clear that the respondents have been running a general tailoring business in a rented premises, which is also used by the respondents as their residence and that they do not own any non-residential building of their own for such a business. On the other hand, the evidence of R.Ws.1 and 2 does not establish that the respondents are not carrying on the business, as claimed by them. The case of transfer of the business by the respondents set up by the petitioner has not been substantiated at all; nor has it been established that the premises where the father of the respondents had been carrying on the business has not been surrendered by the respondents. A mere assertion by R.Ws.1 and 2 that the tailoring business as well as the tenancy were transferred to a third party cannot be accepted at all, in the absence of convincing documentary evidence to that effect. Considerable reliance was placed upon the evidence of R.W.1 who was formerly working as an agent of Indirani Ammal, the previous owner of the premises. However, it is found that in the course of his cross-examination, R.W.1 has admitted that subsequent to the death of Koneri Mani, the father of the respondents herein, the first respondent herein was carrying on the tailoring business and this would also probablise the case of the respondents that they continued to carry on the business in tailoring and that they require the premises in the occupation of the petitioner for their own use and occupation for the purpose of the an tailoring business. The petitioner examined as R.W.2 would admit the carrying on of business by the father of the respondents in a shop to the east of his shop, though he would also say that after the death of the father of the respondents, that shop had been closed. Though R. W. 2 would claim that the respondents had sold the business to one T.R.C. Pillai, that has not in any manner been established. Though R. W. 2 would claim that the respondents had sold the business to one T.R.C. Pillai, that has not in any manner been established. R. W. 2 would admit that no documents have been produced to show that the respondents own other properties. However, it is not disputed by R. W. 2 that the respondents are now living in a tenanted premises in No. 1, Ayya Pillai Street, Madras-5, though he would say that no business is being carried on in that premises. On a careful consideration of the evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1 and R. W. 2, it is clear that the respondents have established the carrying on of a tailoring business in a tenanted premises in No. 1, Ayya Pillai Street, Madras-5, and that the respondents do not own any other premises for the purpose of carrying on such business. It may also be mentioned that the petitioner has not succeeded in establishing that the respondents filed the application for eviction prompted by oblique motives. No material has been placed by the petitioner to show that the respondents ever demanded higher rent from the petitioner and that on his refusal to accede to that, the application for eviction had been filed. This would also go to establish the bona fides of the claim made by the respondents. On the basis of the evidence, the conclusion in irresistible that the respondents have satisfactorily established their bona fide requirement of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner for the purpose of their own business under section 19 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. 6. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner would have that as the respondents have secured possession of the rest of the building except the portion in the occupation of the petitioner, they are not entitled to an order for eviction against the petitioner as the subsequent recovery of accommodation would be a circumstance which should be considered by the Court in dealing with the application for eviction. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents, contends that the respondents are not in occupation of a building for a business already and that the second proviso to section 10 (3) (a) of the Act is applicable only to a subsequent application filed under the provisions of the Act and not to a subsequent stage of the same application. It is not in dispute that in E. P. No. 684 of 1930 in H. R. C. No. 1673 of 1974. the respondents have obtained possession of the property on 5th August, 1980, except the portion in the occupation of the petitioner and this has also been recorded on 7th August, 1980. 7. The question that now arises for consideration is, whether this would in any manner preclude the respondents from retaining the benefit of the order of eviction obtained by them already against the petitioner under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. This would depend upon the construction to be put upon the second proviso occurring after section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. That proviso reads as under: — “Provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause, he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause: (i) in case he has obtained possession of a residential building, for possession of another residential building of his own; (ii) in case he has obtained possession of a non- residential building, for possession of another non-residential building of his own.” The language employed is the proviso referred to above appears to indicate that if a landlord had succeeded is a prior attempt to secure possession of a building under section 10 (3) (a) of the Act, he will not once again be permitted to apply for relief under the same section. The use of the words “‘where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause” in the proviso postulates a prior securing of possession of a building under section 10 (3) (a) of the Act. The latter part of the proviso is to the effect that such a landlord will not be entitled to apply again under this clause. The language employed in the latter part of the proviso, namely, “to apply again” contemplates, in my view, a second application by the landlord under section 10 (3) (a) of the Act and not a subsequent stage of an application already filed. The language employed in the latter part of the proviso, namely, “to apply again” contemplates, in my view, a second application by the landlord under section 10 (3) (a) of the Act and not a subsequent stage of an application already filed. In cases where an application has been filed and an order for eviction had been obtained and that order is questioned in appeal or revision, as the cast; may be, then it will not be in consonance with the language of the proviso to apply it to such a case, as there is no question of the landlord applying again when the prior application is still pending either in appeal or in revision. The second proviso referred to already in its two parts covers, in my view, all the cases contemplated under section 10 (3) (a) (i) to 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. The first part of the second proviso would cover section 10 (3) (a) (i), while the second part would cover 10 (3) (a) (ii) as well as 10 (8) (a) (iii) of the Act. But the object of the proviso, as a whole, whether the building is residential or non-residential, is to preclude a landlord who has already recovered possession of such a building by resorting to section (10) (3) (a) (i) to 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act from a second resort, as it were to the same provision to enable him to secure possession of the building. This is brought out by the use of the words “to apply again” which discloses a repetitive act on the part of the landlord. In the present case, the respondents had not obtained possession of a portion of the premises on the date when the respondents filed H. R. C. No. 1672 of 1974, namely, 8th July, 1974 and, therefore, that application cannot be considered to be one again at the instance of the landlord. Therefore, even as a matter of construction, the proviso cannot stand attracted to the present case. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, places considerable reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Pasupalati Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders1. That decision recognises and gives effect to the general principle whether subsequent events should be taken into account or not, while granting the relief prayed for. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, places considerable reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Pasupalati Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders1. That decision recognises and gives effect to the general principle whether subsequent events should be taken into account or not, while granting the relief prayed for. No doubt, that decision had been rendered with reference to the interpretation of section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. But it does not appear that the language of the second proviso to section 10 (3) (a) of the Act referred to above has either been brought to the notice of the Court or has been considered. That decision cannot, therefore, be of any assistance to the petitioner. In Rameshwar v. Jot Ram2, the Supreme Court had occasion to refer to the decision in Paspulati Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders3and held that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted and that later developments cannot defeat his rights, as, had the Court found his facts to be true, the day he sued, he would have got his decree. The Supreme Court approved the position that procedural delays cannot deprive a party of either legal justice or rights crystallised in the initial cause of action. Dealing with the impact of subsequent events on the right of action, the Supreme Court observed thus at p. 52: “First, its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its importance to create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson v. State of Alabama4, illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Patterson v. State of Alabama4, illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal5, falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs, cannot deny rights — to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary’ Courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the tune the relief is to be ultimately granted, the Court, even in appeal, may take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. P. Venkateswarlu's case1, read in its statutory setting’ falls in this category. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statue, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the Court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute can not be divested by this equitable doctrine”. 9. There is no change in the law applicable to the present case and there are no exceptional situations present in this case. Even the statute on which the proceeding is based does not inhibit by its scheme or even otherwise, the ground of relief to the respondents in the present case. 9. There is no change in the law applicable to the present case and there are no exceptional situations present in this case. Even the statute on which the proceeding is based does not inhibit by its scheme or even otherwise, the ground of relief to the respondents in the present case. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid principle, the respondents cannot be deprived of the relief under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, if they have otherwise satisfied the statutory requirements merely on the ground that they have since recovered possession of the premises excepting that portion in the occupation of the petitioner. In M/s. Excel Lables, Tirupur v. M/s. Simson Knitting Company2, Ismail, J. (as he then was), considered the scope of the proviso under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Pasapalati Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders1. On a construcion of the proviso, it was held that the promo deals with the eligibility or entitlement of a landlord to apply for recovery of possession of a premises under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act and that if a landlord had obtained possession of the building under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act he will not again be entitled to recover possession under the very same provision. It was also further held that since the landlord had not obtained possession of the premises on the date on which the application under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act was tired by the landlord, that would not preclude him from either maintaining or securing the relief under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. In Arjun and another v. Yogendrakumar Gupta3. Mohan, J., considered the applicability of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders1, and the decision of Ismail, J. (as he then was), in M/s. Excel Lables, Tirupur v. M/s. Simson Knitting Company4, to a case where a portion of the building had been surrendered by one of the tenants and had been taken possession of by the landlord. It was pointed out by the learned Judge that the effect of the proviso is only to prevent a second application at the instance of the landlord. It was pointed out by the learned Judge that the effect of the proviso is only to prevent a second application at the instance of the landlord. If he was not in occupation of any portion of the premises in question, the application under section 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act, in that case, was maintainable. These decisions also support the view expressed above as regards the scope of the second proviso to section 10 (3) (a) of the Act vis-a-vis the subsequent recovery of accommodation by the landlord. Under these circumstances it has to be held that the subsequent taking of possession by the respondents herein of the premises except the portion in the occupation of the petitioner cannot in any manner disentitle them from either maintaining their application under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act or securing the relief prayed for by them. The order of the authorities below has, therefore, to be maintained. The civil revision petition is dismissed with costs. R. S. ----- Petition dismissed.