ORDER J.P. Bajpai, J. This short point involved in this revision relates to the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit as framed and based on the allegations as made in the plaint claiming refund of certain amount already paid towards market fees by contending that the said amount towards market fees was illegally recovered and, therefore, was liable to be refunded and that the defendant-Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti be restrained by a permanent injunction from recovering in future market fees on the agricultural produce purchased outside the Mandi areas and imported by the plaintiff inside the Mandi area for the purposes of consumption in manufacture of edible oil. The defendant Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of such a suit by contending that in view of" section 61 of M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Adhiniyam', the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was excluded and that the levy of market fees could not be challenged before the Civil-Court on the allegation as made in the plaint. The argument put-forth was that since section 61 provides a special machinery for adjudication of disputes about liability towards market fees and directs that if any such question' arises whether a sum is due to the Market Committee on account of any charge, fees, rent, etc. or on any other account under the provisions of the Act, or any rule or bye-laws made thereunder, the same shall be referred to the Director who shall after making such enquiry as he may deem fit with due opportunity to the person from whom the same is sought to be recovered, decide the question and that his decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law. It would be significant to mention that prior to the institution of the suit, the defendant had already given a reply to the notice served by the plaintiff and in the said reply it was specifically stated that if the plaintiff disputed his liability to pay market fees, he was free to make a reference to Director and the decision of the Director will be binding on the Market Committee and also on the plaintiff. Despite receiving the said reply, the plaintiff chose to file the suit and did not make any reference as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 61 of the Adhiniyam. The trial Court had, however, rejected the preliminary objection raised by the defendant and had held that the suit for refund by raising the dispute about the liability of the plaintiff to pay market fees and for claiming permanent injunction restraining the Market Committee from recovering market fees on such agricultural produce which was imported within the market area by the plaintiff for the purpose of consumption in manufacture of edible oil was tenable, and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not ousted by virtue of the provisions of section 61 of the Adhiniyam. In order to appreciate the contentions put-forth by the parties it would be relevant to reproduce the provisions of section 61 of the Adhiniyam for the sake of ready reference: 61. Recovery of sums due to market committee or Board.--(1) Any sum due to a market committee or the Board on account of any charge, costs, expenses, fees, rent or any other account under the provisions of this Act or any rule or bye-law made thereunder shall be recoverable in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. (2) If any question arises whether a sum is due under sub-section (1), it shall be referred to the Director and he shall after making such enquiry as he deems fit, and after giving to the person from whom the sum is alleged to be the due, an opportunity of being, heard decide the question and his decision shall be final and shall not he called in question in any Court of law. Since the question relates to the recovery of market fees, it would also be relevant to reproduce sub-rule (4) of Rules 56 and 57 of the M.P. Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1962. These Rules though framed under the provisions of the repealed M.P. Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, were in force on the date of suit by virtue of the provisions of section 82 (2) of the Adhiniyam: 56 (1) * * * (2) * * * (3) * * * (4) No fee shall be levied on notified. These Rules though framed under the provisions of the repealed M.P. Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960, were in force on the date of suit by virtue of the provisions of section 82 (2) of the Adhiniyam: 56 (1) * * * (2) * * * (3) * * * (4) No fee shall be levied on notified. Agricultural produce brought from outside the market area by the industrial concerns situate in the market area for their bona fide consumption or by the licensed traders for export in respect to which a declaration has been made and certificate has been obtained by the market committee in Form VI: Provided that if such agricultural produce brought into the market area for export is not exported or removed therefrom before the expiry of thirty days from the day on which it was so brought, the market committee shall levy and collect only half the market fee due on such agricultural produce from the person bringing the produce into the market area. (5) * * *. Recovery of fees.--(1) The fees on notified agricultural produce shall be payable as soon as it is brought into the market area or market proper for sale or bought or sold in the market yard, and shall be recovered in such manner as may be specified in the bye-laws. (2) Licence fee shall be paid along with the application for licence but in case the market committee refuses the grant of a licence, the fees recovered shall be refunded to the applicant. The contents of Form VI as prescribed by the aforesaid rule being relevant are reproduced below for the sake of ready reference: FORM VI [See Sub-Rule (4) of rule 56] Form of Declaration and certificate-- Kind of notified Agricultural Produce. Carts and Packages. Weight Where bought Name of seller. Through whom bought. Name of the buyer or his agent. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) I hereby certify that the above-mentioned notified agricultural produce has been bought outside the limits of the market area and brought in the limits of the market for the purposes of____________ Dated............ Signature................." Since the recovery of market fees was to be made in the manner as prescribed by the bye-laws, reference to the relevant provisions of bye-laws Nos. Signature................." Since the recovery of market fees was to be made in the manner as prescribed by the bye-laws, reference to the relevant provisions of bye-laws Nos. 46 and 47 (3) would be helpful:-- In the context of the aforesaid provisions of the Adhiniyam, Rules and the bye-laws, this Court is of the opinion that the suit as framed was not maintainable before the civil Court in view of the discussion made herein-after. The grievance of the plaintiff was that since the agricultural produce which he imported within the market area was purchased by him outside the market area and was brought within the market area not for the purpose of sale or storage for sale but for the purpose of being consumed in the manufacture of edible oil, he was not liable to levy of market fees inasmuch as the charging section of the Adhiniyam, i.e. section 19, permits levy of market fees only on such agricultural produce which has been bought or sold or brought within the market area for the purposes of sale or storage for sale. In the light of the specific provisions made in the Adhiniyam and the rules framed thereunder, there could be no dispute about this proposition. Sub-rule (4) of rule 56, as quoted above, itself contains a prohibition by saying that no market fee shall be levied on notified agricultural produce which is imported within the market area for the purposes of being consumed in manufacture or for being exported. However, in order to secure the interests of the Market Committee, and to provide a safeguard against evasion of market fees in the pretext of a claim that the produce was brought within the market area for the purposes other than that of sale, the procedure of requiring the trader to file a declaration in Form VI, as quoted above, was made. As will be evident from the contents of Form VI and the certificate appended thereto, the trader has to make a declaration that certain quantity of agricultural produce, brought in the limits of the market area, with necessary details as required to be given in the prescribed columns, was being brought within the market area for certain other purposes. As will be evident from the contents of Form VI and the certificate appended thereto, the trader has to make a declaration that certain quantity of agricultural produce, brought in the limits of the market area, with necessary details as required to be given in the prescribed columns, was being brought within the market area for certain other purposes. Once such a declaration was made in the prescribed Form VI, the rule itself prohibited levy of market fees by saying that no market fees shall be levied on such agricultural produce in respect of which a declaration on Form VI has been made. In the present suit there is no such allegation by the plaintiff that despite furnishing a declaration in Form VI the Market Committee levied the fees and, as such, the same was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction so as to entitle the plaintiff for a refund. Similar is the position about the relief of permanent injunction. Actually speaking, if the trader complies with necessary requirement of the relevant rules, the injunction is already in the Adhiniyam itself and for such matters there is no scope for entertaining a suit or granting the relief of permanent injunction. By virtue of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 61 of the Adhiniyam, there is already a special machinery and procedure provided for the decision of the question regarding the liability of payment towards market fees. The plaintiff could always make a reference to the Director. When he served the Committee with the notice of the suit, the same was the reply given by the Committee specifically stating that if the trader-plaintiff wanted to raise a dispute, he may make a reference to the Director and his decision will be binding on the Committee. Learned counsel for the non-applicant-plaintiff, however, contended that the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 61 did not cover the dispute as is being raised in this suit for claiming the relief of refund, permanent injunction. The argument was that sub-section (2) of section 61 contemplated a dispute confined to the question whether the sum due to the market Committee on account of any charge, market fees, etc., could be recovered as an arrear of land revenue or not. The argument was that sub-section (2) of section 61 contemplated a dispute confined to the question whether the sum due to the market Committee on account of any charge, market fees, etc., could be recovered as an arrear of land revenue or not. According to the learned counsel, the dispute covered under sub-section (2) did not cover the dispute about the fact whether certain amount towards market fees was actually due or not. On the face of the clear language as used in sub-section (2), this contention is wholly misconceived and without any basis. Sub-section (2) clear provides that if any question arises whether a sum is due under sub-section (1) or not, it shall be referred to the Director. What are the sums due under sub-section (1) have been clearly and specifically indicated in sub-section (1) itself. The sum due under sub-section (1) includes the dues towards fees leviable under the provisions of the Adhiniyam, the Rules and the bye-laws. Learned counsel for the plaintiff, however, contended that at the stage of deciding the question of maintainability of the suit the weight and worth of the contention should be overlooked and that by assuming the plaint allegations to be true, the question of jurisdiction has to be decided by taking into consideration the relevant legal provisions. Even if this contention is to be accepted, the suit is apparently not tenable. The Adhiniyam provides for specific forum and machinery in the matter of levy and collection of market fees. It further provides a prohibition that no market fees shall be levied on the agricultural produce brought within the market area from outside for the purposes other than that of sale or storage for sale, i.e., consumption in manufacture or export, etc. It further provides a procedure for furnishing necessary declaration at the time of import of agricultural produce within the market area. The provisions as contained in sub-section (2) of section 61 also provided that if a party questions its liability towards payment of market fees, it shall refer the dispute to the Director. According to the provisions of sub-section (2) the Director has to decide the dispute after due notice and opportunity to the parties. The provisions as contained in sub-section (2) of section 61 also provided that if a party questions its liability towards payment of market fees, it shall refer the dispute to the Director. According to the provisions of sub-section (2) the Director has to decide the dispute after due notice and opportunity to the parties. The law further makes the decision of the Director binding on the parties and also excludes the jurisdiction of all Courts by saying that such a decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. Vs. City of Jabalpur Corporation, actually concludes the controversy involved in the present case. In the case of Bata Shoe Company (supra) there was an occasion for construing the provisions of section 84 (3) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act (2 of 1922), which provided that the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed shall not be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than as provided in the Act. The view taken by the Supreme Court, after referring to various earlier decisions, where, in the context of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, suits before the civil Court challenging the liability of tax, etc., were held to be not maintainable, was that when there is a specific machinery and special forum provided for dealing with the question of liability of a person in the matter of payment of tax, etc., and the provisions of the taxing statute contain a specific direction expressly prohibiting such challenge in any other manner before any authority or Court than as provided in the Act itself, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands ousted and that simply by showing that an assessment has been wrongly made, a plaintiff cannot maintain and prosecute a suit before the Civil Court disputing his liability to tax instead of taking recourse to the special machinery and specific forum provided in the Act. Their Lordships have held that the question of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are, for the decision of the authorities set up by the Act, and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of those authorities are given finality. Their Lordships have held that the question of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are, for the decision of the authorities set up by the Act, and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of those authorities are given finality. On this basis the earlier decisions in the cases of Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. Vs. Municipal Committee, Dhamangaon, , Ballabhadas Mathurdas Lakhani and Others Vs. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, and Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, were distinguished. The observations made by the Supreme Court in Kamala Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Bombay, were relied. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the Market Committee acted without a vestige or even a semblance of shadow of authority. It is not the case of the plaintiff that despite a declaration in Form VI having been furnished the Committee had recovered market fees or that it intended to levy tax even on such agricultural produce imported within the market area for the purposes of consumption or for export in respect to which a declaration in Form VI was made, as required by the provisions of sub-rule (4) of Rule 56. This revision, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The order impugned is set aside. It is held that the suit giving rise to this revision is not maintainable before the Civil Court and is liable to be dismissed on this preliminary ground itself. The preliminary issue regarding the question of maintainability of the civil suit is accordingly decided against the plaintiff. The case is remanded to the trial Court for passing necessary judgment and decree in the light of the aforesaid finding on the preliminary issue. Parties will however, bear their own costs of this revision.