Judgment 2. The petitioner is a resident of Habeebnagar in Hyderabad. He is a businessman and a social worker. The 1st respondent is a resident of Banjara Hills in Hydeiabad and there is enmity between the petitioner and the 1st respondent since long. The 2nd respondent is a businessman at Hyderabad and is the proprietor of a concern known as ‘High Foam’. The 3rd respondent is the editor of a weekly known as ‘Leader’. The 4th respondent is an Income -tax Officer. The 5th respondent is the proprietor of a Television sets company. The 6th respondent is the proprietor of a studio known as ‘Sadhana Studio’. The 7th respondent is a telephone operator. It is said that the 8th respondent is unoccupied without any particular avocation. The respondents 3 to 8 are residents of Hyderabad. 3. On 10th March, 1978, the petitioner filed a complaint under section 420 read with sections 120-B and 34, Indian Penal Code, in the Court of the IV Metropolitan Magistrate impleading the respondents 1 to 8 as accused 1 to 8 respectively. The complaint contained 11 paper besides the praver. The first and second paras, contained allegations of the 1st accused's previous bad behaviour. Paras. 3 to 7 contained allegations against the conduct and behaviour of the accused 2 to 7. In paras. 8 and 9, it was alleged that the accused persons conspired to cheat the general public and for this purpose, began to publish in the newspapers of the city from the 15th of November, 1977 and onwards that Film Star Award Function was going to be held on 11th December, 1977, and that they got printed tickets of the denominations of Rs.10, 15, 25,50 and l00. It is further alleged that the tickets were got sold through ministerial and official influence in the State in almost all the districts including Chittoor, Karimnagar, Nizambad and that, when the public came to attend the function on the 11th of December, 1977, they were informed that the programme was postponed, though the postponement was not published through newspapers. The proceeds, according to the complainant went into the pockets of the first accused. The proceeds, according to the complainant went into the pockets of the first accused. It is also alleged that, the programme was postponed and the accused mis-appropriated the amounts, it was published again that the programme would be held ore the 25th December, 1977, and that various important actors including Miss Hema Malini, Amjad Khan, Asrani, Shatrughan Sinha,Kumari Sarikaand Miss Nithu Singh, would be participating in the programme. The complainant, being a fan of Shatrughan Sinha, Miss Hema Malini and Nithu Singh, " he felt like looking these actors from close range ", and therefore, he purchased two tickets of the denomination of Rs. 25 from M/s. Royal Hotel, Nampally at Hyderabad for himself and for his wife. Before purchasing the tickets, he enquired the Manager of the Royal Hotel whether the particular film stars would be participating in the programme. The Manager in turn telephoned to A-l and on being informed, that the film stars would participate told. the complainant that they would be participating. The complainant again asked, the Manager whether the sale proceeds would be utilised towards cyclone relief" and on the matter being confirmed by A-l on telephone with the Manager, the complainant, purchased the tickets. According to the complainant he would not have purchased the tickets but for the representation that the three film stars,. Shatrugan Sinha, Miss Hema Malini and. Miss Nithu Singh, would participate in the programme and that the collections, would be utilised for cyclone relief. The organisers took more than 6000 chairs for the function, having sold the tickets through A-l, A-3 and A-5 to A-8,and through several’ others with the influence of Ministers and other officials and appropriated the entire sale proceeds without crediting anything towards cyclone relief fund. The particular film stars also did not participate in the function. Hence the complaint. 4. While presenting the complaint, in would appear that the Counsel for the complainant requested the Court to refer the complaint to the Central Crime Station for investigating saying that the case involved lakhs of rupees of misappropriation. The Magistrate accordingly referred the case to the D.C.P. Crimes 1, Hyderabad, requesting him to entrust the work of investigation to the Inspector of Police,. Team No. IV, Hyderabad. It would appear that no charge-sheet was filed by the Police even by the 26th of June, 1979. The Magistrate accordingly referred the case to the D.C.P. Crimes 1, Hyderabad, requesting him to entrust the work of investigation to the Inspector of Police,. Team No. IV, Hyderabad. It would appear that no charge-sheet was filed by the Police even by the 26th of June, 1979. On this day, the complainant filed a petition styling the same as a “Protest Petition” and requested the Court therein to ignore thatfact of having sent his complaint to the Police for investigation in so far as nearly 18 months have elapsed since the complaint was sent to the Police for investigation and as the accused seemed to have joined hands with the Police, the Police have not been investigating into the case. It was further requested in the petition that the Magistrate may proceed with the complaint according to law. Thereupon, the Magistrate recorded the swor statement of the complainant on the 28th June, 1979, and passea the impugned order dismissing the complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, on the 30th June, 1979. 5. Sri S.B. Sri Dixit, the learned Counsel for the complainant-petitioner, contends that the order of the learned Magistrate dismissing the complaint under the cirumstances is illegal and unsustainable. His first contention is that in so far as the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and then only sent it for investigation, he ought not to have acted on the complaint until after receipt of a report from the police. His next contention is that, even so, the Magistrate ought to have examined the witnesses of the complainant before dismissing the complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. The last contention of Sri Dixit is that, in any view of the matter, the Magistrate was not justified in holding that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused persons. M/s. B. Madhava Reddy, Chennabasappa Desai and Smt. Prasanna Kumari, appearing for the accused-respondents refute the contentions. The learned Public Prosecutor also opposes the revision application and supports the impugned order of the Magistrate. 6. As regards the first contention, on 10th March, 1978, on the petitioner presenting the complaint before him, the Magistrate passed the following order: “It is represented by the Counsel for complainant that it may be referred to Central Grime Station. The learned Public Prosecutor also opposes the revision application and supports the impugned order of the Magistrate. 6. As regards the first contention, on 10th March, 1978, on the petitioner presenting the complaint before him, the Magistrate passed the following order: “It is represented by the Counsel for complainant that it may be referred to Central Grime Station. This case is referred to D.C.P. Crime-1, Hyderabad as the case is involved in lakhs of rupees of misappropriation as per the allegation I also request the D.C.P. Crimes-1 to entrust the work to the Inspector of Police Team No. IV, C.C.S., Hyderabad. I also direct the said Inspector Team IV to investigate the case and report on or before 1st April, 1978.” On 13th March, 1978, on receipt of the complaint of the petitioner with the order of the Magistrate, the Administrative Inspector, Central Crime Station, Hyderabad, registered a case in Crime No. 10 of 1978 under section 420 read with section 120-B and section 34, Indian Penal Code, and handed over the file to the Inspector, Team IV, CCS. for investigation. Subsequently no report has been received by the Magistrate from the Police even by the 26th June, 1979, when the petitioner complainant submitted what is styled as the ‘protest petition requesting the Court to take action directly on his complaint ignoring the previous order directing investigation by the Police. It was submitted in this protest petition that the concerned Police seemed to have gained over by the accused persons. The Magistrate thereupon took up the complaint and examined the complainant on oath on the 28th of June and passed the impugned order dated 30th of June dismissing the complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. 7. The contention of Sri Dixit that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and then only directed investigation by the police under section 156, Criminal Procedure Code, does not commend itself to me as correct. As pointed out by their Lordships of “the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Abdul Noor1 the Magistrate can under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, before taking cognizance, ask for investigation by the police under section 156 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. As pointed out by their Lordships of “the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Abdul Noor1 the Magistrate can under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, before taking cognizance, ask for investigation by the police under section 156 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate can also issue warrant for production before taking cognizance.” The words may take cognizance, in section 190 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, give judicial discretion to the Magistrate and a Magistrate is not bound to take cognizance of an offence on receipt of a complaint. It is open to him in his discretion to direct investigation by the police under section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code, to proceed under section 200 and subsequent provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It cannot be said that while mere y receiving the complaint and passing an order directing investigation under section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code, a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences disclosed in the complaint-petition. The expression ‘taking cognizance of an offence’ has not been defined in the Code. In R. R. Ghiri v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted with approval the observations of Das Gupta, J. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumir Banerjse2 and those observations are as follows: “It seem; to me clear, however, that, before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 190(1)(a) , Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter-proceeding under section 200 and there after sending it for enquiry and report under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code. When the Magistrate applied his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter but for taking action of some other kind e.g., ordering investigation under section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.” In the instant case, therefore, it cannot be said that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, when he passed an order directing investigation by the Police. His power to take cognizance as invested in section 190 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, is in no way affected in passing an order of investigation by the Police. In fact, even if the police submit a report after investigation stating that no offence has been made out, it is open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence on the facts contained in the repoit of the police officer, if such facts in the opinion of the Magistrate constitute an offence. In Abinandan fha v. Dinesh Mishra,1 their Lord -ships of the Supreme Court have pointed out that even in cases, where the police submitted a report no case is made out for sending up an accused for trial, a Magistrate will have ample jurisdiction to direct further investigation and if again another report of similar nature is submitted by the Police and the Magistrate considers that the facts disclosed from the report constitute an offence the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence under section 190 (1)(c) notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police expressed in the final report. In State v. Mehar Singffi2 a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that Magistrate has inherent power to withdraw or suspend cognizance taken by him event the police can start a fresh investigation and as a general rule the police investigation stops on the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence though in any special case a Magistrate may allow the police to investigate. No doubt, it will not be proper for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence while the same is under investigation by the police. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed3 “In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function.” The Court having jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence can certainly exercise its jurisdiction by taking cognizance of that offence but not so as to interfere with the statutory rights of investigation of the police into a cognizable offence. The investigation directed by a Court under section 156 (3) and carried on by the police under section 157 , Criminal Procedure Code is quite different from the investigations, which were directed by a Court under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code as the latter kind of investigation is directed only after the Court takes cognizance of the offence. In S. N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar,1 the Supreme Court pointed out that Magistrate cannot put a stop to the investigation and substitute a Magisterial enquiry in its place under section 159, Criminal Procedure Code where the police have taken up the enquiry of a cognizable case in right earnest. In the instant case however, no investigation of the offence complained by the complainant petitioner was being carried on by the police when the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on the 28th of June, 1979. When the complaint was forwarded to the police under an order dated 10th March, 1978 directing investigation under section 156 (3), Criminal Procedure Code, the Police registered a First Information Report on the 23rd March, 1978 and subsequently did nothing. In the protest petition dated 26thJune, 1979 filed by him, the complainant, revision petitioner submitted that “the said Police Officer concerned has not made any investigation in the matter of this case. It seems that the accused have joined hands with the police authorities concerned. Therefore, the police are not at all interested in the investigation of the case. This Hon’ble Court has sent several remainders to the police but the police have not carried out the orders of this Hon’ble Court. Even an First Information Report has not been issued by the Police. The petitioner herein is ready and willing to prove the guilt of the accused on his own accord. This Hon’ble Court has sent several remainders to the police but the police have not carried out the orders of this Hon’ble Court. Even an First Information Report has not been issued by the Police. The petitioner herein is ready and willing to prove the guilt of the accused on his own accord. Therefore, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleads to allow the petitioner to prove the allegations made in his complaint filed some sixteen months back”. It is on an examination of all the allegations in the protest petition and on a consideration of the hard fact that no action of any kind was taken by the police, even though more than 15 months have elapsed after the case was sent for investigation, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence complained in the complaint-petition. Therefore, it cannot be said that the cognizance taken under the particular circumstances of this case is in any way injudicious or improper. No doubt, the apathy of the Magistrate in not taking effective steps for a report from the police inspite of the lapse of more than 15 months after the complaint was forwarded by the Court for investigation cannot be commended. The Police Officer, who has registered the case, should have known that it is his bounder duty to make an earnest and honest investigation and submit a report to the Court as required under the Code. The failure of the Police Officer to discharge his duties need not be over emphatically condemned. It is unfortunate that the Magistrate not Only did not take proper action against the concerned police but at least did not report to the High Court about the absolute indifference of the police towards the orders of the Court. The Magistrate directed investigation under section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code. It is unfortunate that the Magistrate not Only did not take proper action against the concerned police but at least did not report to the High Court about the absolute indifference of the police towards the orders of the Court. The Magistrate directed investigation under section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code. Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides: (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer-in-charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 to investigate he shall forth with send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognisance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order prescribe in this behalf, to proceed to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender Provided that- (a) When information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of serious nature, the officer-in-charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot; (b) If it appears to the officer-in-charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case. (2) In case of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (2) of the proviso to sub section (1), the officer-in-charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section, and in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant if, any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated. This section is mandatory and the failure to act in accordance with the terms of the section is a serious dereliction of duty on the part of the concerned Police Officer. This section is mandatory and the failure to act in accordance with the terms of the section is a serious dereliction of duty on the part of the concerned Police Officer. Such wilful affront to the law will be a serious offence punishable under section 217 of the Indian Penal Code, besides being an undisputable contempt of the Court. It may be neessary for the concerned authorities to pull up the Officer, if there are any circumstances of mitigation in his failure or otherwise to pull him out of the department, if his failure was deliberately disregardful of the law. The insolvent conduct of the Police Officer or the improper indifference of the Magistrate can -not however, have any affect on the validity or propriety of the congnizance taken by the Magistrate in so far as the police were not investigating into the case when the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence complained in the case. 8. As regards the second contention, Sri Dixit, the petitioner's learned Counsel, himself fairly states that the complainant did not produce any witnesses before the Court on the day, when he filed ‘the protest petition’ or en the day, when the Magistrate examined the complainant on oath under section 200, Criminal Procedure Code. It is, however, arguect that the Magistrate ought not to have dismissed the complaint under section 203 , Criminal Procedure Code, without examining the witnesses of the complainant under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code. The language of sections 200 and 202, Criminal Procedure Code, is too clear to permit any doubt. A Magistrate is not bound to examine the witnesses cited by the complainant in the complaint petition before dismissing complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. What section 200, Criminal Procedure Code, contemplates is the examination of the complainant upon oath and the witnesses present, if any, if no witnesses are present, it is not incumbent on the Magistrate to issue summonses to the witnesses until when he decides to issue process to the accused and the accused appears before him. Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, clearly provides that a Magistrate may dismiss a complaint after considering the statements on oath, if any, of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the enquiry or investigation, if any, under section 202, Criminal procedure Code, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, clearly provides that a Magistrate may dismiss a complaint after considering the statements on oath, if any, of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the enquiry or investigation, if any, under section 202, Criminal procedure Code, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. Enquiry or investigation under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code, is discretionary and a Magistrate may either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by? Police Officer or by any other person only when thinks fit to postpone the issue of process against the accused. The contention that, in any case, where a Magistrate does not wish to issue process to the accused after examining the complainant, the Magistrate has to hold an enquiry under section 202 , Criminal Procedure Code, before he passes a valid order of dismissal under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, is without merit and cannot be accepted. 9. Reliance is placed by Sri Dixit on Pramatha Nath v. Saroj Ranjan.1 and Chandra Deo v. Prakash Ghandra2 In the cases relied the Supreme Court has pointed out that the object of the provisions of section 202, Criminal Procedure Code, is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint and also to find out as to what material is there to support the allegations made in the complaint. It was not held in either of the two cases relied that an enquiry under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code, is compulsory before a Magistrate dismisses a complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. 10. The last contention of Sri Dixit is that the allegations in the complaint-petition and the sworn statement of the complainant as recorded by the Magistrate discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused and the Magistrate was, therefore, not justified in dismissing the complaint. The main allegations in the complaint are that the eight accused persons conspired to cheat the public some time during the period from November, 1977 till the 25th of December, 1977 and that the collections for the show would be utilised for cyclone relief and thereby induced the complainant to purchase two tickets of the value of Rs. The main allegations in the complaint are that the eight accused persons conspired to cheat the public some time during the period from November, 1977 till the 25th of December, 1977 and that the collections for the show would be utilised for cyclone relief and thereby induced the complainant to purchase two tickets of the value of Rs. 25 each for the Film Star Nite programme in the night of 25th of December, 1977. According to the complainant the particular film stars whose names were published were not shown on the stage and the ticket collections also were not utilised for the cyclone relief. The alleged cheating having taken place on the 25th December, 1977 the complainant approached the Court with a complaint for the first time of the 10tb of March, 1978, i.e., more than three months after the Film Star Nite. The averments in the complaint-petition clearly show that there is any amount of bad blood between the complainant and the first accused. A careful examination of the complaint-petition and the sworn statement of the complaint shows that there is not a single allegation made specifically against any of the eight accused. The only allegation is that on 25th December, 1977 when the complainant purchased two tickets of the denomination of Rs. 25 each at the counter¡ of the Royal Hotel from the Manager of that Hotel, he enquired the Manager whether Shatrughna Sinha, Hema Malini and Nitu Singh would be participating in the function and that then the Manager telephone to A-l and then answered the enquiry of the complainant in the affirmative. It would be difficult to hold on this allegation that A-l made any dishonest misrepresentation to the “complainant so as to induce the complainant to purchase the tickets. With whom exactly the Manager spoke is any dody's guess. Mr. Dixit cited Debendra Math v. State of West Bengal1, K. S. Ghokalingam in support of the contention that the order of dismissal of a complaint should not be passed merely because a Magistrate thinks that there is no prospect of a conviction in the case. 11. In view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Debendra Math v. State of West Bengal1 it would be unnecessary to consider in detail the other case cited by the petitioner's learned Counsel. 11. In view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Debendra Math v. State of West Bengal1 it would be unnecessary to consider in detail the other case cited by the petitioner's learned Counsel. In Debendra Math's easel, the Supreme Court held as follows: “What the Magistrate has to determine at the stage of issue of process is not the correctness or the probability or improbability of individual items of evidence on disputable grounds, but the existence or otherwise of a primafacie case on the assumption that what is stated can be true unless the prosecution allegations are so fantastic that they cannot reasonably be held to be true”. In the same case their Lordships have pointed out as follows: “It has to be remembered that an order of dismissal of a complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, has to be made on judicially sound grounds. It can be made where the reasons given disclose that the proceedings cannot terminate successfully in a conviction. It is true that the Magistrate is not debarred at this stage, from going into the merits of the evidence produced by the complainant. But, the object of such consideration of the merits of the case at this stage, could only be to determine whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding further or not. The mere existence of some grounds which would be material in deciding whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted does not generally indicate that the case must necessarily fail. On the other hana such grounds may indicate the need for proceeding further in order to discover the truth after a full and proper investigation. If, however, a bare perusal of a complaint or the evidence led in support of it show that essential ingredients of the offence alleged are absent or that the dispute is only of a civil nature or that there are such patent absurdities in the evidence produced that it would be a waste of time to proceed further the complaint could be properly dismissed under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code.” In the instant case, the Magistrate has carefully applied his mind to the allegations made in thecomplaint and the sworn statement, the inordinate delay in filling the complaint and the nature of evidence proposed by the complainant in proof of his allegations. The complainant has cited 21 witnesses and then added that a list of other witness will be furnished during trial. Of the 21 witnesses, the first four-are film actresses living in Bombay, 5 to 7 are film actors also living in Bombay 8 to 10 are ex-Ministers, while 11 and 12 are Bank Managers, 13 to 16 are Police Officers, 1 7 is the Manager, A to Z Supplying Company at Hyderabad, 18 is Messrs, Khan & Sons of Hyderabad, 19 is one Mohammad Ali of Asifnagar in Hyderabad,20 and 21 are the Managers of the Royal Hotel and Deccan Chronicle respectively and both are from Hyderabad. It is not explained nor can it be culled out from the allegations in the complaint-petition as to how the witnesses are connected with the offers complained. The allegations are vague and many of the witnesses cited are such that it may not be easy to secure their attendance within a reasonable time. The complaint implicating the eight accused under the circumstances is frivolous and the same has been rightly dismissed by the lower Court. This revision application is devoid of any merit whatever and the same is accordingly dismissed. Criminal revision dismissed.