JUDGMENT : Y.V. Chandrachud, CJI. - In or about 1967 the appellant was convicted under section 302 of the Penal Code for committing the murder of his wife. He was sentenced to death by the Sessions Court but the High Court reduced that sentence to imprisonment for life. The appellant earned certain remissions while in jail, as a result of which he was released after he had undergone a sentence of about 9 years. After his release, he started living with his cousin Hukam Singh. The family members of Hukam Singh did not much appreciate the appellants presence in their house. That is all the provocation which the appellant thought he had. On the night between 4th and 5th of July, 1977 while Hukam Singh and his wife were away at Nainital and while their son and daughters were sound asleep, the appellant who was sleeping along with them committed the murder of Desa Singh, the son of Hukam Singh, and Durga Bai and Veeran Bai, his daughters. He also caused grievous injuries to another daughter of Hukam Singh called Vidya Bai. In these circumstances we see no reason whatsoever to interfere with the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court. It is evident that the appellant is beyond the possibility of any correction or redemption. He was ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for life for committing the murder of his wife, but the long term of incarceration which he suffered for that offence, far from having any beneficial effect on him, appears to have emboldened him to take the law into his own hands. He is a potential danger to the society, believing as he seems to do. that no one is going to sentence him to death, no matter how many murders he is going to commit. Mr. Puri, who has ably and thankfully assisted us an amicus curiae, has drawn our attention to certain decisions of the Federal Court, the Privy Council and of our own Court in support of his argument that the delay between the imposition of the death sentence and its actual execution is a relevant consideration on the question as to whether the death sentence should be confirmed. Having given our anxious consideration to the argument of the learned counsel, we do not think that any such test can be applied to the instant case, apart from our view that in matters of sentencing, there can be no inflexible rule that a delay of this or that particular number of years is a necessary impediment in the confirmation of sentence, including the sentence of death. 2. We, therefore, confirm the sentence of death imposed on the appellant and dismiss the appeal. The leave, it may be mentioned, was limited to the question of sentence only.