ORDER A. N. Verma, J. - This is a landlord's petition directed against an order passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Shahjahanpur dated 8-8-1978 dismissing an appeal filed by the landlord against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972). 2. The relevant facts are these. The petitioner filed an application under section 21(l)(a) of the aforesaid U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for the eviction of Salik Ram, the deceased respondent No. 3, who died during the pendency of this writ petition and is now represented by his heirs. The application was moved on the ground that the petitioner was a gold-smith by profession. With the enforcement of Gold Control Order, the petitioner became unemployed like thousands of other gold-smith in the country. He had no source of livelihood and was badly in need of the shop in dispute for carrying on the business of general merchandise therein. 3. The application was contested by the tenant Salik Ram who denied that the petitioner bona fide required the shop in dispute. It was alleged that the petitioner still continued to do the business of gold-smith. It is further stated that the tenant in any case had no other alternative accommodation available to him and would, therefore, suffer irreparable loss if he is evicted from the accommodation in dispute. 4. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the petitioner's application on the ground that he did not bona fide require the shop in dispute. The petitioner thereupon appealed. The appellate court by the order dated 1-2-1974 came to the conclusion that having regard to the number of members of the petitioner's family, and to the act that the petitioner had become unemployed in consequence of the enforcement of the Gold Control Order, and further to the act that the petitioner had no other shop available to him to enable him to carry on some business, the need of the landlord for the shop in dispute must be held to be bona fide. The learned District Judge consequently allowed the appeal, as well as the application of the landlord under section 21(1)(a) by the order dated 1-2-1974. The learned District Judge consequently allowed the appeal, as well as the application of the landlord under section 21(1)(a) by the order dated 1-2-1974. 5 The tenant came up to this Court against the order passed by the learned District Judge in a Writ Petition. This Court by the order dated 18-11-1977 allowed the writ petition on the sole ground that the learned District Judge did not bear in mind the hardship likely to be caused to the tenant from the grant of the application with the hardship likely to be caused by the refusal of the same. It is significant to note that this Court made no observations with regard to the very categorical finding of the learned District Judge that the landlord bona fide required the shop in dispute. 6. However, when the matter went back to the learned I Additional District Judge for a rehearing of the appeal, the learned District Judge also made some comments on the bona fide requirements of the landlord and came to the conclusion that the landlord did not bona fide require the shop in dispute. The learned District Judge then took up the issue of relative hardship and answered it against the landlord. On these findings, the learned District Judge dismissed the landlord's appeal. 7. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the learned District Judge has committed a patent error of law in disposing of this appeal. His first submission was that the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of bona fide requirement is no finding in the eye of law, assuming that it was open to the learned District Judge to go into that question. 8. Counsel next submitted that the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of relative hardship is also manifestly erroneous in law inasmuch as the learned District Judge has not at all considered the hardship likely to be caused to the landlord from the refusal to release the accommodation in dispute. Lastly, counsel submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition, the tenant Salik Ram died bringing about a material change in the circumstances warranting a review of the finding on the question of relative hardship. 9. Lastly, counsel submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition, the tenant Salik Ram died bringing about a material change in the circumstances warranting a review of the finding on the question of relative hardship. 9. Counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that the findings given by the learned District Judge are findings of fact, not vitiated by any error of law and are, therefore, not open to review by this Court. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of view that the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are well founded. A perusal of the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of bona fide requirements clearly shows that he has not applied his mind at all to the relevant acts and to the material existing on the record as regards the bona fide requirements of the landlord. The learned District Judge who had allowed the petitioner's appeal by the order dated 1-2-1974, had taken into consideration the various acts having a bearing on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord, including the act that the petitioner had a large family, that he had no other accommodation available to him, that it was a well known act that with the enforcement of the Gold Control Order, thousands of goldsmiths in the country had been thrown out of employment etc. etc. The learned 1st additional District Judge by his order dated 8-8-1978, however, dismissed the petitioner's need and requirement in a very summary manner without adverting to the affidavits which had been filed on behalf of the parties on the cardinal question as to whether the landlord became unemployed for whether he was still carrying on the business of goldsmith as alleged by the tenant. The learned District Judge has observed thus : "The learned counsel for the appellant argues that had the landlord been carrying on the possession of goldsmith he would have obtained a licence for the same. But cases of breach of law are not wanting. As such I am unable to convince myself that the need of the appellant is bona fide and the ground is so compelling." In my opinion, the above is a very unsatisfactory way of disposing of a vital issue. The finding of the learned District Judge is based wholly on suspicion. But cases of breach of law are not wanting. As such I am unable to convince myself that the need of the appellant is bona fide and the ground is so compelling." In my opinion, the above is a very unsatisfactory way of disposing of a vital issue. The finding of the learned District Judge is based wholly on suspicion. No amount of suspicion can take the place of evidence. Whether the landlord was continuing to carry on the business of goldsmith even after the endorsement of the Gold Control Order had to be decided objectively and upon the evidence, if any. The learned District Judge should have adverted to the affidavits filed on behalf of both the parties in giving a finding on this question. He has, however, not done that. The finding of the learned District Judge on the question of bona fide requirement is, therefore, liable to be set aside for a reconsideration. 11. The finding of the learned District Judge on the question of relative hardship is equally vitiated in law. The learned District Judge has concerned himself entirely with the hardship which was likely to be caused to the tenant from the grant of the application. He has not considered the hardship likely to be caused to the landlord from the refusal of the application at all. As the hardship likely to be caused to the landlord has not been considered at all the said finding is liable to be set aside. 12. As I am directing the learned District Judge to reconsider the case, the learned District Judge may consider the situation arising out of the death of Ram during the pendency of the writ petition. He may compare the hardship likely to be caused to the landlord with that which is likely to be caused to the heirs of Salik Ram who may still be doing the business in the shop. The parties will be at liberty to apply for the amendment of their respective pleadings in regard to this change in the circumstances which is said to have taken place since the making of the application. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the learned District Judge dated 8-8-1978 is quashed. The parties will be at liberty to apply for the amendment of their respective pleadings in regard to this change in the circumstances which is said to have taken place since the making of the application. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the learned District Judge dated 8-8-1978 is quashed. The case is remanded to the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Shahjahanpur for being disposed of according to law and having regard to the observations made by this Court in the judgment. The parties will bear their own costs.