ORDER M. P. Mehrotra, J. -This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The petitioner was issued the notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act and he filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 8-6-1976, a true copy whereof is Annexure 2 to the petition. The Prescribed Authority declared 82 bighas 5 biswas and 5 biswansis of irrigated land as surplus. Thereafter an appeal was filed and the same was decided by the appellate court by its judgment dated 29-4-1977, a true copy whereof is Annexure 3 to the petition. The appeal was partly allowed and the Prescribed Authority was directed to compute the surplus land in the light of the direction given in the said appellate judgment. Thereafter, the Prescribed Authority passed the order dated 30-9-77, a true copy whereof is Annexure 4 to the petition. The Prescribed Authority declared 41 bighas 18 biswas and 15 biswansis of irrigated land as surplus. Thereafter an appeal was filed by the petitioner but the same was dismissed by the appellate court by its judgment dated 9-1-1979, a true copy whereof is Annexure 5 to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment is also on the record. 3. Now the petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri U. C. M. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made his submission. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that despite the aforesaid earlier judgment of the appellate court (Annex. 3), it should be held that U was open to his client to press certain contentions before the Prescribed Authority which had not been decided in favour of the petitioner by the appellate court. In my view, this contention is not correct. It should be seen that the appellate courts judgment fully decided the controversies raised and pressed before the said court and only the work of calculation was left to be done by the Prescribed Authority. Clear directions were given and it was directed that the Prescribed Authority should carry out those directions. In my view, this contention is not correct. It should be seen that the appellate courts judgment fully decided the controversies raised and pressed before the said court and only the work of calculation was left to be done by the Prescribed Authority. Clear directions were given and it was directed that the Prescribed Authority should carry out those directions. In a situation of this kind, it was not possible for the petitioner to seek to raise any contention which travelled beyond the directions given by the appellate court. The judgment of the appellate court was final as laid down in Section 13 (2) of the Act. If the petitioner felt dissatisfied with the 6aid judgment of the appellate court, he might have sought to question the same by filing a writ petition, if he was advised to do so. However, when no such petition was filed at the appropriate stage, it was not possible for the petitioner to seek to raise certain contentions, which, if accepted by the Prescribed Authority and later on affirmed by the appellate court itself, would have modified the earlier judgment of the appellate court. It cannot be disputed that this course is not warranted in law. The earlier judgment of the appellate court could not, in any manner, be modified by the Prescribed Authority or by the appellate court itself save in certain well understood circumstances and situations such as by way of review petition etc. The appellate courts earlier judgment could be questioned in appropriate circumstances by a writ petition in this Court if the same could be held to be maintainable in law. However, the course which was adopted in the instant case with a view to seek to travel beyond the first appellate courts judgment was not correct. It has been held in several decisions rendered in the cases that even a remand order passed by the appellate court at an earlier stage is final and if it is not questioned at the appropriate stage, then this Court will not allow the same to be questioned in a writ petition which is filed against the subsequent appellate courts judgment in proceedings which take place after the remand order. In this connection, attention may be drawn to a Division Bench pronouncement in Pritam Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, (1978 All LJ 186) where an exhaustive statement has been made regarding the law which regulates remand. Of course, the pronouncement is directly in relation to a question raised under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In the light of the discussion contained in the said judgment and taking into consideration the provisions contained in Section 13 (2) of the Ceiling Act. it seems to me that the position will be identical in the Ceiling law also as it exists in the Consolidation of Holdings Act. 5. Learned counsel next contended that in the instant case the second ceiling proceedings which took place before the Prescribed Authority, resulting in the passing of the order dated 8-6-1976, the appellate courts judgment dated 29-4-1977 and the subsequent order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 30-9-1977, were all without jurisdiction inasmuch as in the earlier ceiling proceedings the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 28-3-1975 had held 8 bighas 18 biswas of irrigated land of the petitioner to be surplus and it was not open to the Ceiling Authority to re-initiate the second ceiling proceedings by issuing a fresh notice under Section 10 (2), In this connection, learned counsel placed reliance on Section 31 (3) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U. P. Act No. 20 of 1976). Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the latest Division Bench pronouncement in Krishna Kumar v. State of U. P. (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 3073 of 1977, decided on 21-9-1979). It should be seen that this contention is not really open to the petitioner in the circumstances of the case. When the second ceiling proceedings were started by issuance of a fresh notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act, the petitioner should have taken an objection against the said notice. Further, this objection should have been pressed before the Prescribed Authority and thereafter before the appellate court in the appeal which had been pressed at the earlier occasion. It is obvious that this was not done. The issues as they stand in Annexure 2 clearly show that this point was never pressed before the Prescribed Authority and Annexure 3 again shows that this contention was not raised before the appellate court. It is obvious that this was not done. The issues as they stand in Annexure 2 clearly show that this point was never pressed before the Prescribed Authority and Annexure 3 again shows that this contention was not raised before the appellate court. I have already held above that the appellate courts said judgment became final as it was not questioned by appropriate proceedings. In this view of the matter, it was not open to the petitioner to seek to raise the said controversy before the appellate court when the subsequent appeal was filed after the proceedings had taken place before the Prescribed Authority after the remand. 6. Further, it should be seen that it is not a pure controversy of law which was sought to be raised. It can- not be denied that in consequence of certain amendments which had been made by the U. P. Act No. 2 of 1975, it was open to the ceiling authorities to redetermine the ceiling area and the surplus land of the tenure-holder. This position stands clearly crystallised from the transitory provisions contained in Section 31 of the U. P. Act No. 20 of 1976. If the petitioner wanted to contend that compared to the situation as it existed when the earlier ceiling proceedings took place, no such change in law had taken place as would have justified the reopening of the earlier ceiling proceedings, then it was necessary that the necessary material should have been placed before the Prescribed Authority which would have shown as to how in C. L. H. Form 3, which had been issued earlier, the land had been classified and determined as surplus and in what manner the C. L. H. Form 3, which was issued in the second ceiling proceedings differed in its classification of such land from the earlier C. L. H. Form 3, issued in the earlier ceiling proceedings. Therefore, it will not be correct to think that there was absolutely a lack of jurisdiction. The controversy which could have been raised was bound to be one of the nature of a mixed question of law and fact and the same cannot be allowed to be raised in the manner it was sought to be raised in the lower appellate court by the petitioner in the subsequent appeal filed by him. 7. The petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. However, Mr. 7. The petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. However, Mr. Tripathi made a request on behalf of the petitioner that he may be allowed to express his choice in respect of the land which is to be given as surplus. In view of the law laid down by a learned single Judge in Bharat Singh v. State of U. P. (1977 All WC 407: (1977 All LJ 375)), which stands affirmed by the Division Bench pronouncement in Meharban Singh v. S. D. M, 11978 All LR (SOC) 92), I think the petitioner's prayer should be accepted subject to the qualification that if the petitioner has not lost his rights in the surplus land in any of the proceedings under Section 14 of the Act, the Prescribed Authority will allow him to express his choice and such choice as far as possible will be accepted in accordance with the provisions of Section 12-A of the Act. It has been repeatedly emphasised by this Court that the clear legislative intention is that a conscientious effort be made to accept the choice of the tenure-holder and direct accordingly. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.