JUDGMENT This Rule is directed against Order no. 67 dated January 20, 1979 whereby the learned Munsif allowed an application under Order 6, rule 17, C.P.C. made by the present opp. party with a view to adding some words indicating that the application which was originally made under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act would be regarded as one made under section 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. The application which was originally made by the present opp. party was one under section 8 of the W.B. Land Reforms Act but latter, when the present petitioner put in his petition of objection to the said application under section 8 stating as the subject matter of the proceeding was a tank an application under section 8 of the W.B.L.R. Act would not lie, for according to the definition of land as it stood after the amendment in 1971 of section 2(7) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 'tank' ceased to be included within the meaning of agricultural land, an application for amendment referred to above was made on behalf of the present opposite party who was the original applicant before the learned Munsif. The impugned order is the Order of the learned Munsif which was made allowing the application under order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Mr. C.D. Roy Choudhury, learned Advocate appearing in support of the Rule, contends that the learned Munsif acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction in allowing the application under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act inasmuch as the relief claimed stood barred by limitation at the date of the filing of the application for amendment. In view of my decision rendered in an unreported case, namely, (1) Civil Revision Case No. 3743 of 1978 which was disposed of on 24.1.80, I find no substance in this contention of Mr. Roy Choudhury. Here as already pointed out the only amendment asked for is to incorporate in the application the fact that the application is one under section 24 of West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and not one under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. In my judgment referred to above I relied upon several decisions including the decisions in (2) Debabrata Bhowmik v. Sm. Nanibala Shom, AIR 1978, Cal. In my judgment referred to above I relied upon several decisions including the decisions in (2) Debabrata Bhowmik v. Sm. Nanibala Shom, AIR 1978, Cal. 482 (3) Kishandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba, 33 Bom. 644. (4) Pingonda Hangonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil & Ors. AIR 1975 S.C. 363 and (5) Bisweswar Bajpayee & Ors. v. Joggeswar Bajpayee & Anr. 70 C.W.N. 1095. A reference to the decisions in the cases referred to above as also to (6) Monoharlal v. N.B.M. Supplies, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267 will make it clear that even though as a general rule an amendment ought not to be allowed after the lapse of the period of limitation, In cases where the court finds that in the interest of justice the amendment ought to be allowed the law of limitation would not stand on the way of the court allowing such amendment. The law on this subject has been very succinctly stated in the following words appearing in the decision in said Monoharlal's case, "Rules of procedure are intended to be a hand-maid to the administration of justice. A party, can not be refused the relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always given leave to amend the pleading of party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting malafide, or that by his blunder he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side". Thus it appears that when justice requires an amendment to be allowed the court can not refuse to allow such amendment merely because of some mistake, inadvertence, infraction of rules of procedure or even negligence, The Court may refuse to allow an amendment when such amendment is found necessary by the court only in cases where the party applying for an amendment was acting malafide or he, by his blunder, caused such injury to the opponent as may not be compensated for by cost. It is significant to note that the Supreme Court in that case holds that however negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. Here injustice obviously means injustice which cannot be compensated for by cost or, in other words, irreparable injury. 3. In the present case the transfer which forms the basis of the original application for pre-emption under section 8 of the W.B. Land Reforms Act was effected on October 1, 1973. The opp. party who was the applicant under section 8 of the W.B. Land Reforms Act states that he came to know of this transfer on October 5, 1973 and the application under section 8 was filed on December 12, 1973. Thereafter on August 30, 1974 the petition of objection was filed wherein it was stated, inter alia, that as the tank is not comprehended within the meaning of the definition of land as appearing in section 2(7) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act the application under section 8 was not maintainable. On September 15, 1978 the said application for amendment under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. was made. 4. In the circumstances aforesaid Mr. Chandidas Roy Chaudhury further argues that when the fact that the subject matter was a tank and that accordingly application under section 8 of the W.B. Land Reforms Act would not lie was made known to the opp. party through the petition of objection filed in the court below the opp. party should have asked for amendment without loss of further time. But instead of so doing the opposite party neglected to ask for an amendment till September 15, 1978. In these circumstances Mr. C.D. Roy Chaudhury, argues that the court below should have disallowed the prayer for amendment. From the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above it will appear that even though there was negligence on the part of the party applying for amendment that would be no ground for refusing to allow the prayer for amendment if in the interest of justice the court otherwise holds that the amendment ought to be allowed. Thus even negligence in not preferring an application for amendment for a long time would by itself be no ground for refusing the prayer for amendment. 5. Lastly, Mr. Thus even negligence in not preferring an application for amendment for a long time would by itself be no ground for refusing the prayer for amendment. 5. Lastly, Mr. C.D. Roy Chaudhury points to the fact that in the present case there was a delay of more than four years even from the date of the petition of objection referred to above and the court below should not have on that ground allowed the prayer for amendment. This is practically the repetition of the arguments of Mr. Roy Chaudhury which have been discussed in the just proceeding paragraph and I find no substance in this contention as well. 6. All the contentions of Mr. Roy Choudhury fail and the Rule ought to be discharged but in the facts and circumstances of the case the present petitioner ought to be awarded some cost in view of the fact that there was considerable delay on the part of the opposite party in asking for amendment of the original application. 7. Accordingly, the Rule is discharged subject to the condition that the opposite party herein should pay to the present petitioner and put in the trial court to the credit of the petitioner a sum of Rs. 100/- (one hundred) within a month from date. In default the rule will be made absolute and the impugned order should stand vacated. Records be sent down as quickly as possible.