JUDGMENT S.J. Hyder, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents in a representative capacity under the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They claimed an injunction restraining the defendants-appellants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs and the members of the Ansar community over the land in dispute and the trees standing thereon. The claim of the plaintiffs-respondents found favour with the two courts below. In the result the trial court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs which was affirmed in appeal by the 1st Additional Civil Judge Jaunpur. Aggrieved, the defendants-appellants have now come up in second appeal before this court. 2. The plaintiffs respondents stated in their statement of claim that the land in dispute was a public graveyard and was being used from time immemorial by the members of the Ansar community for burying their dead and that a large number of graves exist in the said land. It was also disclosed that the land contained a number of the trees which were appurtenant to the graveyard and were to be utilised for its purposes. According to the plaintiff-respondents, the defendants-appellants, with the connivance of the landlords, wanted to plough and sow the land in dispute and to cut and remove the trees standing thereon. It was on these allegations that they sought the relief stated above. 3. The defendants-appellants contested the suit on the ground that the land in dispute was not a graveyard and that the members of the Ansar community had nothing to do with it. They claimed to be the bhumidhar of the land in dispute. They pleaded that the suit was barred by Sections 34, 54 and 56 of the Specific Relief Act. They also pleaded that the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents was barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence and that the suit was bad for non-compliance of the provisions of law contained in Sections 52 and 53 of U.P. Act 13 of 1936. 4. In this state of pleadings, the trial court struck a number of issues. It decided all the material issues in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents and decreed their suit. As already stated, the appeal filed by the defendants-appellants also failed. In consequence, the defendants-appellants have approached this court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. 4. In this state of pleadings, the trial court struck a number of issues. It decided all the material issues in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents and decreed their suit. As already stated, the appeal filed by the defendants-appellants also failed. In consequence, the defendants-appellants have approached this court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants urged that the land in dispute was situate in a village and that consequent on the abolition of Zamindari, all estates vested in the State Government under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. It was urged by him that the land in dispute was also a part of the estate and had become the property of the State Government which, in its turn vested it in the Gaon Sabha by means of a notification under Section 117 of the Act. According to him, the findings of the two courts below that the land in dispute was a graveyard and the trees standing thereon were appurtenant to the graveyard is vitiated by manifest error of law. He placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this court reported in Mohammad Nagi Khan v. State of U.P. 6. The argument urged on behalf for the defendants-appellants, at first blush, appears to be attractive. However, on a closer examination, the said arguments cannot be sustained and has to be overruled. 7. True it is that in Mohammad Nagi Khan's case (supra) a Division Bench of this court held that the combined effect of Sections 4 and 6 and 117 of the Act was that the land constituting a graveyard and the trees standing thereon vested in Gaon Sabha which was competent to dispose of the same in the exercise of its powers of management. The said decisions, if I may say with respect, is binding on me. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-respondents has not been able to point out any error in the said decision which may induce me to refer this second appeal to a larger Bench for decision. 8. The said decisions, if I may say with respect, is binding on me. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-respondents has not been able to point out any error in the said decision which may induce me to refer this second appeal to a larger Bench for decision. 8. Assuming, as I must assume, in view of the above cited authority, that the land in dispute and the trees standing thereon are vested in the Gaon Sabha, the question which arises for decision is whether after coming into force of the Act, the land in dispute had ceased to possess the character of a graveyard. In case the land in dispute was treated as a waqf, then the ownership of the same would have vested in the Almighty. However, the Division Bench in Mohammad Naqi Khan's case has expressly laid down that on the enforcement of the Act, the ownership of the Almighty ceased and the land in dispute became vested in the State Government who in its turn vested it for the purposes of management only to the Gaon Sabha. 9. Right to bury ones dead is, however a customary right and if that right was being exercised from time immemorial, the customary nature of the right cannot be said to have terminated on the issue of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The notional ownership of the land in dispute is not very material for the decision of this case. The land in dispute may be in the ownership of the Almighty or it may belong to the State Government. But the customary right which was being exercised by the members of the Ansar Community in the land in dispute could not terminate or come to an end after the coming into force of the Act. 10. Section 4 of the Act no doubt lays down that on the issue of the notification under that section all estates situated in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State from the date specified in the notice free from all encumbrances. A customary right of the nature claimed by the plaintiff cannot be said to be an encumbrance within the well understood can notation of the word encumbrance. To hold otherwise would result in the disruption of the entire fabric of the rural life. A customary right of the nature claimed by the plaintiff cannot be said to be an encumbrance within the well understood can notation of the word encumbrance. To hold otherwise would result in the disruption of the entire fabric of the rural life. There are numerous customary rights which have an ancient origin and are well recognised in the State. To enumerate some of such rights, one may refer to the right of grazing cattle, taking water from a channel or using a pond for the purpose of making bricks for houses. The entire object of the Act is to abolish the right of the intermediaries and the tenure holders and to confer fresh rights on them to the extent indicated in the Act itself. Customary rights claimed by determinant body of rural inhabitants were not intended to be affected or prejudiced by the Act. No provision in the Act has been brought to my notice from which this startling conclusion may be drawn. 11. The land in dispute and the trees standing thereon may have been vested for the purpose of management in the Gaon Sabha. The said management, however, could be exercised by the Gaon Sabha in accordance with the well recognised principles. The trees standing on the land in dispute being intended for the purpose of the graveyard, the Gaon Sabha has no right or authority to cut and remove the trees and to use the price thereof for its general Purposes. As has been pointed out by a single Judge of this Court in Khuda Bux v. Gaon Sabha Berotha, 1972 RD 172 the trees were planted in the graveyard for the purpose of giving shade and for using their plants for covering the dead bodies which were to be buried in the graveyard. Instead of the Mutwalli or the person incharge of the graveyard before the coming into force of the Act, this duty now devolves on the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha. 12. In view of the discussion made above, I see no force in this second appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs.