JUDGMENT R.R. Rastogi, J. -This is plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit, filed by him, for permanent injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from continuing their coal depot, in their house no. 18, situated in Mohalla Garhi Gorwan in the town of Muzaffarnagar. It was alleged that the plaintiff lived with his family in his house no. 38, situated in Mohalla Babar Kassaban at a distance of about 15 ft. towards the north of the house of tHe defendants, that earlier the defendants were using their house for residential purposes, but, about 8 or 10 days before the filing of the suit they opened a coal depot. In their house and on account of the coal depot, coal particles enter his house and cause great inconvenience to him and to his family members. Coal dust also causes damage to his clothes and food and that amounted to nuisance, it was alleged that particularly at the time of the unloading of the trucks which was made by the defendants in front of his house coal dust and particles of coal spread all around and it becomes difficult even to breathe. The plaintiff also claimed right of easement in respect of fresh air and alleged that because of the defendants coal depot, the air was polluted. Since the defendants did not remove their coal depot, despite repeated protests, the plaintiff filed this suit. 2. The defence was that the coal depot had been in existence since two years before the filing of the suit and that unloading of the coal from trucks and other vehicles used to be done only after every two or three months. It was denied that the plaintiff had any right of easement as claimed and it was also denied that the plaintiff lived in the aforesaid house. It was, further, pleaded that the road in front of parties houses is about 30 ft. in width and no inconvenience was being caused to the plaintiff because of the coal depot and dust and coal particles do not enter the plaintiffs house. 3. The trial Court framed a number of issues and held that the plaintiff lived with his family in house no. in width and no inconvenience was being caused to the plaintiff because of the coal depot and dust and coal particles do not enter the plaintiffs house. 3. The trial Court framed a number of issues and held that the plaintiff lived with his family in house no. 38, that he had no right of easement as claimed, that the defendants had been unloading coal from trucks and other vehicles in front of plaintiffs house and on that account coal dust enters his house and spoils his meals, clothes and walls and that amounts to nuisance. The trial Court hence decreed the suit partly, restraining the defendants from loading and unloading coal in front of the plaintiffs house. Parties were directed to bear their own costs. From that judgment and decree the plaintiff filed an appeal while the defendant filed cross-objection claiming that the suit should have been dismissed in entirety. 4. The question which thus arose before the lower appellate Court was whether the loading and unloading of the coal from trucks and other vehicles on the road in front of the plaintiffs house amounted to a nuisance. The court below confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the defendants had been unloading coal from trucks and other vehicles on the road in front of the plaintiffs house. However, taking into consideration the facts that unloading of the coal was not a regular feature but was being done periodically only, that there were two more coal depots, existing in that locality since before and lastly that the plaintiff-appellant had not produced any witness of the neighbourhood to corroborate his case that the unloading of the coal was actionable. According to the Court below there had been no material interference with the ordinary comfort and convenience of life to which the plaintiff-appellant was entitled under normal circumstances. Accordingly the suit was dismissed in toto. hence this further appeal. 5. According to Halsburys Laws of England (Third Edition Vol. According to the Court below there had been no material interference with the ordinary comfort and convenience of life to which the plaintiff-appellant was entitled under normal circumstances. Accordingly the suit was dismissed in toto. hence this further appeal. 5. According to Halsburys Laws of England (Third Edition Vol. 28, page 126) 'Nuisances may be broadly divided into (1) acts not warranted by law or omissions to discharge a legal duty, which acts or omissions obstruct or cause inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all of them, (2) acts or omissions which have been designated or treated as nuisances by statute; (3) acts or omissions generally but not always or necessarily connected with the user or occupation of land which cause damage to another person in connection with the latters user of land or interference with the enjoyment of land or of some right connected with the land. The present case would fall within the third category i. e. of a private nuisance. Whether any thing is a nuisance or not is a question to be determined not merely by an abstract consideration of the thing itself but with reference to its circumstances; and where a locality is used for the purpose of carrying on a trade or manufacture, the fact that such trade or manufacture does not exist elsewhere, not far from the place, cannot be left out of account. As pointed out by Clerk and Lindsell, the affairs of life in a dense neighbourhood cannot be carried on without mutual sacrifice of . comfort and in all actions for discomfort the law must regard the principle of mutual adjustment, and the notion that the degree of discomfort, which might sustain an action under some circumstances, must therefore do so under all circumstances is as untenable as the notion that if the act complained of was done in a convenient time and place, it must, therefore, be justified, whatever was the degree of annoyance that was occasioned thereby. This passage was quoted from "Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 6th Edition, page 419, by a Division Bench of this Court in Behari Lal v. James Mac-lean, AIR 1924 All 392. This passage was quoted from "Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 6th Edition, page 419, by a Division Bench of this Court in Behari Lal v. James Mac-lean, AIR 1924 All 392. In that case the plaintiff who owned a house in the city of Farrukhabad, claimed an actionable nuisance arising from a flour mill by an oil engine belonging to the defendant installed in his house behind the house of the plaintiff. The principle laid down by this Court was :- "A discomfort to be actionable should be substantial, it should be substantial not merely with reference to the plaintiff; it must be of such a degree that it would be substantial to any person, occupying the premises of the plaintiff, irrespective of his position in life, age, or state of health. As pointed out by Lord Westbury in St. Helens Smelting Co. v.Tipping, (1865) 11 HL Cases 642, there is a distinction between an action for a nuisance in respect of an Act producing a material injury to property, and one brought in respect of an act producing personal discomfort. As to the latter a person must, in the interest of the public generally, submit to the discomfort of the circumstances of the place, and the trades carried on around him. The nature of the interference has to be examined in each case in the light of the circumstances of the place, where the thing complained of actually occurs, and the degree of inconvenience caused must determine the nature of the relief to which the person complaining may be entitled." 6. The present case is one brought in respect of an act producing personal discomfort and for such an act the plaintiff must in the interest of the public generally submit to the discomfort of the circumstances of the place and the trades carried on around him. The plaintiff lives in a town and it is necessary that he should subject himself to the consequences of those operations or trade which may be earned on in his immediate locality, which are actually necessary for trade and commerce and also for enjoyment of the property and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town and of the public at large. However, if it is found that as a result of the impugned coal depot, there is a material or substantial interference with the ordinary physical comfort and convenience of the plaintiff, then different considerations would unquestionably arise. 7. It would not be out of place to refer a decision of the Travancore Cochin High Court in the case of George Phillip v. Subbammal, AIR 1957 Trav-Co 281, which was based on almost similar set of facts. In that case the plaintiffs who were the owners of a garden land brought an action for abatement of nuisance caused by the construction of a cashew nuts factory in the neighbouring compound. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court and the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the High Court. The view taken was : "Every little discomfort or inconvenience cannot be brought on to the category of actionable nuisance. Consistent with the circumstances under which a person is living, he may have to put up with a certain amount of inevitable annoyance or inconvenience. But if such inconvenience or annoyance exceeds all reasonable limits, then the same would amount to actionable nuisance. The question as to what would be a reasonable limit in a given case, will have to be determined on a consideration as to whether there has been a material interference with the ordinary comfort and convenience of life under normal circumstances." 8. It was, further, observed :-- "Due importance has also to be given to a consideration of the aspect as to whether the undertaking, which is the source of the nuisance, is a new or extraordinary one, or is only one of common occurrence in that particular locality. In order to constitute an act of nuisance, there must be interference with the use or enjoyment of land, or of some right over or in connection with it, causing damage to the plaintiff." On the facts of the case the dismissal of that suit was upheld by that Court. In order to constitute an act of nuisance, there must be interference with the use or enjoyment of land, or of some right over or in connection with it, causing damage to the plaintiff." On the facts of the case the dismissal of that suit was upheld by that Court. In Muhammad Mohidin Sait v. The Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras, (1902) ILR 25 Mad 118, where because of a burial and burning ground opened by the Municipal Commissioner for the City of Madras, the plaintiff, who owned premises in the neighbourhood complained that his premises in consequence thereof had become unhealthy, insanitary, and unfit for residential purposes, and that his property had deteriorated in value and it was even found that the burning ground was to some extent a source of nuisance (to persons), who occupied plaintiffs premises and that the market value of the premises had been depreciated by the opening of the burial ground, it was held that no actionable nuisance had beer, proved. Notice was taken of the fact that the plaintiff himself carried on business as a tanner and a sewage farm existed in the immediate neighbourhood. It was also found in that case that the number of corpses burnt was about one every three days and die nearest burning platform was at a distance of about 485 ft from plaintiffs premises. On the basis of those facts, the view taken was that no appreciable nuisance was caused by the burning of corpses to persons occupying the plaintiffs premises. It was observed that in order to be entitled to an injunction or damages the plaintiff must show that the injury suffered by him is not merely a nominal but real and substantial. 9. It was submitted before me on be half of the plaintiff-appellant that D. W. 1 Dr. Ali Raza Chowdhary who is a medical practitioner resides in the same locality, admits that coal dust would spoil meals and would blacken the walls and that being so, every time the defendants-respondents unloaded coal in front of the appellants house, his meals would be spooled and the walls of his house would become black and thus, there was constant nuisance caused to him. I do not think that simply because of that consequence it could De said that the plaintiff would suffer any material or substantial damage. I do not think that simply because of that consequence it could De said that the plaintiff would suffer any material or substantial damage. It has been found as a fact by the court below that there are two more coal depots, existing since long before in the same locality secondly that the unloading of the coal by the defendants-respondents is not a daily feature but occurs after interval of several months and lastly that the plaintiff appellant did not produce any witness of the neighbourhood to prove that any such discomfort or inconvenience is caused to the residents of that locality as complained of by the plaintiff himself. On these facts it cannot e said that the finding recorded by die court below that the plaintiff failed to prove that the existence of the coal depot; causes any material interference with the ordinary comfort and convenience to which under normal circumstances and keeping in view the locality concerned, the plaintiff appellant is entitled, can be disturbed. In my opinion therefore, the finding recorded by the court below is perfectly justified and no interference whatsoever is called for. 10. The appeal is, hence, dismissed with costs to the defendants-respondents.