JUDGMENT The matter relates to the violation of an order of restraint passed by this Court on 16.4.1979 against the respondents in the following circumstances. 2 The first appeal in question was filed by defendant no. 1 against the final decree. The decree holders put the decree into execution in Execution Case No. 6 of 1975 and took delivery of possession sometime in the year 1976. Thereafter they also started making construction on one of the plots over which a house stood. This led to the filing of an application by the appellants under the provisions of Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an order of interim injunction against the respondents restraning them from making any construction over plot nos. 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41. This appllcation was put up for consideration before a Bench on 16.4.1979 and the Court restrained the respondents "from proceeding with further construction, if any, from tomorrow". Status quo as it existed on that day was ordered to be maintained. This order was made operative for a period of three months only from the date of the order under a hope that the first appeal itself would be disposed of within that time. Liberty was, however, given to the respondents to re-agitate before the Court the question whether they should he permitted to proceed with further construction of latrine and bath room in case the appeal was not disposed of within the stipulated period of three months. This order was passed in presence of the counsel of both the parties and in any event it is oat disputed that this order was also communicated to the parties at their residence. 3. On 16.4.1979 the appellant made an application under rule 2A of Order XXXIX of the Code alleging that Dr. R.K. Sinha, respondent no. 6 disobeyed the order of restraint passed by this Court inasmuch as he was continuing with the construction over the plots in question over which status quo as on 16.4.1979 was ordered to be maintained. In support of his allegations the appellant also filed certain reports as annexures. The allegations were refuted by the respondents by their counter affidavit filed on 17.5.1979, in which they took the position that they had not committed any violation of the order of restraint and the construction, if any, had been made only upto 16.4.1979. In support of his allegations the appellant also filed certain reports as annexures. The allegations were refuted by the respondents by their counter affidavit filed on 17.5.1979, in which they took the position that they had not committed any violation of the order of restraint and the construction, if any, had been made only upto 16.4.1979. Earlier to the filing of the counter affidavit on 20.4.1979, the appellant had filed a petition under section 151 or the Code alleging therein that the appellant has come to know that the respondents are collecting masons and labaurers for completing the construction over night even in defiance of this Hon’ble Court's order". On these allegations a prayer was made for appointing a survey knowing pleader commissioner to ascertain the facts as alleged in the petition in question. This prayer was allowed by this Court by order dated 25.4.1979 and directed the Subordinate Judge, Hajipur, namely, the trial court to "forthwith appoint a survey knowing advocate commissioner fur the purpose of inspecting the disputed properties (bearing plot nos. 37 to 41) and ascertaining the extent of the construction standing on the disputed land on the date of inspection and submitted a report." We are informed by the learned counsel for the appellant that no pleader commissioner has been appointed so far. 4. The petition for the alleged disobedience of the order of injunction and the counter-affidavit of the respondents was placed for orders on 18.5.1979 and in view of the fact that the trial court and not appointed any survey knowing pleader commissioner, this Court appointed Shri Keshav Shrivastava a practising advocate, on the agreement of both the parties," to go to Hajipur and make a local visual inspection and then report with regard to the construction of latrine, bathroom and a room which are alleged to have been constructed by Dr. R. K. Sinha. Sri Shrivastava inspected the site on 19.3.1979 and submitted his report which is on the record. It may be mentioned that the first appeal itself was dismissed on a statement of the learned counsel for the appellant that this would not be pressed. 5. The office has now put up the petition and the counter affidavit along with the report of the Advocate commissioner and the objection tiled on behalf of the respondents to the report of the advocate commissioner for our consideration. 6. 5. The office has now put up the petition and the counter affidavit along with the report of the Advocate commissioner and the objection tiled on behalf of the respondents to the report of the advocate commissioner for our consideration. 6. When the matter was taking up Mr. Prem Lal raised a preliminary objection that in view of the dismissal of the appeal itself this Court bas since become functus officio and no order could be passed on the petition filed by the appellant for alleged disobedience of the order of injunction. Mr. Krishna Prakash Sinha learned counsel appearing for the appellant, on the other hand, contended that notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal this Court was fully competent to deal with the matter and pass an appropriate order in this regard. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the dismissal of the appeal has got any bearing on the powers of this Court to make an order under rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code. Sub-rule (1) of rule 21A provides that : "in the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach or any of the terms of which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order of any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property or the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to he attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release." Rule 2A has been inserted by the Amendment Act, of 1976 in place of sub-rules (3) and (4) of rule 2. It cannot be disputed teat disobedience of an order of injunction is contempt of Court and sub rule (1) of rule 2A confers on courts the power to punish the contemner, and, further prescribes the punishment to be awarded therefor. The sub-rule provides punishment for not only disobedience of the order of temporary injunction but also for breach of any term subject to which injunction may have been granted, It is, therefore, obvious that as long as the injunction continues the person against whom it is issued cannot disobey it. The sub-rule provides punishment for not only disobedience of the order of temporary injunction but also for breach of any term subject to which injunction may have been granted, It is, therefore, obvious that as long as the injunction continues the person against whom it is issued cannot disobey it. If injunction is disobeyed during its continuance, the person holds himself liable for contempt, punishable under this rule. The argument of Mr. Prem Lal, however, is based upon a decision of a learned single Judge of Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Shankar V. Suraj Prasad where it was no doubt observed by the learned Judge that after a suit or an appeal is concluded the courts become functus officio and cannot pass any order for disobedience as it can pass an order for disobedience only as long as the suit is proceeding. On examining the authority we find that the decision is based upon the rule which was substituted by the Allahabad High Court in place of the existing provisions under sub-rules (3) and (4) of rule 2 Order XXXIX. In the old provision as contained under sub-rule (3) also the Court "granting injunction" was competent to order the property of the person guilty of disobedience or breach to be attached and to detain such person in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months. In its place the rule that was substituted by the Allababad High Court is that: "In the case of disobedience to an injunction issued under sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 2A or of breach of any terms of any such injunction the court, in which the suit is proceeding may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach, to be attached and may also order such person to be detained In civil prison for a term not exceeding six months, unless in the meantime the court directs his release." The learned Judge, therefore, on a perusal of the old and the new rule as substituted by the Allahabad High court, took the view that power to punish was only confined to the court In which the suit was proceeding. The learned Judge himself has made observation that the latter expression that is the expression used in the central rule "was wide enough and allowed the court which granted injunction to dispose of the matter relating to disobedience at any time. But the substituted expression has now limited the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court can only pass an order on an application for disobedience of injunction as long as the suit is proceeding. Once the suit is concluded whether in the original court or in appeal, the Court would become functus officio for the purpose of taking any action or passing any order on the application for disobedience of injunction.' The Allahabad decision itself, therefore, gives ample support to the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that dismissal of the suit would not cease the power of the Court to pass appropriate orders in the matter of the alleged disobedience of the order of Injunction passed by the Court. Nonetheless, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court as far back as in the year 1917 in the case of Ottapurakkal Thazath Suppi Vs. Alabi Mashur Koyanna Koya Kunhi Koya has very clearly laid down that if a disobedience or breach of Injunction granted under Order XXXIX Rule 2 (2) has occurred and an application for action was filed under sub-rule (3) while the suit was pending and the injunction had not been dissolved, a subsequent dissolution of the injunction by the dismissal of the suit can in no way excuse the party who had already disobeyed it. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in the above case, and, therefore, rejecting the contention of Mr. Prem Lal we hold that the dismissal of the appeal does not debar this Court to pass an order against the person who is alleged to have violated the order of injunction. 7. Having thus answered the question of law raised for our consideration, we now proceed to decide the merits of the case. Prem Lal we hold that the dismissal of the appeal does not debar this Court to pass an order against the person who is alleged to have violated the order of injunction. 7. Having thus answered the question of law raised for our consideration, we now proceed to decide the merits of the case. We have already said that the allegation of disobedience made by the appellant has been controverted by the respondents although there is a report of an advocate of this Court who made local inspection besides certain other reports filed as annexures to the petition filed under rule 2A by the appellant, since the nature of the proceeding is punitive and exposes the contemner to imprisonment besides taking of other steps against him, we think on the facts of the present case that it would be desirable that a clear finding may be recorded as to the fact of alleged disobedience on proper evidence and materials brought on the record. In order to save time of this Court, we would direct the trial court, namely, the Subordinate Judge, Hajipur to make an enquiry in the matter and submit his report within a period of three months from the receipt of the records. It will be open to the parties to adduce such evidence as they may deem fit and proper in the case. Enquiry ordered.