JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This is a defendants petition directed against the orders passed by the courts below disposing of a preliminary issue relating to the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain a suit filed by the respondent no. 2 against the petitioners for a declaration that an order passed by the District Inspector of Schools under the provisions of Section 16-G (2) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act granting the approval to the committee of management of the petitioner no. 1 college with regard to the action of the dismissal taken by the college against the respondent no. 2 was null and void. 2. The relevant facts are these:- The respondent no. 2 filed a suit for declaration that an order of approval dated 19-5-1978 passed by the District Inspector of Schools approving the the action of the committee of management of the college purporting to dismiss the petitioner from service was null and void and that the defendants be restrained from interfering with the functioning of the respondent no. 2 as teacher in the petitioner no. 1 college. The suit was based on the assertion that the action taken by the committee of management seeking to terminate the services of the petitioner was null and void. It was asserted that the plaintiff was not given adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the management and that he did not have sufficient opportunity to defend himself. The action of the District Inspector of Schools granting approval to the action proposed to be taken by the committee of management was also challenged in the suit on the ground that he had not been served with a show cause notice. The defendants contested the suit on a variety or grounds. One of the pleas taken in the defence was that the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 16 G (4) of the U P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The trial court struck the preliminary issue relating to the jurisdiction of the court which' ran thus :- "Whether the suit is barred under Section 16-G (4) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921?" 3. The trial court considered the above as a preliminary issue answered it against the defendant holding that the suit was not barred by Section 16-G (4) of the aforesaid Act. The trial court considered the above as a preliminary issue answered it against the defendant holding that the suit was not barred by Section 16-G (4) of the aforesaid Act. The defendants thereupon filed a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned District Judge. Fatehpur. The learned District Judge has dismissed the revision agreeing with the view taken by the trial court as regards to the jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance of the suit. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the defendants who are respect lively the collage and the Principal of the college of which the respondent no. 2 was the teacher have filed this petition Counsel for the petitioner has submitted-that the suit filed by the plaintiff respondent was clearly barred by Section 16-G (4) and the view taken by the courts below to the contrary is manifestly erroneous in law Counsel for the respondent no. 2 supported the order passed by the courts below on merits. He also took a preliminary objection. The preliminary objection was that the petitioner no. 1 is an Intermediate College and not the managing committee of the college and not being a juristic person, was hot entitled to file this petition. I find no merits in the preliminary objection. The petitioners no. 1 and 2 are the parties whom the plaintiff himself has arrayed as defendants nos. 1 and 2 in the suit. As the defendants in the suit the petitioners are clearly entitled to challenge the orders passed by the courts below holding that the suit was not barred by Section 16 G (4). 5. Coming to the merits of the case, in order to appreciate the respective submissions, it will be useful to have the provisions of Section 16-G (4) extracted here. Section 16-G (4) runs thus :- "An order made or decision given by the competent authority under sub-section (3) shall not be questioned in any court and the parties concerned shall be bound to execute the direction contained in the order or decision within the period that may be specified therein." 6. The bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is express and unambiguous. The bar will apply, in my judgment, to all causes in which the actions of the authorities mentioned in Section 16-G is challenged. The bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is express and unambiguous. The bar will apply, in my judgment, to all causes in which the actions of the authorities mentioned in Section 16-G is challenged. The only exception possibly would be in those causes where the impugned action is beyond the ambit of powers of the authorities purporting to exercise the powers which are specified under Section 16-G. The present suit is certainly not a case which falls in the category of these exceptions. In paragraph is of the plaint, the plaintiff has listed the various of grounds of attack which mainly are that the petitioner was not given adequate opportunity to defend himself in the disciplinary enquiry which was conducted against the petitioner and that the petitioner was not afforded by the District inspector of Schools adequate opportunity to defend himself. I have perused the grounds of attack set and in paragraph 10, and find that none of the grounds bring the case within the category of actions which can be described as ultra vires the authority. The plaintiff does not dispute that the authority which took action against him was empowered to take actions. The grievance, however, is that in the exercise of that power, the authority, acted improperly. Such grounds of attack do not, in my judgment, take the case out of the mischief of Section 16-G (4). Each one of the grounds of attack listed in paragraph 10 of the plaint or also where in the plaint is a ground which could be clearly a ground of appeal which is provided under the Act itself. The bar of Section 16 G (4) was, therefore, clearly attracted to the facts of the present case. Both the courts below as well as counsel for the respondent no. 2 placed strong relience on a case reported in 1970 ALJ 4 04 at page 409. S. P. Tiwari v. Managing Committee. Counsel for the respondent placed particular emphasis on paragraph 13 of the decision which reads as follows : - "An argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner was that, as the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court to enquire into the legality or termination of service is barred by the provisos of Section 16-G (4) of the Act, this court should consider this matter under Article 226 of the Constitution. I am unable to construe Section' 6-G (4) of the Act so widely. Provisions barring jurisdiction or ordinary courts are to be strictly and narrowly construed. It seems to me that Section 16-G (4) only prevents an ordinary civil court from questioning the propriety of the approval or disapproval and of any consequential direction given by educational authorities. It protects the actions of the authorities functioning under Section 16-G (4) but not the action of the institution complained against. The decisions given by the Inspector or the Appellate Authority do not have the force of res judicata binding upon parties in a civil suit. An action for a breach of contract and damages by an aggrieved party against an institution could not be barred by the provisions of Section 16 G (4). This was the view which I took also in Munna Lal Agarwal v. State of U. P." 7. This is the passage on which the courts below have also realised. In my view, the learned Judge deciding the case of S. P. Tiwari has not said anything which may in the slightest degree assist the contention raised by the plaintiff. In the first place, it is important to note that the learned Judge who decided the case of S. P. Tiwari (supra) was dealing with a writ petition which was directed against the orders passed by the authorities under Section 16-G of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. The case had not arisen out of any suit. The observations referred to above had been made in answer to an argument raised by the respondents in the writ petition to the effect that the writ petition was barred by the provisions of Section 16-G (4) of the Act just as a suit would be barred under that provision. It was white dealing with this argument that the learned Judge made the observations quoted above. The learned Judge has clearly said that Section 16-G (4) protects the actions of the authorities functioning under Section 16-G. That being so, the case from assisting the plaintiff fully supports the contention raised by counsel for the petitioner. In the present case, the main relief is directed against the action of approval taken by the District Inspector of Schools. The action complained of is the action which clearly falls within the four corner of Section 16G. In the present case, the main relief is directed against the action of approval taken by the District Inspector of Schools. The action complained of is the action which clearly falls within the four corner of Section 16G. The bar of Section 16-G (4) was, therefore, attracted in terms of that section. The courts bellow fell into a patent error of law in holding otherwise. 8. Counsel for the respondent urged that if the impugned orders are quashed and the suit is dismissed as not maintainable, the respondent no. 2 might be deprived of the opportunity to amend the plaint by which he may ask for a relief on damages. This petition has to be decided on the basis of the plaint as it stands. As the suit stands today, it is certainly barred by Section 16-G (4). If, however, the petitioner is entitled to any other relief such as damages, he may claim the same by seeking his remedy in appropriate proceedings and by instituting proper suit. The orders passed in this writ petition shall not in any way effect the rights of the plaintiff to claim any such relief if he is so entitled. 9. In view of what has been stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders pissed by the courts below dated 8-5-1979 are quashed. Suit no. 177 of 1978 filed by the respondent no. 2 is dismissed as not maintainable. The parties will bear their own cost of this petition.