JUDGMENT : A.N. VARMA, J. 1. This is a husband's petition. It is directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts u/s 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act directing that the custody of the children of the Petitioner be given to his wife, Respondent No. 3, Shrimati Anjali Bajpai and further that the Petitioner should pay a maintenance allowance of Rs. 150/- per month for each of the two children. 2. The relevant facts are these. The Petitioner and the Respondent No. 3 were married on 1-10-1973. Two children were born out of the wedlock, namely, Hemant Bajpai (son) born on 28-6-75 and Shalini Bajpai (daughter) born on 15-4-77. It appears that the relations between the husband and the wife became strained. Ultimately on 4-8-79, according to the husband, the wife left the marital home, while according to the wife, she was kicked out because of illicit relations which had developed between the Petitioner and one Dr. (Miss) Maya Agarwal. 3. On 28-11-1979, Respondent No. 3, the wife filed petition u/s 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce on grounds of cruelty. She also moved an application (paper No. 13-C) u/s 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 4-12-79 for the custody of the children, who were said to have been forcibly snatched from her on 4-8-1979 as well as for their maintenance. The application was opposed by the husband. He asserted that the welfare of the children demanded that they be left with the father and not with the mother. 4. The trial court considered the allegations and counter-allegations and came to the conclusion that the custody of the children ought to be allowed to remain with the mother and not with the father. The trial court directed by the same order, the husband to pay a sum of Rs. 150/- per month to the wife for the maintenance of each of the two children. 5. Aggrieved by this order, the husband filed an appeal which was later converted into a Revision. The learned District Judge concurred with the trial court and held that there was no reason why the children ought not be left in the custody of the mother in preference to the father. The writ petition is directed against these orders. 6. 5. Aggrieved by this order, the husband filed an appeal which was later converted into a Revision. The learned District Judge concurred with the trial court and held that there was no reason why the children ought not be left in the custody of the mother in preference to the father. The writ petition is directed against these orders. 6. Counsel for the Petitioner submitted firstly that so far as the son of the Petitioner is concerned, the courts below ought to have laid proper emphasis on the fact that the son would attain the age of five years on 26-5-80 was urged that the fact that u/s 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, in the case of children of less then five years of age, ordinarily their custody should be with the mother ought not to have been over-emphasised by the courts below. 7. u/s 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the relevant part of Section 6 of the aforesaid reads as follows, it is provided that the custody of the minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother.; The natural guardian of Hindu minor, in respect of minor's person as well as in respect of minor's property (excluding his or her undivided interest in a joint family property), are--(a) in the case of a boy or any unmarried girl--father, and after him the mother, provided that the custody of minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; 8. The learned District Judge hearing the Revision before whom a similar argument was advanced construed this provision as meaning that unless there are some exceptional circumstances, the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years ought to be left with the mother. The learned Judge, then examined the circumstances of the case and came to the conclusion that the Petitioner failed to establish any such exceptional circumstances which may justify leaving the custody of the minor with the father in preference to the mother. The learned Judge, then examined the circumstances of the case and came to the conclusion that the Petitioner failed to establish any such exceptional circumstances which may justify leaving the custody of the minor with the father in preference to the mother. The learned District Judge has observed that u/s 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act itself, there is a provision that orders passed for the custody of the children under that provision could be reviewed from time to time, and that consequently, it would be open to the Petitioner to apply to the court for a change in the custody of the son after the son had attained the age of five years. 9. Counsel for the Petitioner vehemently contended that a minor is not like a property which may change hands from time to time. He submitted that in view of the fact that the son was going to attain the age of five years in June 1980, the courts below ought not to have given the custody at least of the son to the mother. I do not agree with the contention. 10. The provisions of Section 6 the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, are clear and unambiguous. Admittedly, both on the date on which the application u/s 26 was moved by the mother as well as the date on which the impugned orders were passed, the minor son was less than five years. The provisions of Section 6 of the Act were, therefore, applicable in terms and the courts below had placed reliance on them. In directing, therefore, that the custody of the minors be given to mother rather than the father, following the above statutory mandate, the courts cannot be said to have committed any error, nor can they be said to have exercised their discretion improperly. The learned District Judge was entitled to and was justified in passing the order In favour of the mother, as in his opinion, there were no compelling or exceptional circumstances justifying deviation from the normal rule embodied in Section 6 of the Act. The mere fact that the son Hemant was going to attain the age of five in June, 1980, in my judgment, did no exclude the applicability of the rule embodied in Section 6. The rule was fully applicable to the facts of the case. I, therefore, find no substance in the first argument. 11. The mere fact that the son Hemant was going to attain the age of five in June, 1980, in my judgment, did no exclude the applicability of the rule embodied in Section 6. The rule was fully applicable to the facts of the case. I, therefore, find no substance in the first argument. 11. Counsel for the Petitioner next submitted that the courts below have erred in any case in allowing the custody of the children with the mother, as the mother has neither sufficient means to support the children, nor has she a permanent place of residence. It may be mentioned here that neither of these two grounds was urged before the courts below, in opposition to the application of the wife. What was urged before the courts below was that the mother was a Punjabi lady and had a way of life totally different from that of the Petitioner. It was asserted that the mother was leading a way of life which was opposed to the traditions of the family. The learned District Judge rightly rejected these allegations as completely vague and indefinite. In my opinion these allegations do not justify a departure from the normal rule laid down in Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The Petitioner was unable to substantiate these allegations with reference to any concrete fact relevant for determining the question whether or not, she (the wife) is a fit and proper person to be given the custody of the children. 12. As regards the means of the mother to look after the children, the Respondent No. 3 had in the application (Paper No. 13-C) not only prayed for the custody of the children but also for maintenance of the children. The courts below have granted a maintenance of Rs. 150/- per month in respect of each of the two children. That direction, in my view will take care of the children, assuming that the mother does not have any other independent source of income. 13. As for the residence, the allegation of the wife is that she had been turned out of the marital home. The husband on the other hand asserts that she walked out of the marital home of her own free will. 13. As for the residence, the allegation of the wife is that she had been turned out of the marital home. The husband on the other hand asserts that she walked out of the marital home of her own free will. Be that as it may, the fact remains the husband had sought an injunction restraining the wife from entering into the marital home in any case. The wife has stated in her counter-affidavit that she was compelled to take a house on rent for the residence of her children. I am, therefore, not satisfied that the custody of the children should be refused to the wife on the mere allegation that she does not have any permanent place of residence. At any rate, I find no ground to interfere with the orders passed by the courts below. The grounds on which the courts below have turned down the claim of the Petitioner are legal and proper and call for no interference. 14. Counsel for the Petitioner lastly urged that the children had been directed to be produced before the court on the date of final hearing of the Revision. It was urged that the learned District Judge ought to have ascertained the wishes of the children even though the children may have been of tender age. It was contended that the wishes of the children would have been a very safe guide as regards the parent with whom their custody ought to be left. I find no substance in this argument. The children were directed to be produced before the court on the date of final hearing upon an application moved by the wife to the effect that the husband had removed the children from the jurisdiction of the court and that, therefore, it was necessary to direct the husband to produce the children so that their custody may be given to the mother immediately. 15. Upon the pronouncement of the order, there is a dispute between the parties whether the children were in fact produced before the court or not. However, the fact remains that the Petitioner himself made no application before the court for ascertaining the wishes of the children. An allegation has been made in the writ petition that an oral request was made to this effect. That allegation has been denied in the counter-affidavit as totally baseless. However, the fact remains that the Petitioner himself made no application before the court for ascertaining the wishes of the children. An allegation has been made in the writ petition that an oral request was made to this effect. That allegation has been denied in the counter-affidavit as totally baseless. Had the Petitioner really wanted the court to ascertain the wishes of the children, he would have requested the court to do so. He did not do so. The argument has, therefore, no merits. It is an afterthought. 16. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 brought to my notice the memorandum of appeal which was filed by the Petitioner, a true copy of which has been annexed as Annexure "3" to the counter-affidavit. In the memorandum of appeal, the prayer is that the minors be allowed to remain with their grandmother at Lucknow. The learned District Judge has rightly observed that as between the mother and the grand-mother, the custody of the children ought to be left with the former. 17. For the reasons mentioned above, I am satisfied that the orders passed by the courts below are legal and proper and call for no interference by this Court. 18. There are no merits in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The stay order is hereby vacated.