ORDER A.N. Varma, J. -This is a tenants petition. It is directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below decreeing a suit filed by respondent No. 3, Mahant Onkar Ashram, the landlord, for the eviction of the petitioners from an accommodation which was let out to the petitioners by the respondent No. 3 on a monthly rental of Rs. 45/-. 2. The relevant facts are these. The respondent No. 3 filed a suit for the ejectment of the petitioners on the ground that they had not paid any rent for the period 1-6-1970 to 28-2-1971 despite a notice of demand dated 25th March, 1971 which was served on the defendants on 26-3-1971. 3. The petitioners contested the suit. They filed a written statement, a true copy of which has been filed with the I rejoinder affidavit as Annexure A1 in. I para 18 of this written statement, it was specifically asserted that the rent for the period 1-6-1970 to 28-2-1971 was not due, and that the landlord had, therefore, no right to demand the same through his notice dated 25-3-1971. In the written statement, the case pleaded by the petitioners was that the defendant had cleared off the entire arrears of rent, and that no rent was due from the defendant on the date of the said notice of demand. 4. By means of an amendment introduced by U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1972, O. 15, Rule 5 of the Civil P. C. was amended providing for striking off the defence of a tenant defendant, who does not deposit the entire arrears of rent admitted to be- due from him along with certain other I sums of money mentioned in Order 15,. Rule 5 of the Civil P. C. on the first date of hearing. Relying on this provision, the plaintiff filed an application for striking off the defence of the petitioners. The defendant objected. By an order dated 18-9-1972, the trial court overruled the objection of the petitioners and directed the striking off the defence of the petitioners. Having struck off the defence, the trial court proceeded to dispose of the suit itself, and by a decree dated 20-9-1973, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed for the ejectment of the defendants as well as for recovery of Rs. Having struck off the defence, the trial court proceeded to dispose of the suit itself, and by a decree dated 20-9-1973, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed for the ejectment of the defendants as well as for recovery of Rs. 510/- as arrears of rent and mesne profits in addition to damages, pendente lite and future, calculated at the rate of Rs. 45/- per annum. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decree dated 20-9-1973, the petitioners filed a Revision which was allowed by an order dated 6-12-1974. The learned District Judge took the view that Order 50, R. 1 of the Civil P. C. which makes certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to suits triable by Judge Small Causes, was amended only on 20-10-1973, as a result of which the provisions of Order 15, Rule 5, C. P. C. were also included among the provisions applicable to the suits of the nature mentioned above. The learned District Judge, therefore, held that on the date on which the trial court had directed the defence of the petitioners to be struck off, that is on 18-9-1973, the trial court had no power to do so. The case, was, therefore, remanded to the trial court for being disposed of afresh. 6. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved an application (Paper No. 79/C) purporting to be under Order 15, Rule 5 of the Civil P. C. for striking off the defence of the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners had not deposited the requisite amount under that provision on the first date of the hearing of the suit. By an order dated 15-7-1975, the trial court held that the amount deposited by the petitioners in court under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Civil P. C. was short of the amounts required to be deposited by Rs. 83/- as up to June, 1976, and, therefore, their defence was liable to be struck off and by an order dated 15-7-1975, the trial court ordered accordingly. 7. The petitioners filed a revision against the aforesaid order which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Varanasi, by an order dated 22-9-1977. Thereafter, the suit proceeded on merits and was decreed by the trial court on 9-2-1978. 7. The petitioners filed a revision against the aforesaid order which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Varanasi, by an order dated 22-9-1977. Thereafter, the suit proceeded on merits and was decreed by the trial court on 9-2-1978. A revision filed by the petitioners under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against the said decree was also dismissed by the learned V Additional District Judge, Varanasi, by an order dated 12-4-1979. Hence this petition. 8. It may be stated at this stage that an attempt was made by the petitioners before the learned District Judge hearing the Revision against the final decree, challenging the correctness of the orders passed by the trial court and affirmed in revision striking off the defence of the petitioners, but the court below overruled that objection on the short ground that the matter had become final between the parties and could not, therefore, be allowed to be challenged in the same proceedings. 9. Having heard counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that this petition has to be allowed. 9-A. Counsel for the petitioners first submitted that the view taken by the learned District Judge that it was not open to the petitioners to challenge the correctness of the orders passed by the trial court (as affirmed in revision) striking off the defence, was manifestly erroneous in law. The argument was that the said order was at best an interlocutory order passed at an intermediate stage which not being appealable could be challenged in a revision filed against the final order or decree passed by the trial court. In support, he placed reliance on AIR 1960 SC 941 (at p. 947), AIR 1972 SC 1201 and AIR 1964 SC 993 (1000-1001). 10. The second argument raised by counsel was that the orders passed by the trial court and the Revisional Court striking off the defence were on the face of them manifestly unsustainable in law inasmuch as in calculating the rent which the petitioners were required to deposit under Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C., they also took into account the rent for the period 1-6-1970 to 28-2-1971 even though the petitioners had specifically denied that rent for this period was due. The contention was that under O. XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. only admitted arrears of rent were required to be deposited. 11. The contention was that under O. XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. only admitted arrears of rent were required to be deposited. 11. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand urged that the orders striking off the defence of the petitioners had become final and could not be challenged by the petitioners in the same proceeding at a subsequent stage, they having failed to challenge the said orders by way of a writ petition when they were passed. 12. As regards the second point, counsel for the respondents submitted that the finding of the courts below that there was a deficiency of Rs. 83/- in the deposit made by the petitioners was a finding of fact not liable to be challenged in a writ petition. I shall first take up the question whether it is open to the petitioners to challenge the correctness of the orders passed by the trial court and the Revisional court striking off the defence of the petitioners. 13. In my judgment, while it is correct that the Revisional Court being a court of coordinate jurisdiction, could not, while hearing a Revision against the final orders or decree passed by the trial court, entertain a challenge to the orders passed by his predecessor as well as by the order passed by the trial court striking off the defence of the petitioners, this Court is not debarred by any provision of law or principle from considering the correctness of these orders in a petition filed against the final decree passed against the petitioners I am fortified in this view by a pronouncement of the Supreme Court (See Jasraj Indersingh v. Hemraj Multan Chand, AIR 1977 SC 1011 ). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : "14. Be that as it may, in an appeal against the High Courts finding, the Supreme Court is not bound by what the High Court might have held in its remand order. It is true that a subordinate court is bound by the direction of the High Court. It is equally true that the same High Court, hearing the matter on a second occasion or any other court of coordinate authority hearing the matter cannot discard the earlier holding, but a finding in a remand order cannot bind a higher court when it comes up in appeal before it. It is equally true that the same High Court, hearing the matter on a second occasion or any other court of coordinate authority hearing the matter cannot discard the earlier holding, but a finding in a remand order cannot bind a higher court when it comes up in appeal before it. This is the correct view of the law, although Shri Phadke controverted it, without reliance on any authority. Nor did Shri S. T. Desai, who asserted this proposition, which we regard as correct, cite any precedent of this court in support. However, it transpires that in Lonankuktty v. Thomman, (1976) 3 SCC 528 : ( AIR 1976 SC 1645 ), this proposition has been affirmed. Viewed simplistically, the remand order by the High Court is a finding in an intermediate stage of the same litigation. When it came to the trial court and escalated to the High Court, it remained the same litigation. The appeal before the Supreme Court is from the suit as a whole and, therefore, the entire subject matter is available for adjudication before us. If, on any other principle of finality statutorily conferred or on account of res judicata attracted by a decision in an allied litigation the matter is concluded, we too are bound in the Supreme Court. Otherwise, the whole list for the first time comes to this Court and the High Courts finding at an intermediate stage does not prevent examination of the position of law by this Court. Intermediate stages of the litigation and orders passed at those stages have a provisional finality. After discussing various aspects of the matter, Chandrachud, J. speaking for the Court in Lonankuttys case observed:- "The circumstance that the remanding judgment of the High Court was not appealed against, assuming that an appeal lay therefrom, cannot preclude the appellant from challenging the correctness of the view taken by the High Court in that judgment". The contention barred before the High Court is still available to be canvassed before this Court when it seeks to pronounce finally on the entirety of the suit." The above dictum completely covers the controversy in my judgment. The order striking off the defence was an interlocutory order and was at best a finding given at intermediate stage. It partook the character of interlocutory orders which are merely steps towards the decision of the dispute between the parties. The order striking off the defence was an interlocutory order and was at best a finding given at intermediate stage. It partook the character of interlocutory orders which are merely steps towards the decision of the dispute between the parties. These orders do not have the force of a judgment disposing of either the suit or any controversy touching substantive rights of the parties. The order striking off the defence had, therefore, only a provisional finality and not being appealable, the petitioners cannot be held barred by any principle from raising its correctness in a petition filed against the final decree. 14. I, therefore, hold that this Court can certainly examine for itself whether the order striking off the defence passed by the courts below was correct. 15. Now on the merits of the order striking off the defence. Both the trial court as well as the revisional court have undoubtedly taken into account the arrears of rent claimed by the petitioners for the period 1-6-1970 to 28-2-1971 in determining the question whether the petitioners had not failed to deposit the amounts contemplated under Order XV, R. 5, C. P. C. This was obviously wrong. For, Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. requires deposit of the admitted arrears of rent only and not the arrears of rent claimed by the plaintiff. That the defendant is required only to deposit the admitted arrears of rent is obvious from the plain language of the statute. However, if any authority is needed, one may refer to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Surendra Nath Dubey v. Shakuntala Devi, Civil Revn. No. 1154 of 1977 connected with Civil Revn. No. 1163 of 1977 (decided on 16-1-1980) (reported in AIR 1980 All 136 ). It has there been ruled that where the defendant does not admit any arrears of rent or damages for use or occupation, he was not required to deposit the same under Order XV, Rule 5. The orders passed by the trial court on 15-7-1975 and 22-9-1977 holding that the petitioners defence was liable to be struck off being based upon an erroneous view of the law, are thus manifestly unsustainable. The orders passed by the trial court on 15-7-1975 and 22-9-1977 holding that the petitioners defence was liable to be struck off being based upon an erroneous view of the law, are thus manifestly unsustainable. If the arrears of rent for the period 1-6-1970 to 28-2-1971 are excluded from consideration, it is obvious that on the own findings of the two courts below, the defendants cannot be said to have failed to deposit the arrears of rent. According to the learned District Judge, there was deficiency of only Rs. 83/-. The defence of the petitioners was thus struck off illegally. 16. Counsel for the petitioners also vehemently argued that the courts below fell into a patent error of law in taking the view that in a case to which the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. were attracted, there was no discretion left in the Court. The court had no option but to strike off the defence. In support counsel placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court rendered on November 28, 1979 in Civil Revn. No. 2646 of 1977 (reported in 1980 All LJ 690) Brij Gopal v. Ratan Chand. Counsel for the respondents on the other hand placed reliance on two single Judge decisions of this Court reported in 1979 All LR (SOC) p. 78: (1979 All LJ 706) Pati Ram v. Sukhram and 1979 All LR 320 : ( AIR 1979 All 359 ) Beni Madhav Misra v. Shiv Gopal. In the first of these two cases, it was observed that the court had no option but to strike off the defence where the defendant fails to make the deposit as contemplated by Order XV, Rule 5 on or before the first date of hearing. The second case cited by counsel for the respondents has no bearing on the issue involved. In the case of Brij Gopal (supra), a Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether any discretion was left with the court under Order XV, Rule 5, Civil P. C. in some depth. It noticed the various decisions of this Court in which apparently conflicting views were expressed. In the case of Brij Gopal (supra), a Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether any discretion was left with the court under Order XV, Rule 5, Civil P. C. in some depth. It noticed the various decisions of this Court in which apparently conflicting views were expressed. The Division Bench ultimately concluded; that it was not correct to say that no discretion was left with the court in a case covered by Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. where the defendant fails to deposit the amounts contemplated under Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. as it stood prior to its amendment by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976. It may be added here that on the facts of the present case, the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. as they stood prior to their amendment by U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976 would apply. 17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length on this issue, I am clearly of the view that Order XV, Rule 5 of the Civil P. C. does not compel the court to strike off the defence. It only vests a discretion in the court to strike off the defence. This view is fully supported by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Brij Gopal (supra). The trial court, was, therefore, clearly in error in taking the view that it had no option but to strike off the defence and that it had no discretion in the matter. The orders passed by the trial court as well as the learned District Judge dated 15-7-1975 and 22-9-1977, are therefore, both liable to be set aside for both the aforesaid reasons, namely, as regards the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation which the defendants were required to deposit under Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. as well as the ambit and nature of powers exercisable under Order XV, Rule 5, C. P. C. The decrees passed by the courts below pursuant to these orders are also consequently liable to be set aside. 18. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this petition succeeds and is allowed. 18. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders passed by the trial court dated 15-7-1975 and that passed by the learned Additional District Judge Varanasi dated 22-9-1977 as well as the decree passed by the trial court dated 9-2-1978 and the order passed by the learned V Additional District Judge dated 12-4-1979 are all quashed. The case is remanded to the trial court for a decision afresh of the suit as well as of the question whether the defence of the petitioners is liable to be struck off under Order XV, Rule 5 of Civil P. C., according to law, having regard to the observations made herein. 19. The parties will bear their own costs of this petition.