JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Kisan Mazdoor Intermediate College at village Attrara, Pargana Sarawa, District Meerut, is run under a scheme of administration framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act. It is common case of the parties that an election to constitute the committee of management of the said college was held on 26th June, 1978. The parties are however divided on the question as to who were the persons who were elected to constitute the committee of management. According to the petitioners a committee of management having petitioner No. 1 as its manager was constituted on that date. Chandra Kiran Singh Tyagi, respondent No. 2, however, asserted that no such committee as alleged by the petitioners was elected on that date and that another committee of management of which he was the manager had been elected. The matter was referred to the District Inspector of Schools, respondent No. 1, who by his order dated 8th Aug., 1978, held that the committee of management of which the petitioner No. 1 was the manager was the duly constituted committee. A Suit No. 440 of 1978 was thereafter instituted in the Court of the Civil Judge Meerut, on behalf of the rival committee of management and an application for ad interim injunction restraining petitioner No. 1 and other defendants from interfering with the working of the management and control of the plaintiffs was also made. This application was dismissed by the 1st Addl. Civil Judge, Meerut, on 17th Aug., 1978, on the ground that since the plaintiffs were not in the effective control of the college an interim order could not be granted to disturb the status quo. He, however, took the view that the case of the plaintiffs appeared to be prima facie correct and observed that the District Inspector of Schools "should review his order in the interest of justice to put the real elected party in a position to control and manage the affairs of the college." He further observed that if the plaintiffs so wanted they could approach the District Inspector of Schools with a prayer to review his order. Thereafter at the instance of respondent No. 2 the District Inspector of Schools passed another order on 13th Oct., 1979, whereby he recalled his earlier order dated 8th Aug., 1978, and held that the committee of management as asserted by Chandra Kiran Singh Tyagi, respondent No. 2, had been elected in the meeting held on 26th June, 1978, and gave recognition to that committee of management. It is this order of the District Inspector of Schools which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioners that the District Inspector of Schools having passed his order dated 8th Aug., 1978, after considering the case of the rival claimants became functus officio and did not have jurisdiction to review that order notwithstanding the observations made by the 1st Addl. Civil Judge while dismissing the injunction application as aforesaid and the impugned order was consequently without jurisdiction. 3. Since cases have been frequently coming to this Court wherein the District Inspectors of Schools in the (matter of granting recognition to a duly elected committee of management have been found passing successive orders we find it necessary to consider the scope and the extent of the power which can be exercised by (the District Inspectors of Schools in this matter. In Committee of Management, S. A. V. Inter-College v. District Inspector of Schools, Writ Petn. No. 12725 of 1975, decided on 24th Nov., 1977, a Division Bench of this Court held "Under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act as well as under the High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971, the District Inspector of Schools has to perform various administrative functions of statutory character in collaboration with the management of High Schools and Intermediate Colleges. These duties cannot be discharged by the District Inspector of Schools unless he is in a position to find out on an administrative level as to who are the real office-bearers of the college. For this limited purpose the District Inspector of Schools must of necessity satisfy himself as to who, according to him, are validly elected office-bearers of the institution. If any party feels dissatisfied with the administrative decision taken by the Distt. For this limited purpose the District Inspector of Schools must of necessity satisfy himself as to who, according to him, are validly elected office-bearers of the institution. If any party feels dissatisfied with the administrative decision taken by the Distt. Inspector of Schools he is at liberty to file a suit against the rival claimants for adjudication of their rights either as office-bearers or as members of the Managing Committee. In the event of a decree being obtained by such a party there can be little doubt that the District Inspector of Schools, in case he has taken a wrong decision, will alter his decision and will recognise that party in whose favour decision has been given judicially." In Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools (1978 All WC 124) it came to the notice of this Court that a request was made to the District Inspector of Schools to give recognition to a Committee of Management said to have been duly elected but he refused to go into the matter on the ground that since a dispute had been raised on behalf of the old Committee of Management in regard to the validity of the election in which a fresh committee of management was said to have been constituted he would continue to recognise the old committee of management till the dispute was decided either by a competent court or by the parties amicably. A Division Bench of this Court after referring to the decision dated 24th Nov., 1977, in Writ Petn. No. 12725 of 1975 (supra) held that if the view taken by the District Inspector of Schools was upheld it was likely to lead to disastrous results. For instance even if in a given case fresh election may have validly taken place all that the office- bearers of the old committee of management, whose term has expired, need do is to raise a dispute before the District Inspector of Schools and thereby deprive the new office-bearers of the right to discharge their functions and themselves continue as office-bearers of the committee of management even though their term had expired. It was emphasised that merely because a dispute had been raised was not enough for the District Inspector of Schools to continue to recognise the old committee of management till the dispute was finally resolved either by a competent court or amicably. It was emphasised that merely because a dispute had been raised was not enough for the District Inspector of Schools to continue to recognise the old committee of management till the dispute was finally resolved either by a competent court or amicably. He had to go into the matter as to whether fresh election as asserted had been held. This was, however, to be done in a summary manner and on an administrative level. Committee of Management, Inter-College, Nonapur v. District Inspector of Schools (1979 All LJ 33) was a case wherein the District Inspector of Schools had reviewed an earlier order passed by him in the matter of granting recognition to a committee of management claiming to have been duly elected. This Court relying on an earlier decision in R.S. Chaube v. Distt. Inspector of Schools (1977 All LJ 451) held that in the absence of a specific power of review the District Inspector of Schools could not recall or revoke an earlier order passed by him unless the said order had been obtained by mistake, misrepresentation or fraud. It was also held that even in those cases where an earlier order was sought to be recalled or revoked on the ground that it had been obtained by mistake, misrepresentation or fraud it was incumbent on the District Inspector of Schools to give an opportunity of hearing to the person in whose favour the said order had been passed notwithstanding the fact that the jurisdiction exercised by the District Inspector of Schools in such matters was of a summary and administrative nature. In view of the aforesaid decisions and in view of the nature of the jurisdiction which the District Inspector of Schools exercises in the matter of recognition of a committee of management and further in view of the consequences of the orders which he passes we are of opinion that the following principles emerge in this behalf :- (1) The District Inspector of Schools does not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim made by rival committees of management, each one of them asserting to have been duly elected and to give a final decision thereon. No such power has been conferred on him either by the U. P. Intermediate Education Act or by the High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. No such power has been conferred on him either by the U. P. Intermediate Education Act or by the High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. The jurisdiction to decide such a dispute rests with the Civil Court. (2) Since the District Inspector of Schools under the aforesaid two Acts has to perform various administrative functions of statutory character in collaboration with the management of High Schools and Intermediate Colleges and since these duties cannot be discharged by him unless he is in a position to find out on an administrative level as to who are the real office-bearers of the college, he for this limited purpose must of necessity satisfy himself as to who, according to him, are the validly elected office-bearers of the institution. This satisfaction has to be reached by the District Inspector of Schools by making a summary enquiry on an administrative level. (3) The order so passed by the District Inspector of Schools does not have the effect of finally adjudicating upon the dispute between the parties. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to institute a suit in the Civil Court for appropriate relief and the decision given in the suit will alone have the effect of making a final and binding adjudication in the matter and the said decision will have to be given effect to by the District Inspector of Schools in supersession of the order that may have been passed by him earlier. (4) The inquiry which the District Inspector of Schools has to make for his satisfaction as aforesaid is to be confined to the question as to whether a fresh election has taken place and if so who are the persons who have been elected to constitute the committee of management. This inquiry is to be made by first ascertaining as to whether the meeting to hold the election had been convened in accordance with the requirements of the scheme of administration and any other relevant provision in this behalf applicable to the affairs of the society which runs the institution. If the meeting had been so convened reference should be made to the minutes of the meeting in order to find out as to who were the persons who were duly elected to constitute the committee of management. If the meeting had been so convened reference should be made to the minutes of the meeting in order to find out as to who were the persons who were duly elected to constitute the committee of management. Such disputes which the parties may raise before him which are contrary to the minutes of the meeting held and which involve decision of disputed questions of fact after taking evidence should be left open to be decided by the Civil Court in a suit which may be filed by the person aggrieved by the order of the District Inspector of Schools. (5) The District Inspector of Schools is not expected to write a detailed order as if it were a judgment of a Court of law. His order must, however, indicate that he has applied his mind to the controversy involved before him for if the order does not disclose application of mind it is likely to be termed arbitrary. (6) The District Inspector of Schools having once passed an order in the manner stated above does not have jurisdiction to review his order unless it is established that the said order had been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud or was the result of mistake in the sense that it was passed on incorrect facts and would not have at all been passed if the correct facts had been brought to his notice. These facts should, however, be such which go to the very root of the matter. The District Inspector of Schools has no power to review his earlier order on a fresh assessment of facts or law. (7) Even in those cases where it is established that the earlier order had been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud or had been given under mistake as aforesaid the District Inspector of Schools must not recall or revoke the said order without giving an opportunity of hearing to the person in whose favour the said order had been passed. (8) The opportunity of hearing which the District Inspector of Schools has to give either at the stage of passing the initial order or recalling or revoking it in the circumstances stated above is to be confined to giving the persons concerned an opportunity to put forward their case. It is not to be converted into a regular hearing as is done by a Civil Court. It is not to be converted into a regular hearing as is done by a Civil Court. The District Inspector of Schools has to keep in mind that the inquiry to be made by him is of a summary nature and on an administrative level meant to satisfy himself as to who, according to him, are the validly elected office-bearers of the committee of management. In other words the District Inspector of Schools should not arrogate to himself the jurisdiction of a Civil Court and thereby assume the power to decide the fate of the parties before him. 4. Coming to the facts of the instant case we must point out that we would have no difficulty in quashing the impugned order passed by the District Inspector of Schools whereby he recalled his earlier order dated 8t'n Aug., 1978, but for one circumstance, to be pointed out shortly, in view of which we are of opinion that it is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. A perusal of the order dated 8th Aug., 1978, passed by the District Inspector of Schools, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure I to the writ petition, will indicate that the District Inspector of Schools, virtually ignored the minutes of the meeting held on 26th of June, 1978, and decided the matter on the basis of a document filed before him purporting to be a declaration on behalf of 168 members out of 325, the total number of members entitled to vote, of their support to Jaswant Singh, petitioner, No. 1. He held that since 168 out of 325 members were in favour of Jaswant Singh only 157 members remain in respect of whom there could be a possibility that they were supporting Chandra Kiran, Singh Tyagi, respondent No. 2. In adopting this procedure the District Inspector of Schools, as pointed out above,1 virtually ignored the minutes of the meeting and really held another election and decided the matter on its basis. This was certainly beyond the competence of the District Inspector of Schools. The impugned order on the other hand has been passed on the basis of the minutes of the meeting held on 26th June, 1978. This was certainly beyond the competence of the District Inspector of Schools. The impugned order on the other hand has been passed on the basis of the minutes of the meeting held on 26th June, 1978. It is for this reason and for the further reason that the impugned order is subject to the decision of the Civil Court in a suit that may be instituted by the aggrieved person that we are of opinion that it is not a fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 6. Before parting with the case we find it necessary to point out that since neither the U. P. Intermediate Education Act nor the High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971, makes a provision for deciding a dispute raised by rival committees of management in regard to the validity of election in which they claim to have been elected and considerable time and expenditure is involved in getting an adjudication from a Civil Court consequent upon the District Inspector of Schools recognising one of the rival contenders as the duly constituted committee of management and further, since the experience of this Court has shown that the rate of litigation on this score is fairly high, it seems to be advisable that some tribunal may be constituted to decide such disputes as has been referred to above. 7. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The interim order is vacated, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment may be sent to the Judicial Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh for such action as may be considered advisable. 8. After the judgment was delivered an oral prayer was made for the grant of a certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion the case does not involve any such substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The prayer for the grant of the certificate is accordingly refused.