M. K. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THE accused has filed this criminal miscellaneous application aggrieved by an order passed by the learned Sessions Judge Surendranagar in criminal revision application No. 31 of 1979 dismissing the said application of the accused and confirming the order dated 30/06/1979 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First class Bajana below Ex. 7 in criminal case No. 173 of 1979 praying for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was barred by limitation. ( 2 ) UNDER sec. 468 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code it is provided that Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-sec. (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. Sub-sec. (2) prescribed period of limitation at: (A) six months if the offence is punishable with fine only; (B) one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. In the instant case the offence would be punishable for a period not exceeding six months and therefore the court would be barred from taking cognizance after expiry of the year 1977 as the period during which the offence are alleged to have been committed ended with the year 1976 unless it is shown that the court can take cognizance as per the provisions contained elsewhere in the Code. Commencement of the period of limitation as shown in sec. 469 (1) is (a) on the date of the offence or (b) if the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer whichever is earlier. Clause (c) is not relevant for our purpose. Sec. 470 provides for exclusion of time in certain cases and as per the Explanation to sec. 470-in computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be excluded. 470-in computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be excluded. The next section material for our purpose is sec. 473 and it reads thus:notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter any court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. ( 3 ) IN the instant case the prosecution tried to explain the delay by saying that the District Co-operative officer made an inquiry in the matter and he submitted his report to the Assistant Registrar of Money lending. The inquiry was starred on 7-4-1977 and thereafter the complaint was filed on 29-1-1979. It was also sought to be explained on the ground that time was also taken in getting sanction from the competent authority for which an order was passed on 6-12-1978 in pursuance of an application made on 19-10-1978. ( 4 ) THE learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that though no previous sanction of the Registrar was necessary as such in filing the complaint and in that way the provisions with regard to Explanation to sec. 473 of the Code would not be automatically applicable yet the learned Magistrate was entitled to take into consideration the fact that under the scheme of the Act the District Co-operative Officer was bound to obtain previous permission of the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar for taking any penal action and that as the court has been given full discretion to take cognizance of a case after the expiry of the period of limitation and if it is satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that delay has been properly explained or it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice the court can take cognizance even after the expiry of period of limitation. He agreed with the view taken by the learned Magistrate that delay had been properly explained and that in any event this was a case in which it was absolutely necessary to take cognizance of the case in the interest of justice. ( 5 ) MR. D. D. Vyas the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner accused draws my attention to the fact that as per the material on record the only time which can be excluded would be the time of one month and half between 19-10-1978 when the letter for sanction was written and 6-12-1978 when the order of sanction was passed and that it cannot be said that delay is properly explained even if it is taken that for the first time the complainant came to know about the offence when they received an application in this behalf on 23-3-1977. The period begins to run from that date which would expire on 22-3-1978 and even if period of one and half months taken for sanction is excluded then also the period would expire on 7-4-1978 and there is no explanation with regard to the rest of the period that is-the unexpired period of over 72 months thereafter. ( 6 ) I find considerable force in this submission of Mr. Vyas and I accept the same. But I am unable to accept his second submission that both the courts erred in their view that this was a fit case in which the court should take cognizance of the case after the expiry of limitation on the ground that it was necessary so to do in the interest of justice. ( 7 ) MR. K. J. Vaidya the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submits that the expression in the interest of justice is wide enough to include within its sweep the cases arising out of breach of such social and beneficial legislation as the Act which is enacted with the object of protecting economically weaker section of the community which is being exploited by money lenders who charge interest on the loans at exorbitant rates and indulge in fraudulent practices taking advantage of the need of the poor men who approach them for loans. ( 8 ) MR. ( 8 ) MR. Vyas on the other hand contends that the expression in the interest of justice should not be so construed as to result in causing injustice to one of the parties to the proceedings viz. the accused who has got a valuable right of defending himself against the prosecution on the ground of limitation which is now specially conferred on him by the new provisions contained in Chapter 36 of the Code. Mr. Vyas also draws my attention to the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limit- ation) Act 1974 which has been enacted to provide for inapplicability of the provisions of chapter 36 of the Code to certain economic offences punishable under the Act mentioned in sec. 2 of the said Economic Offences Act and that though as many as 20 acts are set out in the schedule as per sec. 2 the Act does not find a place therein and that therefore also it would be wrong to include as one of the grounds for arriving at the conclusion that it is necessary to take cognizance of the offence in the interest of justice the ground that the offence is one punishable under the Act which is a piece of social legislation enacted with the object of protecting weaker section of the people. ( 9 ) IN my opinion each case has to be decided on its own facts. In the instant case the trial Court exercised its jurisdiction inter alia on the ground that it was necessary so to do in the interest of justice in taking cognizance of the offence after the expiry of period of limitation. The revisional court also took the same view inter alia on the ground that the offence was one connected with the Act which was enacted for the protection of the weaker sections of the people who are being exploited by the professional money lenders. It has to be borne in mind that though the entire period between the expiry of the period of limitation and the filing of the complaint is not explained so far as a substantial part the- reof is concerned it is explained and for that matter properly explained as coming within the meaning of the first of the two counts on which cognizance can be taken after the period of limitation under sec. 473. 473. My attention was drawn to STATE OF GUJARAT V. CHUNILAL GORDHANBHAI 19 G. L. R. 603 wherein this court while interpreting the very expression came to the conclusion after referring to a number of decision and after considering the provisions of sec. 473 that the said expression it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice appearing at the conclusion of sec. 473 did not take its colour from the preceding words viz if it Court is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained and that the contention based on a reading of the principles of ejusdem generis cannot be sustained. I am fully in agreement with this interpretation and in this view of the matter also if delay is properly explained as in the instant case this court will be reluctant to interfere with a discretionary order passed by the trial court and confirmed by the revisional court when it is not shown that the discretion is not properly exercised or is exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. .