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1980 DIGILAW 554 (ALL)

Ram Phal v. Sheo Mangal

1980-05-07

S.D.AGARWALA

body1980
JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. -This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit filed for a mandatory injunction directing the respondents to demolish certain constructions alleged to have been made over plot No. 494/2 as also for a prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff-appellant and for recovery of Rs. 100/- as damages. 2. The case of the plaintiff-appellant was that he is Bhumidhar of plot No. 494/2 measuring 12 biswas and that the Gaon Sabha, Sarai Bir Singh executed a patta on 1st July, 1955 in his favour and that he has been in possession since then and has also obtained Bhumidhari sanad after depositing 10 times of rent. It was further alleged that the defendant-respondents wanted to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff-appellant and hence the necessity of filing the suit. The suit was contested by the defendants-respondents on the ground that the patta in question was fictitious and invalid in law. The plaintiff-appellant is neither the Bhumidhar nor in possession. It was further alleged that the plot in dispute contains trees planted by the ancestors of the defendants-respondents who have been in possession over the plot in dispute. It was further alleged that the suit was barred by time. 3. The trial court by its judgment dated 12th December, 1967 decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff-appellant is the Bhumidhar of plot No. 494/2. It was further held by the trial court that the constructions in suit are new and are liable to be removed. Against the judgment dated 12-12-1967 an appeal was filed before the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court by judgment dated 5th April, 1968 allowed the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the trial court resulting in the dismissal of the suit. The lower appellate court recorded a categorical finding of fact that the plaintiff-appellant was not the Bhumidhar of the land in dispute nor he has been in possession over the said land. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 5th April, 1968 the present appeal has been filed. 5. At the commencement of the hearing, learned counsel for the appellant urged that since the village in which the land in dispute is situate has come under the consolidation operation, the appeal as well as the suit abate. I therefore heard the parties at length on this question first. 6. 5. At the commencement of the hearing, learned counsel for the appellant urged that since the village in which the land in dispute is situate has come under the consolidation operation, the appeal as well as the suit abate. I therefore heard the parties at length on this question first. 6. Section 5 (2) (a) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which is relevant for the purposes of this case is as follows:- "(a) Every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated: Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard; Provided further that on the issue of the notification under sub-section 11) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part as the case may be, shall stand vacated." The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the question of title as to whether the plaintiff-appellant is the Bhumidhar of the land in dispute is involved in the case, it is the consolidation courts which could decide this question, and as such the provisions of sub-clause (a) mentioned above would apply. 7. In Hasrat v. Haridwar, 1973 All WR (HC) 325, Hon'ble K. N. Seth, J. held as follows :- "It is obvious that if under the provisions of the Act no proceeding could be taken for the adjudication of a dispute or no relief could be obtained from the consolidation authorities, the suit or proceeding in respect thereof pending in a court could not be abated...... ...... ........ .......... ......... ...... ........ .......... ......... It is true that before the suit could be decreed, the plaintiffs had to establish their rights over the land in dispute, but mere declaration of their right over the land would neither decide the controversy nor afford any relief to the plaintiffs. There being no provision in the Act under which the plaintiffs could proceed or the consolidation authorities could grant the relief of demolition of constructions, mere adjudication about the right of the plaintiffs over the land in dispute could be of no avail to them and such a declaration would leave the real dispute between the parties unresolved. If the real dispute between the parties could not possibly be decided by the consolidation authorities and no relief could be granted to the plaintiffs or if they are forced to file a suit after first obtaining a declaration of their rights over the land from the consolidation authorities, it would virtually amount to negation of their legal rights. I am not prepared to hold that in enacting Section 5 (2) (a) the legislature intended such a situation to arise." 8. In the instant case the relief of demolition as well as the injunction and damages have been claimed. None of these reliefs can be granted by the consolidation courts. Since no effective relief can be granted by the consolidation courts the mere fact that the question of title has also to be decided to grant the said relief, it cannot be said Section 5 (2) (a) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act would apply. The principles laid down in the case of Hasrat (supra) are fully applicable to the present case. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the appeal as well as the suit would not abate under Section 5 (2) (a) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant, thereafter raised contentions on the merits of the appeal. His first contention is that the lower appellate court has erred in holding that the Gaon Sabha had no right to execute the patta in favour of the appellant on 1st July, 1955. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant, thereafter raised contentions on the merits of the appeal. His first contention is that the lower appellate court has erred in holding that the Gaon Sabha had no right to execute the patta in favour of the appellant on 1st July, 1955. His second submission is that in any case even if the notification under Section 117 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was issued subsequently, then took the land being vacant land, the Gaon Sabha had the right to issue a patta under Section 195 (a) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The third submission of the learned counsel is that the respondents took steps for cancellation of the patta in which they did not succeed and the civil courts have no jurisdiction to cancel the patta executed in favour of the appellant. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the judgment of the lower appellate court and has also urged that in any case since the plaintiff-appellant has not been found in possession of the land in dispute, no injunction could be granted and the suit has to fail on this ground alone. 11. In support of the first submission learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a notification No. 1780/I-C-277-C-1953 dated March 31, 1955. The material terms of the notification are as follows:- "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act I of 1951), the Governor, Uttar Pradesh, is pleased to direct that the said Act shall, with effect from April 1, 1955, apply to estates or parts thereof which are owned by the State Government and administered as State property under the control of the Land Reforms Commissioner or which are Nazul and are under the management of a Collector and are situate in the districts specified in Schedule I, subject, in the case of estates or parts thereof in which an intermediary. as defined in clause (12) of Section 3 of the said Act has no right, title or interest, to modifications and amendment specified in Schedule II". as defined in clause (12) of Section 3 of the said Act has no right, title or interest, to modifications and amendment specified in Schedule II". The above notification only lays down that Zamindari Abolition and' Land Reforms Act will apply to the districts mentioned in Schedule I. It does not confer any power on the Gaon' Sabha to manage the land of the State Government. 12. The notification under Section 117 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 was issued on April 6, 1963. The relevant portion of the notification is quoted below:- "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 117 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No. I of 1951), as amended from time to time and as applied by notifications Nos. 1780/I-C277-C1953, 2779 (i)/I-C- 277-C-1953, 520/I-C-277-C1953 and 1157-AZ/-A-2153 (i)-58, dated March 31, 1955, June 28, 1955, July 1, 1958 and June 30, 1959, respectively to estate or parts thereof owned by the State Govt, and situate in the districts specified in Schedule I, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to declare that as from the date of the publication of this notification in the Gazette, the lands and things mentioned in Schedule II, as appertained to estates or parts thereof owned by the State Government on March 31, 1955, shall vest in the Gaon Sabhas in the circle of which such estates or parts thereof are situate." 13. It would therefore, be seen that it is only by notification dated 6th April, 1963 that the Government land to which the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was applied by virtue of the notification dated 31st March, 1955 vested in the Gaon Sabha. The view, therefore, taken by the lower appellate court that the Gaon Sabha had no jurisdiction to issue the patta in dispute is clearly in accordance with law. 14. Learned counsel then submitted that actually the patta was granted under Section 195 (a) of the Act as the land was vacant land. Under Section 195 the Gaon Sabha has right to admit any person as the sirdar of any land namely, vacant land. In the instant case, the patta which is Ext. 14 dated 1st July, 1955, clearly shows that sirdari rights were not conferred on the appellant by the said patta but only asami rights were conferred. Under Section 195 the Gaon Sabha has right to admit any person as the sirdar of any land namely, vacant land. In the instant case, the patta which is Ext. 14 dated 1st July, 1955, clearly shows that sirdari rights were not conferred on the appellant by the said patta but only asami rights were conferred. In the circumstances, the patta cannot be held to be valid under Section 195 (a) of the Act. The first and second submissions, therefore, made by the learned counsel for the appellant do not have substance. 15. In regard to the third submission, learned counsel specifically relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in, AIR 1977 All 360 : (1977 All LJ 310) (FB), Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha, Uskar Ghaziapur. In the case of Similesh Kumar the Full Bench of our court has taken the view that a lease or an allotment made by the Land Management Committee under the Land Reforms Act cannot be cancelled or set aside by the consolidation authorities under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The machinery provided under the Land Reforms Act is exclusive. If such lease or allotment is contrary to the provisions of Section 198 of the Land Reforms Act it would be voidable and the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to go into its validity and to hold the same inoperative so long as it has not been set aside by a competent court. 16. The principle laid down by the Full Bench is not disputed. In the instant case, however, it is not necessary to get the patta in favour of the plaintiff-appellant cancelled. The patta if taken to be valid which is Ext. 14 in the record only confers asami rights on the appellant. Since it confers asami rights the plaintiff-appellant cannot become Bhumidhar by the mere fact that he deposited 10 times rent. In Data Din v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1961 All LJ 526, a Division Bench of this court has taken the view that mere fact that a Bhumidhari Sanad has been issued in favour of a person does not confer Bhumidhari rights if, otherwise, he is not entitled to obtain Bhumidhari sanad. In the instant case, admittedly the patta executed in favour of the appellant was in respect of asami rights only even if it is taken to be valid. In the instant case, admittedly the patta executed in favour of the appellant was in respect of asami rights only even if it is taken to be valid. The asami cannot become Bhumidhar by a mere deposit of 10 times rent. In the instant case no benefit can be taken by the appellant on the mere issue of Bhumidhari sanad. In view of the above, I do not find any force in the third contention of the learned counsel for the appellant also. 17. The lower appellate court has recorded a finding that the plaintiff-appellant has not been in possession of the land in dispute. The finding of the lower appellate court further is that prior to the abolition of the Zamindari in 1963, the respondents were in possession. The lower appellate court was, therefore, right in holding that the plaintiff-appellant cannot get relief of a permanent injunction in the present suit. The argument made in this regard by the learned counsel for the respondents is well founded. 18. In the result, I do not find any force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.