JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—This petition under Section 397/401/482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with .Article 227 of the Constitution arises out of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code initiated at the instance of respondent No. 1, Smt. Tulu, against the present petitioners in the Court of the Executive Magistrate, Rampur. 2. It appears to be the common case of the parties that the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 29/36, Khasra No. 34 and 35 measuring 3.13 bighas, situate in village Bohali, Mauza Koti, Sub-Tehsil Kumarsain was owned and possessed by one Shri Het Rain who died issueless. Smt. Tulu respondent No. 1 is the real sister of the said Shri Het Ram. In her application filed under Section H5 of the Code on 6-10-75 Smt. Tulu alleged that she along with her husband Nantia had been residing and looking after Shri Het Ram for about 16 years immediately before his death. She further alleged that as Shri Het Ram was quite old and unable to cultivate his land himself, the land mentioned above was under herself cultivation since during the life time of Shri Het Ram. She continued to cultivate this land even after the death of Shri Het Ram. She further alleged that Shri Het Ram during his life time had made a will bequeathing his entire movable and immovable property including the land in question in her favour. The petitioners, however, set up a false claim that Shri Het Ram deceased had executed a will in favour of Shri Baldev Singh petitioner and in assertion of this false claim the petitioners on 28-9-1975 forcibly entered into the disputed land after tying respondent No. 1 with a rope and cut and removed the maize crop standing thereon which had been earlier cultivated by respondent No. 1. The petitioners thereafter forcibly ploughed that land and would not permit respondent No. 1 to enter therein. Respondent No. 1 was, therefore, apprehensive of danger to her life from the petitioners who were large in number in case she cared to enter into her own land. 3. This application under Section 145 of the Code was presented by Smt. Tulu respondent No. I before the Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) Rampur on 6-10-1975. The Executive Magistrate, Rampur called for the police report which was submitted to him on 31-12-1975. 3. This application under Section 145 of the Code was presented by Smt. Tulu respondent No. I before the Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) Rampur on 6-10-1975. The Executive Magistrate, Rampur called for the police report which was submitted to him on 31-12-1975. The police report appears to have supported the apprehension as expressed by respondent No. 1. The Executive Magistrate, Rampur, therefore, feeling satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed concerning the land in question, passed a preliminary order under Section 145(1) of the Code on 29-1-1926. This order is in Hindi and when translated in English it reads as under : "29-1-1976, This file has been received from the S. H. O. Rampur. It is found from the police enquiry that-there is a dispute with respect to Khasra Nos. 34/35 measuring 3.13 bighas situate in Chak Koti Sub Tehsil Kumarsain between Smt. Tuiu applicant and Baldev Singh etc. which is likely to result in breach of peace. Since both parties assert their own possession there is a possibility of an open-fight between them. Notices be, therefore, issued to both the parties directing them to appear in my Court on 2-3-1976 either in person or through counsel and to submit written statements with respect to actual facts. A copy of the notice be affixed on an appropriate place in the village. Summons be issued to all concerned. A. P. P. also informed." 4. In response to the notices issued to them, the parties put in appearance before the Executive Magistrate, Rampur on 2-3-1976 and filed their written statements. The present petitioners raised a preliminary objection in the written statement that since the land forming subject of dispute was located in Sub Tehsil Kumarsain and was beyond the local jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate, Rampur the said Magistrate was not competent to initiate the proceedings regarding such property. These proceedings initiated by the Executive Magistrate Rampur were, according to the petitioners, void being without jurisdiction. The learned Magistrate fixed 26-3-1976 for hearing arguments of the parties on this preliminary objection regarding his jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. On 26-3-1976 after hearing the parties, the Executive Magistrate, Rampur appears to have accepted the contention of the petitioners and hence he forwarded the record of the case to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur for necessary orders. The learned Magistrate fixed 26-3-1976 for hearing arguments of the parties on this preliminary objection regarding his jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. On 26-3-1976 after hearing the parties, the Executive Magistrate, Rampur appears to have accepted the contention of the petitioners and hence he forwarded the record of the case to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur for necessary orders. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur vide his order dated 30-3-1976 purporting to act in exercise of his powers under Section 4] 1 of the Code, transferred the case to the Court of Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar), Kumarsain. 5. The case after transfer was put up for the first time before the Executive Magistrate, Kumarsain on 1-4-1976 when the Executive Magistrate, Kumarsain directed issue of notices to the parties for 22-5-1976. On 22-5 1976 Smt. Tulu respondent No. 1 put in appearance before the Executive Magistrate, Kumarsain but the other party (the petitioners ) was not present and hence fresh notices were directed to be issued to the petitioners for 10-6-1976. On 10-6-1976 the Executive Magistrate, Kumarsain passed the following order : "File put up. Tulu applicant is not present. An application for an adjournment has been received from her which is allowed. None present for the opposite party. Shri C. R. Kainthla counsel is present. Summons issued to the opposite party have not been received back after service. Fresh summons be issued. Fresh notice under Section 145 Cr. P. C. be also issued. The application of the applicant for attachment of the disputed land will be considered after service of notice on the opposite party. File be now put up on 29-6-1976. Sd/- Executive Magistrate, Kumarsain 10-6-76" 6. In pursuance to the order dated 10-6-1976, notices appear to have been issued to the parties who then filed the written statements. After such written statements were filed the Executive Magistrate, .Rampur proceeded to record evidence but before he could conclude the proceedings, he was trans rerred. It appears that his successor ( Naib Tehsildar, Kumarsain ) was not invested with the powers of an Executive Magistrate and hence the proceedings were transferred to the Court of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur who ultimately passed the final order in the proceedings under Section 145(6) of the Code on 31-1-1979. It appears that his successor ( Naib Tehsildar, Kumarsain ) was not invested with the powers of an Executive Magistrate and hence the proceedings were transferred to the Court of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur who ultimately passed the final order in the proceedings under Section 145(6) of the Code on 31-1-1979. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate concluded that Smt. Tulu respondent No. 1 was in actual physical possession of the disputed land upto 28-9-1975 when she was forcibly dispossessed by the petitioners and as such in terms of the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the Code she was deemed to be in possession of this land on the date of passing of the preliminary order under Section 145(1) of the Code. He accordingly declared that Smt. Tulu was entitled to peaceful possession of the disputed land till she was evicted there from in due Crouse of law and directed that the possession which had been forcibly taken by the present petitioners be restored to her. He further ordered the petitioners not to disturb the possession of respondent No. 1 and to maintain peace until this respondent was evicted from such land in due coure of law. 7. It appears desirable to mention at this stage that although Rampur is described as full-fledged Tehsil and Kumarsain as a Sub Tehsil, the latter is neither subordinate to nor forms part of the former and both these Tehsils are independent of each other. It would be clear from the Himachal Pradesh Government notification No. C-5-9/48 dated 25-5-1949, the relevant portion of which reads as under : "The Chief Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, is-pleased to direct the constitution of the following tehsils and sub-tehsils within the Mahasu District of Himachal Pradesh :— 1. 2. 3. 4. Kumarsain Areas formerly comprising the State of Kumarsain Sub-Tehsil excluding the illaqa of Jahu, Sahgri and Sadocb illaqa of Khaneti Estate. 5. 6. 7. 8. Rampur Areas formerly comprising the Rampur tehsil of Bushahr Tehsil State, Delath Estate and Jahu illaqa of Kumarsain State." 8. It appears that after the merger of the princely States in Himachal Pradesh, those states were attached to various districts and later the districts were divided into Tehsils and Sub Tehsils. The notification referred to above pertains to the division of erstwhile Mahasu district into Tehsils and Sub- Tehsils. It appears that after the merger of the princely States in Himachal Pradesh, those states were attached to various districts and later the districts were divided into Tehsils and Sub Tehsils. The notification referred to above pertains to the division of erstwhile Mahasu district into Tehsils and Sub- Tehsils. Sub Tehsil Kumarsain as is apparent from the above notification comprised of the areas formerly comprising the State of Kumarsain excluding the illaqa of Jahu and also the erstwhile princely State of Sahgri and Sadoch illaqa of Khaneti Estate. The areas comprised in Kumarsain Sub Tehsil were thus different from those which were comprised in the erstwhile princely State of Kumarsain. Similarly Rampur Tehsil as constituted vide the above noti fication comprised of the areas formerly comprising Rampur Tehsil of the princely State of Bushahr plus Delath Estate and Jahu iHaqa of Kumarsain State. From the language of this notification there is no scope for doubt that both Kumarsain Sub-Tehsil and Rampur Tehsil were independent of each other and the former had been given the rank of Sub Tehsil probably for the reason that it was smaller in area. 9. Shri S. R. Mehta was Tehsildar Rampur Tehsil at the relevant time who had been conferred with the powers of an Executive Magistrate vide notification No. 10-4/72- DP-Apptt. (I) dated 6-3-1975 reading as under : "...Simla-2, the 6th March, 1975. No. 10-4/72-DP-Apptt. (I)—In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to appoint the following officers, to be the Executive Magistrates, with all the powers of an Executive Magistrate, under the said Code, to be exercised within the local limits of their respective jurisdiction with immediate effect 1. Siri S. R. Mehta, Tehsildar, Rampur. 2. Shri Khem Dass, Naib Tehsildar, Suni. Sd/- P. S. Rana, Joint Secretary." It is obvious from this notification that Shri S. R. Mehta, Tehsildar, Rampur had been conferred the powers of Executive Magistrate under the Code to be exercised within the local limits of his jurisdiction which local limits apparently did not exceed beyond the territorial limits of Rampur Tehsil as defined in the above mentioned notification dated 2^-5-194V. In other words, Shri S. R. Mehta, Tehsildar, Rampur was Executive Magistrate for Tehsil Rampur only and he had no jurisdiction to exercise the powers of an Executive Magistrate in the area falling within Sub Tehsil Kurrarsain. Since the land in dispute is admittedly located within the limits of Sub Tehsil Kumarsain, the Executive Magistrate Rampur had no jurisdiction over this land. It was for this reason that the objection raised by the present petitioners before him regarding his jurisdiction, prevailed with the Executive Magistrate Rampur and he forwarded the records of the case to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur for necessary orders. The Sub Divisional Magistrate Rampur also agreed with the view of the Executive Magistrate Rampur and hence transferred the case to the Executive Magistrate Kumarsain. There thus appears to be no dispute regarding the tact that the Executive Magistrate Rampur had no jurisdiction in the area where the land in dispute was located. 10. In view of the facts of this case as stated above and which are beyond the pale of controversy it looks quite safe to observe that the final order dated 31-1-1979 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate Rampur under Section 145(6; of the Code and which is the subject of challenge in this petition is vitiated and needs to be quashed on at least two grounds, namely, (1) that no valid older as required under Section 145(1) of the Code was passed in this case with the result that the Magistrate could assume no jurisdiction to institute the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code against the petitioners and (2) even if the order dated 10-6-1976 passed by the Executive Magistrate Kumarsain and as reproduced above be taken as an order under Section 145(1) of the Code, the final order of ths Sub Divisional Magistrate in so far as it directs restoration of possession in favour of respondent No. 1 cannot be sustained inasmuch as even by invoking the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145, this respondent could not be deemed to be in possession of the land in dispute as on the date of the order under Section 145(1) of the Code. 11. 11. Now the object of Section 155 of the Code is to provide a speedy and efficacious remedy for the prevention of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace relating to land or water or the boundaries thereof. The section, in order to achieve this objection, confers adequate powers on the Executive Magistrates and also lays down the procedure to be adopted in the exercise of said powers. The first essential rather the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under this section by a Magistrate is his satisfaction that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning some land, water or boundaries thereof located within the local limits of his jurisdiction. This satisfaction must be based either on a police report or some other relevant information. 12. After a Magistrate feels so satisfied, the next step which he is required to take is to make an order in writing known as the preliminary order under sub-section (1) of Section 1-5 stating the ground of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties involved in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader on a specified date and time and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute This prelimininary order is considered the very foundation or the proceedings under Section 145 and the failure to draw up such an order has been held by various High Courts in the country to vitiate all the subsequent proceedings. It is only by making this order that the Magistrate can assume jurisdiction to institute proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. 13. This view would find additional support from sub-section (3) of Section 145 which requires that a copy of the order passed under sub-section (1), that is, the preliminary order, shall be served upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. It is obvious that this requirement of serving copies of the preliminary order on the person/ persons concerned and publishing thereof by affixation to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute can just not be complied with unless and until an order envisaged by subsection (0 is actually drawn up for it is only then and then alone that such copies could be made available for service and affixation. It would thus necessarily follow that in the absence of the preliminary order neither any party can be summoned nor any further proceedings could be conducted. 14. After the parties put in appearance and submit their written statements in response to notices issued to them under sub-section (1) and served upon them under sub-section (3), the Magistrate is required by sub-section (4) to hold an enquiry in order to determine the question whether any and which of the parties was n possession of the subject of dispute as on the date of the preliminary order. Proviso to sub-section (4) next provides that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate or after that date and before the date of the preliminary order, he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of the preliminary order. 15. Sub-section (6) of Section 145 then lays down that if the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was or should under the proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being in such possession of the subject of dispute he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted there from in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction, and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, incase, however, any party succeeds in satisfying the Magistrate that no such dispute as referred to in sub-section (1) exists or has existed, the Magistrate of course has to cancel his order passed under sub-section (1) and to stay all further proceedings. 16. 16. It may be pointed out at this stage that the dispute within the contemplation of sub-section (I) must relate to land etc. located within the local limits of jurisdiction of the Magistrate passing the preliminary order. This is very much clear from the language of sub-section (1) itself which specifically enjoins that before recording the preliminary order, the Magistrate must feel satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any Ian l etc within the local limits of his jurisdiction. It thus follows that this section neither requires nor empowers a Magistrate to adjudicate upon any dispute or question concerning land or water falling outside his local limits. To put in other words an order under sub-section (1), that is, the preliminary order can be passed only by a? Magistrate having local jurisdiction over the subject of dispute and an order of this nature passed by any other Magistrate would be void being without jurisdiction. 17. Viewed in the light of the object and scope of Section 145 as enunciated above, there should be no difficulty in concluding that the preliminary order dated 29-1-1976 passed in this case by the Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) Rampur as also the other proceedings conducted in his Court were bad in law and void for want of jurisdiction as the subject of dispute is admittedly located outside the local limits of his jurisdiction. All proceedings conducted in the case in the Court of the Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) Rampur are, therefore, to be treated as nonest. 18. As earlier observed the Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) Rampur upheld the objection of the petitioners that the subject of dispute being located in sub-Tehsil Kumarsain which was beyond the local limits of his jurisdiction, he had no jurisdiction either to pass the preliminary order or to initiate further proceedings under Section 145. After upholding this objection the proper course for that Magistrate was to return the application of respondent No. 1 to her with the directions to present the Same before a Court of competent jurisdiction. The learned Magistrate, however, instead of doing so forwarded the case to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur for necessary orders. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur as stated above, purporting to act in the exercise of his jurisdiction vested in him under Section411 of the Code transferred the case to the Executive Magstrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain. The learned Magistrate, however, instead of doing so forwarded the case to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur for necessary orders. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur as stated above, purporting to act in the exercise of his jurisdiction vested in him under Section411 of the Code transferred the case to the Executive Magstrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain. Although this order of transfer was not specifically challenged before me in these proceedings,! have my strong doubts if it was within the competence of the Sub Divisional Magistrate to pass such an order under Section 411 of the Code. There must be a case or a proceeding legally and validly pending in a Court before it can be withdrawn or recalled by a superior Court in exercise of its transfer jurisdiction A case or a proceeding cannot be legally instituted in a Court having no jurisdiction and in case it is so done the only proper course open to such a court is to return the same with a direction to the party concerned to approach a Court of competent jurisdiction. Since in the instant case there was no case or proceeding validly or legally pending before the Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) Rampur, the question of transferring any such case or proceeding did not arise. The so-called order of transfer passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur would in the circumstances of this case amount to no more than conveying the information as contained in the application dated 6-10-75 of respondent No. 1 and the police report dated 29-12-1975 to the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain. 19. The Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain does not appear to have attached that -importance to this case which it deserved. He treated this as a routine matter and in a leisurely manner directed issue of notices to the parties for their appearance without caring to apply his mind to the information produced before him regarding the existence of a dispute which was likely to cause a breach of the peace. After two adjournments vide his order dated 10-6-1976 reproduced in an earlier part of this judgment, the learned Executive Magistrate, Kumarsain directed issue of fresh notices under Section 145 of the Code. This order dated 10-6-1976 is the only order on the record which the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain can be said to have passed under Section 145 (1). After two adjournments vide his order dated 10-6-1976 reproduced in an earlier part of this judgment, the learned Executive Magistrate, Kumarsain directed issue of fresh notices under Section 145 of the Code. This order dated 10-6-1976 is the only order on the record which the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain can be said to have passed under Section 145 (1). This order nowhere mentions if the Magistrate was satisfied about the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace much less to mention the particulars of such dispute and the grounds of his being so satisfied. This order is certainly no order in the eyes of law within the meaning of Section 145(1). After passing this order the Executive Magistrate .(Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain proceeded to record evidence of the parties under sub-section (4) for determining the question of possession. This enquiry was later completed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur who after transfer of the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain withdrew the case on his own file and continued with the proceedings from the stage at which they were left by the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain. All the proceedings conducted in the case by the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain as also by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur ending with and including the final order dated 31-1-1979 passed under Section 145(6) are thus vitiated being without "foundation which could be laid only by drawing «p a valid order under Section 145(1) of the Code. 20. In the end I would like to observe that in so far as the final order dated 31-1-1979 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur directing restoration of the land in dispute to respondent No. 1 is concerned, the same could just not be sustained even if the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain had passed a valid preliminary order before instituting the proceedings under Section 145. As per findings of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate himself, respondent No. 1 had been dispossessed from the land in dispute on 28-9-1975 and ever since then the petitioners had been coming in actual possession of such land. As per findings of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate himself, respondent No. 1 had been dispossessed from the land in dispute on 28-9-1975 and ever since then the petitioners had been coming in actual possession of such land. In .directing restoration of possession in favour of respondent No. 1, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate invoked the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145 on the plea that this respondent had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed from the subject of dispute within two months next before the date when she presented her application dated 6-10-1975 before the Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) Rampur. It is here where the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate mis-directed himself. The provisions of the proviso to sub-section (4) for treating a person in possession as on the date of the preliminary order can be invoked only if it is found that such person had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the report of a police officer or other information referred to in subsection (1) was received by the Magistrate. Now the term the Magistrate appearing in this proviso does not mean any Magistrate. It means the Executive Magistrate as referred to in sub-section (1), i. e. the Executive Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the subject of dispute is located. The Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar) Rampur having admittedly no jurisdiction over the subject of dispute, any information conveyed to him or received by him concerning the dispute was of no consequence for the purposes of Section 145 including the provisions found under proviso to sub-section (4). In the instant case the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction, namely, the Executive Magistrate (Naib Tehsildar) Kumarsain who initiated the proceedings, received information of the dispute much after the expiry of two months from the date of dispossession of respondent No. 1 and hence she could not be treated in possession as on the date of the preliminary order passed or which could have been passed by the Executive Magistrate, Kumarsain. For this reason also the impugned order is vitiated. In the result, this revision petition is accepted and the order of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate dated 31-1-1979 is quashed. Revision allowed.