JUDGMENT V. D. Misra, C.J.—The judgment will dispose of R.S.A. No. 35 of 1971, E.S.A. No. 9 of 1975 and R. S. A. No. 37 of 1980 since a common question of law has been raised in these appeals. 2. Before discussing the facts of each case, we find it convenient to deal with the question raised in these appeals The question relates to the amplitude of section 4 read with proviso to section 28 (2) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 (referred to as the Act), which makes the tenancy heritable to a limited extent. 3. Now, a tenant is a lessee to whom immovable property has been transferred under a contract in terms of section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the absence of a contract, a lease of immovable property, other than for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, is to be deemed to be a lease from month to month, and is terminable by 15 days notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy (section 10o of the Transfer of Property Act). The lease is determined by one of the methods laid down by section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. The person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy is called a "tenant holding over". Where the landlord accepts the rent from such a person or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, a new tenancy in Jaw comes-into existence (section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act). Under the English law a tenant whose tenancy has expired and wrongfully continues in possession without the consent of the landlord is known as a "tenant at sufferance". 5. Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act makes a lease transferable in the absence of a contract to the contrary. In other words, the interest of a tenant in the immovable property is property. This interest is, therefore, heritable if it has not been determined during the life time of a tenant. 6. The legislation controlling the rent and eviction of the tenants, notwithstanding the contract or the law to the contrary, grants protection to the tenants. They cannot be evicted by the landlords simply because the tenancy stands determined. They can be evicted only on the ground slaid down in the Rent Acts. 6. The legislation controlling the rent and eviction of the tenants, notwithstanding the contract or the law to the contrary, grants protection to the tenants. They cannot be evicted by the landlords simply because the tenancy stands determined. They can be evicted only on the ground slaid down in the Rent Acts. In other words, through a person ceases to be a tenant after the termination of his lease, the rent statutes do not permit his eviction. The acceptance of a rent from such a person does not revive his original tenancy nor creates a new tenancy. This person has been loosely and wrongly called a statutory tenant; an expression borrowed from English law. However, since this term has been freely used in various judgments, it has come to stay. 7. The Supreme Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das and others, AIR J961 Supreme Court 1067, ruled: "It is, however, well settled that where a contractual tenancy to which the rent control legislation applies has expired by efflux of time or by determination by notice to quit and the tenant continues in possession of the premises, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after the expiration or determination of the contractual tenancy will not afford ground for holding that the landlord has assented to a new contractual tenacy." While taking a similar view in Bhawanji Lakahmshi and others v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and others, [AIR 1972 Supreme Court 819], Mathew, J., observed ; "...the whole basis of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is that, in case of normal tenancy, a landlord is entitled, where he does not accept the rent after the notice to quit, to file a suit in ejectment and obtain a decree for possession, and so his acceptance of rent is an unequivocal act referable only to his desire to assent to the tenant continuing in possession. That is not so where Rent Act exists : and if the tenant says that landlord accepted the rent not as statutory tenant but only as legal rent indicating his assent to the tenants continuing in possession, it is for the tenant to establish it....-the animus of the tenant in tendering the rent is also material. That is not so where Rent Act exists : and if the tenant says that landlord accepted the rent not as statutory tenant but only as legal rent indicating his assent to the tenants continuing in possession, it is for the tenant to establish it....-the animus of the tenant in tendering the rent is also material. If he tenders the rent as the rent payable under the statutory tenancy, the landlord cannot, by accepting it as rent, create a tenancy by holding over.- The Supreme Court in J. C. Chatterjee and others v. Shri Sri Kishan Tandon and another, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2526] held thus: "It is now settled that after the termination of the contractual tenancy the statutory tenant has only a personal right to continue in possession till evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is pointed out by this Court in Anand Niwas (Private) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi, [(1964; 4 SCR 892 at page 908; (AIR 1965 SC 414] : ‘A person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly though in law not accurately, called a "statutory tenant". Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal . it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute." This court in Ran Singh v. Sagar Chand, [ILR 1976 Himachal Pradesh, 519] held; "Unlike the position obtaining under the general law, where a tenant is no longer entitled to possession on the termination of his tenancy, the position is entirely different under the Control of Rent and Eviction Acts, where notwithstanding the termination of the contractual tenancy, the tenant continues to be entitled to possession. As a result of such continuing possession becomes liable to pay to the landlord a sum equal to the rent. As a result of such continuing possession becomes liable to pay to the landlord a sum equal to the rent. When the landlord accepts the amount, he does so on the basis that the tenant has become liable to pay it by reason of the operation of the statute. It would, therefore, not be correct to say that the landlord has agreed to accept the tenant under a renewed contract of tenancy." 8. It is thus plain that a contractual tenant is protected by his contract. It is a right in property which can, subject to a contract to the contrary, be transferred and inherited. After the determination of the tenancy, the tenant gets protection of the Rent Act and is not a lessee in terms of section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. The statutory tenant "is not a tenant at all in the sense that he has an estate" : Carter v. S. Carburetter Co. Ltd., [(1942) 2 KB 288]. The only right of the statutory tenant is personal, that is, not to be evicted. It is not a property and so it cannot be transferred or inherited except where any Rent Act provides otherwise. This personal right of a statutory tenant ceases when he is evicted under the law or he leaves the property or dies. 9. The question of heritability of a tenancy had been engaging the attention of various States in this country over a long period of time. The sudden death of a tenant leaves his successors, some of whom may be depending solely on the deceased, without a roof over their heads. Various States have made a provision in the Rent Acts for protection of heirs from eviction. But as the phraseology of relevant provisions of the statutes show, the objects sought to be achieved have differed. Now we will read sections 4 and 28 of the Act. "4. Various States have made a provision in the Rent Acts for protection of heirs from eviction. But as the phraseology of relevant provisions of the statutes show, the objects sought to be achieved have differed. Now we will read sections 4 and 28 of the Act. "4. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, it shall be lawful after the death of a tenant for his widow and if the tenant is the wife, the widower, to retain possession of the building or rented land as tenant of a landlord till she dies or remarries, and in the case of the widower till he dies, on the same terms and conditions on which the tenancy was held by her husband and in the case of widower the wife and all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such a case. (2) After the death or remarriage of the widow or the death of the widower or where after the death of a tenant there is no widow or widower then in such a case notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, it shall be lawful for minor sons or daughters of such a tenant to retain possession of the building or rented land of a landlord till the age of majority of the sons or till the daughters get married, on the same terms and conditions on which the tenancy was held by their father or mother." “28. (1) The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949) as amended from time to time as in force in the areas comprised in Himachal Pradesh immediately before 1st November, 1966 and the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949) as amended from time to time in its application to the area added to Himachal Pradesh under section 5 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the said Acts pending at the commencement of this Act, before any Court or other authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Acts, as if the said Acts had continued in force and this Act had not been passed : Provided that section 4 shall be applicable to all pending suits and proceedings for the fixation of fair rent or eviction against widows, widowers, minor sons or unmarried daughters of any tenant and all such suits and proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided further that the provisions for appeal under the said Acts shall continue in force in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of there under: Provided further that notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, all orders of ejectment passed whether before or after the commencement of this Act under the provisions of the Acts hereby repealed, shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of the Act under which they arc passed." It will be noticed that section 4 does not make the tenancy heritable in the ordinary sense of the term. On the other hand, a limited right has been given to the widow /widower as well as the minor-sons and daughters left behind by a deceased tenant. This limited protection has to be read in terms in which it has been given. 10, The widow is entitled to retain possession as tenant of the landlord till she dies or remarries. The widower is entitled to retain possession till his death. Minor sons and daughters of a deceased tenant are entitled to retain possession after the death of the widow/widower or the remarriage of widow or where the deceased tenant does not leave behind any widow/ widower. This right of the minor sons expires the moment the age of majority is reached by them. In the case of daughters this right comes to an end the moment they get married. The terms and conditions on which the tenancy is to be held by the aforementioned persons will be those on which the deceased tenant was holding the tenancy. 11. In the case of daughters this right comes to an end the moment they get married. The terms and conditions on which the tenancy is to be held by the aforementioned persons will be those on which the deceased tenant was holding the tenancy. 11. We need hardly add that the protection granted to the persons named in section 4 is subject to the terms of the tenancy under which the deceased tenant was holding the premises. In other words, if these protected persons make themselves liable to be evicted in terms of Section 14 of the Act, they can be evicted. 12. The effect to proviso to sub-section (2) of section 28 of the Act is to make provisions of section 4 retrospective by applying them to pending suits and proceedings. It may be noticed that the word "suit" has been used in view of the fact that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. which was applicable in the areas comprised in Himachal Pradesh immediately before 1st November, 1966 and thereafter to the areas which were added to Himachal Pradesh under section 5 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, a suit had to be instituted for the eviction of the tenant. In other words, benefit of section 4 will be available to widow/widower or minor sons or unmarried daughters of the deceased tenant in respect of all pending suits or proceedings for their eviction. 13. We will now deal with each case individually. R. S. A. No. 35 of 1971. 14. One Bali Ram was a tenant of shop, having khasra numbers 1290 and 1291, situated in Chowgan Bazar Chamba. He died on 15th September, 1962. The landlords filed a suit for eviction against Dewan Chand son of the deceased, Shrimati Sikhni widow of the deceased, and Shrimati Dakhu widowed mother of the deceased. The suit was filed on 8th March, 1966. It was dismissed on 6th April, 1970. The landlords appealed. The appeal was accepted and the suit was decreed on 8th January, 1971. The present appeal is directed against this decree. 15. The main ground in the appeal was that Shrimati Sikhni, being the widow of the deceased tenant, cannot be evicted in view of section 4 read with section 28 of the Act. The landlords appealed. The appeal was accepted and the suit was decreed on 8th January, 1971. The present appeal is directed against this decree. 15. The main ground in the appeal was that Shrimati Sikhni, being the widow of the deceased tenant, cannot be evicted in view of section 4 read with section 28 of the Act. However, the learned counsel for the appellant does not now invoke section 4 of the Act since .hrimati bikhni, widow of the deceased tenant, died on 14th January, 1980. The contention now is that Bali Ram deceased was a month to month tenant at the time of his death and so the tenancy was heritable. Reference is made to the pleadings to support the contention. 16. Now the plaintiff specifically avers that the deceased was a statutory tenant at the time of his death, and so the tenancy was not heritable. In the written statement the defendants alleged that the shop in question was taken on rent by Bekuntha Mal, father of Bali Ram. It is alleged that Bekuntha Mai started the business in his own name and thereafter under the name and style of Bekuntha Mai Bali Ram. The business is being run under that name and style even to-day. It was averred that Bali Ram was the tenant of the shop in the capacity of karta. It was denied that Bali Ram was a tenant in his personal capacity. In replication it was denied that Bekuntha Mai was a tenant as a karta of the joint family. It was asserted that Bali Ram was a statutory tenant. 17. One of the issues framed by the trial court was : "Whether late Bali Ram was a statutory tenant?" Parties led evidence. The trial court came to the conclusion that Bali Ram was not a statutory tenant but held a month to month tenancy. On appeal the District Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and came to the conclusion that Bali Ram at the time of his death was a statutory tenant inasmuch as his possession was protected by the Rent Control Act. On appeal the District Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and came to the conclusion that Bali Ram at the time of his death was a statutory tenant inasmuch as his possession was protected by the Rent Control Act. It was noticed by the District Judge that "the learned counsel for the respondents has not seriously disputed the fact, that the fixed period of tenancy of Bali Ram had expired long before his death." As regards Bali Ram paying rent as a karta, the District Judge recorded: "the alleged tenancy of Bali Ram as a member of the Joint Hindu Family, is neither borne out from the facts on the record, nor this position had been adhered to by the defendants during the trial of this case." 18. We are in agreement with the findings arrived at by the District Judge. Bali Ram was a statutory tenant. Mere acceptance of rent from Bali Ram, who had the protection of the Act, cannot give him a month to month tenancy. 19. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. E.S.A. No. 9 of 1975. 20. This execution second appeal is directed against the judgment of District Judge, Simla, upholding the-judgment of the executing court and dismissing the objections filed by the judgment-debtor-appellants. 21. One Kanshi Ram was a tenant in the residential set bearing No. 137/3 Lower Bazar Simla. Kanshi Ram died in 1968. Thereafter a suit for eviction was filed against Shrimati Devki widow of Kanshi Ram, and others as trespassers. On 17th March, 1969 the defendants agreed to vacate the premises by 15th July, 1969 and accordingly a decree of eviction was passed. Again time for vacating the premises was extended upto 30th November, 1970 vide order dated 24th September, 1970. Since the premises were not vacated, the landlords filed an application for execution. Shrimati Devki, judgment debtor, raised objections to the execution of the decree. It was inter alia alleged that section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 read with section 28 of the Act protects her possession since she is a widow of the deceased tenant. However, during the pendency of the objection petition Shrimati Devki died. Objection petition was dismissed. Appeal by the objectors was also dismissed. 22. It was inter alia alleged that section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 read with section 28 of the Act protects her possession since she is a widow of the deceased tenant. However, during the pendency of the objection petition Shrimati Devki died. Objection petition was dismissed. Appeal by the objectors was also dismissed. 22. In the present appeal it is contended that Jasbir appellant being a minor son of Kanshi Pam deceased, and Neelam being an unmarried daughter of the deceased are entitled to retain possession of the house under Section 4 read with proviso to section 28 (2) of the Act. 23. None of the provisions is applicable to the facts of the case in hand. As already stated, the decree was passed against Shrimati Devki as a trespasser and not as a tenant and this decree was passed long before the present Act came into force. The time granted to the judgment debtor also expired on 30th November, 1970. They had thus no right to object to the execution of the decree. 24, We may further record that during the course of arguments before us it was stressed by the learned counsel for the respondents that the premises in question were lying vacant for a long time and nobody was residing there. Since this fact was contested by the learned counsel for the appellants, we immediately appointed Shri Dev Raj Advocate as Local Commissioner to inspect the place and report. The report reveals that the premises are lying un-used over a long period of time. The passage to the house was noticed as "very dangerous almost in dilapidated condition." The latrine attached to the house was also found in most dangerous condition showing that it had not been used for fairly long time. The condition of the kitchen was no better. Odd articles lying there were found covered "with huge amount of dust as if not having been cleaned for months together." The other articles lying in the rooms showed that the house was not being used. Some of the utensils found in the kitchen appeared to have been kept very recently. In other words, the premises in question had been lying vacant- Evidently the appellants have been carrying on the proceedings for the sake of litigation only. 25. The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs. R. S. A. No. 37 of 1980. Some of the utensils found in the kitchen appeared to have been kept very recently. In other words, the premises in question had been lying vacant- Evidently the appellants have been carrying on the proceedings for the sake of litigation only. 25. The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs. R. S. A. No. 37 of 1980. 26. One Gopal Singh took on rent shop known as Emporium shop9 situated within the municipal limits of Dalhousie. In May, 1970, Gopal Singh died. On 30th June, 19/J, the landlord filed a suit for eviction against Balbir Singh appellant, son of Gopal Singh, on the ground that the latter was a trespasser. Balbir Singh resisted the suit and raised various contentions. However, the suit was finally decreed on 1lth April, 1979. The appeal challenging the decree was dismissed on 25th December, 1979. 27. In this appeal we are not concerned with the contentions raised from time to time by the appellant. During the course of hearing before the learned lower appellate court, the parties advanced their arguments on the ground that Gopal Singh was a statutory tenant at the time of his death. 28. Before us the only contention of the appellant is that the appellant, being the son of the deceased tenant Gopal Singh, is entitled to retain the possession. Admittedly the appellant is not a minor son. He is major. He cannot claim protection under section 4 of the Act since it is available only to a minor son?. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -