ORDER H.N. Seth, J. -Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution are that one Smt. Saraswati Devi, widow of Sri Harish Chandra was residing in house No. 119/69-A, Nasimabad-Kanpur, along with her son Yogesh Chandra and Smt. Shakuntala Devi widow of her pre-deceased son named Brijesh Chandra. These three persons occupied different portions of the house. Whereas Smt. Saraswati Devi and Yogesh Chandra occupied portions on the ground floor of the house, Smt. Shakuntala Devi occupied portion of the house on the first floor. 2. On 23rd November, 1979 Smt. Saraswati Devi, claiming herself to be the owner of the house executed registered sale deed and conveyed the house to the petitioner Sri Lal Chand. In the sale deed she recited that she had delivered possession of the portion of the house in her occupation to the vendee and had directed her son and daughter-in-law to vacate the portions of the house in their possession. In case her son and daughter-in-law failed to vacate the portions of the house in their possession, the vendee could have them evicted through court or in any other manner he deemed fit and proper. 3. On 15th December, 1976 petitioner Sri Lal Chand moved an application under Section 16 (1) (b) of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 praying for the release of the portion of the house in occupation of Yogesh Chandra and Shankutala Devi in his favour. He claimed that the said portion, being in unauthorised occupation of Yogesh Chandra and Shakuntala Devi was legally vacant and was available for being released in his favour. 4. In due course notices were issued to Yogesh Chandra and Smt. Shakuntala Devi and the process-server reported that they had refused to accept the same. Notices issued by registered post were also returned with an endorsement 'refused'. Consequently after notifying vacancy the said portion of the house was, on 13th April, 1977, directed to be released in favour of Sri Lal Chand, the purchaser-landlord. 5. Notices issued by registered post were also returned with an endorsement 'refused'. Consequently after notifying vacancy the said portion of the house was, on 13th April, 1977, directed to be released in favour of Sri Lal Chand, the purchaser-landlord. 5. Since Yogesh Chandra and Smt. Shakuntala Devi did not vacate the portion of the house in their possession, the purchaser obtained an order from the Rent Control Tribunal on 11th May, 1977 for delivery of possession over the said portions through police force and eventually evicted Yogesh Chandra and Shakuntala Devi from major portion of the house in occupation of Yogesh Chandra and entire portion which was in occupation of Smt. Shakuntala Devi. Sri Lal Chand then made an application praying that possession of the remaining portion of the house in occupation of Yogesh Chandra be also got delivered to him by police force. Sri Yogesh Chandra not only objected to the prayer made by Sri Lal Chand but he also made an application under Section 16 (5) of U. P. Act 13 of 1972, claiming that he had been in lawful occupation of the disputed portion of the house in his own right and prayed that the release order passed in favour of Sri Lal Chand be reviewed. According to him, the disputed portion of the house never fell vacant and, as such it could not have been released in favour of Lal Chand. As he had been wrongly ejected from the portion of the house in his occupation, the possession of the said portion should be got restored to him. He also claimed that the order declaring the accommodation as vacant and releasing the same in favour of Lal Chand had been made without serving any notice upon lam. 6. The Rent Control Tribunal, vide its order dated 16th June, 1977 rejected the objection and the prayer for review made by Sri Yogesh Chandra ad allowed the request made by Sri Lal Chand for delivery of possession of the remaining portion of the accommodation that remained in occupation of Yogesh Chandra. The Tribunal held that the question of vacancy had already been determined by it. Sri Yogesh Chandra had failed to prove that he either was owner of the house or the lawful occupant of any portion thereof. The Tribunal held that the question of vacancy had already been determined by it. Sri Yogesh Chandra had failed to prove that he either was owner of the house or the lawful occupant of any portion thereof. Since he was not in lawful occupation of the portion of the house in his possession, he was not entitled to maintain the application under Section 16 (5) of U. P. Act 13 of 1972. In the result, it directed that the portion that still remained in occupation or Sri Yogesh Chandra should be got vacated and its possession delivered to Lal Chand. 7. Yogesh Chandra then went up in revision before the District Judge and wanted to support his claim that he was a co-owner of the house by filing certain additional evidence. He explained that he could not file the evidence sought to be produced by him before the Rent Control Tribunal by saying that the Tribunal did not afford him adequate opportunity to produce that evidence. The Additional District Judge, who heard the revision, did not accept the plea that the trial court did not afford adequate opportunity to Sri Yogesh Chandra to produce his evidence and held that no case had been made out for accepting any additional evidence. He went on to observe that neither the Tribunal nor he was competent to decide complicated questions of law and title and to adjudicate whether Sri Yogesh Chandra was a co-owner of the house and whether Smt. Saraswati Devi was a Benamidar of her husband Harish Chandra. Since the evidence sought to be produced by Yogesh Chandra pertained to the question of title, which question could not be gone into by him, the application for additional evidence deserved to be dismissed on this ground as well. Proceeding with the merits of the revision, the Additional District Judge held that the accommodation in possession of Yogesh Chandra had neither fallen vacant nor was Sri Yogesh Chandra an unauthorised occupant of the same. The authorities under U. P. Act 13 of 1972, therefore, had no jurisdiction to direct release of the said portion in favour of purchaser-landlord and the application under Section 16 (5) of the Act, for review of the release order, was maintainable. The authorities under U. P. Act 13 of 1972, therefore, had no jurisdiction to direct release of the said portion in favour of purchaser-landlord and the application under Section 16 (5) of the Act, for review of the release order, was maintainable. In the result, he allowed the revisions and rescinded the order dated 16th June, 1977 passed by the Tribunal and directed that possession of the accommodation got vacated from Yogesh Chandra, be restored to him. 8. Being aggrieved, Sri Lal Chand the purchaser-landlord has approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the revisional court was wrong in taking the view that the application for review made under Section 16 (5) of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 was maintainable at the instance of Yogesh Chandra and that it also erred in holding that the order for release of accommodation made in petitioners favour was not justified as there had been no vacancy entitling the authorities to make the release order. 10. Section 16 (1) of the Act lays down that where a building or part thereof has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, the District Magistrate can make an order directing the land-, lord to let it out to a person (allotment order) nominated by him. He can also, in such a case, make an order permitting the landlord to occupy the same (release order). Proviso added to the said section makes it clear that such allotment or release order can be made where either the accommodation has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant in the sense that the occupant of the building or portion thereof either ceases to or is likely to cease to occupy the same. But then, the legislature in its wisdom thought that such a power to pass allotment or release order should also be available in certain cases where the occupant does not physically cease to occupy the building or portion thereof. Accordingly, it, by Section 12 (1) to (3-B) of the Act, created a fiction and laid down the circumstances in which either the landlord or the tenant who had been in physical occupation of the building would be deemed to have ceased to occupy the same. Accordingly, it, by Section 12 (1) to (3-B) of the Act, created a fiction and laid down the circumstances in which either the landlord or the tenant who had been in physical occupation of the building would be deemed to have ceased to occupy the same. It also in Section 12 (4) of the Act provided that in cases falling under sub-sections (1) to (3) of the Act, the 'building or portion thereof would be deemed to be vacant so as to enable its being allotted or released by the District Magistrate. However, proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act enjoins upon the District Magistrate to, in cases where there is no physical vacancy but there is a deemed vacancy under sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Act, before making an allotment or release order, give an opportunity to the landlord and the tenant of showing that the circumstances mentioned in sub-sections (l) to (3) of Section 12 in which the vacancy is deemed to have been created under sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Act does not exist. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 of the Act lay down the circumstances in which the release order can be made and what should be the content of an allotment order. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 of the Act lay down the circumstances in which the release order can be made and what should be the content of an allotment order. Subsection (4) to Section 16 making provision for enforcement of the allotment or the release order runs thus:- "Where the allottee or the landlord has not been able to obtain possession of the building allotted to him or as the case may be, released in his favour or any part thereof, the District Magistrate, on an application of the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, may by order evict or cause to be evicted any person named in the order as well as every other person claiming under him or found in occupation, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and put or cause to be put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building or part thereof." The legislature recognised the fact that in certain cases the provisions of sub-section (4) may be so utilised that a lawful occupant of the building, be he a landlord or any other person, may be dispossessed without being heard and even though there was neither vacancy nor deemed vacancy, thus causing him grave injustice. It, therefore, enacted sub-section (5) of Section 16 and gave an opportunity to such a person to apply for the review of the allotment or the release order, as the case may be, in following words:- "(a) where the landlord or any other person claiming to. be a lawful occupant of the building or any part thereof comprised in the allotment or release order satisfies the District Magistrate that such order was not made in accordance with clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be, of sub-section (1), the District. Magistrate may review the order. Provided that no application under this clause shall be entertained later than seven days after the eviction of such person. Magistrate may review the order. Provided that no application under this clause shall be entertained later than seven days after the eviction of such person. (b) Where the District Magistrate on review under this sub-section sets aside or modifies his order of allotment or release, he shall put or cause to be put an applicant if already evicted, back into possession of the building and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary: It also enacted sub-section (6) providing for the consequences, in cases where the District Magistrate finds that an application under sub-section (5) is false or frivolous thus:- "If the District Magistrate finds an application given under sub-section (5) to be false or frivolous, he shall, by order award to the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, against the applicant special costs which shall not exceed Rs. 500/-. This sub-section implies that an application under sub- section (5) would not be maintainable at the instance of the person claiming to be in lawful occupation of the accommodation if it is shown that such-claim was both false or frivolous. 11. Reading sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 16 together, therefore, leads to the conclusion that even though an allotment order or a release order under Section 16 (1) of the Act has been made and whether or not the same Has been executed, a person claiming to be lawful occupant of the building or portion thereof can unless it is shown that the claim made by him is both false or frivolous maintain an application for review of the allotment or the release order, as the-case may be on the ground that the same had not been made in accordance with clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 16. 12. There is in my opinion, a clear distinction between claim made by a person that he has been in lawful occupation of the accommodation and his establishing title to occupy the accommodation. An application under sub-section (5) is maintainable, at the instance of a person who claims to be lawful occupant of the accommodation unless it is shown that the claim made by him was either false or frivolous. An application under sub-section (5) is maintainable, at the instance of a person who claims to be lawful occupant of the accommodation unless it is shown that the claim made by him was either false or frivolous. A claim made by a person that he has been in lawful occupation of the accommodation can be said to be false or frivolous only if it is shown either that the claimant had put forward the claim knowing he was not in occupation of the accommodation or that his occupation was not legal or that he put forward his claim in such circumstances that no reasonable person could think his occupation to be lawful. Where a person believed or had reasons to believe that his occupation was lawful, but then it ultimately turns out that such belief was in law not tenable it would be difficult to say that the claim made by him was either false or frivolous. A 'false claim contemplated by the sub-section is not to be equated with a wrong claim and in the context false claim implies that the claimant knows that the claim put up by him is wrong. 13. In the case before me, the finding recorded by the revisional court shows that Yogesh Chandra had physically been in occupation of the disputed portion of the accommodation. He claimed that the property had been purchased by his father, bename in the name of his mother. He was thus in lawful occupation of the accommodation. Thus the application filed by him was an application by a person claiming to be lawful occupant of the disputed portion of the building in his own right. The revisional court found that this involved going into the question of title which could not be gone into either by it or by the authorities constituted under the Act it is not necessary for me to express any opinion on the Question whether the authorities constituted under the Act could, for the purposes of making an order under this section, go into this question and record its own finding). The fact, however, remains that there is, in this case, no finding that the claim made by Yogesh Chandra was either false or frivolous. The fact, however, remains that there is, in this case, no finding that the claim made by Yogesh Chandra was either false or frivolous. In the absence of such a finding it cannot be held that the application under Section 16 (5) of the Act filed by Yogesh Chandra is not maintainable and was liable to be rejected on this ground alone. The applicant, therefore, could place material before the District Magistrate to satisfy him that the release order passed in favour of Sri Lal Chand had not been made in accordance with clause (b) of Section 16 (1) of the Act. 14. A perusal of Section 16 (1) of the Act clearly indicates that an order releasing the accommodation in favour of landlords can be passed only if the same is vacant or is about to fall vacant. A release order made in respect of an accommodation which has neither fallen vacant nor is about to fall vacant cannot be said to have been made in accordance with clause (b) of Section 16 (1) of the Act, Indeed, in the instant case it is for this very reason that Sri Yogesh Chandra claimed that the order releasing the accommodation in favour of Sri Lal Chand had not been made in accordance with clause (b) of Section 16 (1) of the Act. 15. From the material brought on the record it is absolutely clear that goods belonging to Yogesh Chandra were stored in the disputed accommodation of the house and he had been occupying the same. It was thus nolo vacant in the normal sense of the word. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, claimed that in the instant case the accommodation in dispute will be deemed to have ceased to be occupied under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act which runs thus:- "A landlord.....of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or part thereof if:- (a)............................; or (b)............................; or (c) in the case of a residential building he as well as the members of his family have taken up residence else- where." And the accommodation would be deemed to be vacant as provided by Section 12 (4) of the Act, and would thus be available for being released under S. 16 (1) (b) of the Act. He urged that in this case the position of Smt. Saraswati Devi was that of the landlord. He urged that in this case the position of Smt. Saraswati Devi was that of the landlord. After execution of the sale-deed in petitioners favour, she had shifted her residence to another building. Smt. Shakuntala Devi and Yogesh Chandra who were her family members had also likewise taken up residence elsewhere. Sri Yogesh Chandra continued to occupy the disputed accommodation only for the purpose of storing his goods. As the landlady and other members of her family had taken up residence elsewhere, the accommodation. is to be deemed to be vacant and it could be released in petitioners favour in accordance with the provisions of Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. 16. I am unable to accept this submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner. In my opinion, correctly interpreted a deemed vacancy under Section 12 of the Act occurs where the landlord or the tenant performs acts of the nature specified in the clauses (a) to (c) thereof in such circumstances that by doing that act his title to the property as landlord or the tenant, as the case may be is not affected under the general law. i.e. legally speaking he, notwithstanding those acts, continues to be the landlord or the tenant as the case may be and it is for this reason that the legislature has created a fiction that in such cases it will be deemed that the tenant or the landlord, as the case may be, had ceased to occupy the accommodation. Accordingly in a case where a owner-landlord transfers and hands over possession of the accommodation to the vendee, the transferor while handing over possession to the transferee does not continue to be the landlord and even though he and members of his family might take up residence elsewhere, no Clear vacancy because of the landlord ceasing to occupy the building or part thereof within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act occurs. In such a case the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor and when the vendor takes up residence elsewhere, he is not the landlord of the accommodation transferred by him. In such cases it cannot be said that a person shifting residence is the landlord of the accommodation: See Smt. Parmeshwari Devi v. Jagdish Sharma (1976 All WC 703). In such cases it cannot be said that a person shifting residence is the landlord of the accommodation: See Smt. Parmeshwari Devi v. Jagdish Sharma (1976 All WC 703). In the instant case, when Smt. Saraswati Devi after transferring the house, took up residence elsewhere, it could not be said that she did so as landlord of the accommodation or any portion thereof (including the portion in occupation of Yogesh Chandra). It cannot, therefore, be said that the landlord of that portion of the accommodation and members of his family had taken up residence elsewhere within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. Clearly this provision has no application where persons other than the landlord or the tenant who had been in occupation of the accommodation has taken up residence elsewhere. If the disputed portion of the building was neither vacant nor could it be deemed to have fallen vacant under Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act, a release order in respect thereof would not be in accordance with Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. 17. The case may be looked at from yet another point of view. In the very nature of things Section 16 (1) (b) does not contemplate an order for release of an accommodation in a case where the landlord vacates it or is deemed to have vacated the same. It contemplated release of an accommodation where the vacancy is or is deemed to have been created because of something done by a tenant or a pen son other than the landlord. Consequently a person stepping into the shoes of the landlord cannot claim release of the accommodation in his favour. 18. In the result, I agree with the revisional court that the application made by Sri Yogesh Chandra under Section 16 (5) of the Act was maintainable and that he had succeeded in showing that the impugned release order had not been made in accordance with Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, direct the parties to bear their own costs.