JUDGMENT-The revision applicants have filed this revision application under section 18 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being aggrieved by the order dated 29-5-1975 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Zilla Parishad Works, Amravati rejecting their application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for making a reference to the Court in respect of the Award in Land Acquisition Case No. 119/65/72-73. 2. The award against which a reference was sought was passed on 25-7-1974. The revision applicants filed an application under section 18 for making a reference to the Court on 20th September 1974 inter alia contending that they came to know of the award on 8-8-1974. The Special Land Acquisition Officer exercising the powers of the Collector under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act rejected the application on the ground that it was filed beyond 6 weeks from the date of the award. 3. Sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 deals with the contents of the application contemplated by section 18 (1) and also about the time within which it should be filed. The said sub-section reads as follows: "The application shall state the grounds Oft which objection to the a ward is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made,- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire." The learned Special Land Acquisition Officer has held that the clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 governs the present case. According to him, as revision applicant No.2 Surajmal had executed a kul-Muktyar-patra dated 7-3-1964 authorising revision applicant No.1 Dagdulal to appear in the Court and to take necessary action to file documents etc., revision application No.2 was thus represented when the award was passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and hence the case would be governed by clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section) 8 of the Land Acquisition Act which prescribes a period of six weeks for filing an application under section 18 (1) from the date of the Collector's award. It appears that the learned Special Land Acquisition Officer was labouring under a wrong impression that once a power of Attorney is executed by a party to the award authorising the Power of Attorney holder to represent him in the land acquisition proceedings then even if the party and his power of Attorney holder are absent when the award is made by the Collector (in this case the Special Land Acquisition Officer), the party will be deemed to have been represented before the Special Land Acquisition Officer at the time when he made his award. It is clear from the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer that neither revision applicant No.2 Surajmal nor his father and his power of Attorney holder Dagdulal was present when the award was declared on 25-7-1974. There is nothing in the order to show that the Special Land Acquisition Officer had intimated the revision applicants the date on which he was going to declare the award. More over even if the revision applicants were intimated of the date of the decision, clause (a) of proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 would not be attracted unless the party challenging the award or any other person authorised to represent him in the proceeding is present before the Special Land Acquisition Officer at the time when he made his award. Admittedly neither revision applicant No.2 Surajmal nor revision applicant No.1 Dagdulal who appeared in the proceedings on his own behalf as well as power of Attorney bolder of his son Surajmal was present when the Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 25-7-1974. Admittedly neither revision applicant No.2 Surajmal nor revision applicant No.1 Dagdulal who appeared in the proceedings on his own behalf as well as power of Attorney bolder of his son Surajmal was present when the Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 25-7-1974. What is contemplated by clause (a) of proviso to sub-section 2 of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is that either the person making the application under section 18 (1) or his representative must be present before the authority making the Award, at the time when the award is made and declared. The representation of the party contemplated by the said clause is not general representation but representation at the time when the award is made, that is to say the authorised representative of the person making the application under section 18 (1) must be present at the time when the award is made. As admittedly nobody on behalf of the revision applicants was present when the award was made on 25-7-1974, the case clearly falls within the purview of clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 4. It is an admitted position that no notice under section 12, sub-section of the Land Acquisition Act was given by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to the revision applicants. The first part of clause (b), therefore, is not applicable to the present case which would be governed by the second part which prescribes a period of six months from the date of the Collector's award for filing an application under section 18 (1). As the application was filed within six months from the date of the award, the learned Special Land Acquisition Officer was wrong in rejecting the application on the ground that it was filed beyond time. 5. Mr. Mohta for the revision applicants further contended that even assuming that the case is governed by the clause (a) of the proviso to subsection (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act the application was filed in time if the period required for obtaining certified copy of the award in question is excluded. 5. Mr. Mohta for the revision applicants further contended that even assuming that the case is governed by the clause (a) of the proviso to subsection (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act the application was filed in time if the period required for obtaining certified copy of the award in question is excluded. It will be seen from the endorsement made on the certified copy, filed in the present proceeding that the copy was applied for on 2-8-74 and it was delivered to the revision applicants on 30th August 1974, the date given to them for that purpose by the copying authorities. If the days required for obtaining the certified copy are excluded, then the application filed on 20th September 1974 was within time. The period of six weeks expired on 5-9-1974 while 29 days were required for obtaining the copy. 6. Mr. B. T. Patil for the opponent contended that section 12 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application under section 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. According to him, the application under section 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act is not one of the proceedings contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act nor it is an application for setting aside an award as contemplated by sub-section (4) of section 12 and hence time required for obtaining copy of the award cannot be excluded. In support of the proposition that section 12 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application under section 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, Mr. Patil placed reliance on the decision of the Lahore High Court in the Nafis-ud-Din and others v. Secy. of State & another1. In that case the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court placed reliance on an earlier decision in the case Bhagwan Das v. Collector of Lahore2 and disapproved the view expressed in the case H. N. Burjorjee v. Special Collector of Rangoon3. In Burjorjee's case it was held that section 12 (4) of the Limitation Act (as amended in 1922) applies to an application to the Collector to refer a matter to the Court and the applicant is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the Collector's award. 7. Another decision on which reliance is sought to be placed by. Mr. 7. Another decision on which reliance is sought to be placed by. Mr. Patil is reported in Secretary of State v. Karim Bux4. In that case it was held relying on an earlier decision reported at A I R 1932 All. 598, that the time taken to obtain copies of the order under the Land Acquisition Act, cannot be excluded for the purposes of computing the period of six weeks prescribed by the proviso to section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 8. In the case Jankibai Tukaram v. Nagpur Improvement Trust, Nagpur5, the case reported in H.N. Burjorjee v. Special Collector of Rangoon (cited supra) was dissented from and the decision reported at Secretary of State v. Karim Bux (supra) was relied on by a Single Judge of this Court. In that case Raju J. held as follows:- "The Land Acquisition Act, which is a special law, prescribes for an application under section 18 a special period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, and therefore in determining any such period of limitation the provisions contained in section 1, sections 9 to 18 and section 22, Limitation Act shall apply. But sub-section (2) of section 12 refers to an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for review of judgment. An application for reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act does not therefore attract the application of sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act. Sub-section (4) of section 12 refers to applications to set aside an award such an award in arbitration proceedings and an application for reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can never be treated as an application to set aside an award. Even if the reference is accepted the award may be only modified. An application for reference under section 18 of the Act cannot, therefore, be treated as an application to set aside an award. Hence time taken for obtaining copy of award cannot be excluded in computing limitation under section 18 (2), Land Acquisition Act. Even if the reference is accepted the award may be only modified. An application for reference under section 18 of the Act cannot, therefore, be treated as an application to set aside an award. Hence time taken for obtaining copy of award cannot be excluded in computing limitation under section 18 (2), Land Acquisition Act. It appears that the learned Judge took the view that the general provision contained in sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act is circumscribed by the provisions contained in section 2 of section 12 of the Limitation Act and that the latter provision is applicable only to the proceedings mentioned in the said sub-section that is to say to an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for review of the judgment. The said decision was based on section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1908. The corresponding provision in sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follows: "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." Though this provision is somewhat different then the old provision, it does not change the position so far as the applicability of section 12 of the Limitation Act is concerned. Section 29 (2) makes section 12 (2) applicable to every application under a special or local law and not only to proceedings mentioned in section 12 (2). What is made applicable is the substantive provision of section 12 (2), which permits exclusion of time required for obtaining copy. Moreover the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court, that subsection (2) of section 12 is applicable only to an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and aft application for review of the judgment would be no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case The Commissioner of Sales Tax. U. P. v. M/s Madanlal Dan & Sons, Barielly6. In that case Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the question whether time required for obtaining the copy of the order of the Sales Tax Officer can be excluded while computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing revision under section 10 (3B) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. It was held that time taken in obtaining tae copy could be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing revision even though it was not essential to file copy of order along with revision petition. In rejecting, as wholly bereft of force, the contention that the U. P. Sales Tax Act constitutes a complete code in itself and as that Act prescribes the period of limitation for filing revision petition, the High Court was in error in relying upon the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, Their Lordships observed as follows after quoting sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963: "There can be no manner of doubt that the U. P. Sales Tax Act answers to the description of a special or local law. According to sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, reproduced above, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in. section 12 (2), inter alia, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. There is nothing in the U. P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the application of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act for determining the period of limitation prescribed for revision application. The conclusion would, therefore, follow that the provisions of section 12 (2) of the. Limitation Act of 1963 can be relied upon in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision petition under section 10 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act." Their Lordships also observed that there is nothing in the language of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act to justify the Inference that the time spent for obtaining copy of the order sought to be revised can be excluded only if such a copy is required to be filed along with the revision application. All that section 12 (2) states in this connection is that in computing the period of limitation for a revision, the time requisite to obtain a copy of the order sought to be revised shall be excluded. Their Lordships further observed that it would be impermissible to read in section 12 (2) a proviso that the time requisite for obtaining copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded only if such copy has to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal or application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of judgment. 9. It is significant to note that revision application is not one of the proceedings which is specifically mentioned in section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. Even then Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that in view of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation, Act, section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act would be applicable ever to a revision petition under a special Act. 10. There can be no manner of doubt that the Land Acquisition Act answers to the description of special law. As mentioned above, proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 prescribes a limitation for an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. But there is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act expressly excluding the application of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act for determining the period of limitation prescribed for an application under section 18 (1). Hence in view of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act would apply to an application under section 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus taking any view of the matter, the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer rejecting revision applicants' application for reference cannot be sustained. 11. The revision application is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the Special Land Acquisition, Z. P. Works, Amravati is directed to make reference to the Court under section 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act as desired by the revision applicants. No order as to costs. Revision allowed.