Judgment 1. This writ application arises of it of an election petition which was filed, by respondents No. 4 and 5 challenging the election of the petitioner as the Mukhiya of Chak Rajopatti Gram Panchayat. 2. The petitioner was declared elected as the Mukhiya of the aforesaid Gram Panchayat on 1-6-1978. Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 filed the election petition in question on 1-7-1978 before the Panchayat Officer as on that day the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal constituted for deciding such election disputes was on leave. On 3-7-1978 that election petition was presented before the Election Tribunal, respondent No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). It is not in dispute that the period of thirty days prescribed under Rule 72 of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Election Rules) expired on 1-7-1978. As on that date the election petition was not filed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal, by its order dated 5-8-1978, dismissed the said election petition as time barred. Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 being aggrieved by the aforesaid order filed an appeal before the District Judge, Sitsmarhi, who was the appellate authority, against the decision of the Tribunal as provided by Rule 70 of the Election Rules. Learned District Judge after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the election petition in question should not have been dismissed because on the last day of the limitation prescribed for filing such petition the Presiding officer of the Tribunal was on leave and; as such, respondents Nos. 4 and 5 had no option but to present that election petition on 3-7-1978. In his view, the delay, if any, will be deemed to have been condoned under Sec. 5 read with Sec.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Limitation Act). Copies of the orders passed by the Tribunal and the learned District Judge have been annexed to the writ application and marked as Annexures 1 and 2, respectively. On behalf of the petitioner the legality of the order passed by the District Judge has been questioned before this Court. 3. Copies of the orders passed by the Tribunal and the learned District Judge have been annexed to the writ application and marked as Annexures 1 and 2, respectively. On behalf of the petitioner the legality of the order passed by the District Judge has been questioned before this Court. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that under the provision of the Election Rules there is no power in Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the election petition, and once an election petition is not filed within the period prescribed by Rule 72(2), the Tribunal has no option but to dismiss such election petition in limine. The relevant portions of Rule 72 of the Election Rules are as follows :- "72(2) - An election petition against a returned candidate shall be presented to the Election Tribunal within thirty days from the date of the declaration of the result of the election. Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible." "72(3) When the period prescribed by sub-rule (2) for the presentation of an election petition expires on a day which is a public holiday within the meaning of Sec.25 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, or has been notified by the State Government to be observed as a holiday in Government offices or courts, the petition shall be considered as having been presented on the next succeeding day which is neither such public holiday nor a day so notified." On a plain reading of the aforesaid rule, an election petition,. has to be presented to the Tribunal within thirty days of the date of the declaration of the result of the election. However, if the period prescribed for presentation expires on a day which is a public holiday or has been notified as a holiday by the Government concerned, such petition can be presented on the next succeeding day to such holiday. Rule 77 of the Election Rules is as follows :- "77. If there is any failure to comply with the provisions of sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 72, Rule 73, sub-rule (1) and clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 75, the Election Tribunal shall summarily dismiss the election petition. Rule 77 of the Election Rules is as follows :- "77. If there is any failure to comply with the provisions of sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 72, Rule 73, sub-rule (1) and clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 75, the Election Tribunal shall summarily dismiss the election petition. Provided that the petition shall not be dismissed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard." In view of this rule whenever there is any failure to comply with the provision of sub-rules (2) and (3) of R.72, the Election Tribunal has to summarily dismiss the election petition. in the facts and circumstances of the present case two questions arise for consideration. Firstly, whether this case is covered by Rule 72(3) as the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal was on leave on 1-7-1978 and 2-7-1978 was a holiday. Secondly, if the answer of the first question is in negative, then whether the Tribunal could have condoned the delay in filing the election petition under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act saying that in the facts and circumstances of the case sufficient cause has been shown for not filing the election petition on 1-7-1978. 4. Admittedly 1-7-1978 was not a holiday as contemplated by Rule 72(3). According to the facts stated in the orders of the learned District Judge as well as the Tribunal it appears that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal was on leave on 1-7-1978. In my view that will not bring the case under sub-rule (3) of Rule 72. The election petition could have been filed in the office of the Tribunal. There is no finding in the order of the learned District Judge that even the office of the Tribunal was closed on that day for one reason or the other. In such a situation, it has to be held that the election petition could have been filed on 1-7-1978, in the office of the Tribunal. That having not been done, when it was filed on 3-7-1978, it was beyond time. This leads to the next question as to whether that delay could have been condoned under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. That having not been done, when it was filed on 3-7-1978, it was beyond time. This leads to the next question as to whether that delay could have been condoned under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. If the Tribunal has power to condone the delay in filing an election petition under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act then only it has to consider as to whether sufficient cause has been shown or not for exercise of such power. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, under the provisions of the Election Rules the Tribunal has no such power and Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. 5. Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is much different than what it was in the old Act of 1908. It speaks of any application which may be admitted after the prescribed period if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act is as follows :- "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Sec.3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed, by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Secs. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." In view of this Sub-Section if any special or local law prescribes any special period of limitation, even in such cases the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply unless expressly excluded by such special or local law. In view of this provision, unless the application of Secs. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are excluded, those provisions become applicable. On the basis of this Sec.29(2) it can be argued that unless the Election Rules specifically exclude the applicability of Sec. 5, Sec. 5 shall be applicable vesting power in the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing an election petition on being satisfied about the sufficiency of the cause. 6. On the basis of this Sec.29(2) it can be argued that unless the Election Rules specifically exclude the applicability of Sec. 5, Sec. 5 shall be applicable vesting power in the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing an election petition on being satisfied about the sufficiency of the cause. 6. A similar question had arisen in connection with an election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Representation Act) in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav V/s. Lalit Narain Mishra, AIR 1974 SC 480 . There an election petition challenging the election of the successful candidate was presented before this Court after the expiry of the period of limitation, under more or less similar circumstances, the limitation expiring on Saturday when this Court was closed although the offices were functioning. The election petitioner of that case being under an impression that, it has to be filed before the Election Judge, filed it on the next Monday. The learned Judge dismissed the election petition saying that it was barred by limitation. It was further held that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable, and, as such, there was no power to condone the delay. On appeal to the Supreme Court it was urged that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act having not been expressly excluded by the Representation Act it should have been held that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable and the delay should have been condoned taking into consideration the acts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court, after referring to Ss. 81 and 86 of the Representation Act, held as follows :- "For all these reasons we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions or their trial and, in this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether there are any merits in the application for condonation of delay." 7. The relevant portion of Section 81 of the Representation Act is as follows : "(1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 100 and Sec.101 to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than, the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates." Sub-Section (1) of Section 86, which relevant in that context, is as follows :- "The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Sec. 82 or Sec.117." Section 81 prescribes the period of limitation and Sub-Section (1) of Section 86 provides that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sec. 81. It may be stated that even under the Representation Act there is no express provision excluding the application of the Limitation Act, as contemplated by Sub-Section (2) of Sec.29 of the Limitation Act, but it was observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Hukumde V/s. Narain Yadav, AIR 1974 SC 480 (supra) :- "In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Secs. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation." It was pointed out that in view of the language of Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 86, which is a peremptory command of the Legislature that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81, or Section 82 or Sec.119, as election petition, which has been filed beyond time, has to be dismissed in mine and S.5 or other Sections of the Limitation Act are not attracted. 8 Rules Q2(2) and 79 of the Election Rules are very similar to the provisions of Section 81 and Section 86(1) of the Representation Act. 8 Rules Q2(2) and 79 of the Election Rules are very similar to the provisions of Section 81 and Section 86(1) of the Representation Act. Representation of the People Act as well as the Election Rules both deal with the conduct of election and disposal of the election disputes, the only difference being that one deals with the election concerning Assemblies and Parliament and the other with the Gram Panchayats. In my view, if Sections 81 and 86 have to be construed strictly because they have to deal with a special law dealing with election, containing the command of the Legislature, the Election Rules, which are statutory in nature, have also to be, similarly construed so that disputes concerning Gram Panchayat elections are decided as early as possible, if a person challenging an election has not approached the Tribunal within the time prescribed, he should not be allowed to take recourse to S.5 of the Limitation Act. It is well known that persons are elected to such offices for a fixed term, and, as such, their elections, if at all challenged, should be challenged within the prescribed period. I am quite conscious that in some cases a person challenging such election may not be able to present the election petition on the last day of the period prescribed due to some circumstances beyond his control, but that will not be a "justification" for holding that he is entitled to avail the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. 9. Learned Government Pleader urged that the proviso to Rule 77 of the Election Rules which requires the Tribunal to give an opportunity to the election petitioner of being heard before dismissal of the election petition indicates that the Tribunal has power to condone the delay under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. In my view, this contention is without any substance. That proviso only requires opportunity to be given to the petitioner so that he may show to the Tribunal that there has been no non-compliance of sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 72 or other rules mentioned in Rule 77. On the basis of this proviso, it cannot be held that it vests power in the Tribunal to condone any of the contravention mentioned therein. 10. On the basis of this proviso, it cannot be held that it vests power in the Tribunal to condone any of the contravention mentioned therein. 10. In the result, the writ application is allowed, the order passed by the learned District Judge (Annexure-2) is quashed and the order of the Tribunal (Annexure-1) dismissing the election petition as time barred is restored. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.