JUDGMENT : R.C. SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Smt. Ram Kishori Plaintiff-opposite party No. 3 filed a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. Ultimately a preliminary decree was passed in that suit with a direction to Defendant-Applicant No. 1 that he should render the accounts. After a long gap opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 applied for preparation of a final decree. The Applicants filed objection to the preparation of final decree on the ground that they were not required to render accounts to opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 and further that the application made by opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 was barred by time. The objection of the Applicants was rejected by the First Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, by his order dated 6th September 1975. The Applicants filed a revision before the District Judge against the order of the I Additional Civil Judge, which was also rejected by the III Additional District Judge, Kanpur, by his judgment and order dated 26th November, 1977. Aggrieved, the Applicants have come to this Court in revision. 2. Learned Counsel for the Applicants has contended that as no limitation is prescribed for preparation of final decree under the Indian Limitation Act, the residuary Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act would apply and the period of limitation for preparation of the final decree would be three years from the date of preliminary decree and as the application was filed after about five years, the same was barred by time. 3. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties on the other hand contended that the residuary Article 137 will not apply in the suits relating to dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. He has further contended that as there is no provision for applying for preparation of final decree in the CPC hence the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act will not apply and there would be no limitation for applying for preparation of final decree. 4. I have considered the contentions of the Learned Counsel for the parties. 5. In order to appreciate the controversy it is necessary to examine the provisions in respect of nature of the suit. Order XX Rule 15 of the CPC provides for a decree in a suit for dissolution of a partnership, which is reproduced below: (Order 20, Rule 15 quoted Editor) 6. 5. In order to appreciate the controversy it is necessary to examine the provisions in respect of nature of the suit. Order XX Rule 15 of the CPC provides for a decree in a suit for dissolution of a partnership, which is reproduced below: (Order 20, Rule 15 quoted Editor) 6. Similarly in respect of a suit for partition also it provides for passing of a preliminary decree. The aforesaid provision, therefore, clearly indicates that it is not incumbent upon the Court to pass a preliminary decree. However, it may pass a preliminary decree if it is necessary. Apart from it, there is no provision under the CPC which may direct or make it incumbent upon a party to apply for preparation of a final decree. In fact the provision makes it clear that it is the duty of the Court to pass final decree keeping in view the nature of the suits. Thus there can be no limitation for applying for preparation of a final decree unless it is specifically provided under the Limitation Act. As no limitation can be provided, hence Article 137 of the Limitation Act would not apply. 7. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the Applicants in respect of applicability of residuary Article 137 cannot be accepted on another ground also. There is a specific mention in Article 137 of the Limitation Act that there would be three years' limitation in respect of an application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere and this period of three years would run from the date when the right to apply accrues. Admittedly in the present case no right accrues for applying for preparation of a final decree. As no right accrues, the question of application of this Article does not arise. I am fortified with the view expressed by the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. It has been held by the Calcutta High Court in Bhusan Chandra Mondal v. Chhabimoni Dasi AIR 1948 Cal 363, that in a suit for partition and accounts Article 181 of the Act will not apply. Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 is analogous to Article 137 of Limitation Act 36 of 1963. For the purpose of comparison of the two Articles of the two Acts, it is necessary to reproduce them as follows. 8. Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 is analogous to Article 137 of Limitation Act 36 of 1963. For the purpose of comparison of the two Articles of the two Acts, it is necessary to reproduce them as follows. 8. From a perusal of the aforesaid two Articles it is evident that the provisions are similar. In the decision of the Calcutta High Court (supra) it was held that: Article 181 is the residuary Article relating to applications...If the Plaintiff and none of the other parties make the deposit the fact that the Court would not be able to dismiss the suit is, however, another matter. 9. A similar view was taken by the Madras High Court in Ramanathan Chetty v. Alagappa Chetty AIR 1930 Mad 528, where the Court observed as under: It is clear to me that the suit continues for some purposes at least until the final decree; it would indeed be an anomaly if any decree could be reached by proceedings other than a suit. That being so, I have been shown no authority for the view that an application in a pending suit desiring the Court to proceed to judgment is governed by any rule of limitation. 10. A controversy in respect of preparation of final decree in a partition suit was specifically raised before the above mentioned High Courts wherein also it was held that Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 for preparation of a final decree will not apply. 11. It has also been held by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramabai Govind Vs. Anant Daji, AIR 1945 Bom 338, that the decree contemplated decree or a final decree, and an application made by a party to a decree under Order 20, Rule 18(1), asking that the papers should be sent to the Collector for effecting a partition as directed in it is of the nature of a mere proceeding in the suit rather than an application to execute the decree, and therefore no period of limitation for making it is prescribed under the Limitation Act. Similar is the view taken by the Madras High Court in Ramasu' or amanya Pattar v. Karimbil Pati AIR 1940 Mad 124 and Andhra Pradesh High Court in P. Suryanarayana v. P. Sreeramachandr amurthi AIR 1957 AP 18 . 12. Similar is the view taken by the Madras High Court in Ramasu' or amanya Pattar v. Karimbil Pati AIR 1940 Mad 124 and Andhra Pradesh High Court in P. Suryanarayana v. P. Sreeramachandr amurthi AIR 1957 AP 18 . 12. Learned Counsel for the Applicants tried to distinguish these provisions by urging that in suits relating to mortgage of immovable property, the provision of Article 137 has been made applicable hence the same can be made applicable in suits for partition. 13. This contention of the Learned Counsel for the Applicants also cannot be accepted. 14. In a suit for foreclosure, if the Plaintiff succeeds, the Court shall pass a preliminary decree ordering either that an account be taken of what was due or declaring the amount so due at that date. It has further been provided under order XXXIV Rule 2(2) that the Court may, on good cause shown and upon terms to be fixed by the Court, from time to time, at any time before a final decree is passed, extend the time fixed for the payment of the amount found or declared due under Sub-rule (1) or of the amount adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges, expenses and interest. 15. It is, therefore, evident from the provision of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order XXXIV that a specific provision has been made for passing a preliminary decree and Sub-rule 3 of Order XXXIV of the CPC provides specifically for passing a final decree. It has further been provided that an application has to be made for preparation of final decree. Once the provision makes it incumbent upon a party to apply for preparation of final decree, there can be no doubt that the provision of Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act will apply in such cases. The provision in respect of preparation of final decree in the nature of the suits for mortgages is therefore quite distinct from the nature of the suits in respect of dissolution, partition and account. This distinction has also been drawn in a number of cases including the cases mentioned above. 16. This revision has, therefore, no force and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. The stay order, if any, shall stand discharged.